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India’s system of separate Hindu, Muslim, and Christian family laws is often cast as a 
threat to national unity. In contrast, I argue that Indian law was structured by the emphasis 
of English law on preserving the marriage tie and wives’ legal dependence on their husbands. 
Based on a study of judicial and bureaucratic decisions about families in Indian law, I show 
that a patriarchal English family structure based in coverture influenced Indian women’s 
experiences of the law at least as much as religious norms did. I focus on three legal devices:  
domicile, restitution of conjugal rights, and maintenance. I argue that “law of the family” is a 
better category with which to consider women’s rights than “family law.”  “Law of the 
family” suggests the ways in which family statuses structured many aspects of Indian law, 
including those concerned with family disputes as well as matters such as citizenship. The 
dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part studies bureaucratic and judicial decisions 
about the status of wives and sons in Indian citizenship law. Through the legal device of 
domicile, coverture structured Indian citizenship law. The second part is based in a survey of 
matrimonial litigation in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh between 1939 and 1972. 
Litigants of all religious communities used restitution of conjugal rights suits and 
maintenance suits to seek marital redress even after important statutory reforms such as the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (1939) and the Hindu Marriage Act (1955). Courts 
ruled in favor of wives without condemning marital violence. An individual wife could win 
her suit without necessarily challenging the patriarchal structure of marriage. Wives faced  
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difficulties in proving matrimonial violence and often won their suits on the grounds of 
more easily proved social offenses. Husbands often challenged wives with arguments about 
both geographic and religious jurisdiction, in a pattern found in England as well. The 
dissertation concludes with a study of the 1962 UP Amendment to the Hindu Marriage Act, 
which made cruelty a ground for divorce in the state, providing a model for national reform 








































This dissertation studies how marriage shapes legal identity in modern India. Indian 
marriage is often viewed through religious and social lenses because it is regulated by 
religious personal law. In contrast, this dissertation argues that English law influenced 
important aspects of wives’ and husbands’ rights in modern India in a variety of legal 
domains. These include criminal procedure, civil law, and religious personal law. I show that 
English laws of marriage influenced Indian laws regardless of whether litigants were Hindu, 
Muslim, or Christian. An English family structure and the emphasis of English law on 
preserving the marriage tie had as much to do with Indian women’s experiences of the law as 
did so-called indigenous religious norms. The English model of marriage granted husbands 
rights of physical control over wives. An English patriarchal family structure with a dyadic 
husband-wife relationship at its center structured much of Indian law whether civil, Hindu, 
Muslim, criminal, or Constitutional citizenship law. Violence and physical control were an 
integral part of the English model of marriage written into secular and religious Indian laws.  
This dissertation sets out to answer the following questions: How did colonial and 
post-colonial courts adjudicate disputes about family status? How did English law inter-
twine with Hindu and Muslim law in India? What, besides religion, shaped the modern 
Indian family? Were there appreciable changes in Indian family law marked by Indian 
Independence in 1947? This dissertation focuses on development of case law in the High 
Courts of India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh. It focuses on the twentieth century 
 2 
and looks at cases from both before and after Indian independence in 1947. I describe 
several complex routes for the incorporation of English law into Indian secular and religious 
laws. I focus in particular on how courts defined cruelty and violence in matrimonial 
disputes.  
 The remedies of maintenance and restitution of conjugal rights were incorporated in 
Indian law in the nineteenth century and constituted an important arena for the development 
of the jurisprudence of cruelty. In at least two ways, these older remedies structured the 
jurisprudence of cruelty and violence in marriage even after twentieth century statutes 
reformed and codified Hindu and Muslim law. First, the adjudication of new statutes drew 
on earlier litigation under these older remedies between these same litigants, indicating the 
meso-level timeframe of the progress of an individuals’ litigation through the courts. Second, 
litigants for purposes of legal strategy turned to the older remedies of maintenance and 
restitution of conjugal rights before turning to the new statutes. Twentieth century statutes 
built upon rather than replaced the nineteenth-century remedies. 
The sources for this argument are several hundred decisions about family status in 
twentieth century Indian courts. The decisions come from the Indian High Courts and the 
Supreme Court. The decisions covered topics like the citizenship status of wives, marriage, 
separation, and maintenance. I analyze how lawyers and litigants used these laws between 
1939 and 1974. Through an examination of how the courts and the bureaucracy determined 
both matrimonial disputes and citizenship disputes that involved wives’ and sons’ dependent 
identities, I show how a patriarchal family structure in which the husband had extensive 
rights over his wife structured many areas of Indian law, even when Indian courts often 




The United Provinces 
  
 The setting for much of this dissertation is Uttar Pradesh (UP) and its two High 
Courts at Lucknow and Allahabad. UP is India’s most populous state, with a population 
close to 200 million.1 The state is bisected by the Ganges River. The Ganges flows down 
from the Himalayas through Uttar Pradesh and across Bihar and Bengal into the Indian 
Ocean. Its route, in reverse, is that of the British East India Company (EIC) as it moved into 
northern India, from its base at Calcutta.   
Prior to Indian Independence in 1947, “UP” stood for United Provinces. The word 
“united” indexes the major developments of the first century of colonial rule in India, from 
1757-1858. In this period, the colonial state dismantled the north Indian political universe 
centered around the historic polity of Awadh and stitched it back together into the United 
Provinces. Awadh and Bengal to its east were large and wealthy Indian kingdoms under the 
nominal sovereignty of the Mughal Empire centered in Delhi. The nawabs, or kings, paid 
revenues to the Mughal Emperor in Delhi but were otherwise centers of their own complex, 
vibrant, and wealthy political universes. They are often called regional or “successor” states 
since they grew out of the provinces of the Mughal Empire in the first half of the eighteenth 
century. By 1765, the EIC had gained from the Mughal Emperor in Delhi the right to collect 
revenue on behalf of the Nawab of Bengal. With control of the state’s coffers came 
Company governance. As Clive put it,  “We must indeed become the [Nawabs] ourselves.”2 
This marked a crucial shift from trade to rule for the EIC state.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 2011 Census. 
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/population_enumeration.html [last accessed August 17, 2015].  
2 Quoted in P. J. Marshall, Bengal: The British Bridgehead (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 89.  
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Northwest of Bengal, the Company gained a toehold in the Awadh court. In 1775 it 
acquired the Awadhi state of Benaras to the south and east of the capital at Lucknow. In 
1801 and 1803 it also acquired large swathes of territory belonging to Awadh and a 
neighboring Indian ruler.3 By 1856, the EIC maintained indirect rule in Awadh and had 
appointed a full-time “resident” or supervising official at the Awadh court. The twelve 
historic core provinces of Awadh were surrounded by the British United Provinces and 
British controlled kingdoms to the north in Nepal. The Company wanted direct control of 
Awadh for several reasons. First, Awadh was a wealthy agricultural state. Second, order in 
the state had broken down, in part due to the pressures of East India Company rule. Third, 
Governor-General Dalhousie sought to regularize British administrative structures and 
eliminate indirect rule as much as possible across the subcontinent. As indicated by the 
recent Company takeover of seven nearby Indian states in seven years, Dalhousie sought to 
unify India’s patchwork of sovereignties.4  
By wresting control from the Nawabs and restoring “good government,” order in 
the state, revenues, and economic management could be maximized. The EIC state issued an 
ultimatum to the nawab that he reform his government. He refused, leading the EIC to 
annex the state in 1856.5 The 1856 annexation of Awadh was one cause of the 1857-8 
Rebellion in north India. Awadh and other recently annexed north Indian states provided 
the heartland for the 1857-8 Rebellion.6  
 
Colonial Governance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Barbara Metcalf and Thomas Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 72; Surendra Nath Sen, Eighteen Fifty-Seven (New Delhi: Government of India, 1957), 
172-3; Peter Reeves, Landlords and Governments in Uttar Pradesh: A Study of their Relations until Zamindari Abolition 
(Bombay/New York: Oxford University Press), 8.  
4 Metcalf and Metcalf, Conccise History, 95.  
5 Veena Talwar Oldenburg, The Making of Colonial Lucknow, 1856-1877 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984), 7-9; Sen, Eighteen Fifty-Seven, 175-6.  
6 Metcalf and Metcalf, Concise History, 95-6; 101-3.  
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 As the Company expanded northwest from its base at Calcutta, it developed systems 
for governing and collecting land revenue from its new territories. In 1772, the first 
Governor-General, Warren Hastings, developed a plan to administer Bengal. To collect 
revenue from the new territory of Bengal, Hastings focused on the district as the basic unit 
of administration.7  His plan sought to maximize the company’s own revenue through the 
efficient use of pre-existing Indian social and landholding structures. Indeed, districts were 
largely based on sixteenth century (or earlier) administrative units.8 The creation of private 
markets in land would maximize agricultural productivity and profit.9 The Company took on 
state-like functions such as determining land revenue amounts, collecting revenue, and 
regulating disputes over land rights, marking a shift from trade to rule.10 
Beyond this basic administrative structure of the district, the way the colonial state 
administered India varied by time and place over the next seventy-five years.11 It developed 
different systems of land revenue collection that fit local circumstances and the 
contemporary ideology about land ownership and the state.12 The Permanent Settlement of 
1793 was Lord Cornwallis’s refinement of Hastings’s plan. Cornwallis was the second 
Governor-General of India. The Permanent Settlement set a fixed amount of revenue due 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Along with Orissa and Bihar.  
8 Cohn, “Law and the Colonial State in India” in Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 60; Sen, Eighteen Fifty-Seven, 172. 
9 Metcalf and Metcalf, Concise History, 59-60; Thomas Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj: The New Cambridge History of 
India III.4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 20-1; Cohn, “Law and the Colonial State,” 60-1. 
10 M. Zaheer and Jagdeo Gupta. The Organization of the Government of Uttar Pradesh: A Study of State Administration. 
(New Delhi: S. Chand, 1970), 718.  
11 Bernard Cohn,"The Initial British Impact on India: A Case Study of the Benaras Region," in An Anthropologist 
Among the Historians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 320. 
12 Paul Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1965), 11. For example, it collected revenue through intermediary estate owners/holders in 
Bengal Presidency and most of UP. In Madras and Bombay Presidency, it attempted to collect revenue and vest 
rights in land directly in individual cultivators. In Awadh, such estate holders were treated as tenants of even 
larger landowners, called talukdars. See also Metcalf, Ideologies; Reeves, Landlords and Governments in Uttar Pradesh, 
6-11.  
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from each estate to the colonial state, through the aegis of a large landlord. The rate was 
fixed. The revenue could be paid to the state in cash or in kind. Setting a fixed revenue rate 
was designed to push each landlord to maximize the efficiency of his holdings and profits. 
The idea was to create a private market in land that would encourage agricultural 
productivity.13   
The Permanent Settlement of Bengal also applied to Varanasi in 1795. But Awadh 
settled much later, after the Rebellion of 1857-8, followed a different system of land rights 
and revenue collection. In general, differing regimes of system of land rights and revenue 
collection rules were found across India.14 The chronology of British acquisition of India 
territory, prevailing beliefs about land and government, and the pre-existing social structure 
influenced the political economy, social structure, ecological, and economic trajectory of the 
UP countryside. The Company state generally sought to govern through pre-existing social 
identities and institutions, but it could privilege different elements at different times.15  
The first century of British rule amply demonstrated that knowledge is power. As the 
colonial state spread its control across the subcontinent, it also developed a variety of 
institutions designed to “know” the sub-continent.16 Along with law and the courts, to be 
discussed shortly, we might also include the gazetteer. These were books designed to 
describe all natural, physical, demographic, linguistic, social, and economic features of India, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ranajit Guha, A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1996); Metcalf, Ideologies, 19-23; Cohn, “Initial Impact,” 335, and Colonialism and its Forms of 
Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Vasudha Dalmia, The Nationalization 
of Hindu Traditions (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 74-5; Anand Yang, The Limited Raj (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1989), 54-6; 61-2; 92-4; David Washbrook, “Law, State and Agrarian Society in 
India,” Modern Asian Studies 15, no. 3 (1981): 649-721.  
14 Thomas Trautmann, India - Brief History of a Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 178; Reeves, 6-11; 
Metcalf, Ideologies, 21. 
15 For example, Varanasi state, acquired in 1775, was eventually settled under the Permanent Settlement in 1795 
on estateholders called zamindars. But Awadh was not settled until after the Mutiny when the colonial state 
settled land revenue rights on an extremely small group of rural landed magnates called talukdars. Reeves, 
Landlords, 6-11.   
16 Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge, passim. 
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district-by-district. A system of knowledge production begun in the early nineteenth century 
and carried across straight through the twentieth century, they had a variety of uses.17 For 
example, they might guide a colonial official in a far away city needing to make a decision 
about rural affairs or a new colonial officer headed to a posting. They also had legal 
influence: the gazetteers were used in colonial courts to determine local social customs and 
adjudicate all manner of social and revenue disputes on the basis of the custom of the 
district.  
Other forms of colonial knowledge included linguistic research and preservation, the 
cartographic knowledge of surveying the entire sub-continent, history writing, and 
archaeological and geologic research; and the census. The colonial state’s primary purpose 
was extractive and colonial knowledge projects contributed to concrete material changes to 
Indian life such as the building of the railways and laying of telegraph lines; development of 
irrigation and canal systems, for better or worse; the expansion of cash crops (including 
indigo and opium); major restructurings of social structures in many parts of India; and 
many others. In line with its view of Indian society as “a land lost in the past” the colonial 
state privileged caste and religious identities and reinforced elite dominance as a bulwark to 
its own rule.18  
The colonial view of Indian history and religion had many ramifications for the 
development of India’s legal system.19 Eighteenth century colonial scholars and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Zaheer and Gupta state that the State Editor of the gazetteer in UP was a high level appointment within the 
Indian Administrative Service appointed by the Secretary of Revenue; see Zaheer and Gupta, Organization of the 
Government of Uttar Pradesh, 53, 58, 181-2. They also state that the system of gazetteer publishing dropped off 
around World War I but was revived by the post-colonial UP government in the 1960s, 206.  
18 Metcalf, Ideologies, 27.  
19 See Chapter Three, “Law and the Colonial State in India” in Bernard Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of 
Knowledge; Scott Kugle, “Framed, “Framed, Blamed, and Renamed: The Recasting of Islamic Jurisprudence in 
Colonial South Asia,” Modern Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (2001): 257-313; Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Cases in the Muhammadan 
Law of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, 2nd ed., edited and revised by Tahir Mahmood (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); Derrett, “The Administration of Hindu Law by the British,” in Religion, Law, and the State in India 
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administrators like Warren Hastings and Sir William Jones attempted to preserve the 
customs of India’s two major religions, Hinduism and Islam, so as to minimize the impact of 
East India Company rule on Indian society.20 So-called personal affairs like marriage and 
inheritance were distinguished from criminal and contractual legal transactions. Personal 
laws dealt with those aspects of law that depended on the individual’s religion, caste, 
location, and other factors. Personal law covered many aspects of modern life: marriage, 
separation, divorce, inheritance and succession, tax and finance, religious institutions and 
trust, and commercial affairs of family business.21 We have already described how the land 
settlement was one of the key markers of colonial sovereignty. Often through property 
disputes, the colonial state was drawn into this longer list of affairs.  
The story of colonial legal development was of the increasing authority of the book 
over personal or individual religious-legal authority. We have already described, for example, 
how the gazetteers recorded local customs regarding property rights, the celebration of 
religious festivals, marriage practices, social divisions, and others.  When it came to religious 
affairs, there were two sources of authority for the colonial state to learn what Hindu and 
Muslim laws were, exactly: religious texts and the personal authority of learned men. At first, 
colonial courts used learned religious advisors to advise colonial judges on the appropriate 
way to apply Hindu and Muslim law. But colonial officials distrusted these officers. For 
example, in 1798 a provision was enacted that allowed a judge who doubted the advice of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(London: Faber and Faber, 1968); Robert Lingat, The Classical Law of India, trans. J. Duncan M. Derrett 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).  
20 Michael Anderson, "Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India," Women Living Under Laws, 
Occasional Paper (1996); Bernard S. Cohn, "Law and the Colonial State." 
21 See for example, Eleanor Newbigin, The Hindu Family and the Emergence of Modern India: Law, Citizenship, and 
Community. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Ritu Birla, Stages of Capital: Law, Culture, and Market 
Governance in Late Colonial India (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); Gregory C. Kozlowski, Muslim 
Endowments and Society in British India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).  
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the pandit, or Hindu scholar at the court, to appeal to law officers of superior courts.22 
Colonial officers preferred to rely on the impersonal authority of books rather than the 
personal and biased authority of Indians themselves and by 1864 the institution was 
abolished.  
The preference for textual certainty lead Hastings to commission an early text on 
Hindu law. It was completed in 1775. It was called the Vivadarnava Setu (Bridge Across the 
Ocean of Litigation, known as Halhed’s Code of Gentoo Laws). This digest was the product of 
a “synod” of eleven Hindu jurists. Their text was then translated from Sanskrit to Persian to 
English.23 Other such efforts followed with variations specific to regional differences in 
Hindu law.24 Derrett listed 19 such texts directly commissioned by the colonial state and 
another thirty or so that were encouraged by its presence.25 
A Code of Gentoo Laws might be seen in two ways. On the one hand, it could be seen 
as a continuation of a much longer tradition of commentary and explanation of Hindu law in 
a complex and incredibly sophisticated intellectual tradition. For example, there were 
multiple forms of jurisprudential literature in India that dealt with the science of legal and 
ethical interpretation. These ranged from commentaries on revealed texts that were 
essentially fundamental rules; treatises; commentaries on these treatises; and regional 
variations on all of these.26 On the other hand, it could be seen as a rupture with the pre-
colonial past, in that it marked the passage of a flexible, local, and uncodified system into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Reg. II of 1798, s. 4, noted on p. 583, Jain, 5th ed. 
23 J. Duncan M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), 238-40.  
24 Ibid., 255-73.  
25 Ibid., 270-3.  
26 Lingat, Classical Law of India.  
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British common law.27  One hallmark of this system was its dedication to certainty even over 
authenticity since certainty was considered important to private property rights.28 
The general scholarly consensus is that the British dramatically changed Hindu and 
Muslim law especially through their emphasis on precedent, textual certainty, and the 
adversarial legal system. What exactly was the Hindu law the British “found” when they 
arrived in India? Moreover, the legal systems developed regional variations that were 
incorporated into the British system.  
A similar process occurred within the realm of Muslim law. The Hedaya was a 
primary source of Muslim law for the colonial legal system. This was a twelfth-century 
manual of jurisprudence compiled in Central Asia and adopted by Indian jurists of the same 
Hanafi school of religio-legal adjudication.29 Colonial courts relied heavily on this text as a 
guide to Muslim law. However, the version they used had been translated, first, by Indian 
scholars from Arabic to Persian, and then, by Charles Hamilton in 1791, to English.30 The 
complex and inherently selective and political process of translation fundamentally changed 
the text, as did its deployment in the precedent-based common law courts. Scholar Scott 
Kugle concludes that in commissioning this translation of the Hedaya, Hastings “did not just 
find a text, he created one.”31 While there were many textbooks on Islamic jurisprudence and 
compendia of non-binding but authoritative legal rulings on how to live a pious and correct 
life, it seems that colonial judges, for simplicity’s sake, defaulted to the Hedaya.32 A close 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Derrett, “The Administration of Hindu Law by the British,” in Religion, Law, and the State.  
28 Ibid., 296 n. 2.  
29 By Ali ibn Abi Bakr al-Marghinani (d. 1196). Alan Guenther, “Hanafi fiqh in Mughal India: Fatawa i-Alamgiri,” 
in India’s Islamic Traditions, 711-1750, ed. Richard Eaton (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 209-30, 
here 209-11.  
30 Kugle, “Framed, Blamed, and Renamed,” 272.  
31 Ibid., 272. 
32 Ibid., 273. 
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second was the Fatawa-i-Alamgiri, a seventeenth century manual of jurisprudence 
commissioned by the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb.33  
The general scholarly consensus is that the British dramatically changed Indian legal 
practices. First and foremost, dividing and confining law to “Hindu” and Muslim” itself 
represented a major change. Second, the common law system relied on precedent and the 
adversarial legal system. One key point that the Orientalist assumption about India’s inherent 
religiosity tends to obscure is that within the realm of Hindu law, there were three sources of 
authority and law. One was dharma, or a sacred and timeless ethical duty. A second was the 
King’s royal edict. A third source was custom.34  The King was both sanctioned by religious 
authority and responsible for maintaining religiously sanctioned just and right rule within his 
kingdom.35 In contrast to visions of Oriental despotism in which the king was unchecked by 
the legislature dharma and custom both checked his powers.36  
 The dharma designated as such by the Brahmans the colonial state worked with, 
represented a “high” or correct tradition. Brahmnanical dharma was the norm and custom 
was seen as deviation. This privileging of Brahmanical dharma over custom could not last 
long in the courts in India. Custom came to play a very important role in Anglo-Hindu law. 
This is all the more so since after all the common law itself greatly respected custom. In its 
early years, the common law was sometimes described as English custom and custom also 
implied “foundation in the consent of the users of the English law.”37 The reverence for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Guenther, “Hanafi fiqh in Mughal India.” 
34 Trautmann, India, 119. There is a distinction between custom and practice. Custom is afforded the authority 
of law even if it remains unrecorded. See Susan Reynolds, “Early Medieval Law in India and Europe: A Plea for 
Comparisons,” Medieval History Journal 16, no. 1 (2013): 4.   
35 Trautmann, India, 119.  
36 Ibid. See also Lingat, Classical Law, 141. Summaries of Oriental despotism in India are found in Cohn, “Law 
and the Colonial State” and Metcalf, Ideologies.  
37 Paul Brand, “Law and Custom in the English Thirteenth Century Common Law,” in Custom: The Development 
and Use of a Legal Concept in the Middle Ages, edited by P. Anderson and M. Münster-Swendsen (Copenhagen: 
Djøf, 2009), 17-31; quote from 31. It was custom that influenced the divergent English position on the 
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custom in the common law and pre-colonial legal systems made a happy marriage with the 
Company’s stated need to administer on the cheap using pre-existing social structures. The 
incorporation of custom began early in Company rule with a 1799 Regulation allowing 
Bombay Presidency in western India to defer to well-established customs in the area instead 
of applying the distinctive law of Bengal. By the late nineteenth century, one District Judge 
argued that the colonial state should scrap its reliance on “Brahmanical codes.” It should 
replace such law with a code of law based on “a simple form [of] the practices and primitive 
customs” of “all the castes or a majority of them.”38 The plan might not be as naïve as it 
seems based on the recent spurt of codification starting with the Indian Penal Code of 1860 
and the Criminal Procedure Codes of the 1860s and 1870s (discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Four).  
Custom in the Indian system can refer to local or regional customs and the customs 
of a particular religious or caste grouping. For example, in some parts of south India, 
matrilineal succession to property is the norm. In western India around Bombay, some 
communities that have putatively converted from Hinduism to Islam retain Hindu 
inheritance law. Custom could also refer to the practices of a particular caste and religious 
community. In this way, caste, religious community, and location all played an important role 
in defining custom. 
Coming to the “high” Brahmanical dharma that came to stand for Hindu law. 
Dharma means duty or moral righteousness. One way to consider this system of law is in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
controversial issue of subsequent legitimation of the illegitimately born offspring of an unmarried man and 
woman who subsequently married. This is discussed in Chapter One. See Brand, 27-31.  
38 Lingat, Classical Law, 138-9. The District Judge was James H. Nelson.  
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terms of layers of commentarial traditions.39 At its core was the corpus of the sacred, 
revealed Vedas. A system of commentaries on the Vedas specifically commenting on their 
ethical and legal (as opposed to their implications for philosophy, language, or the ritual of 
the Vedic sacrifice, for example) application arose. These texts, called dharma-shastras, studied 
and commented upon the science (shastra) of the dharma.40 They were written in verse.41 The 
most famous and prestigious of these is the Code of Manu, very important in India as well as 
in “further India” as it was exported to Champa, Cambodia, and Indonesia.42 The Code of 
Manu is a “veritable encyclopedia of religion, morality, politics, and law”43 developed 
sometime between second century BC and second century AD.44 The Code of Manu and 
other dharma-shastras had a great deal of authority by their relative proximity to the Vedas 
themselves, the original source of revealed truth. Even though the dharma-sastras did not have 
quite the authority of the Vedas themselves, by the late medieval period (around the ninth 
century) they were almost in the same class.45 Together, the early Vedic and post-Vedic 
dharmashastras “appeared as if they were scripture, timeless, eternal; the whole of 
them…brought to men the voice of a tradition which was both holy and in conformity with 
the order of nature.”46  
In the late medieval period developed a body of literature that sought to interpret, 
apply, and explain the dharmashastras. The medieval texts had great authority though they 
lacked the sacred quality of the earlier corpus of texts. These commentaries and treatise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 This corresponds to Sir William Jones (1746-94) and H. T. Colebrooke developed an enduring and influential 
view of Hindu law that emphasized that the older the text, the greater its authority. See Cohn, “Law and the 
Colonial State,” 71-8.  
40 Lingat, Classical Law, 9-13.  
41 Ibid., 73, 77.  
42 Ibid., 77.  
43 Ibid., 86.  
44 Ibid., 95.  
45 Ibid., 73, 77.  
46 Ibid., 107.  
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(which the British called digests) not only explained the law but also played an important role 
in preserving sections of dharmashastra texts that otherwise would be lost. Such treatises and 
commentaries did not have the same sacral character as the Vedas and earlier dharmashastra 
literature. But they became the basic building blocks of the British administration of law. It 
was the later commentaries and treatises that were translated first for use in the colonial 
courts and it was only later that the colonial state concerned itself with the actual dharma-
sastras themselves. Litigants and Indian law officers preferred to defer to other the more 
sacred but distant dharma-sastra literature.47 
 Among these treatises, two treatises in particular came to be privileged by the 
colonial state. One of these became the standard Hindu law for all of India except for Bengal 
and Assam in eastern India. Composed in the eleventh century Deccan, the Mitakshara was a 
commentary on a much earlier eminent dharmashastra.48 Counter-posed to this was the so-
called Bengal school of law, called the Dayabhaga.49 The schools differ on an important point 
of philosophy: whether the son’s right of property ownership begins upon the son’s birth 
(Mitakshara) or the father’s death (Dayabhaga), with the father as a “sole master” during the 
father’s lifetime.50 This difference has implications for the structure of property holding in 
the joint (or extended) Hindu family.  
 Another way to define the difference is between the sons’ succession to the father’s 
share (the Mitakshara position) or the sons’ inheritance of a fixed share in his father’s estate 
(the Dayabhaga position). The proportions of ownership do not change on the father’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Ibid., 110-11.  
48 Ibid., 113. This text and its resultant school of law were called Mitakshara. Mitakshara means “measured in its 
syllables.” The dharma-shastra text upon which the Mitakshara comments is Yajnavalkya after its putative author. 
The Mitakshara was composed by Vijnanesvara.   
49 Ibid., 118-19. This text was Jimutavahana’s Dayabhaga, composed sometime between around 1100 and 1500 
AD in Bengal. 
50 Ibid., 172-4, quote on page 172.  
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death in the Dayabhaga system, reflecting tenancy-in-common rather than joint tenancy.51 
One scholar argues that late eighteenth century thinkers saw “schools” as structuring Hindu 
law because of their prior knowledge of the system of schools of Muslim law. In this model, 
Muslim law was divided into two major sects (Sunni and Shia) and Sunni Islam was further 
sub-divided into four schools of religious law, with Hanafi law dominant in South Asia.52 
This distinction between the dominant Mitakshara system in most of India and the dayabhaga 
system in Assam and Bengal was enduring. The undivided Hindu family (the joint family 
considered as a legal rather than social structure), with its coparcenary property ownership 
structure, became the basic structure for the Hindu family under the 1955 Hindu Succession 
Act, albeit with major changes.53  The colonial ideology of Mitakshara dominance and other 
systems of law as “deviations” rather than “progressive” was replicated in the post-colonial 
statute.54 
 It must be reiterated that the High Court decisions examined in this dissertation were 
at a far remove from the original Vedas, the dharmashastra texts, and the commentaries and 
treatises upon the dharmashastra. Late eighteenth century translations formed the basic corpus 
of texts on Hindu law for the colonial courts. These texts were then applied in individual fact 
circumstances in adversarial proceedings in colonial courts. The colonial judge would have 
acted with the assistance of the Indian law officer at the court as well as the text. Once his 
decision was made, it would become binding precedent. In this way, Hindu law in twentieth 
century Indian common law courts was distantly and delicately linked to the longer chain of 
ethical texts associated with Hindu intellectual traditions that derived their original authority 
from the Vedas.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ibid., 173.  
52 Cohn, “Law and the Colonial State,” 73-4.  
53 Newbigin, Hindu Family, 214-26.  
54 Ibid., 219. 
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 There was an almost infinite number of links in this chain, however, each link 
indexing a multitude of historical changes. This distance from any spiritual or religious 
element in so-called Hindu law helps undercut the overly religious view of Indian law. So 
too, does my analysis that a substantial amount of matrimonial litigation took place under 
non-religiously marked civil and criminal law, and that these domains all influenced each 
other. By the twentieth century, Indian lawyers were primarily concerned not with the Vedas 
or the medieval commentaries. Occasionally these treatises were discussed and debated in 
court judgments, especially in property suits. However, ultimately courts had to make 
decisions based not just on the dharmashastra commentarial texts but a variety of other, more 
recent sources including i) statutory frameworks; ii) precedent; iii) local considerations such 
as custom; iv) general principles of common law governance such as justice or certainty. 
Treatises helped guide lawyers through the statutes and precedents that structured the 
practice of Hindu law in twentieth century India.  	  
These were all pre-Rebellion developments. The names Hindu law and Muslim law 
might suggest that some form of “pure” Hindu or Muslim law was being practiced in India 
with both substantive law and procedural law governed by religious norms and authorities. 
The law practiced in colonial courts was often called Anglo-Hindu or Anglo-Muhammadan 
law. This suggests how the law had been inflected by the colonial legal system in numerous 
ways. To mark the substantial Indian rather than Anglo agency in creating this body of law, 
barrister and scholar A.A.A. Fyzee called Anglo-Muslim law Muhammadan law.55 
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55 See Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Cases in the Muhammadan Law of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, 2nd ed., edited and revised 
by Tahir Mahmood (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), xxiii-xxiv. See also Derrett, “Translator’s Preface,” 
in Lingat, Classical Law, vii.  
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Colonialism shaped law and the courts in India. The district played an important role 
as the fundamental unit for administration. The Collector was also the District Magistrate. 
He was responsible for revenue collection, civil justice, and law and order.56 Over the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the institution of the District Magistrate developed so 
that its various extensive powers could be completed by other individuals besides the DM 
himself. This was concomitant with the general growth of the administrative state.57 The 
District Magistrate/Collector also took on the supervision of development projects in the 
twentieth century.58 The structure of the district courts ensured that most litigants had two 
appeals, from the sub-district courts to the district courts and from the district courts to the 
High Courts. According to one guide to Uttar Pradesh government, the District 
Magistrate/Collector in general possessed “extensive magisterial, police and revenue 
powers.”59  
The guide listed the District Magistrate’s multifarious activities. They started with 
“supervision over Treasury Officer” and ranged to “Land Records,” “relief on account of 
natural calamities,” “colonization” [the settlement of new land with land rights], and 
“President of District Soldiers’, Sailors’ and Airmen’s Board.”60 In his turn, the DM was at 
the base of an executive administrative structure overseen by the elected Chief Minister of 
the province or state. After the Indian Parliament passed a law allowing “registered” or 
“special,” non-religious, civic marriages in 1954, UP District Magistrates were tasked with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Cohn, Anthropologist; Metcalf, Ideologies, 25-7; Zaheer and Gupta, Organization, 718.  
57 A.T. Markose, Judicial Control of Administrative Action in India: A Study in Methods (Madras: Madras Law Journal 
Office, 1956), 91. 
58 Zaheer and Gupta, Organization, 718-19. The terminology for such offices varied somewhat by province and 
district but the general structure remained the same.  
59 Ibid., 718.  
60 Ibid., 749 (Index), 123, and passim.  
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registering and ensuring the administration of the law in their districts. Together the DMs 
and the “state government” could appoint assistants to help with the workload.61  
Among the DM’s powers were his supervision of civil and criminal powers in his 
district. Each district had a system of courts centered at the town or city that served as the 
district headquarters. Even though the buck stopped with the District Magistrate, by the 
twentieth century responsibility for overseeing the courts in the district was vested in the 
District and Sessions Judge.  Such a position actually rolled two separate jurisdictions into 
one, powers which would subsequently be further separated from each other.62 This was due 
to the large amount of work in each district. 
The chief district judge oversaw a network of Civil Judges sitting below him. The 
District Judge and Civil Judges’ courts were of “unlimited jurisdiction,” meaning they could 
try suits of any amount of money. Beneath them sat another layer of inferior civil courts that 
had limits on the size of the suits they could hear.63 Appeals from these limited inferior civil 
courts lay to the District Judge or one of his Civil Judges. A decision from such district 
courts could then be appealed to the High Court in Lucknow or Allahabad.  
 The Sessions Judge was the chief criminal judge in the district.  He had a network of 
Magistrates below him, mirroring the structure on the civil side. Magistrates were ranked by 
severity of crimes they could try: as they advanced through the ranks of the colonial judiciary 
they could hear criminal cases with ever-larger penalties. The Sessions Judge was the only 
one who could try “grave offences.”64 Appeals lay to the Sessions Judge and until 1947 from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Ibid., 123.  
62 The terminology for the chief executive throughout various districts in India is not consistent. Moreover, the 
executive chain of command is further complicated by the existence of over-arching executive positions of 
authority within the civil service, like the Divisional Commissioner. The state’s districts are grouped together in 
divisions and other groupings.  This is a general sketch of the position of judges and executive officers vis-à-vis 
each other.  
63 Kalias Nath Katju. The Days I Remember (Calcutta: New Age Publishers, 1961), 132.  
64 Ibid.,132.  
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him to the District Magistrate.65 From the district level, appeals lay to the High Courts in 
Lucknow or Allahabad.  
There are several different ways in which executive and judicial powers are 
imbricated with each other in India that may surprise the American reader. It is a model akin 
to the English system of combined powers.66 Even after the process of separating the 
judicial and executive powers of the Collector/District Magistrate was mostly complete in 
the late 1960s, the District Magistrate still had many executive powers in his capacity as the 
chief executive of the district such as issuing orders if he perceived a danger to “public peace 
and tranquility.”67  
By the late 1960s, the District and Sessions Judges reported to the High Court in 
Allahabad rather than the elected Chief Minister of the state. Nonetheless, for most of the 
period of this dissertation, combined powers of the executive and judicial district officer was 
the norm.68 The extensive executive powers of the District Magistrate were a specific marker 
of the colonial legacy. The Indian set-up was similar to England’s system of combined 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers, distinguished of course by the lack of consent of 
the people.69 After colonial rule, the Constitution created inviolable fundamental rights to life 
and liberty. Moreover, the Indian Constitution’s weaker but still significant Directive 
Principles of State Policy section enjoined the state to separate executive from judicial 
powers. But, it was not so simple to separate out executive and judicial powers from each 	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Exploring the Limits of Legality, edited by Victor V. Ramraj and Arun K. Thiruvengadam (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010): 89-120.  
67 Zaheer and Gupta, Organization, 724-5. Under s. 144 o f India’s Criminal Procedure Code. The District 
Magistrate also enforces the Press Act that can allow the government to suspend the rights of a press to 
publish.  
68 However, appointments to the judicial service were still controlled by the executive branch. See Ibid., 63.  
69 M.C. Setalvad, The Common Law in India (London: Stevens, 1960), 173-5.  
 20 
other because after two centuries they were deeply inter-laced. One 1956 commentator 
seemed to assume this would happen quickly now that India had its own Constitution.70 But 
the process took until the late 1960s in UP and even then it was not implemented in all 
districts.71 There were many other such anomalies in jurisdiction.72  
Despite these different jurisdictional positions at different times, the threefold 
division of the Indian legal system has remained in place. At the base are the sub-district 
courts through which most litigants enter the legal system. Decisions of these courts can be 
appealed to the District Courts. From the District Courts, appeals lie to the appellate courts, 
first the High Courts in the state capitals and possibly then the Supreme Court in Delhi.  
 In England, Magistrates acquired the power to order a husband to support his wife 
living separately from him if he had been convicted of assaulting her. The Magistrates had 
also been concerned with legal rights and obligations of sustenance and maintenance 
through the poor law, discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. From these initially small 
roots in the Magistrates jurisdiction grew the adjudication and administration of maintenance 
law in English Magistrates courts that lasted until the 1970s.73 It is also worth noting that 
Magistrates were in England and the empire responsible for administering the law of masters 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Markose, Judicial Control, 91 
71 Zaheer and Gupta, Organization, passim.   
72 Ibid., 123. Also, Perveez Mody, The Intimate State: Love-Marriage and the Law in Delhi (New Delhi: Routledge, 
2008) provides an excellent ethnography of the way in which the Special Marriages Act of 1954 works in 
practice. She highlights how the Act seeks to tie individuals to a particular location and before the couple can 
marry. The marriage officer where they seek to marry must seek objections in their home localities. On the one 
hand, this suggests the ways in which community control and the state are imbricated in regulating marriage.  
On the other hand, the vast majority of Indians marry under their own religious personal laws. Both the Special 
Marriage Act (i.e. the civil, non-religious marriage law of India) and India’s religious personal laws do afford 
some measure of community control and/or surveillance over marriage choices. One crucial difference 
between the realm of the Special Marriage Act and community regimes of control is that as long as the 
objection and other requirements of the Special Marriages Act can be met by the couple, they may marry 
regardless of any prejudice of caste or religion. Even though there are problems with the Special Marriages Act 
and it certainly evidences a social control interest in opening up the couple’s marriage to the publicity and 
objections of their home communities, nevertheless, it also provides an undeniable refuge for controversial 
marriages.  
73 Stephen Michael Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 200-1 and 443-5.  
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and servants which governed employment contracts, was an important aspect of the law of 
status and therefore also distantly related to marriage law, and was, like its cousin the law of 
marriage, shaped by social control, colonial governance, and principles of unfree labor.74  	  
Courts in Uttar Pradesh 
Since UP united two separate provinces, it had two separate High Courts. In 
Lucknow, the Oudh Chief Court [Lucknow High Court] was founded at Lucknow just after 
British annexation in 1856. 75 Colonial courts of appeal had been in operation in the eastern 
United Provinces since 1831, when courts of civil appeal were established in Allahabad so 
that Indians would not need to undertake the expense of travel to distant Calcutta to pursue 
litigation.76 However, as a High Court, the Allahabad High Court was not founded until after 
the Rebellion of 1857-58.  It was founded under the 1862 High Courts Act. The Act was 
designed to unify the jurisdiction of the three appellate courts at Calcutta, Madras, and 
Bombay. It also allowed the formation of new courts in British territory where they were 
deemed necessary, such as at Allahabad in 1869.   
This dissertation focuses on decisions by the appellate courts in the capitals of UP at 
Lucknow and Allahabad. The Lucknow High Court and its counterpart in Allahabad most 
closely parallel United States circuit courts. As the Indian legal profession developed over 
the late nineteenth century, it opened up to Indian legal participation at the Appellate Court 
level. By the twentieth century, Lucknow and Allahabad were legal, political, and cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Douglas Hay and Paul Craven, “Introduction,” in Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 
1562-1955 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), especially 5, 8-9, 26, and passim. 
Violation of an employment contract could until 1867 in England result in corporal punishment, 
imprisonment, and wage garnishment.   
75 H.K. Ghose, “History of the Court of Awadh from 1856 AD up to the Present Time” in High Court of 
Judicature at Allahabad, 1866-1966, Centenary Commemoration, vol. 1 (Allahabad High Court Centenary 
Commemoration Volume Committee, 1966). The court was founded in 1856. It was called the Judicial 
Commissioner’s Court. In 1925, its name was changed to the Chief Court of Oudh.  
76 Zaheer and Gupta, Organization, 9.   
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capitals, with sophisticated infrastructures dedicated to making colonial law “work” in India. 
Such institutions included bar associations and law libraries, courses of legal study in 
universities, and the all-important legal publishing houses. Even in important cities without a 
High Court like Kanpur legal practice was sophisticated. Some litigants appealed to District 
Courts and then to one of the High Courts. They often mobilized local connections in their 
home areas to find lawyers in the legal capitals. Similarly, starting lawyers made their way to 
legal capitals at Lucknow and Allahabad from outlying districts, starting practice in a small 
town, moving to a city like Kanpur, and eventually settling in the more prestigious and 
lucrative High Court town of Lucknow or Allahabad.77 
The careers of Sir Wazir Hasan (1872-1947) and his son Syed Ali Zaheer (1896-1983) 
show the various routes lawyers took to joining the legal profession. Syed Ali Zaheer was the 
oldest son of Sir Wazir Hasan. Sir Wazir was an eminent Lucknow lawyer, Chief Judge of 
the Lucknow High Court, and nationalist politician. Sir Wazir held a law degree from Aligarh 
Muslim University (1896). Sir Wazir first practiced as a lawyer in his familial homes of 
Pratapgarh and Jaunpur districts, in southeastern UP near Allahabad and Benaras. When Sir 
Wazir moved his family and his practice to Lucknow to in 1903, Syed Ali was seven years 
old. In 1912, Syed Ali enrolled as an undergraduate student in Canning College in Lucknow. 
In 1914, his father went to London as part of a delegation to the British government. At the 
same time, Sir Wazir made arrangements for Syed Ali and another son to enroll at New 
College, Oxford University. Just as Syed Ali arrived in Bombay to embark for England in 
1914, World War I began. He returned to Lucknow. He completed his degree from Canning 
College and began his career as a pleader in 1918.78  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Katju, Days.  
78 Syed Ali Zaheer. The Memoirs of Syed Ali Zaheer, edited by Syed Kazim Zaheer (Delhi: Frank Bros. & Co., 
2004), 1-15.  
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During this early phase in his career, Syed Ali could only practice in the district 
courts. At the lower court level, the lawyer who advocated in court was called a pleader.79  
To become a pleader one had to pass an examination.80 Presumably Syed Ali Zaheer passed 
the District Pleader’s examination.81 Generally advocates and vakils at the High Court were 
considered more prestigious than the lawyer in the lower courts. Lawyers could begin as 
pleaders and either build a local practice or move to the appellate court towns where practice 
was more lucrative.82 Sir Wazir Hasan, father of Syed Ali, began his career as a pleader in 
Pratapgarh and Jaunpur, near Allahabad. The career of Mehr Chand Mahajan, future Chief 
Justice of India’s Supreme Court, followed a similar trajectory in the Punjab.83  
Besides going to England to become a barrister, there were routes to legal practice 
within India. Kailash Nath Katju started practice in a small town, moving to a city like 
Kanpur, and eventually settling in the more prestigious and lucrative High Court town of 
Lucknow or Allahabad.84 To become a lawyer, Kailash Nath Katju took a competitive 
examination for admission to the Allahabad High Court’s register of vakils for the Allahabad 
High Court in 1906. After passing the examination and earning an MA in History the next 
year, he enrolled as a vakil with the Allahabad Bar in 1908.8586 He spent his career as a 
practicing lawyer and in government. Within the Allahabad Bar, there were two separate 
registers, an Advocates’ Register and a Vakils’ Register. Advocates were those who had been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Samuel Schmitthener, “A Sketch of the Development of the Legal Profession in India,” Law and Society Review 
3, no. 2/3 (1968-9), 350-1. In nineteenth century colonial courts, the pleader acted on behalf of the litigant in 
the court and had special knowledge of the colonial regulations, especially Hindu and Muslim law.   
80 Ibid., 363.  
81 This is supposition on my part since Syed Ali Zaheer’s memoir provides few details about his qualification 
process. He also does not state where he initiated his practice but presumably within the District Courts of 
Lucknow in its capacity as district headquarters. Schmittener and Katju both mention such exams.  
82 Schmitthener, “Sketch,” 354, 371. 
83 Ibid.  
84 Katju, Days.  
85 Ibid., 129, 131.  
86 Katju had a law degree as well. He also got the second highest score on the Allahabad University LL.B. 
examination in 1906. Katju, Days, 128-9.  
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called to the Bar at the Inns of Court in London. The Advocates would select the High 
Court vakils it deemed meritorious for nomination into the Advocates association as well.87 It 
should be noted here that Calcutta and Bombay had a slightly differently structured legal 
profession than all other jurisdictions, for complex historical reasons. In Calcutta and 
Bombay, like in England, lawyers could be either solicitors or attorneys. Solicitors prepared 
the case and the pleadings and handed off the case to an attorney to be argued in court. 
However, there was no such system of solicitors in most states, including UP.  
The legal profession might provide financial stability as well as political 
independence, social prestige, and intellectual attainment to the skilled practitioner no matter 
his exact route through the profession.88 The independent source of income and the 
professional commitment to individual rights for the lawyer also assisted in his political 
independence. It likely predisposed him to support for greater Indian political 
representation, political activity, and nationalism.89 Famously, Motilal Nehru, father of first 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, gave up his lucrative Allahabad practice to join Gandhi’s 
non-cooperation movement in 1921.90 Over the course of the twentieth centuries the Indian 
state has unified the legal profession, with the 1961 Advocates Act creating the single status 
of advocate out of the formerly much more complex landscape. Even still, admission to the 
Bar is contingent on passing an examination and there are multiple routes to obtain the 
training necessary to pass that exam. These include taking a undergraduate degree course 
that combines a BA and LLB into one five-year curriculum; obtaining a BA (usually three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Ghose, “History of the Court.”  
88 Schmitthener, “Sketch,” 369-80. 
89 Ibid., 377-81. David A. Bell suggests, however, that in eighteenth century France the legal profession’s 
political independence was in part due to the barristers’ pre-existing sources of independent wealth that allowed 
them to enter and succeed in the profession in the first place. See Bell, Lawyers and Citizens: The Making of a 
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years) and then obtaining an LLB as a graduate degree; or taking correspondence courses for 
an LLB.  
 
Practicing Law 
 After World War I, Syed Ali took up his England plan again. In 1921 he went to 
London to enroll in the Inns of Court. These were the ancient learned institutions 
responsible for the creation and qualification of barristers. There were four Inns of Court: 
Gray’s Inn, the Inner Temple, the Middle Temple, and Lincoln’s Inn. Indian students began 
enrolling at the Inns of Court in the 1860s. Across the late nineteenth century about one 
hundred total Indian students had enrolled at Lincoln’s Inn, a few per year.91 Soon after Syed 
Ali arrived in London in 1921, however, South Asian students had increased to a third to 
half of the students at the Inns of Court.92  
He enrolled in the Inner Temple. Usually students had to attend twelve “terms” of 
dinners to become barristers over three years. Many Indian students enrolled in the Inns of 
Court while pursuing other educational qualifications at the same time—for example, 
Mohandas K. Gandhi took the London matriculation exam in the late 1880s.93 Closer to 
Syed Ali’s own time, future civil servant and diplomat Y.S. Gundevia sat for the Indian Civil 
Service examination while attending dinners at the Middle Temple.94 Syed Ali only had to 
attend two years’ worth of terms since he had already earned a degree in law and practiced as 
a pleader for two years in India. Along with the dinner requirement students (or “benchers”) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Ibid., 366. 
92 Mitra Sharafi, Law and Identity in Colonial South Asia: Parsi Legal Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 104 n. 107 states that between 1926 and 1931 32-54 percent of students at the Inns of Court were 
South Asian.  
93 Mahatma Gandhi, The Law and the Lawyers, edited by S.B. Kher (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 
1962), 9-13.  
94 Y.S. Gundevia, In the Districts of the Raj (Bombay: Disha Books/Orient Longman, 1992), 11-15. I am uncertain 
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had to pass examinations, generally considered to be relatively easy.95 Syed Ali was called to 
the Bar in 1922.96  
 As a barrister, Syed Ali could now leapfrog into the more prestigious High Court Bar 
when he returned to Lucknow. Zaheer’s legal career received a substantial boost from his 
well-positioned father. Zaheer wrote that when he returned to Lucknow from London, his 
father “set up an office for me, to which he transferred his extensive and valuable library.”97 
Wazir Hasan also helped his son rent a house that served as an office. He even bought his 
son a Chevrolet, suggesting he was close in wealth to Motilal Nehru.98 For the next decade, 
Sir Wazir would serve as a judge of the Lucknow High Court, becoming Chief Judge in 
1930. After he retired in 1934, he played important roles in Indian nationalist politics.99 Sir 
Wazir passed away just two weeks after Independence in 1947. Syed Ali would go on to 
become an important politician in post-colonial UP as well as India’s ambassador to Iran. He 
was the Justice (law) Minister in UP during the 1950s and 1960s. He played an important 	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tremendous earnings from his practice in Allahabad. See Schmitthener, “Sketch,” 370.  
98 Zaheer, Memoirs, 11. 
99 Sir Wazir Hasan served as the President of the Muslim League in 1936. In the 1937 elections held under the 
1935 Government of India Act, the Indian Nationalist Congress did very well while the Muslim League lost its 
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dual membership in the League and the Congress. Sir Wazir Hasan was present at this meeting, advocated 
against Jinnah’s position, and lost. He resigned from the League, casting his fortunes with the Congress. So too 
did Syed Ali Zaheer, as shown in his steady rise through the Congress ranks over the next several decades. Syed 
Ali Zaheer’s memoir emphasizes his own activities within the Shia Political Conference, a sort of sub-party 
within the big tent of the Indian National Congress’s nationalism devoted to convincing Shia Muslims to join 
the Congress. In a recent monograph, historian Justin Jones argues that though it might seem like Sir Wazir 
Hasan and Syed Ali Zaheer took a Shia-Muslim-Nationalist position, they primarily saw themselves as 
representatives of Muslim rather than “Shia” or “Shia Muslim” opinion. See Zaheer, Memoirs, 6-10 and Justin 
Jones, Shia Islam in Colonial North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 152, 183. The story 
does not end there. Among Sir Wazir’s four sons, the youngest became one of the most important writers of 
modern India, part of a literary movement known as the Progressive Writers’ Association. Sajjad Ali Zaheer 
was also a journalist and a Communist. Sajjad Ali went to Pakistan when he was elected the General Secretary 
of the new Pakistani Communist Party in 1947 but he was then imprisoned in 1951 on alleged involvement in 
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“Introduction to the Urdu Edition,” in Sajjad Ali Zaheer, trans. Amina Azfar, introd. Ahmad Ali Khan, The 
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 Lawyers need books.100 One advantage of a wealthy father who practiced law was 
access to his books and law library. Specifically, common lawyers need law reports and 
treatises. In a common law system, law reports are regularly published collections of recent 
decisions of binding precedents by appellate courts. The most eminent such series is the All 
India Reporter, published in a yearly series with reports for each High Court, the Supreme 
Court, a journal, and other sections.101 Most of the sources for this dissertation come from 
the law reports published in UP in the twentieth century. Individual lawyers developed their 
own private notetaking systems to remember the key points of each case they read.102  
 Along with reports, treatises are also important books for the lawyer. A treatise is a 
reference work on a particular area of law that helps guide the practicing lawyer through the 
case law on the topic. By the late nineteenth century an entire industry devoted to publishing 
legal treatises had developed. These treatises became something like franchises, updated and 
republished every few years to reflect the latest High Court decisions. One example is John 
D. Mayne’s A Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, published originally from Madras in 1878 and 
in the seventeenth edition as recently as 2014 by Bharat Law House. Such treatises range 
into the hundreds of pages. They provide a detailed and systematic topic-by-topic discussion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Kalias Nath Katju, Experiments in Advocacy: A Colossus in the Courts of Justice, edited by Col. V. Katju, Justice 
Markandey Katju, and Dr. Harish Bhalla (Delhi: Universal Law Publishing, 2006 [1952]), 68-72. 
101 Between 1937 and 1950, under the 1935 Government of India Act, India had a Federal Court that acted as a 
precursor to India’s Supreme Court. Appeals from High Courts in places like Allahabad, Madras, and Calcutta 
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102 See Katju, Days, 320.  
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of all aspects of a particular area of law. They report the details of precedents on the topics 
so that if a particular point applies in a lawyer’s case, the lawyer can find and examine the law 
report. They use examples to help the lawyer understand how the courts might see particular 
gray areas of the law. They have extensive citation systems to help the practicing lawyer find 
the correct law reports for a certain point and the various directions in which that point 
might take him.103 Some treatises became so prominent that they were very close to 
authoritative law themselves. Treatises also editorialize about the direction the law should 
take, since they are referenced by judges.104  
Kailash Nath Katju spent his first ten weeks as lawyer living with a relative who was 
a Civil Judge and maintained a large law library.105 He wrote, “I remember reading legal 
classics such as Smiths’ Leading Cases, Maine’s treatises on Hindu Law, and on Crime, and 
on Damages, Gale on Easements and Anson on Contract….that study of Maine, has left a 
permanent impression on me…”106 Katju also wrote that, “I browsed also among the Indian 
Law Reports and particularly the early Privy Council Reports, known as Moore’s Indian 
Appeals.”107 These were the law reports from the first century of British rule in India. By the 
twentieth century they would be supplanted by the All India Reporter.  
By the twentieth century treatises were held in Bar Association libraries as well as in 
private collections. Not much different from the trajectory of an American lawyer joining a 
firm, a lawyer’s early apprenticeship period was important for both study and 
professionalization.108 Katju’s early career also included an apprenticeship phase. He spent 
his early career under the tutelage of a senior advocate in Kanpur, Pandit Pirthi Nath. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Katju, Experiments, 68-9.  
104 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act.  
105 Katju, Days, 128-9. 
106 Ibid., 129. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Sharafi, Law and Identity, 103-12; Schmittener, “Sketch,” 374-6. 
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experience initiated him into the profession. In Pandit Pirthi Nath’s practice Katju learned a 
great deal. He recalled that the leader of the Kanpur Bar “…corrected my draft pleadings 
and notes with minute care, and discussed legal principles and pending cases. His 
reminiscences, his observations on men and affairs as well as on professional ethics and 
etiquette, were invaluable.”109 Professionalization involved training, reading, drafting 
documents, and developing systems for managing notes and documents.110 Katju’s period of 
apprenticeship was essential and most lawyers had similar backgrounds. Badruddin Tyabji, 
the first Indian Muslim to be called to the Bar at the Inns of Court, experienced it. He spent 
a period of observation and apprenticeship in London.111 Gandhi dozed through his Bombay 
High Court observations after returning from London.112 Since unspoken and unwritten 
practices play an important role in common law, etiquette and the oral transmission of 
knowledge was also important. 
  
Historiography 
Scholars have discredited the colonial state’s claims that it somehow helped protect 
Indian women by showing how the colonial state sided with conservative elements in Indian 
society.113 In a variety of contexts, the colonial state acted as a check on progressive demands 
within Indian society. When it came to women’s rights, time and again the colonial state only 	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reluctantly yielded to Indian calls for reform.  It was Indian reformers like Rammohun Roy 
(1772-1833) and Iswarchandra Vidyasagar who called for the colonial state to pass legislation 
banning the ritual immolation of Hindu widows (in the 1820s) and positively allowing the 
remarriage of Hindu widows (in the 1850s).114 In 1891, the colonial state conceded Indian 
reformers’ demands for legislation that raised the age of consent for sexual intercourse from 
ten to twelve years old. But immediately after passing the law, the colonial state used an 
executive order to prohibit the enforcement of the Act, reducing it to mere law on the 
books.115 It would not be difficult to identify other instances of colonial hypocrisy.116  
Instead, historians have turned their attention to the internal complexities of Indian 
debates over marriage and social reform. After the Rebellion of 1857-58, the colonial state 
reaffirmed its commitment to protecting Indian religious customs. One very important 
article by political theorist Partha Chatterjee suggested that in the post-Mutiny period, Indian 
male elites in similar positions as Rammohun Roy and Iswarchandra Vidyasagar did not 
make similar demands for the colonial state to pass legislation reforming women’s status. 
Instead, male leaders of middle- and upper-class respectable opinion, especially in Calcutta, 
linked the protection of the Indian family, home, and religion to the protection of an 
uncolonized inner core of Indian life. Chatterjee argues that the nationalist “resolution” of 
the women’s question was to argue for the culturally defensive position of protecting the 
Indian home from colonial regulation. This posited continuity with the pre-colonial past in 
the spiritual realm allowed respectable upper class Indians to accommodate colonial changes 
to Indian politics and economy. This was behind what Chatterjee described as the 	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“unimportance of the women’s question” to late nineteenth century nationalists, notable 
when contrasted to the pre-1857 activism around social reform efforts.117  
Historians have revised Chatterjee’s thesis in a few ways. First, they have shown the 
centrality of marriage to debates about nationalism, colonialism, and identity throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nationalists did not resolve the women’s question by 
withdrawing from it but rather debating how the colonial state should regulate marriage and 
family.118 Second, colonial, revivalist nationalist, and reformist discourses shared key 
assumptions about marriage and masculinity.119  
Colonial and nationalist discourses shared assumptions about marriage and 
masculinity. These shared mindsets about the control of women were in part a product of an 
“imperial social formation” that by the late nineteenth century could not be separated out 
into simply English and Indian strands. Sinha examined the 1891 Age of Consent Act 
debates. These debates considered whether the British should enact legislation to raise the 
age of consent for the consummation of marriage from 10 to 12. Some Indian nationalists 
resisted all forms of colonial intervention aimed at reforming the position of Indian 
women.120 Nevertheless, conservative nationalists shared colonial views of masculinity, 
undercutting their own claims of opposition to colonial rule. Colonial masculinity associated 
masculine success with the protection of women and used gender to naturalize racial 
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hierarchies. The mythic masculine control of emotion and sexuality of an upper-class white 
male was counterposed to the effeminacy of a middle-class Indian male, stereotypically in the 
employ of the colonial state. Conservative nationalists deployed a similar framework of 
masculinity in their attempt to prevent colonial legislation on the Age of Consent. They 
suggested that the control of a woman’s sexuality lay with her father or her husband. For 
colonial and nationalist opinion, masculinity became a marker of civilizational value. Sinha’s 
analysis exposes the hypocrisy of both conservative nationalists and the colonial 
government. Notably, the colonial government immediately torpedoed any chance of the 
enforcement of the Act with an executive order.121  
Indian agency has been an important theme in this literature. On the one hand, the 
colonial state almost always seemed to have the upper hand, at least in out right conflicts 
with Indians.122 It controlled the police and army as well as a total willingness to use them 
when deemed necessary. On the other hand, India was not a tabula rasa upon which the 
colonial state could develop its social experiments, no matter how much colonial social 
control and experimentation projects suggested otherwise.123 Regardless of what the colonial 
state said or did, Indian thinkers had their own ideas about India’s development in the 
twentieth century. In debates throughout the twentieth century, the relationship among 
religion, state, and family have simultaneously reinscribed dominant social norms and 
opened up new possibilities.   
For example, Tanika Sarkar argued that even though moments like the 1891 Age of 
Consent Act debates exposed nationalist male conservatism, they opened up the prospect of 
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a girl-wife’s rights as an individual not marked by religion. Discussions of women’s legal 
positions pushed forward the development of an individual rights discourse. The idea of 
consent, she argues, opened “the door to more radical demands…”124 In late 1920s debates 
about child marriage, women’s activists, nationalists and religious leaders all advocated for 
legislation prohibiting child marriage. This exposed the fallacy of the colonial claim that 
Indians themselves were somehow conservative and opposed to reform. Women were 
viewed as liberal subjects, not representatives of a particular religious community.125  
Discourses of consent also structured marriage reform projects that centered on the 
Self-Respect movement in Madras state. This radical movement of simplified and consent-
based marriage contested the dominance of Brahmanical cultural norms in late colonial 
South India. Simplified, “de-sacralized and de-traditionalized” marriages of the Self Respect 
Movement eschewed caste hierarchy and emphasized women’s consent and free choice.126 
They shared with Indian nationalist ideas about conjugality the view that marriage and the 
family could be agents of political change and nation building. But Self-Respect weddings 
emphasized consent and rejected caste and class distinctions. Such marriages “disrupted the 
closures of Indian nationalism” and “…[they] consciously posited alternative modern and 
national forms.”127 The idea of a woman’s consent, part of its larger “individualist politics” 
aimed at destroying caste hierarchy, included “connections between consent and 
compatibility, equality, and companionship.” The movement put forward a contractual idea 
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of marriage.128 According to Srinivas the movement which much further than Indian 
nationalism in its ideas of consent. 
Since such issues have prompted major controversies in the past century in India, the 
tantalizing alternative trajectories of Indian modernity and perhaps alternative futures.  
Sturman and Newbigin’s accounts of late colonial personal law reform also have the value of 
remaining firmly committed to the position that India’s personal law system does not deviate 
or fail at modernity but rather comprises it. Given that Indians make an important 
proportion of residents in former British holdings from Fiji to Guyana and that most of 
these polities accommodate plural family laws, Sturman and Newbigin’s point may be 
empirically provable as well as philosophically true.129  
Personal law statutes were the starting point for a variety of legal developments, 
often unanticipated. For example, in UP, a substantial amount of litigation under the 
DMMA concerned the narrow question of how a husband’s false charges of adultery could 
impact his wife’s rights under the Act. In scholarly accounts of the legislative debates, this 
issue is not discussed.  
Newbigin and Sturman each examine the DMMA alongside other late colonial 
personal law statutes and statute efforts. This is a very useful development as it shows how 
in political institutions and the public sphere conversations about Hindu and Muslim women 
were intimately woven together. A variety of voices urged differing visions of the 
relationship between community, religion, law, and the family. There were certainly a range 
of conceptions put forward, which historians today tend to consider progressive because 
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they sought to improve women’s rights and challenged the colonial religious division of 
Indian society.130 
In part, this helps link India into new developments in global history or suggests how 
India was connected to other parts of the world both through and around London. Law was 
and had been one important conduit of the exchange of ideas and practices.131 This 
dissertation points out examples of the connections between American and Indian law.  
One key question in law and society is the extent to which law influences behavior. 
Although this is a complex question with many potential avenues of research, this 
dissertation and its associated body of scholarship do offer some interesting historical 
evidence to consider. We have already briefly noted how administrative and legal state 
structures re-shaped Indian society especially with regard to dispute resolution and land 
ownership. Recent legal histories offer other tempting glimpses of how ordinary people 
modified their behavior to fit colonial legal structures especially that defined identity. 
Chandra Mallampalli’s historical ethnography of a dispute over personal law 
describes the legal travails of the Abraham family between 1854 and 1863. When the 
patriarch of the family died, leaving substantial property invested in a distillery, his widow 
and his much-younger brother entered into a long legal battle over whether the property 
should be governed by English law or the law of the Hindu undivided family.  
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Gradually individual family members’ perceptions of family history and identity were 
shaped by legal discourses. Mallampalli very carefully traces out this process: he argues that 
the brother, in letters to his nephew at Cambridge, very carefully put into writing his claims 
on the status of a Hindu brother. Mallampalli also shows how the case moved from the 
arena of a family dispute through layers of pleaders, vakils, and barristers, moving all the way 
to the Privy Council in London.  
Mallampalli’s nuanced account shows us that choice is better understood as a 
spectrum than a dichotomy. It is not that the Abrahams were choosing between binary 
options such as Christian/Hindu or Indian/European. Choices were layered. Their actions 
and beliefs shaded along a continuum, seemingly sometimes guided by economics or 
emotion and other times purely legal motivations. In courts, earlier choices were “spun” by 
family members to support their preferred legal position. The courts analyzed the “spin” on 
those choices to come to final legal decisions. Another important insight that emerges from 
Mallampali’s account is the ways in which Hindu law often had very little to do with Hindu 
belief or practice. This dissertation bolsters such a view, showing how husbands and wives 
acted strategically in the adversarial common law courts. 
 Sharafi has examined the relationship of the Parsi or Zoraoastrarian community 
based in Mumbai to the law. She examines a variety of relationships between Parsis and the 
law: Parsis were especially active as litigants and lawyers, and also as lobbyists, legislative 
drafters, and in other roles. Parsis sought to regulate their community using colonial legal 
institutions that represented a particular form of Parsi modernity.132 It could be argued this 
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was a specific form of Parsi legal masculinity. Like Mallampalli, Sharafi concludes that, in the 
Parsi case, “…influence between law and identity flowed in both directions.”133  
Sharafi’s study shows that a minority community can capture a particular profession 
and exert outsize dominance, as the Parsis did with the Bombay legal profession. Many 
forces affected the development of the legal regime of personal law for Parsis, especially 
Parsis’ own agency in gaining the use of colonial law to regulate the community. The study 
certainly provides fodder for additional analysis of how Parsi law or Parsis acted as a conduit 
for English features into Indian law. Parsis mainly dominated the western India legal 
profession centered on Bombay, however. Based on my analysis of UP law in the twentieth 
century, there was nothing like the Parsi dominance of Bombay law at work either among 
UP lawyers or litigants. The studies of Sharafi and Mallampalli both show that law and social 
identities influenced each other, for lawyers, litigants, and religious communities. I show how 
litigants negotiated multiple layers of litigation through India’s formal courts over relatively 
long periods of time and suggest instances when law may have shaped human action and the 
ways in which lawyers, judges, and litigants conceptualized their stories to fit the dictates of 
law and achieve their desired outcomes. 
 Showing the complexity of India’s personal law system allows us to view it with 
lenses beyond religion. It undercuts any simple notion of a straightforward competition 
between the state and monolithic religious community institutions over women’s rights. One 
group of scholars has examined how courts apply law and suggests that, despite problems, 
India’s plural system can be a resource. Gopika Solanki’s account of family law in 
contemporary Mumbai provides perhaps the clearest and most succinct explanation of how 
India’s landscape of matrimonial law works: “…among Hindus and Muslims, plural legal 	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actors imagine, construct, debate, shape, and regulate heterogeneous notions and models of 
the family, marriage, gender, and religion in state and societal legal sites.” Norms and ideas 
about marriage and family are shared “across legal spheres” in a “cross-pollination of 
insights…”134 Solanki argues the important point that this “plural legal system with shifting 
balance of authority” among various players and institutions “often checks violations of 
individual liberty.”135 In Solanki’s view, the “shared adjudication model” “fractures the ‘fixed’ 
religious identities, and provides institutional spaces for ongoing intersocietal dialog between 
ethno-religious groups, civil society, and the state.”136 In sum, “cultural pluralism and gender 
equality are not antithetical to one another…”137  
Solanki’s method contributed to her ability to make this claim. She conducted 
extensive studies of cases of marriage disputes not only in state courts in Bombay but also in 
informal sites of microadjudication such as caste councils, family meetings, and counseling 
sessions with various religious clergy.138 Solanki gives a substantial amount of credit to 
women’s ability to exercise agency, at least in plural legal Mumbai. Vatuk has also examined 
the diverse methods Muslim women can use to obtain marital redress from community 
institutions.139  
Such models fit one possible vision for India put forward by political theorist 
Christine Keating. Keating argues, “The struggles for egalitarian pluralism in India can be 
seen, in part, as fostering arenas in which people are free to agree on the terms and 
conditions of their own relationships.” Such “free agreement” can create an “egalitarian” 	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social contract.140 Even though some aspects of the Indian Constitution tend toward 
domination, the document can be a very potent source for liberation contracts as well.141 
One point that must be considered is that institutions like the courts and marriage do 
not exist outside of dominant social ideologies. They reinscribe dominant norms and can be 
unfriendly to vulnerable litigants. Basu examined Calcutta family courts that held out great 
promise for easy justice for the common wife.142 Despite the optimism of such institutions, 
Basu finds, “…seeming innovations continue to be embedded in deeply gendered 
conceptions of conjugality, allowing for limited negotiation...”143 Women exist in vulnerable 
material and social states such that for most women, “The state of staying married…is 
regarded as their primary form of property.”144According to Basu, when women enter 
marriage they enter into a vulnerable position.145 Basu’s portrayal of women’s lack of choice 
in entering marriage and the normative compulsion to remain married suggests that marriage 
may be one area in which Keating’s free agreements will not easily work.  
At a day-to-day level, courts are contested spaces.146 They tend to reinscribe 
dominant norms and employ violence, as the discussion in Chapter Six makes clear in greater 
detail. Nevertheless the deeply held commitment to individual liberties especially in post-
colonial India makes the courts important institutions of social change and protection for 
minorities or the vulnerable. I focus on the High Courts through the historical record of 
published court decisions. Such decisions provide some glimpses of how lower courts 
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treated litigants before their cases reached the High Courts. I also examine some aspects of 
the bureaucratic and legal treatment of marriage. Like the contemporary ethnographic 
accounts, this dissertation shows how even within the formal court system the legal regime 
governing marriage is very complex. It involves a variety of laws and institutions. In 
something akin to the model put forward by Solanki, legal norms about marriage, especially 
English norms, were transferred among diverse jurisdictions.  
Can marriage co-exist with egalitarian social contracts? These examples and others 
suggest that there is a constant debate on these issues in India and other liberal democracies. 
While some systems may work better than others in guaranteeing egalitarian conditions, in 
general it is most important that democracies hold this as a common good.147 This 
dissertation presents the example of appellate courts often in favor of protect individual 
litigants using an ideology of protection while either reinforcing or not challenging the idea 
of the husband’s physical and legal control of his wife found in Indian marriage law. It 
shows how marriage provided on important structuring principle for many arenas of Indian 
law.  
 Many histories of South Asia use 1947 as an end or starting point for their 
narratives.148 For histories of nationalism and nationalist histories, Indian independence in 
1947 is a natural endpoint, the culmination of at least ninety years of anti-colonial 
nationalism. For historians of post-colonial India, 1947 is a starting point of independent 
Indian rule. We have already outlined some of the impacts of religion on Indian political life, 
such as the division of personal law into Hindu and Muslim, without describing the multi-
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faceted effects of the colonial system of religious political identities on nationalist politics. 
Though Pakistan is often portrayed as a religious state, historians de-emphasize the  
extent to which religious belief or fervor motivated the demand for and creation of Pakistan.  
Most relevant to this dissertation are the nuanced and rich feminist histories of the 
ways in which the new states handled Partition. Within the past two decades, feminist 
scholars have used oral history and careful archival analysis to develop how gender and 
sexuality structured violence in Partition. Sexual assaults and the abduction of women were 
used as a weapon of war during Partition violence as well. India and Pakistan sought to 
assign abducted women to their proper countries in the aftermath of Partition. State 
detention facilities held women who were caught in between the two countries.149 
The literature on the colonial period also highlights the importance of gender to 
boundaries between communities and nations. Over the course of the nineteenth century, 
we can trace the development of new and highly communalized and sexualized narratives of 
Indian history. Colonial histories about Indian history emphasized an ancient Hindu (or 
Ayran) golden age. Middle-class nationalists took up this idea of a golden past and squarely 
located its decline in the gradual emasculation of Hindu men via supposedly aggressive 
Muslim invasions. From the 1860s onward, these historical invasions were sexualized by 
portraying atrocities against Hindu women and sexual excesses by Muslim men.150 As Sarkar 
points out, this was not always a coherent or total narrative, but the identification of the 
Hindu woman with the nation was already clear.151 In the twentieth century these ideas about 
history were consolidated and brought into the present in a variety of ways: Muslim rulers 	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became Muslim men in general; past atrocities became present; and these ideas proliferated, 
compelling social and political action ranging from communal associationalism to communal 
violence.152  
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, this link between women and religious 
community carried over into the violence of Partition and its aftermath. Feminist histories of 
Partition have shown how closely women’s bodies were linked to community and nation 
during Partition violence and in subsequent recovery and rehabilitation efforts. During the 
period of Partition violence from 1946-8, rape and other forms of violence against women 
and forced marriages and conversions were used as weapons by men of all religious 
communities against other religious communities.153   
Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin’s discussion of this process emphasizes the uses and 
abuses of state power in the recovery effort. Their account also highlights how essential the 
control of Hindu and Sikh’s women’s bodies and reproduction was to the new Indian 
nation-state. Recent feminist scholarship has also shown how the idea of India-as-Hindu 
influenced post-Partition recovery efforts. In the aftermath of Partition, both the Indian and 
Pakistani governments agreed that they would not recognize forced conversions or 
marriages and would endeavor to return abducted women to their original families, no 
matter what the women themselves wanted.  From March 1947 until 1954, the governments 
decided that any woman living with a man of the “wrong” religion would  “be presumed to 
have been abducted” and all marriages and conversions would thus be illegitimate.154 
 Echoing colonial-era discourses, Pakistan was cast as the abductor and India was 
cast as the civilized recoverer of lost women. The 1949 Abducted Persons (Recovery and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Ibid. See also Sumathi Ramaswamy, The Goddess and the Nation: Mapping Mother India (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010). 
153 Butalia, Other Side of Silence. 
154 Ibid., 114-15. 
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Restoration) Act, despite verbal guarantees to the contrary, allowed the state to overwrite 
abducted women’s own desires and rights in the service of this project. Women could be 
forcibly returned to their home country no matter whether they wanted to stay with their 
new families or not; once “returned,” they were confined to camps until they could be re-
united with their original families. These families often rejected them. In the aftermath of 
Partition, during the rehabilitation period, women were also subjected to check-ups to 
determine if they were pregnant; if so they could be forced to abort to prevent the pollution 
of the nation by non-national children. Menon and Bhasin argue that the Indian state’s 
willingness to go to such lengths to place women in the nation and community where they 
belonged was driven by a need to maintain strict boundaries and sanctity of nation and 
community in an attempt to rectify the sexual “disorder” of Partition. Throughout these 
efforts the state relied upon religious identity to determine where a woman properly 





 The period of analysis for this dissertation, 1939 to 1972, has been dictated by 
important dates in Indian personal law. The major signposts in this period are the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, enacted in 1939, the Indian Constitution taking effect 
in 1950, the Hindu Marriage Act and the Indian Citizenship Act, enacted in 1955, and the 
Uttar Pradesh amendment to the Hindu Marriage Act enacted in 1962. Since my intent was 
to understand how lawyers and litigants used these statutes in the courts, it was important to 
extend the timeframe to 1972 to allow for the time lawyers and litigants would have needed 	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to take advantage of the UP Amendment to the Hindu Marriage Act. Ending the survey with 
1972 allowed ten years for litigants to use the UP Amendment to the Hindu Marriage Act.  
 The best way to understand the timeframes at work in the court cases provided here 
might be through the image of telescoping or concentric timeframes. Law moved slowly and 
encompassed multiple timeframes. First, once a statute took effect, it would take some time 
before litigants and lawyers could file a case under the statute. Then, the case would need to 
wend its way through the court system, to a decision in the first trial, to a first appeal if the 
litigant chose to appeal, and then from a decision on the first appeal to the second appeal 
and its decision. This process alone could take many years. Also, each court case would 
concern events that happened well before the first suit was ever filed. In the matrimonial 
disputes considered here, a case filed in the post-1947 era might concern a marriage that 
began twenty years earlier. One particular lawsuit could also refer to additional legal disputes 
from an earlier period.  
 Once the final decision had been reached for one set of litigants, their case might 
take on additional valences in subsequent litigation by other litigants. The most apt example 
of this is the Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem decision by the Privy Council in 1867. This case was 
and is repeatedly and regularly cited by lawyers and judges throughout this period, despite 
the advent of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, independence, the Indian 
Constitution, and the Hindu Marriage Act. An individual matrimonial dispute and the 
resultant lawsuit took on a much longer life as a touchstone of the law of restitution of 
conjugal rights in India. That close to one hundred years later this decision continued to be 
regularly cited shows that it is important it is to consider the larger structures of Indian law 
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that underpinned new statutory developments.156 The timeframes of the Indian judiciary do 
not map onto either well-known statutory developments or political events. They followed a 
much longer, slower temporality.  
 In this process, certain legal structures and rules were reinforced over time. The 
timeframe and chronology of legal development show that there was not one linear 
trajectory of progress, as an analysis of statutory developments might suggest, with each new 
statute signposting a step forward for women’s rights. Including bureaucratic and judicial 
decisions in our analysis allows us to see how “progress” could double back on itself: older 
legal forms and rules structured litigation even under new statutes.157 Statutes did not exist in 
a vacuum and could not simply fiat into existence an entirely new legal regime. In particular, 
in this dissertation, I show how the coverture-based family modeled structured legal 
decisions both before and after new statutes and the Constitution purported to give women 
greater rights to autonomy.  	  
Method and Approach  
 This dissertation examines wives’ rights in two separate bodies of Indian law, 
citizenship law and matrimonial law. Chapter One focuses on family status in citizenship law 
in the two decades after India’s Constitution took effect. Chapters Two through Six focus on 
matrimonial dispute litigation in nineteenth and twentieth century India with a special focus 
on the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh.  Since my interest is in delineating how courts 
and bureaucracies applied the law, the main sources are court cases and bureaucratic files.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Another example is given by Sturman: the ruling that Khoja and Kutchi Memons in 1847 were deemed to 
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 The method for the selection of cases differed for each part. For the citizenship 
section, I combined three separate approaches. First, I studied major treatises on Indian 
citizenship law and examined court decisions mentioned there that dealt with questions of 
family status. Second, I surveyed the All India Reporters for the period between 1950 and 
1960. The All India Reporter is the premier reporter of High and Supreme Court decisions in 
India. It is published yearly and it is subdivided into multiple volumes, with one for each 
High Court, a volume for the Supreme Court, an Acts section that details new national 
legislation, and a Journal section wherein lawyers and scholars can comment on legal affairs. 
Each of the volumes has an index at the beginning that is sub-divided into topics listing all 
decisions for that year and bench. When I surveyed the All India Reporters for the citizenship 
section, I noted all cases that involved the part of the Constitution regulating citizenship and 
the Citizenship Act of 1955. Though I was not able to discuss all of these cases in the 
dissertation, the survey helped in understanding the broad landscape of citizenship law. 
Third, I used archival files from the National Archives of India that dealt with the 
bureaucratic determination of citizenship status. There are innumerable such files in the 
National Archives of India, mainly in the records of the Ministries of Home Affairs and 
External Affairs and I was certainly not able to examine all of them. However, I was able to 
closely examine about sixty-six such files, again, not all of which are treated in the 
dissertation.  
 This method might be best envisioned in the shape of a pyramid. The bottom layer 
of the pyramid would be the vast majority of non-controversial citizenship decisions that left 
few to no bureaucratic traces. The next layer would be the more controversial bureaucratic 
decisions that merited inter-Ministry debate and concern and thereby left a larger archival 
trace. This second layer would include the sixty-six bureaucratic files I examined more 
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closely. The third layer would include those decisions that were so controversial or 
troublesome to the applicant that he or she turned to the courts with resultant appeals to the 
High Courts and the publication by the All India Reporter. These are the cases that I found 
with my survey of the All India Reporters. The apex layer would consist of those decisions in 
layer three that were deemed sufficiently important by treatise writers to be noted and 
discussed in their treatises. All told, I examined approximately one hundred unique instances 
of citizenship decisions, whether in the bureaucracy or the appellate courts.   
 The second part of the dissertation focuses on matrimonial litigation in one state, 
Uttar Pradesh. The method I used here was slightly different than in the first part. My intent 
was to understand how the jurisprudence of matrimonial disputes in one jurisdiction evolved 
over a relatively long time frame, 1939 to 1972. I examined the index of every Allahabad 
High Court and Oudh Chief Court All India Reporter and complied a list of all matrimonial 
disputes. I looked at terms in the indices such as “Hindu law,” “Muhammadan law,” 
“divorce,” “maintenance,” and the relevant statutes. All told, I examined approximately 173 
High Court decisions. Many of the court decisions I recorded involved property disputes 
and I was not able to analyze those for the dissertation. Instead, I focused on matrimonial 
disputes between husbands and wives so that I could focus my analysis on how courts 
treated cruelty in matrimonial disputes. I did not intend to conduct a comparative analysis of 
Hindu and Muslim law. I sought to understand how lawyers and litigants used the law.  
 
Plan of Dissertation 
Chapter One studies a variety of decisions about the status of wives and sons in 
Indian citizenship law. This chapter argues that through the legal device of domicile, 
coverture structured Indian citizenship law. Exceptions to this regime of wives’ legal 
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dependence developed, but they did so most often to exclude Muslims from the nascent 
Indian body politic.  
Chapter Two provides an introduction to one of the most widely used legal methods 
of matrimonial dispute resolution in India, restitution of conjugal rights (RCR) suits. To do 
so, it examines the nineteenth century incorporation of this procedure into Indian law. 
Chapter Three turns to the case study of matrimonial disputes in the north Indian state of 
Uttar Pradesh. I provide background on the state and track the incorporation of RCR into 
that state’s law. It shows how within UP, litigants of all religious communities used RCR. I 
also show how RCR suits allowed courts to find in favor of wives without condemning 
marital violence. By juxtaposing the UP cases with a Scottish case, I also show that this 
pattern was not somehow unique to India.  
Chapter Four examines the use of maintenance law by litigants in UP.  Maintenance 
law was another very popular remedy that allowed the wife to claim support from her 
husband. I show how maintenance in UP was shaped by both English poor law and colonial 
dictates of governance and, because of these, maintenance law acted to preserve the marriage 
tie. Chapter Five studies the impact of the 1939 Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act in UP. 
The Act had important political implications for the consolidation of a pan-Indian Muslim 
identity aligned with support for Muslim women’s rights and it represented the first 
codification of Indian divorce law. However, in UP, the Act did not substantially change the 
contours of matrimonial litigation: wives still had difficulties in proving matrimonial cruelty 
in court and suits under the DMMA continued to be structured by earlier RCR and 
maintenance suits and jurisprudence.  
Chapter Six examines the development of matrimonial litigation in UP in the wake 
of major national reforms to Hindu personal law in 1955-56. Much remained the same: RCR 
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and maintenance were important arenas for matrimonial dispute resolution. Wives faced 
difficulties in proving matrimonial violence and often won their suits on the grounds of 
more easily proved social offenses of the husband, such as adultery and false accusations of 
adultery. The jurisprudence of cruelty increasingly took on a psychological cast, suggesting 
that the psychological impact of husbands’ behavior should be weighted heavily in such 
disputes, providing another route for courts to avoid confronting head on the reality of 
physical and sexual violence in marriage. Along with the psychologization of cruelty, the 
courts also engaged in increasingly detailed medical examinations of the wife and her sexual 
capabilities. The chapter concludes with a study of the evolution and impact of the UP 
Amendment to the Hindu Marriage Act, which made cruelty a ground for divorce in the 
state fourteen years before the national Act was changed in similar fashion. While the UP 
Amendment seems to have little impact on litigants, it did provide a model for national 
reform.   
Read through the lens of colonial legal categories of Hindu and Muslim one group or 
the other, or both groups, winds up looking atavistic, anti-modern, and beyond the scope of 
India’s democratically endorsed secular legal framework. My approach reveals a far more 
complex, striated landscape of matrimonial litigation in which the categories of Hindu and 
Muslim were important but secondary. A coverture-based family structure influenced Indian 
women’s experiences of the law of the family in a variety of domains at least as much as 











Entering and Leaving the Body Politic:  
Coverture and Citizenship Law, 1950-70 
 
 
“Domicile cases require for their decision a detailed analysis and 
assessment of facts arising within that most subjective of all fields of legal 
enquiry—a man's mind.” 
    --Justice Scarman, 1968, In Re: Fuld158 
 
After Partition: Seven Weeks, Seven Years 
 The travails of N. Basar Khan and his wife Amirunnissa Begum illustrate the way in 
which the unity of husband and wife produced impractical outcomes as the newly 
independent Indian state put its citizenship law into practice.159 When N. Basar Khan was 
born in Peshawar, North-West Frontier Province in 1923, the idea of Pakistan did not yet 
exist.160  By the time Khan came of age in 1942, the Pakistan proposal to divide the sub-
continent into two separate nation-states was still unresolved. Khan’s early adult life was 
influenced as much by European nationalism as by Pakistani. During World War II, Khan, 
an Indian, joined the Royal Indian Army Service Corps, which provided such services as 
transportation for the Indian army.161 In this capacity, Khan was posted to Madras, where he 	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married Amirunnissa Begum, whose family hailed from the city. After their 1943 marriage, 
Amirunnissa travelled with her husband to his various postings until he was discharged in 
1946. The couple then spent about six months in Peshawar before they returned to Madras 
in 1946, where Khan began his post-war life as a driver.162 
  
 
 For almost a decade, the two remained in Madras, a city not much affected by the 
Partition-related violence of northern India. In 1955, the couple wanted to return to 
Peshawar (by then in Pakistan) to visit Basar's sick mother, and they applied to the 
government of Madras for the India-Pakistan passports that would allow them to do so.163  
The Madras Government in Fort St. George refused to grant the passports without first 
obtaining the approval of the Ministry of External Affairs in the capital, New Delhi.  
The Madras Government reasoned that Basar Khan did not have Indian citizenship. 
The Constitution required domicile in India along with either birth in India or residence in 
India for at least five years prior to January 1950. Khan, who was born in Peshawar and only 
took up residence in Madras in 1946, failed to meet either of these requirements.164  The 
Constitution also granted citizenship to those who migrated to India from Pakistan. 
However, when Khan came to Madras in 1946, he came from British India, not Pakistan, 
which then did not exist.165  He was not migrating, simply moving within the territory of 
British India. If Basar Khan was not a citizen, how could he receive the special India-	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Pakistan passports from the Indian government? Would he not need a Pakistani passport 
instead?  
Others in a similar situation could wait until the Indian Parliament adopted a new 
citizenship law,166  but Basar and his wife urgently needed travel documents to visit Basar’s 
“sickly” mother, as she was described in the correspondence.167 In reference to his wife 
Amirunnissa, the Madras Government wrote: “it appears doubtful whether, in view of the 
indeterminate nature of her husband's national status, she can be considered an Indian 
citizen, for though she was born in India and has been ordinarly [sic] resident in India since 
her birth, she married Shri Basar Khan prior to the commencement of the Constitution.”168 
By virtue of her marriage to Basar Khan, Amirunnissa became a woman without a country in 
her own hometown, Madras. 
 In contrast to the Madras government, the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi took 
the sympathetic position that the couple could be granted special “passports of restricted 
validity” so they could go to Pakistan and visit Basar's mother.169 This was a prospective 
granting of documents on the basis of the idea that the two would eventually become 
citizens after Parliament enacted a new citizenship statute, which will be discussed in this 
chapter. Astutely noting their legally indefinite status, the Madras government wrote back to 
New Delhi, asking which national status should be listed on these passports.  
This follow-up query from Madras prompted the ministries in the capital to 
scrutinize the case anew. During the re-examination, the Ministry of Home Affairs 	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“Pakistan Nationals who entered India, from West Pakistan before the introduction of the permit system may, 
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(abbreviated Smt.), again roughly equivalent to Mrs. 
169 The passport of restricted validity was a limited-validity passport, p. 2. See also p. 6/corres. 
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considered issuing Basar an Emergency Certificate rather than a restricted passport. 
Emergency Certificates, though, were only for stateless people, and Basar was, in the Home 
department’s view, not stateless but still a Pakistani national.170  The telephone consultation 
with the Ministry of Law left no record of the reasoning employed, but it convinced the 
Home Department bureaucrats that Basar was a Pakistani national. If Basar wanted to travel 
to Pakistan, he could only do so on Pakistani documents.171   
No ministry provided advice on how Basar and his wife, once in Pakistan, would 
surmount their apparent Pakistani identities in claiming permits to return to Madras from the 
Indian consulate. Without such permits, they would be stuck in Peshawar on Pakistani 
documents, an almost insurmountable barrier to returning to India and claiming Indian 
citizenship due to the complex and vigorously enforced system of permits for travel between 
the two countries. “In seven weeks it was done, the frontiers decided/A continent for better 
or worse divided,”172 wrote W. H. Auden about the cartography of Partition. But for Basar 
the process was not done even by 1954—it had only just begun, seven years, not weeks, after 
the Partition. Having escaped the ravages of Partition’s violence by living in Madras, his 
origins in Pakistan represented an inescapable blot on his heretofore British Indian identity.  
Perhaps the ruling that Basar was a Pakistani national had some tenuous claim on 
reality—after all, he was a native of Peshawar. This decision produced a far stranger result 
for his wife. Amirunnissa was deemed a Pakistani national by virtue of her marriage to Basar. 
If she wanted to go to Pakistan, she too would need a Pakistani passport. The Ministry of 
External Affairs decided, “she also cannot be held to be an Indian national, for after her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 In order to get his Emergency Certificate, he would have to renounce his Pakistani nationality first as well as 
making an affidavit of his intention to remain permanently in India. 
171 NAI, MEA, F. 41(61) 55-PSP Grant of an India-Pakistan passport to Shri N Basar Khan & his wife, 4-6. 
172 W.H. Auden, “Partition,” 1966, reprinted in Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia: History, Culture, 
Political Economy, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2011), 155-6 and in Collected Poems, ed. Edward Mendelson (New 
York: Modern Library, 2007), 803-4.  
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marriage with Mr. Khan in 1943, she acquired the domicile of her husband.”173  Therefore 
she could not take out an Indian passport. The anomalous outcome in this case was due to 
the Constitution’s requirement of domicile for Indian citizenship and the interpretation of 
domicile using coverture-based principles. A woman’s domicile was defined by her 
husband’s. Amirunnissa lost her Indian domicile due to her marriage to Basar. The file on 
Basar was sometimes unclear as to whether the requirement he lacked was residence for five 
years or Indian domicile, ultimately suggesting he lacked both and was a Pakistani national. 
But it was far more certain that Khan’s wife lost her Indian domicile upon her marriage to 
him.174 The strict requirement of unity of husband, wife, and marital home produced a 
division between identity and home for Amirunnissa and her husband. Tied to the husband’s 
place of origin in Peshawar by this interpretation of the law of domicile, the Madras couple 
faced an impossible choice between what they considered national belonging and family 
obligations.  
 
Entering and Leaving the Body Politic  
India’s Constitutional law of citizenship shaped this dilemma. The Constitutional 
moment took place in the midst of the ideological and practical difficulties of creating two 
new nation-states out of one colony. After World War II, it was clear that the British would 
need to withdraw from India. There were several underlying reasons: promises made to 
secure Indian co-operation during the war; the unrelenting pressure of Indian nationalism, 
both non-violent and violent; and Britain’s own straitened post-war circumstances. 
However, the timeline and logistics of granting independence and determining the post-	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independence political settlement presented enormous challenges for both British rulers and 
Indian politicians.  
In February 1946, Prime Minister Clement Attlee announced that Britain would 
grant India her independence, and quickly: by June 1948. The May 1946 Cabinet Mission 
Plan offered a resolution to the conflict between the Indian National Congress and the 
Muslim League over the role of India’s Muslim population. The various Indian provinces 
would be sorted into three groups so that Muslim and Hindu political power would be nearly 
equal, and Muslim voices would have representation justified by their historically integral 
role to the Indian nation and not based on their numerical minority. The central government 
would be relatively weak, with most power vested in the provinces and only foreign affairs, 
communications, and defense reserved to the center. For a while this seemed a disagreeable 
if effective method of resolving the fundamental disagreement between the Congress and 
the League and moving quickly towards independence. On the basis of this agreement, in 
the summer of 1946, an interim government of Indian politicians was appointed and 
elections for the Constituent Assembly were held on the basis of a limited franchise. In late 
July, the Muslim League withdrew its support of the plan and announced its intentions to 
boycott the new Constituent Assembly. The Assembly postponed meeting until December 
9, 1946, in the hope that the League would come around. Finally, in December, the 
Assembly began its deliberations, avoiding making any decisions on topics that would 
foreclose the possibility of a unified India.175 
The penultimate Viceroy, Archibald Wavell, was unable to break the stalemate and, 
in hopes of solving the India problem once and for all, British Prime Minister Clement 
Attlee appointed Louis Mountbatten Viceroy in February 1947. Mountbatten forced Jinnah’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 The foregoing account draws on Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1999; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 5-7. 
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hand by offering him either an undivided India without any guarantee of Muslim power at 
the center, a far worse deal than the Cabinet Mission had been, or a sovereign independent 
nation-state of Pakistan comprised of the western and eastern Muslim-majority wings of 
India. Jinnah had refused previous such offers, believing that dividing India in this fashion 
would undercut the Indian Muslim nation that was, after all, dispersed across India in both 
Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority provinces. He would have preferred “parity” within 
the Indian nation but accepted the division of Indian sovereignty and the Partition plan.176 
Nehru saw the Pakistan plan as the painful compromise necessary to bring colonial rule to a 
close. It would also avoid the problems of a weak federal center presented by the Cabinet 
Mission’s provincial grouping plan.177 The Mountbatten Plan called on the state assemblies 
of Sind, Baluchistan, Punjab, and Bengal to vote on Partition.178 Nehru announced the 
Congress Party’s support for the proposal even before the state assemblies formally 
assented: “These proposals will be placed soon before the representative assemblies of the 
people for consideration. But meanwhile, the sands of time run out and decisions cannot 
wait the normal course of events.”179  
It was now clear that independent India would not exercise sovereignty over all of 
her current territory. The definite borders between India and Pakistan were not yet decided. 
Neither was the issue of the entrance of the princely states to Indian union fully resolved. 
Despite these remaining open questions, the new developments gave a push to the process 
of Constitution making in India.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Metcalf and Metcalf, Concise History, 216. 
177 Ibid., 216-7 
178 Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, 151-3. 
179 Jawaharlal Nehru, “Nehru’s Broadcast, June 3, 1947” reprinted in B. Shiva Rao, ed., The Framing of India’s 
Constitution: Select Documents, vol. 1 (New Delhi: The Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1966), 528.    
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Mountbatten’s announcement in June 1947 set the date for British withdrawal as 
August 14-15, 1947, a year earlier than originally anticipated. This gave only three months to 
decide on the new borders for India and Pakistan. The Radcliffe Boundary Commission was 
tasked with drawing the boundaries between India and Pakistan in the state of Punjab in the 
west and the state of Bengal in the east. Since the members of India’s various religious 
groups did not live in wholly distinct geographic areas, this was a difficult proposition.180 In 
the Punjab, it was further complicated by that state’s historic role as the birthplace of 
Sikhism and home to many of its holiest sites. Fear that they would end up on the “wrong” 
side of the as yet undetermined new border drove millions to migrate: approximately 5 
million Hindus and Sikhs migrated from Pakistan into India and an estimated 5.5 million 
Muslims left India for Pakistan.181 The Radcliffe Commission’s decisions were not 
announced until after independence, fueling the uncertainty.182 Feminist histories of Partition 
have shown how women’s bodies were linked to religious community during Partition 
violence and in subsequent recovery and rehabilitation efforts. During the period of 
Partition violence from 1946-8, men of all religious communities used rape and other forms 
of violence against women and forced marriages and conversions as weapons of communal 
violence.183 Violence fed violence and retaliation. 
On the eastern border, things were calmer but not placid. Exchanges in populations 
took place, but they spanned a longer period and were less violent if not less traumatic. 	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Hindu Bengalis from the new East Pakistan migrated to Calcutta, substantially reshaping the 
landscape of that city. Many Bengali Muslims also left Calcutta and the new Indian state of 
West Bengal to cross over to the new East Pakistan, which in 1971 would declare its 
independence as the country of Bangladesh. One historian estimates that between 1947 and 
1962 approximately 4.1 million refugees crossed from west to east Bengal while about 1.5 
million Muslims left West Bengal and neighboring Indian states to go to East Pakistan.184 
India officially became independent from Great Britain on August 15, 1947: a day that 
simultaneously marked trauma and triumph.185 
In July 1948, India announced the introduction of a permit system to control 
migration on the western border. Called the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, and 
then Act, the permit system made crossing the border without a valid permit illegal. Under 
the system the Indian High Commission could issue five types of permits to those in 
Pakistan wanting to cross the border to India. The first three (temporary; repeated journeys; 
transit) do not come into play here. The other two, the permanent return permit and the 
permanent resettlement permit, however, were directly mentioned in the Constitution. As 
Zamindar has shown, the permanent return permits were for Muslims who had come to 
Pakistan from India and wanted to return and the permanent resettlement permits were 
designed for Hindus in Pakistan.186 The permit system was termed the “real partition,” and 
many observers, in retrospect, over-optimistically hoped it would come to an end.187 
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As partition refugees poured into New Delhi, the Indian Constituent Assembly used 
parliamentary procedure to hammer out the shape of the post-independence government. 
The Indian Constitution was finally adopted in November 1949 and went into effect in 
January 1950. Until the adoption in 1949, India did not have a citizenship law, per se. Rather, 
movement and migration were governed by the Partition-related statutes and regulations, 
including the permit system. The Constitution included seven articles that directly governed 
Indian citizenship (Articles 5-11). Interestingly, while the other 388 articles of the 
Constitution only went into effect in January 1950, the matter of citizenship was considered 
urgent enough to put these articles into effect immediately.188 Senior government officials—
including Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the first Law Minister and framer of the Constitution, and the 
first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru—intended to soon thereafter pass further statutes 
governing citizenship in Parliament.189 However, these were delayed until 1955 when the 
Indian Citizenship Act (ICA) was finally passed.  
The six articles of India’s Constitution that dealt with citizenship are very complex 
and detailed. Article 5, with which this chapter is primarily concerned, was designed to give 
citizenship to the vast majority of India’s citizens. Article 6 targeted that specific group of 
people who migrated to India from Pakistan. Article 7 was aimed at those who left the new 
territory of India for Pakistan, barring their future Indian citizenship unless they returned to 
India on a resettlement or permanent return permit. Article 8 sought to give citizenship to 
the children and grandchildren of people born in undivided India who were now living 
outside of India. It was specifically aimed at India’s overseas citizens in places such as Ceylon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 See Zamindar, Long Partition.  
189 The main reason seems to be debate about the status of India in the Commonwealth. “Consideration of 
decision of the Prime Minister that the bill should be deferred for some time,” NAI, MEA-United Kingdom, 
1949, File No. 45(1)-UK 1949. See also Hugh Tinker, Separate and Unequal: India and the Indians in the British 




(Sri Lanka), Malaya, Burma, East Africa, and many other places. Article 9 prohibited 
citizenship under the previous articles if the person had “voluntarily acquired” the 
citizenship of another country. Article 10 guaranteed the “continuance of the rights of 
citizenship,” subject to any new laws made by Parliament, and Article 11 exempted this part 
of the Constitution from the normal rules for amending the Indian Constitution. It instead 
allowed Parliament to change India’s citizenship law without needing to invoke the 
procedure for Constitutional amendment. 
Amidst the many uncertainties, the Constituent Assembly turned to the English legal 
concept of domicile. The legal press supported the use of domicile, and commentators 
viewed married women’s dependent domicile as a guarantor of family unity.  But the legal 
unity of husband and wife put married women’s standing as independent citizens in 
jeopardy. The long pedigree and substantial body of law around the legal concept of 
domicile in both England and India provided a touchstone of stability in the uncertain times 
of the Independence and the Partition settlement. India’s Constitution enshrined the English 
legal concept of domicile as a crucial determiner of identity of post-colonial Indian law. This 
older legal form existed alongside the newer legal form of Partition in India’s new 
Constitution.190 Partition was written into the Constitution through the bar on citizenship to 
most people who migrated to Pakistan. Though the Constitution used religiously neutral 
language, in practice nearly all migrants to Pakistan were Muslim, and the move across the 
border was construed as a marker of disloyalty to India.  
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The relationships between family, domicile, disloyalty, and the state’s discretionary 
powers under India’s new law of citizenship form the subject of this chapter.191 In the first 
part, I show how the reliance on domicile in citizenship law created legal outcomes that did 
not reflect practical realities. Bureaucrats and judges interpreted domicile using principles of 
private international law as defined in England to assign married women and minors a 
dependent domicile between 1950 and 1955. Private international law, sometimes also called 
conflict of laws, is that sub-set of international law that determines the correct jurisdiction 
and body of law with which to adjudicate disputes between non-state actors such as 
individuals and corporations.192 Domicile is an important factor in determining which laws to 
use. The definition and application of domicile in private international law, therefore, played 
an important role in Indian citizenship law.   
The middle sections of this chapter focus on the important legal developments of 
1955. In 1955, the Supreme Court and Parliament each reformed the use of the law of status 
in determining citizenship. First, the Supreme Court decided an important citizenship case 
that granted a married woman independent legal will, but only for the very narrow purpose 
of excluding from India those who migrated to Pakistan.193 Second, the Indian Parliament 
enacted a new citizenship statute in 1955, called the Indian Citizenship Act (ICA).  In an 
important departure, the 1955 Citizenship Act granted married women independence of 
nationality. Along with this fillip to married women’s legal independence, the Act adopted a 
patrilineal line of descent of citizenship for Indians born outside of India. This aspect of the 	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Bill attracted criticism from female and left-wing members of Parliament. Moreover, the 
Citizenship Act also created five different “pathways to citizenship.” The different pathways 
had implications not just for gaining citizenship but also for losing it: it was easier to deprive 
registered citizens of their citizenship.194 In this regard, some citizens were more equal than 
others.  
After the 1955 Citizenship Act and Supreme Court ruling, bureaucrats in New Delhi 
and the states used their wide powers of discretion to adjudicate uncertain cases of 
citizenship involving family ties. As shown in the final section of this chapter, state police 
commissions and national and state-level ministries of Home and Law sought to vigorously 
regulate and enforce the boundaries of the Indian body politic.195 Well into the 1960s, the 
state High Courts heard petitions from Muslims on the verge of deportation as a result of 
these actions. Brought by Muslim males who were minors at the time of Partition, the High 
Courts had to adjudicate the delicate interplay between descent and intent in such petitions.  
Coverture structured the response of the Indian state to individuals caught between 
the two nation-states. Usually the father’s domicile was transferred to the wife and minor 
children, showing how coverture and the law of status had intergenerational as well as 
marital implications. When India granted legal independence to married women or minor 
sons, it did so to exclude Muslims from the Indian body politic. In other words, married 
women were seen as having some modicum of legal independence from their husbands, but 
only for the purpose of exercising intent to migrate to Pakistan. The narrow undoing of 
coverture here suggests how well-entrenched it was, only unseated by concerns of a complex 	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of ideas around national security and loyalty. The patrilineal emphasis of citizenship-by-
descent and the insistence on granting rights only to legitimate children also reflected 
English common law. For married women and minors, domicile and citizenship were based 
in coverture. In most cases, the father’s or husband’s status was determinative. But in 
deciding the husband’s domicile, bureaucrats’ and judges’ discretion to judge assimilation 
and loyalty could exclude Muslim men from the body politic. The state could also 
substantially hamper Muslim men’s exercise of their rights within India.196  
 
From the Council of Merton to the Indian Diaspora: 	  
The Rule Against Subsequent Legitimation 
 
As with Basar Khan and Amirunnissa, the first point of contact with a recognizably 
post-colonial arena of the state for many Indians involved the need to travel. Independent 
India’s new foreign missions were not certain how to respond to citizenship claims made by 
some of the approximately three million Indians abroad.197 Evidently this official uncertainty 
was not matched by any lack of clarity among Indians abroad, who were quick to claim 
Indian citizenship. Across the world, Indians petitioned their Consulates for Indian travel 
documents.198 In the case of illegitimate children, consulates adopted a cautious position; 
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they were not over-eager to extend Indian citizenship too far, especially to children with 
uncertain origins. As the files of the Ministry of External Affairs show, Indians in places as 
far flung as Geneva and Hanoi asked their Consulates for citizenship rights for their 
children, and their consular represenatives wrote to New Delhi for advice.199 In response, 
officials in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in New Delhi, supported by their 
colleagues in the Ministries of Home and Law, turned to two long-established English legal 
positions: the rule of patrilineal descent of identity and the enduring rule against subsequent 
legitimation of illegitimate births.200 It might help here to clarify that the ministries used two 
kinds of powers under their broad administrative powers. First, they could issue rulings 
about how to administer the law. Such rulings are a form of subordinate legislation and 
therefore a legislative power. Second, they could engage in “administrative justice” as they 
applied the legislation and the rulings to make final decisions about individual cases that 
anxious or zealous officials in the state enforcement ministries sent to them.  
In 1955 the MEA ruled that in unions between Indians and non-Indians, the child of 
an Indian father abroad was clearly a citizen of India under the Constitution. The domicile of 
the child followed that of its father. In contrast, the child of an Indian mother and non-
Indian father lacked the requisite domicile for Indian citizenship.201 Still, as the MEA wrote 
in response to the query from Geneva, even if the father was not a citizen the child might be 	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registered at the discretion of the registering officer. Scope for discretion was granted to 
citizenship-by-registration in “borderline cases” especially if a separated mother intended to 
return to India with her child.202 Only children of Indian men had a right to citizenship. The 
children of Indian mothers could at best rely on administrative discretion. The emphasis on 
patrilineal descent foreshadowed the position the ICA would take on the matter in 1955.  
In order to decide the rights of a child born out of wedlock, Indian bureaucrats 
turned to a remarkably enduring feature of the English law of the family: the bar on 
subsequent legitimation. In England an illegitimate child could not be subsequently 
legitimated whether through parental declaration of legitimacy, formal adoption, or even the 
subsequent marriage of the parents.203
 
At the Council of Merton, “…[I]n 1236, all the Earls 
and Barons…‘with one voice answered they would not change the law of the realm which 
hitherto had been used and obeyed.’”204 This rule lasted for close to seven centuries. 
Comparison with Scotland and the Continent shows it is also a particularly English 
commitment.205 This draconian position was not adopted in Scottish law. This difference in 
laws led to the conflict behind a foundational case in private international law, Udny v. 
Udny.206 Colonel Udny hoped to prevent creditors from charging his estate in Scotland by 
styling his son as his heir, thereby protecting his property from attachment. Though he 
subsequently married his son’s mother, at the time of the birth the two were unmarried. 
Colonel Udny's domicile was found to be Scottish rather than English, providing the son a 	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204   Quoted in Cretney, Family Law, 547. Cretney’s book, the best account of English family law in the last 
century, quotes from Lord Justice Lush’s opinion in Re Goodman’s Trusts ([1881] (Court of Appeal)). 
205 Maitland saw a similarity between Scottish and French law and engaged in comparison between the two 
jurisdictions. “‘I have long had a dream that Scotland is the link between England and Normandy.’” John 
Hudson, “F.W. Maitland and the Englishness of English Law,” (unpublished paper presented at University of 
Michigan School of Law, Ann Arbor, MI, October 2013), 7. 
206 Udny v. Udny, (1869 LR 1 Sc & Div 447: 7 Macq 89, House of Lords), reprinted in Morris and North, 1-3.  
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legitimacy that he would not have held under English law.207
  
The subsequently legitimated 
son could be considered Udny’s heir under Scottish law. In the course of deciding this case, 
the Appellate Committee drafted a clear statement on the principles of domicile law that 
would serve as the leading case for more than a century: it is the very first reproduced in a 
standard legal casebook on private international law.208  
Like Scotland, English canon law as well as Continental civil law jurisdictions 
accepted subsequent legitimation. This gave Blackstone a chance to extol the virtues of 
English common law over civil law in the eighteenth century.209 The rule against subsequent 
legitimation better promoted matrimony by limiting property transfers to only those blood 
relations legitimated by the state from the start, claimed Blackstone.210 Finally in 1926 
statutory reform in England granted a child born out of wedlock legitimacy if the parents 
married after his or her birth.211 Given the long pedigree of the rule against subsequent 
legitimation, the 1926 statute was quite revolutionary even though it still did not grant 
legitimacy to the “adulterine bastard,” the product of an adulterous union.212 
Despite the reform of the rule in England in 1926, it still held persuasive authority in 
Indian citizenship law in the 1940s through the legal publications and habits of mind of the 
bureaucrats applying the citizenship law. For example, the Consulate-General in Saigon 
queried Delhi about an Indian man who adopted the son of his Cambodian concubine “out 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid.  
209 One might expect a similar conflict between civil law jurisdictions like Louisiana and the common law states 
in the United States. Goa, as a Portuguese territory until 1961, also likely took the continental civil law position.  
210 See Blackstone, Chapter XVI, “Of Parent and Child,” part II on bastardy, in Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765; repr. Buffalo, N.Y.: William S. Hein & Co., 1992), 442-7, 
HeinOnline Legal Classics Library. Blackstone gave four reasons that the common law prohibition of 
subsequent legitimation was better than the civil law position allowing it. It ensured that the father was 
accurately proven; it prevented frauds; it encouraged the married father’s interest in his offspring in infancy, 
rather than only as an adult, since an adult could not later be legitimated; and it encouraged matrimony through 
the encouragement of procreation to create heirs and not just children. 
211 Legitimacy Act of 1926 (16 & 17 Geo V c. 60) 
212 Cretney, Family Law, 548-9, 533. A statute allowing the legitimation of children produced from adulterous 
unions was only enacted in 1959.  
 67 
of parental love and affection.”213  Repeating the pattern of initial approval followed by 
subsequent denial, at first the MEA granted the son an Indian passport because the adoption 
was valid.214
 
After revisiting the issue, the MEA decided, “As no provision has been made in 
our constitution for conferring Indian citizenship on an illegitimate child or for recognizing 
an adopted child as an Indian citizen,” the son could not travel on an Indian passport. He 
could come only on a visa.215 The Indian Evidence Act as well as Hindu and Muslim law 
were potential sources for formulating an Indian law on legitimation after Independence, 
according to the eminent civil law treatise writer Paras Diwan.216 Hindu law allowed adopted 
sons to inherit property, for example, in at least some cases.  Despite the diverse positions 
found in available legal sources, bureaucrats defaulted to the English common law position 
that an illegitimate child's domicile followed its mother's. This ruled out the boy's case for 
citizenship whatever the nature of his affective and legal relationship with his adoptive 
father.   
Similarly, Narain Singh’s case shows how the Indian state upheld a strict requirement 
of proof in cases of doubtful legitimacy. This excluded Narain Singh from Indian 
citizenship. The child of an Indian father and German mother, after World War II Singh 
found himself stuck in Aachen and desperate to leave. Despite the fact that Narain's Indian 
father married his German mother after Narain's birth, he was not considered a legitimate 
child of his Indian father.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 NAI, MEA, F. No. F14/6/1955-UK, corres/4. 
214 Ibid., p. 25. This prompted an enquiry into the Muslim law of adoption before it was pointed out that the 
father was not a Muslim. 
215 Ibid. The circumstances of in the Cambodian case were similar to In Re Luck’s Settlement Trusts (1940 Ch. 
864: 1940 3 All ER 307, Court of Appeals). There it was decided that a subsequent declaration of adoption of 
an illegitimate son is invalid for legitimation purposes; it would only be valid when the law of the father’s 
domicile at the time of the child’s birth and the law of the father’s domicile at the time of the adoption would 
legitimate such a child. Reprinted in Morris and North, Cases and Materials, 415-19. In Re Goodman's Trusts (1881 
17 Ch D 266: 50 LJCh 425, Court of Appeal) was another case on legitimation of a child through subsequent 
marriage. Reprinted in Morris and North, Cases and Materials, 412-13.   
216 Paras Diwan, Private International Law (Bombay: N.M. Tripathi, 1977), 314-15 and n. 41.  
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Working in favor of Narain’s case for citizenship should have been the straitened 
circumstances of his life in Germany. During the war he could neither work in nor leave 
Aachen, and was under threat of being interned by the German authorities. In a case of 
bureaucratic understatement, the correspondence in the file noted that, “The son was badly 
treated by the Nazis during the war.” The end of the war had not improved his struggle to 
gain German citizenship.217 Narain was desperate to leave German racial discrimination and 
chose India as the place where he would feel most at home after his wartime ordeal.  
The Indian state’s capacious commitment to its diaspora seemed designed to answer 
just such situations; it was certainly capable of admitting wartime refugees from Europe.218 
At first the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the MEA seemed inclined to grant it, then 
considered finding witnesses from the marriage decades before in order to establish Narain’s 
pedigree. This case illustrates the genealogical ambitions of the state, and a sense that kinship 
ties and networks could be recorded and referenced as required for the determination of 
status. It is not surprising, given the colonial state’s assiduous attention to recording property 
settlements and family pedigrees.219 As one bureaucrat suggested, the ministries should “try 
and scrape together as much as evidence as we can before we take a decision about Narain’s 
legitimacy and nationality.”220 However, working against Narain’s case was his illegitimacy at 
his time of birth. His father lacked or refused to supply the papers Narain claimed would 
prove his father’s 1922 marriage to Narain’s mother.  
In truth, the paperwork mattered little because the marriage came too late. “Bastardy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 NAI, MEA, FH 1952, Application of Mr. Narain Singh, p. 14. 
218 Please also see the discussion later in this chapter of provisions for Indians abroad under the 1955 Indian 
Citizenship Act. Narain’s foil is found in Rani Pratap Singh, whose maintenance suit is discussed in Chapter 
Three on maintenance. She was a German refugees, possibly Catholic, who married a wealthy Indian man in 
Shimla, then part of Uttar Pradesh. 
219 Jacqueline Stevens uses the term “(Familial) State” in Reproducing the State (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), 51. 
220 NAI, MEA, FH 1952, Application of Mr. Narain Singh, Note by Patandi in the Ministry of External Affairs 
from June 22, 1949 in the file.  
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was indelible,” as an English decision put it, and Narain’s illegitimacy at birth could not be 
erased.221 The Ministry of External Affairs drew on two sources for the ruling against Narain. 
First, he could not be registered because, though one of his parents was Indian, “parent” did 
not include an illegitimate father or mother at the time of birth.222  This ruling used Stroud’s 
Judicial Dictionary for the proposition, though Stroud’s itself gave eleven different definitions to 
choose from.223 Moreover, the memo noted, “Neither Hindu law nor Sikh custom provide 
that an illegitimate son may be made legitimate by the subsequent marriage of the 
parents.”224
 
Narain could not be registered as an Indian resident abroad under the new 
citizenship law of the Indian Constitution.225 On these grounds, Narain's claims were 
rejected. His case shows the incorporation of patriarchal common law principles of family 
and private international law in the Constitutional law of citizenship in India.226 
 
 “All the facts, incidents and events of a man's life:” Discretion and Domicile 
Coverture and patrilineal principles from English law structured the state’s response 
to doubtful citizenship claims in the case of women and children. The case was different for 
men. Domicile relied on human intention and a host of subjective factors played a role in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Lord Greene, in Re Luck’s Settlement Trusts. (1940 Ch. 864: 1940 3 All ER 307, Court of Appeal). As Greene 
pointed out this principle had been “always steadfastly maintained in opposition to the civil and canon law save 
in so far as it was forced to recognize an exception in cases of persons not domiciled in England.” Reprinted in 
Morris and North, Cases and Materials, 490. 
222 NAI, MEA, FH 1952, Application of Mr Narain Singh, 23.  
223 F. Stroud, The Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases Judicially Interpreted…, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1903), 1401-2. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary was designed to appeal to an imperial legal market concerned 
with the questions of personal status and property relations. The preface to the 2nd edition hoped that “…it 
may become the authoritative Interpreter of the English of Affairs for the British Empire; and, incidentally, 
forge a link in the golden chain of common interest and community of feeling which brings together its various 
peoples,” (p. vii, volume 1 of 2nd edition).  
224  NAI, MEA FH 1952 Application of Mr Narain Singh, 21. 
225 Article 8 of the Constitution of India. 
226 Diwan notes, in his 1977 edition of Private International Law, that under Hindu law prior to the Hindu 
Succession Act in 1956, Hindu illegitimate sons did have certain rights, especially among sudras [i.e. lower caste 
Hindus, which today might be called Other Backward Castes]. He also notes that South Asian Muslim law has 
some exceptions to a strict Muslim prohibition on recognizing illegitimacy.  
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assessing it. Despite attempts to pin down an infallible test, it was ultimately discretion that 
determined domicile.227 In Indian citizenship law, ties to Pakistan were hard to surmount. 
State and national bureaucrats debated the many factors that might be considered in 
determining men’s domicile. Some of these were birth, parentage, property ownership, 
personal ties, statements of intention, profession, tax payments, dress, food, and even 
assimilation. The discussion of men’s varied claims on citizenship was as extensive as 
women’s was cursory. 
Examining men’s claims to citizenship sheds light on how carefully the Indian state 
policed the boundaries of citizenship. The individual states were tasked with vetting potential 
citizens and enforcing the citizenship law.228 After one query in May 1954, Fateh Singh229 
chided state governments, “Of late applications from foreigners have been received from 
State Governments which do not seem to have been examined or inquired into thoroughly.”  
He urged, “such applications should be scrutinized with greater care” at the state level. 
Singh’s memo reiterated the principles found in Dicey’s Conflict of Laws as guidance.230 
Each attempt at clarification produced more questions.231 For example, the newly 
formed Andhra state asked about moneylenders with origins in Pakistan and Afghanistan.232 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 The assessment of intention for residence is different than the assessment of criminal intention, yet both are 
spaces for the operation of discretion. Elizabeth Papp Kamali, “Felonia Felonice Facta: Felony and 
Intentionality in Medieval England,” in Criminal Law & Philosophy (2013): 1-25, and Usha Ramanathan, “Images 
(1920-1950): Reasonable Man, Reasonable Woman and Reasonable Expectations,” in Engendering Law: Essays in 
Honour of Lotika Sarka, eds. Amita Dhanda and Archana Parasher (Lucknow: Eastern Book Co., 2007), 33-70.  
228 These important sources for understanding the functioning of the post-1947 Indian state are also considered 
in Zamindar, Long Partition, and Taylor C. Sherman, “Migration, Citizenship and Belonging in Hyderabad 
(Deccan), 1946–1956,” Modern Asian Studies 45, no. 1 (2011): 104 and n. 105.  
229  Unlike Gundevia and many other former civil servants, Fateh Singh seems not to have published about his 
life ‘outside the archives.’ His presence inside them is more constant than Gundevia’s. Gundevia was quickly 
called away to be an ambassador. In contrast, Fateh Singh remained in Delhi and advanced through the 
Ministry of Home Affairs to become a Joint Secretary by the late 1950s.  
230 Fateh Singh's memo was based on BN Lokur's notes in the Ministry of Law from earlier in the month, and 
Lokur indeed cited Dicey specifically. P. 5/Corres, 33/7/54-Re. Mohd Bhai. Singh.  
231 “The difficulty [of the law of domicile] arises not from a lack of clarity in judicial thought, but from the 
nature of the subject. Domicile cases require for their decision a detailed analysis and assessment of facts 
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After an internal debate, the Ministry of Home decided moneylending was not a permanent 
profession, suggesting moneylenders with Pakistani roots did not have a strong claim on 
Indian citizenship.233  This ruling was not without precedent. During the Indian police action 
in the princely state of Hyderabad between September 1948 and 1950,234 Indian forces 
detained thousands of Arabs, Afghans, and Pakistanis on spurious charges of being 
members of the Nizam of Hyderabad’s militias.235 “As it became clear that Indian forces had 
acted with excessive zeal in detaining these Muslims on the assumption that they were 
Razakars [members of the Nizam’s militias],” Taylor Sherman notes, the Government 
labeled some of the 6,255 detainees moneylenders in an effort to find good ground for their 
detention.236  
This query from six years later shows that the suspicion of moneylenders as 
separatist foreign agents did not end with Hyderabad’s incorporation in 1948.  Well into the 
1950s the charge of moneylending provided a legalistic veneer to what started as outright 
religious-communal charges used to detain Muslims without due process.237 Previously 
operating in favor of their detention, now the charge of moneylending was used to reject 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
arising within that most subjective of all fields of legal enquiry—a man's mind.” Scarman J. in Re Fuld (1968 P 
675: 1965 3 All ER 776, Probate Division), reprinted in Morris and North, Cases and Materials, 15. 
232 Formed in October 1953 from Madras State. See W.H. Morris-Jones, Parliament in India (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 22-3.  
233 Fateh Singh was doubtful of moneylenders’ permanent intentions “as their stay is only motivated by the 
object of making as much money as they can in this country.”  NAI, MHA, Foreigners II, File No. 33/121/54-
F. II, 1954, “Subject: Indian Citizenship-Acquisition of-Instructions. Clarification regarding-Reference from 
Andhra Govt.”  
234   Members of the militia fought against the accession of Hyderabad to the India in 1948. Sherman, 
“Migration,” 88. Hyderabad was one of the three princely states that did not voluntarily accede to India. The 
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235 A blanket allegation indicating disloyalty, argues Sherman, “Migration,” 91.  
236 Sherman, “Migration,” 92, describes this process prior to 1950. Relying upon Omar Khalidi, Sherman states 
that moneylending by Arabs prompted violence, conflicts, and backlash from the 1850s onward in Hyderabad. 
Omar Khalidi, “The Hadhrami Role in the Politics and Society of Colonial India, 1750s-1950s,” Hadhrami 
Traders, Scholars and Statesment in the Indian Ocean, 1750s-1960s, eds. Ulrike Freitag and William G. Clarence-Smith 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), 76-7, cited in Sherman, “Migration,” 86. Sherman states that 6,225 “Pakistanis” were 
detained in this period, some of whom were described as money-lenders, “Migration,” 91-3. 
237 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Nasser 
Hussain, The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2003).  
 72 
claims to citizenship.238 The MHA finally ruled that moneylending was not a permanent 
profession,239 but this lack of permanence should be considered along with other factors. It 
might cast doubt on a claim but should not be a sole reason for rejection but rather part of a 
larger picture. The use of the phrase “all the facts, incidents and events of a man's life taken 
together”240 in the ruling is an entirely synchronic use of the male as the legal subject. It 
highlights that ultimately there was no rule of law for determining intent; in tough cases, the 
test would always be discretionary.  
 This ruling did not do much to quell the queries that kept popping up about the 
determination of domicile. West Bengal asked about assimilation, another of the “illustrative 
test[s]” of domicile offered to the states by the MHA.241 Always cautious, Fateh Singh took a 
skeptical view of the virtues of relying too heavily on assimilation as proof of domicile. 
Assimilation, in Fateh Singh’s view, was too easy to fake. Foreigners who seemed Indian 
could really be spies.242 Despite Fateh Singh’s fears about spies, the final ruling from the 
Undersecretary243 largely reproduced the Ministry of Law’s advisory memo defining 
assimilation and allowing it to be used as one determinant of citizenship.244 The memo drew 
on American definitions of assimilation in the context of early twentieth century Chinese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 The government's attempt at excluding the moneylenders on grounds other than their nationalities can 
perhaps be seen as the corollary to Sherman's findings that ethnic origin influenced the administration of 
citizenship cases despite the different, supposedly more neutral, requirements of the legal regime, Sherman, 
“Migration,” 101. 
239 As Fateh Singh urged. In contrast, Undersecretary Gajinder Singh argued that political antecedents should 
not be considered.  
240 NAI, MHA, Home Ministry, Foreigners II, File No. 33/121/54-F. II, 1954, 3-4 corres, “Subject: Indian 
Citizenship-Acquisition of-Instructions. Clarification regarding-Reference from Andhra Govt.” Anupama Roy 
discusses a strikingly similar case from 1958 involving a moneylender from Quetta, 55-8, referring to File 
#2/4/58 MHA-IC. My guess is that her 1958 case referred to these earlier discussons. Anupama Roy, Mapping 
Citizenship in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
241  Mentioned in the first letter sent to all state government as a result of Mohammed Bhai’s case. NAI, MHA, 
Foreigners II, File No. 33/50/55 F. II, 1955, p. 1/corres., “Subject: Security [Scrutiny?] of foreigners’ claim to 
Indian citizenship-Enquiries regarding-(Reference from the Govt. of West Bengal.)” 
242  Ibid., 5. 
243  E.N. Damodaran. 
244  By G.S. Gaitonde.  
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immigration. The memo included a quote from Justice Fields's opinion245 in favor of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act because of a perceived failure of Chinese assimilation:  
They have remained among us a separate people, retaining their original peculiarities 
of dress, manners, habits and modes of living, which are as marked as their 
complexion and language. They live by themselves; they constitute a distinct 
organisation with the laws and customs which they have brought from China…. 
They do not and will not assimilate with our people.246 
 
The quote was meant to be helpful in understanding the meaning of assimilation, though it 
admittedly was not exactly about domicile. Did not reasons similar to those for Chinese 
exclusion undergird the 1917 statute excluding Indians from immigrating to the United 
States?247 One American magazine justified the exclusion of Indians because of their “Their 
habits, their intense caste feeling, their lack of home life—no women being among them--
their effect upon standards of labor and wages.”248 Even an American belief in a shared racial 
past with Indians (under the guise of the “Aryan race”) was not sufficient to override the 
cultural differences and Indian potential to undercut American labor that undergirded the 
policy of excluding Indians.249 The author of the memo, G.S. Gaitonde, an official in the 
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future unanimous majority opinion in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (130 US 581, Supreem Court) in 1889 that 
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246 NAI, Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Foreigners II, File No. 33/50/55 F. II, 1955, 2-3. The Court 
opinion goes on to state in the final sentence “...and their dying wish is that their bodies may be taken to China 
for burial.” This was not included in Damadoran or Gaitonde's quote. This recalls the axiom Gundevia 
developed to deal with the confusion over domicile: “Domicile is where you intend to die; not where you 
intend to live” (Gundevia, Outside the Archives, 54).  
247 1917 Asian/Pacific Barred Zone Act.  
248 From Survey magazine, 1910, quoted in Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian 
Americans (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1989), 297. 
249 Despite the claims of Indians that they were Aryan. However in 1923 the Supreme Court ruled there was a 
difference between white race and Caucasian. Indians may have been Caucasian but were certainly not white, 
said the Court in the United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind (261 U.S. 204, 1923), and therefore Indians’ citizenship 
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Law Ministry, seems not to have known or cared. One wonders what caused him to turn to 
this seventy-year old American decision, and whether it was well-known in the treatise 
literature250 or buried in the library of the Home Ministry or elsewhere in New Delhi.251 
Gaitonde’s use of Chew Heong suggests the well-known persuasive influence of foreign 
precedents on the Indian judiciary, especially American decisions, also stretched to the 
bureaucracy.252  
The MHA advised that assimilation was only one test among many for deciding 
domicile, as it had when discussing the moneylenders. But, “… the adoption of such modes 
on the part of a person of foreign origin will go a long way to establish his intention to settle 
permanently.”253 The cultural orientation of assimilation proposed specifically “Indian modes 
of life,” which given India’s vast diversity would have been difficult to define or limit.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
could be annulled. S. Mazumdar, “Racist Responses to Racism: The Aryan Myth and South Asians in the 
United States,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 9, no. 1 (1989), 50.  
250 Professor A.W.B. Simpson suggested the legal treatise declined as a legal form with the rise of legal realism, 
and that legal realism was prompted by nineteenth century treatises so successful at their attempts to codify 
that they tended to freeze the law. Here Simpson was addressing contract law. In India the legal treatise seems 
to have continued its rise until the internet overtook it with commercial, state, and public interest hyperlinked 
legal records. But it is still impossible for any working lawyer to navigate practice without the help of treatises. 
This is not surprising because, as Professor Simpson pointed out, India was governed by the very Codes that 
inspired the treatise writers in England such as the Indian Penal Code. Drafted by Macaulay in 1830 but not 
adopted til 1860, the Code was reproduced around the empire and now underwrites the criminalization of 
homosexuality in former British colonies. A.W.B. Simpson, “The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal 
Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature,” University of Chicago Law Review 48, no. 3 (1981): 632-79. 
251  Jayanth K. Krishnan, “From the ALI to the ILI: The Efforts to Export an American Legal Institution,” 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 38 (2005): 1255-93. 
252  The Indian Higher Judiciary’s reliance upon foreign judgments to guide its decisions is well-known and 
stands in sharp contrast to the American position. The recent major decision decriminalizing homosexuality 
relied heavily on South Africa’s National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality decision as well as others from 
around the Commonwealth, the United States, and the European Court of Human Rights. See Naz Foundation 
vs. Government of NCT of Delhi (Delhi High Court, 2009), avaialable at 
http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/APS/judgement/02-07-2009/APS02072009CW74552001.pdf, last accessed April 21, 
2015 and Alternative Law Forum, The Right That Dares to Speak Its Name: Naz Foundation Vs. Union of India 
(Bangalore, India: Alternative Law Form: 2009). 
253 In response to another part of the Government of West Bengal's query about the age of majority for 
determining domicile, it is also noteworthy that Gaitonde and then Damodaran ruled that the definition of 
minority in these cases would depend upon the Indian Succession Act. Here the Indian Succession Act, as well 
as the principles of private international law, were cited as the standard of law in India for determining 
domicile. NAI, Home Ministry, Foreigners II, File No. 33/50/55 F. II, 1955, “Subject: Security [Scrutiny?] of 
foreigners’ claim to Indian citizenship-Enquiries regarding-(Reference from the Govt. of West Bengal.), p. 
3/Corres.” 
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Fields’s objection to Chinese inclusion included not just “dress and habits” but also 
“laws and customs.” These were also reasons for the desire to exclude Indian immigration to 
the United States: caste habits and family practices, as well as the perceived effect on wages 
for white workers. In India, since Independence, right-wing Hindu nationalists have objected 
to the provisions for religious pluralism in family law. In both the American West and West 
Bengal, corporeal practices from food to family structure marked the boundary for inclusion 
or exclusion in the body politic.254 Both Indian and American nationalism contain a strand 
that views granting space to plural family customs a threat rather than a resource. This is 
certainly not the official position of Indian constitutionalism and secularism, at least as it is 
written in the Constitution.255 However, in the nexus of everyday practice and state 
discretionary power, alternative family customs served as a marker of difference and perhaps 
even contamination. Embodied corporeal politics create discursive social divisions, which 
are then reified through the use of state power in practice.  
Bureaucratic discretion was used to exclude Muslims with ties to Pakistan. In 
addition to Basar Khan, one Sale Mohammad Khan256 was deemed to lack the requisite 
domicile required for citizenship under Article 5, despite long residence in India. Similarly, 
Mohammad Hashim could not obtain an Indian passport to travel abroad to West Asia on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Both local, as discussed in the case of Uttar Pradesh in Chapters Three and Four, as well as religious. The 
evolution of this policy is discussed in Chapter One. See also Sumit Sarkar and Tanika Sarkar’s comments 
about the fragmented nature of Indian jurisprudence and the importance of property in their introduction to 
Women and Social Reform in Modern India, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 1-12 and Janaki Nair, 
Women and Law in Colonial India: A Social History (New Dehli: Kali for Women, 1996), passim; Richard W. 
Lariviere, “Justices and Panditas: Some Ironies in Contemporary Readings of the Hindu Legal Past,” Journal of 
Asian Studies 48, no. 4 (1989): 757-69. 
255 Early challenges to religious personal law were shot down by the courts, showing that religious-legal 
pluralism has been present throughout in post-colonial Indian legal culture. Discussed in my paper “From 
Appa’s Case to Danial Latifi: The Judiciary and the Legislature in Post-Colonial Indian Personal Law” (2007).  
256 NAI, Ministry of External Affairs F. 41/31/55-PSP, 1955, Grant of Indo-Pakistan passport to Sale 
Mohammad Khan. Khan came from what became Pakistan in 1939, and he was married to a woman from the 
future Pakistan as well. He could register as a citizen under s. 5.  
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religious work.257 Despite his birth in India, his alleged pro-Pakistan leanings disqualified 
him. An “old Muslim Leaguer,” the Central Investigation Department claimed he went to 
Dhaka (then in East Pakistan) and “narrated...the alleged atrocities committed on muslims 
[sic] in the Indian Union” in 1949. More recently he had been involved in a students’ 
agitation in Lucknow.258Admittedly there were no reports of his past violence nor had he 
been convicted of any “wrong-doing.” Yet, it was asserted, he believed in violence and “he 
[was] sure to vilify India in foreign countries if he is allowed to go abroad.”259 Therefore, his 
passport application was rejected.  
The states’ authority to cancel permits and deport stands in sharp contrast to the 
political considerations the same ministries granted to non-Muslims like T. Gomes.260 A 
Congress party supporter from East Africa with a letter from the Ambassador in his file, 
Fateh Singh saw fit to admit Gomes. Gomes owned some property in Pune, boosting his 
case.261 Likewise for G. E. Airan, born in India but eight years resident in Pakistan as an 
engineer. Once a Member of Parliament prevailed on Nehru to intervene, Airan, a Christian, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 For tabligh, proselytizing to other Muslims for the proper practice of Islam. The locations mentioned are 
Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Aden, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Dar-es-Salaam, and Durban. Hashim was listed to be from the 
Firangi Mahal. On Tabligh’s networks see Barbara Metcalf, “Travelers’ Tales in the Tablighi Jamaat,” The 
Annals of the American Society of Political and Social Science 588, no. 1 (2003): 136-48. On the importance of Durban 
in Indian Islam, see Nile Green, Bombay Islam: The Religious Economy of the West Indian Ocean, 1840-1915 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
258 The file associated him with the Raja of Mahmudabad.  
259 NAI, Ministry of External Affairs, F. 41(155)/55-PS, Grant of Indo-Pakistan Passport to Shri Mohd. 
Hashim.  
260 Nora Sheila Doss was assured she would retain her Indian domicile despite her marriage to an American 
citizen and residence there. Mohammad Bhai owned a business in Hyderabad and was granted citizenship 
despite having come to India on a Portuguese passport from Portuguese Mozambique, where he was born to 
an Indian father. Fateh Singh’s note in the T. Gomes files shows India’s Ambassador in East Africa, Apa Pant, 
pressured the Ministry to grant T. Gomes citizenship because of his family’s connections to the Indian 
National Congress in East Africa. Deborah Sutton, “Divided and Uncertain Loyalties,” provides crucial context 
for understanding the citizenship claims of Indians in East Africa. Pant served as the Indian Commissioner 
General in East Africa, which covered Kenya, Uganda, Taganyika, Zanzibar, Belgian Central Africa, and 
Congo. See in Pant, Moment in Time, 48-9. The archival records in the Gomes and Doss cases are from the NAI, 
MEA: Ministry of External Affairs-UK section, File No. K/54/6421, Citizenship of Mr. T. Gomes; Letter 
from Indian Embassy in Washington to the MEA (dated February 6, 1950), in Ministry of External Affairs-UK 
Section, File No. 43-21/49-UK, 1949, NAI, page 100. 
261 Shares in Pune co-operative housing society.  
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was issued a visa and instructed to register as a citizen in India.262 Mohammad Bhai’s claim to 
a business and lack of adverse record in Hyderabad admitted him. Though Mohammad Bhai 
was Muslim, he came from Portuguese Mozambique and had no Pakistan connections, 
which surely worked in his favor.263 
The reference to immovable property as a marker of permanent intention for Indian 
domicile indicates the relationship between owning immovable property and the legal 
assessment of permanence. A series of statutes enacted between 1920 and 1956 in India 
granted first sisters, daughters, and widows and then wives rights to immovable property. In 
a pattern found also in America264 and, I argue, rooted in English law, women’s property was 
cast as movable: utensils (bhartan), jewelry, and cash, items that could move with her 
person.265 But it was immovable property that was the initial basis for full political rights in 
nineteenth century England and America. The division between movable and immovable, 
and women’s exclusion from the immovable, was a structuring principle of common law 
rather than a simple rule that could be easily amended.266 The historical roots of the 
propertied male political actor contributed to the endurance of property as a claim on 
citizenship in early post-colonial India.267 
Domicile could not escape discretion. To demonstrate the permanent intention 
required for domicile, a man needed to exhibit certain economic and social characteristics. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Contrast this with the difficulty NAI, Ministry of External Affairs, File No. 6-16/56-PSP 1956, “Long term 
Visa for Mr. G.E. Airan—note by the Prime Minister.” 
263 NAI, Ministry of Home Affairs, Foreigners Section, File No. 33/7/54-Re. Mohd Bhai. 
264 Linda K. Kerber, “Why Diamonds Really Are a Girl’s Best Friend: Another American Narrative,” Daedalus 
141, no. 1 (2012): 89–100. 
265 The Hindu Succession Act in 1956 gave Hindu women immovable property rights last, after late colonial 
statutes rights to widows, sisters, and daughters between 1929 and 1956.  
266 Though they introduced significant reforms, married women’s property acts, whether in England, America, 
or India, could not undo the coverture-based structure of the law.  
267  See discussion of gendered citizenship in the Introduction. The law of status must be considered in relation 
to social status and not just gender or religion. Access to land was structured through the scope granted to local 
customs of all kinds (and certainly not just religious) by the English revenue codification project in nineteenth 
century India.  
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Property holding in India would help, as would recommendations of good character by well-
placed politicians or officials. An applicant needed to avoid activities that could be construed 
as anti-national, provide a record of “good conduct,” and somehow assimilate.268 Contact 
with Pakistan was viewed very suspiciously, all the more so if it could be shaded in any way 
political. Discretion could be used to deem a man disloyal and disqualify him from 
citizenship or documents. Once a husband’s domicile was decided on these complicated 
grounds, women’s claims were simple because they were dependent.  In these cases, the 
question of women’s loyalty did not arise, since their male relatives’ identities determined 
their identities. The next section examines how India’s Supreme Court balanced women’s 
loyalty and dependence.  
 
Married Women’s Migration in the Courts, 1950-5  
 
A married woman's dependent domicile was “steadfastly maintained”269 in the 
bureaucracy.  At first the judiciary adopted a similar position. In the first five years after the 
Constitution, the Supreme and High Courts heard twenty-one citizenship cases. 270 The 
outcomes in the five discussed here hinged on women’s domicile. In the first four, state 
High Courts upheld a woman’s legal dependence on her husband or father. In 1955, with its 
unanimous decision in Kumar Amar Singh,271 the Supreme Court reversed this trend. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 NAI, Ministry of Home Affairs, Foreigners Section, File No. 33/7/54-Re. Mohd Bhai, see p. 4.  
269 Lord Greene, Re Luck’s Settlement Trusts (1940 Ch 864: 1940 3 All ER 307, Court of Appeal). At p. 419 in 
Morris & North, Cases and Materials. 
270 Sixteen of these cases dealt with questions of the constitutionality of Partition statutes and regulations vis-à-
vis fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution (seven cases), questions of basic legal facts regarding 
citizenship status and property rights of evacuees (seven cases), criminal guilt (one case) and children’s domicile 
and guardianship (one case). 
271 The State of Bihar vs. Kumar Amar Singh and Others, 1955 AIR 282 (Supreme Court). Also discussed by 
Zamindar, Long Partition, 110-11. 
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Supreme Court accepted that a woman could migrate on her own will but only within the 
narrow scope of her decision to migrate to Pakistan.  
The petitions that gave rise to the 1955 Supreme Court decision came from the 
eastern Indian state of Bihar.272 There, Rani Sayeedah Khatoon held a substantial Muslim 
religious endowment or trust (called a wakf).273 The State of Bihar claimed the right to expel 
Rani Sayeedah because Article 7 excluded from citizenship those who migrated to Pakistan, 
and Rani Sayeedah’s trips to Pakistan constituted migration. She went, she claimed, to visit 
her hakim [traditional doctor], who had moved to Karachi from Bihar during Partition. Rani 
Sayeedah came home first in 1948 on a temporary permit. To obtain this permit, she listed 
her domicile as Pakistan. When she came back to India from her second visit to Karachi in 
1950, she successfully obtained a permanent return permit from the Indian authorities in 
Pakistan. However, the State of Bihar cancelled the permit because she listed her domicile as 
Pakistan to get the first, temporary permit in 1948.  
Rani Sayeedah challenged the State of Bihar’s orders against her before the Patna 
High Court, which found in her favor. She was an Indian citizen due to her marriage to a 
man with Indian domicile. Her husband remained in India during her two trips. The Court 
relied on what it viewed as well-settled doctrine that the married woman’s domicile was the 
same as her husband’s. In addition, the Court made a pragmatic, policy-oriented argument 
about the importance of the unity of the family: “It is obvious that to permit a married 
woman to acquire a domicile distinct from that of her husband would be to undermine the 
marriage tie &, indeed, render the purpose for which the marriage was contracted no longer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 Sayeedah Khatoon and Ors. vs. State of Bihar Ors., AIR 1951 Pat 434. Rani Sayeedah seems to have come from a 
different class than the migrants discussed in Papiya Ghosh, “Partition’s Biharis,” Comparative Studies of South 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East XVII, no. 2 (1997): 21-34. 
273 As both trustee and beneficiary.  
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capable of performance.”274  The English definition of domicile dependent on the husband 
was congruent with Indian systems of personal law, argued the decision. At the same time 
that the Court acknowledged the historical roots of this doctrine in British common law, it 
also argued for its local compatibility with Indian systems of personal law.275  
In 1954 the Allahabad High Court followed suit in a similar situation.276 In 1953 the 
Bombay High Court also strictly applied the rule of domicile to find that Karim un Nissa 
could be expelled from India.277 Originally from Nagpur, the petitioner had gone with her 
husband to Pakistan during Partition. When he died a few years later, she returned to India 
with her young children, but her legal domicile remained Pakistani due to her marriage. The 
High Court regretted to find against her but decided it had no choice, allowing the 
deportation to take place but strongly encouraging Indian authorities to register her on moral 
grounds.278 The rule of dependent domicile was strictly applied: wives were invariably 
dependent on their husbands. The practical outcomes of this dependence sometimes worked 
in favor of and at other times opposed wives’ interests.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 On the comparisons and relationships between Indian personal law and canon law, see Lariviere, “Justices 
and Panditas.” It is interesting to compare the public nature of the marriage tie acknowledged by Justice 
Shearer in this quote with historian Hendrik Hartog’s observation that, in America, marriage was described as a 
matter of public policy in the mid-nineteenth century. Hendrik Hartog, “What Gay Marriage Teaches Us About 
the History of Marriage,” History News Network, August 8, 2005, http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/4400, 
last accessed April 21, 2015. 
275  On the significance of British colonial rule in Hindu and Muslim law see Anderson, “Islamic Law and the 
Colonial Encounter”; Cohn, “Law and the Colonial State”; Kugle, “Framed, Blamed and Renamed”; and 
Lariviere, “Justices and Panditas.”  
276   The two wives went to Pakistan with their natal families but returned to their husbands who had remained 
in India. Though the women physically undertook the journey to Pakistan with their fathers, both were married 
before they undertook these journeys, and their husbands remained in India. Though they physically left the 
country, the dominance of the husband’s domicile gave them the right to remain in India, as it had for Rani 
Sayeedah before the Bihar High Court. C. J. Malik and Sapru, J., Mst. Allah Bandi and Anr. vs UoI and Anr., 1954 
All AIR 456 (Allahabad High Court 1953).  
277 Originally from Nagpur, the petitioner went with her husband to Pakistan during Partition. When he died a 
few years later, she returned to India with her young children. But her domicile remained Pakistani due to her 
marriage. The High Court regretted to find against her but decided it had no choice, allowing the deportation 
under the Indian Passport Act of 1920 and Rules of 1950 to take place but strongly encouraging Indians 
authorities (presumably in Pakistan) to register her on moral grounds. Karimun Nissa and Ors. vs. State Government 
of Madhya Pradesh and Anr., (1955 CriLJ 28), Bombay High Court, 1953. 
278 Mitra Sharafi, “The Semi-autonomous Judge in Colonial India: Chivalric Imperialism Meets Anglo-Islamic 
Dower and Divorce Law,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 46, No. 1 (2009): 57-81.  
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 In 1955 the Supreme Court accepted the State of Bihar’s appeal in the Rani Sayeedah 
case, assigning it to a five-justice Division bench.279 The large bench reflected the importance 
with which the Court viewed the issue.  The Justices all agreed that Rani Sayeedah was not 
an Indian citizen. They upheld the validity of the evacuee property laws under which the 
State of Bihar sought to label Rani Sayeedah’s wakf  (trust) evacuee property, divesting her 
and her family from it.280  
The Supreme Court found that the High Court’s earlier decision had incorrectly 
applied the Constitution’s citizenship articles. According to the Supreme Court, Rani 
Sayeedah’s national status depended not on her husband but on her own migration. In other 
words, married women’s legal independence was recognized, but only in the very narrow 
context of migration to Pakistan. Since only Muslims migrated to Pakistan from India, it is 
possible to say that Muslim women were the first women in India to gain legal independence 
of nationality.  This independence was not helpful but harmful, excluding them from Indian 
citizenship.  
Article 7 did allow some migrants to Pakistan to claim Indian citizenship, but only if 
they came to India on the proper return permit. Obtaining valid permits was a difficult feat, 
as Rani Sayeedah’s case indicated. The return permits she obtained from the Indian 
government in Pakistan allowed her to cross the border back into India, but her home state 
of Bihar never consented to these permits.281 Without valid permits, she could not remain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 The bench consisted of Justices B. Jagannadhadhas, Sudhi Rajan Das, N.H. Bhagwati, T.L. Venkataram 
Aiyyar, and B.P. Sinha.  The Indian higher judiciary simultaneously occupies many different jurisdictions such 
as constitutional, criminal, and advisory.  
280 The State of Bihar v. Kumar Amar Singh, 1955 AIR 1263. A. Sinha suggests that this ruling also calls into 
question the decision in Mst. Allah Bandi¸ though no specific mention of that case is made in Kumar Amar Singh. 
See A.N. Sinha, Law of Citizenship and Aliens in India (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962), 83-5. 
281 Because law and order was a state subject, the state executives were responsible for enforcing the permit 
system and initiating legal action in case of violation.   
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permanently in India. As the Court itself pointed out, the 1949 Permit System Rules282 
provided “that every permit issued under the rules shall be liable to cancellation at any time, 
without any reason being assigned by the issuing authority.”283 Though subsequent 
legitimation of children was barred, subsequent cancellation of permits was certainly allowed.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in favor of married women’s independent intent was 
limited to migration to Pakistan. In other arenas of the law, the strict rule of a wife’s 
dependent domicile continued to operate as it always had. For example, Calcutta-based 
Rosetta Attaullah lacked the requisite domicile to avail of the Indian Divorce Act.  She 
wanted to divorce her husband, a Peshawar native, under the 1869 Act for Christians. But 
the Act required Indian domicile for both parties, which, by virtue of her marriage to a 
Peshawar native, Rosetta lost.284  She claimed that, despite her marriage and despite Partition 
and Independence, she still held a British Indian domicile. But the High Court in 1953 
reasoned that her husband did not: “the State known as British India disappears… from the 
map of the world, it is impossible for a person to retain either the nationality or the domicil 
[sic] of British India.”285  Rosetta could not get her divorce. Marriage assigned Calcutta-based 
Rosetta a location in Peshawar due to her husband’s link with the city. For both Rosetta and 
Amirunnissa, also married to a man from Peshawar, marriage upturned any semblance of a 
practical relationship between affective ties and legal identity.286 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282  Framed under the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act of 1949, Rule 29. The Control Act was designed to 
help regulate the continued inflows of refugees on its eastern border. Indian statutes typically delegate the 
power to frame rules on certain issues to the relevant executive Ministry. These rules structure much of how 
Indian law is practiced.  This represents the one major arena of executive power.  
283 Kumar Amar Singh, 1265. 
284 Chapter Three discusses the question of jurisdiction and English poor law.   
285 Kumar Amar Singh, para 31 
286 RP Mookerjee, K. Chunder, and Lahiri, J., Mrs. Rosetta Evelyn Attaullah vs. Justin Attaullah and Anr., 1953 AIR 
Cal 530 (Calcutta High Court). As a domicile case, this decision illustrates that domicile operated in many 
arenas of the law besides citizenship. The idea of the unity of matrimonial home and husband in marriage and 
maintenance laws is discussed further in Chapters Three and Four.  
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 The Supreme Court did not question the general principle that a wife's domicile 
followed her husband’s. It split the wife’s domicile from her husband's only due to the 
provisions of Article 7 of the Constitution, which barred citizenship to almost all migrants to 
Pakistan.  Dependence of domicile held the field, chipped away at only in the narrow arena 
of a disloyal and perhaps even disobedient Muslim wife who crossed the border to Pakistan 
on her own volition. 
 
Dissent Over Descent: The Indian Citizenship Act of 1955 
 After the Supreme Court’s decision in Kumar Amar Singh in February, Parliament 
enacted the Indian Citizenship Act in December 1955.287 The Act provided an important 
boost to women’s independence of citizenship. It granted married women independence of 
nationality, meaning that the wife of an Indian man could choose to take on his nationality 
but need not necessarily do so.  At the same time, the Citizenship Act also enacted 
citizenship-by-descent through the patrilineal line for Indians born abroad after 1950. The 
tensions between these two different aspects of the Act with respect to women’s citizenship 
are explored in this section through an examination of the debate between Home Minister 
Govind Ballabh Pant and Parliamentary Secretary Lakshmi Menon. 
When it enacted the citizenship articles of the Constitution in 1949, the Constituent 
Assembly delegated to future Parliaments the power to legislate on citizenship. Though part 
of its Constitution, India’s law of citizenship could be amended by simple statute rather than 
the more laborious Constitutional amendment process.288 The archives of the ministries 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 India’s first post-Independence elections were held in 1951-2, and the first elected Parliament met in 1952.  
288  Constitution of India, Article 11. This question is by no means so simple for the other sections of the 
Indian Constitution, especially the Fundamental Rights of social and economic equality and civil liberties in 
Part III of the Constitution. Specifically, the requirements for the amendment of the Fundamental Rights have 
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suggest that bureaucrats and politicians assumed that citizenship law in India would be 
further refined by statute on a priority footing.289 In 1952, the Home Ministry circulated a 
draft citizenship bill with a stern but ineffectual warning that  “the introduction of the Bill 
will not be held over for the comments” it requested from state governments.290 It was in this 
interregnum that Amirunnissa in Madras found herself stranded.  
Despite the 1952 warning, it was not until May 1955 that the Congress 
Government291 could introduce the Citizenship Bill to the Lok Sabha. With independent 
India’s second round of national elections just about a year away, the Election Commission 
needed to create voter rolls. This added urgency to the Indian National Congress-led 
Government’s ambitious legislative agenda, which also included its package of family law 
reforms.292 After two rounds of debate Parliament passed the Citizenship Bill in December 
1955. The Parliamentary debates evidenced a remarkably high level of awareness among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
given rise to the two most important cases in India’s constitutional history, Golak Nath and Keshavananda Bharti, 
both on the basic structure doctrine. 
289 As early as January 1950 Fateh Singh, then Deputy Secretary in the MHA, seemed to think that the new 
citizenship Act would be passed soon. See NAI, Ministry of Home Affairs, Foreigners II section, File No. 
33/3/50-F. II, 1950, “Recruitment to services—latest position re: non-Muslims who have migrated from 
Pakistan,” 5.   
290 NAI, Ministry of Home Affairs, F. II 33/41/52 F. II, “Draft Citizenship Bill Circulation to the State 
Government Mission Abroad,” 2, in 1950 and 1951 the Ministries of External Affairs, Rehabilitation, and Law, 
closely tracked the developments relating to the Pakistan’s citizenship law with a particular eye toward the 
position of Hindus in Pakistan. NAI, MEA, Pakistan I, Progs. No. 18(2)-PI 1951 (Pakistan Citizenship Bill) for 
this concern and a similar file from the previous year, NAI, MEA, File No. F. 23 (86) Pak III/50, Ministry of 
External Affairs, Pakistan III Branch, “Subject: Pakistan Citizenship Bill (D. 7090-Pak. III/50)” 1950. 
291 I capitalize here to indicate I am discussing the Congress party’s representative Government in Parliament, 
which in theory if not in practice could have been recalled if it lost its majority. This is in contrast to the 
government institutions that would continue to function no matter who was in power.  
292 Regarding the Election Rolls, see Shri BK Das’s comment in the Lok Sabha on August 9, 1955 when the 
motion to refer the Bill to a Joint Select Committee was being debated. Col. 9721. A note from the Ministry of 
Home Affairs from October 1954 seemed to imply a meeting to finalize the Citizenship Bill was held around 
that time. See NAI, MHA, File No. 99/54 Judicial, Ministry of Home Affairs-Judicial, 1954, Subject: Proposal 
to include in the draft Citizenship Bill provision prohibiting recruitment of Indians on Indian soil in the 
military service of the foreign countries. On the topic of registering voters for elections, see David Gilmartin, 
“One Day’s Sultan,” Contributions to Indian Sociology 43, no. 2 (2009): 247-84. Certainly Ambedkar’s resignation as 
Law Minister in 1951, and perhaps the earlier constitutional duel with President Prasad, contributed to the 
delay. The departure of Constitutional Advisor Sir B. N. Rau to the International Court of Justice in 1951 and 
his death in 1953 meant that the two most experienced voices on these highly complex legal topics were lost to 
the Government at nearly the same time. This is perhaps another reason for the delay. 
 85 
Members about the major concerns and dictates of international law, a notoriously arcane 
and difficult subject.293 
Aimed at Indians born on or after January 26, 1950, the Citizenship Act added to 
rather than replaced India’s Constitutional law of citizenship. Under the Act, the vast 
majority of Indians gained their citizenship through the straightforward citizenship-by-birth 
in India provision. After citizenship-by-birth, the next most common routes to citizenship 
would have been citizenship-by-descent for Indians abroad and citizenship-by-registration 
for several different groups.294  
The Government took its commitment to Indians abroad seriously295 and the Bill 
provided citizenship-by-descent for Indians born outside of India.296 The controversial 
aspect of this section was that it did not go far enough in casting its wide net over diasporic 
Indians. It granted citizenship through only the father's line.297 At the same time, the Act 
granted a non-Indian wife independence of nationality. A non-Indian woman could register as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293 Two especially important themes of these debates were the question of adjudging disloyalty and the bounds 
of executive discretion in depriving someone of citizenship which would resulted in the deprivation of some 
Constitutional rights.  Most Fundamental Rights applied to “persons” but some only applied to citizens 
including Article 15 (prohibition of discrimination); Article 16 (equality of employment), and Article 17 
(freedom of expression and speech, assembly, association, movement, and residence), and Article 29 (right to 
language, script, or culture).  For the difficulty of private international law see the letter of the great master 
Dicey himself to Keith in 1907, A.V. Dicey and Arthur Berriedale Keith, Constitutional Reflections: The 
Correspondence of Albert Venn Dicey and Arthur Berriedale Keith, eds. Ridgway F. Shinn and Richard A. Cosgrove 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996), 22.  
294 The ICA also allowed citizenship by naturalization and citizenship by acquisition of territory, but these 
would have been comparatively rare. Section 5, Citizenship by Registration granted citizenship to “persons of 
Indian origin” who resided in India for six months; “persons of Indian origin” resident abroad; women married 
to Indian citizens; minor children of Indian citizens, and citizens of certain Commonwealth countries.   
295 This 1955 statute first used the term “persons of Indian origin” for the children and grandchildren of a 
person born in undivided India. “Persons of Indian origin” is a category still in use today for Indians abroad; it 
grants them a legal status in India without treading on their claims to citizenship in their home countries. 
Chapter 1 discusses the evolution of this policy in 1946-50 in greater detail.  
296 Indian Citizenship Act (ICA) [No. 57 of 1955, with effect from December 30, 1955], s. 4(1). Clause 4(1) 
runs “A person born outside India on or after the 26th January, 1950, shall be a citizen of India by descent if his 
father is a citizen of India at the time of his birth.” Indians outside of India could also register with a 
“prescribed authority” such as an embassy,” under s. 5 of the Act. 
297 ICA 1955, s. 5, “Citizenship by Registration.” 
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an Indian citizen if she so desired, but her taking on Indian citizenship was not automatic.298 
The Government suggested that this reform was sufficient. Critics insisted that, despite the 
value of married women’s independence of nationality, limiting citizenship-by-descent to the 
patrilineal line contravened the Constitution. 
 From the start of the Parliamentary debates until after the final vote, Members of 
Parliament (MPs) criticized that approach. When the Citizenship Bill was circulated to state 
governments for comments and suggestions, the state government of West Bengal had 
criticized the approach.299 The very first MP to speak in this debate, Ashoka Mehta, a 
Congress representative from Maharashtra,300 pointed out that the children of Indian 
mothers married to non-Indian fathers were not treated on par with the children of Indian 
fathers married to non-Indian women.301  Criticism came from within the Congress party as 
well as from left parties such as the Kisan Mazdoor Praja and Communist Parties.302 I 
structure my discussion of the debates around the exchanges between two key figures, both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 ICA s. 5(1)(c). This was part of a global concern about married women’s citizenship that made its impact felt 
through questionnaires and research, international conferences, and international publications and 
correspondence. For example, in 1960 and 1961 the National Council of Women in India responded to a 
survey from its parent organization, the International Council of Women, about changes in nationality laws and 
their impact on children. See also Candice Lewis Bredbenner, A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage and the 
Law of Citizenship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
299 Three years earlier, in response to a request for feedback on the draft Bill, the West Bengal state government 
noted the gender inequity in the proposal, finding it inconsistent with the impression “the Bill is intended to 
include the widest possible category of potential Indian citizens.” NAI, MHA, Home F. II 33/41/52 F. II 
“Draft Citizenship Bill Circulation to the State Mission Abroad.” The file also contains responses from Uttar 
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Assam, Burma and Nairobi. 
300 Lok Sabha Debates [LSD], August 5, 1955. Asoka Mehta (1911-84) represented the Bhandara district for the 
Congress party & served in the Lok Sabha in the first Lok Sabha (1952-7), second Lok Sabha (1957-62) and 
fourth Lok Sabha (1967-70). He later served as the Cabinet Minister of Planning, Social Welfare and Petroleum 
and Chemicals at various dates between 1966 and 1968. Indian Parliamentary Companion, 309. 
301 Lok Sabha Debates [LSD], August 5, 1955, col. 9483-4. 
302 Such as Renu Chakravarty from the Communist Party in West Bengal (LSD, 9505, August 5, 1955); MS 
Gurupadaswamy from the Kisan Mazdoor Praja [Farm Workers’ Party] from Mysore (LSD, 9469, August 8, 
1955); SV Ramaswamy from the Congress in Madras (LSD, 9651, August 8, 1955); SVL Narasimhan, an 
Independent from Guntur, Andhra  (August 8, 1955, col. 9673); Veeraswamy, an Independent from the 
Scheduled Caste constituency of Mayuram, Madras (LSD, col. 9691-9748, August 9, 1955); Mulchand Dube 
from the Congress in Uttar Pradesh (Farrukhabad); and NR Muniswamy from Wandiwash (LSD, August 9, 
1955, 9726). Biographical data drawn from relevant entries in the Indian Parliamentary Companion: Who’s Who of 
Members of Lok Sabha (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 2003).   
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from the Uttar Pradesh Congress Party: Home Minister G. B. Pant and Parliamentary 
Secretary Lakshmi Menon. 
 Govind Ballabh Pant was the grand old man of Congress politics in Uttar Pradesh 
and was, by this time, rewarded for his loyalty to Nehru with the Home portfolio in Delhi.303  
As Home Minister, Pant defended the Government’s Citizenship Bill in Parliament in the 
second half of 1955. Pant’s first argument was both pragmatic and ideological, suggesting 
that, if Indian nationality could be passed through both mother and father, national identities 
would fragment and loyalties would be difficult to assess. He acknowledged that dual 
citizenship was a necessary evil because Indians abroad had ties to those countries as well as 
India.304  But if the principle went too far, “then we may have to be prepared for triple or six-
fold citizenship.”305 Citizenship by descent should be limited to only the male line in order to 
prevent the proliferation of citizenships and competing allegiances. To some extent, multiple 
nationalities would be impossible to avoid, but should nationalities proliferate overmuch, the 
Indian state would not be able to adjudge loyalty.306 This concern was likely shaped by both 
the context of Partition and the millions of overseas Indians who could claim one of several 
different nationalities. Pant also admitted “We have taken this provision bodily from the 
British Nationality Act.”307 This helped ensure that India’s citizenship law would fit into the 
complex international regime of nationality law: India’s nationality law should not cause 
conflicts or work against international trends in nationality law. “There [in the British Act] I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 In the rivalry between Nehru and Purushottam Das Tandon in the early 1950s. Page 2 of “Sweet Sour 
Remedies” by Ajit Prasad Jain, NMML manuscripts collection, private papers of A.P. Jain (serial no. 63). 
304 Lok Sabha, August 9, 1955, col. 9734. 
305 Ibid. 
306 Article 7’s inclusion indicates ensuring loyalty was one of the discursive emphases of the ideology of 
nationalism.  
307 The British Nationality Act (1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, Ch. 56) stated that “Subject to the provisions of this 
section, a person born after the commencement of this Act shall be a citizen of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies by descent if his father is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies at the time of the birth: …” 
See Pant’s comments at Lok Sabha Debates col. 9734, August 9, 1955.  
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think women have been treated with courtesy and respect,” Pant stated in defense of the 
provision.308 But borrowing from the British Act opened the Government to charges of 
imitative adherence to English law despite India’s newly independent status.    
Pant also justified citizenship by patrilineal descent by pointing to what was, in his 
view, a tradition of patrilineal descent in India.309 Pant argued that Indian tradition was 
patrilineal and preserved the “sublime status” of Indian mothers: “In our country too in the 
olden days the highest virtue that one could earn was to be called the mother of the man 
addressing her. So that is the sublime status that women occupied as such.”310 Pant’s use of 
the term “olden days” is reminiscent of the “rise-and-fall” narrative of women in ancient 
India promoted by Indian nationalist histories of women. In this view, women in ancient 
India occupied a revered position, but suffered a loss in social status and respect as Hindu 
culture was degraded under Delhi Sultanate and Mughal rule.311 It was the project of Indian 
nationalism to restore women to their previous “sublime status.” Pant suggested there was 
no question of discrimination against Indian mothers because Indian women were honored 
as mothers, even if the Citizenship Act did not grant their children citizenship.   
Pant, not always consistent, also suggested that the discrimination in the patrilineal 
citizenship provision was balanced by the grant of married women’s independent 
nationality.312 Moreover, the Government planned to ameliorate women’s exclusion from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 Lok Sabha Debates, August 9, 1955, col. 9734. 
309 However Indian personal law had always granted a great deal of scope for India’s matrilineal cultures, 
especially in the south. See J. Devika En-gendering Individuals: The Language of Re-forming in Twentieth Century Keralam 
(New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2007) and Individuals, Householders, Citizens: Malayalis and Family Planning, 1930-
1970; G. Arunima Here Comes Papa; Janaki Nair, Women and Law in Colonial India. 
310  Lok Sabha, August 9, 1955, col. 9734. Uma Chakravarti’s essay “Whatever Happened to the Vedic Dasi?” 
in the seminal volume Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History, ed. Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid 
(New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 27-87. A. S. Altekar, The Position of Women in Hindu 
Civilisation, from Prehistoric Times to the Present Day, 2nd ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1956). 
311 The ideas of “Hindu culture” and “Muslim rule” are deeply problematic and I strongly disagree with them. 
Sometimes colonial rule was assigned responsibility for degrading women’s status.  
312Lok Sabha, August 9, 1955, col. 9734. 
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inheritance with its Hindu Succession Bill.313 Rather than extending that principle to 
citizenship-by-descent, Pant suggested these two reforms were sufficient. The Succession 
Act would not change what Pant saw as “the deep-seated sentiments of the people” who, 
according to him, “can think only of the continuance of the lineage in the paternal line.” The 
matrilineal traditions of India found no space. In Pant’s view, the Succession Act and 
married women’s choice of nationality were minor changes to the overarching structure of 
the law, which rightly privileged the legal identity of the husband. 
 The Joint Select Committee314 chaired by Pant featured only one female member out 
of forty-five, Anasuyabai Kale, a representative of the Congress Party from Maharashtra.315 
Only one of the six notes of dissent addressed the gender inequity of the provision. By H. N. 
Mukerjee, M.N. Das, and JVK Vallabharao,316 the note argued, “we have been fairly lavish in 
the bestowal of citizenship rights on different categories.”317 Why should citizenship rights 
not be extended to the children of Indian mothers abroad? The trio disagreed with Pant’s 
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313 Ibid. The Succession [inheritance] Bill was part of the Hindu Code reforms discussed in the next chapter. As 
it turns out, the Succession Act’s reforms were less effective in this regard than might have been hoped, 
proving Pant correct. The Hindu Succession Act did grant inheritance rights to daughters, but in most states 
these rights did not apply to agricultural property, where the vast majority of India’s wealth is held. The most 
important commentator on this topic is feminist economist Bina Agarwal, who spearheaded a successful 2005 
campaign to amend the Hindu Succession Act in this regard. See Bina Agarwal’s comprehensive A Field of One’s 
Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
314See Deputy Speaker in Lok Sabha debates, August 9, 1955, around 9747. The Draftsman was R.S. Sarkar, a 
Joint Secretary and S.A. Draftsman in the Ministry of Law. The Secretariat was represented by N.N. Mallaya, 
Deputy Secretary, and P.K. Patnaik, Under Secretary. The complete list of members is found in Gazette of India, 
Part II, Section 2, No. 49A, Monday, November 21, 1955, pp. 702A-702Z. 
315Anasuyabai Kale (b. 1896) represented Nagpur in the Lok Sabha from 1952-7. Prior to that she had been a 
nominated member of the CP and Berar Legislative Council (1928) and served as Deputy Speaker of the 
Central Provinces Legislative Council in Nagpur (1937). She had also been active in the AIWC as well as the 
Congress, prior to independence. Shanta Bhatt, Profiles of Women Parliamentarians of India (Udaipur: Shiva 
Publishers, 1995), 616-17. 
316The other dissenting notes were by Raghubir Sahai, NP Nathwani, Lanka Sundaram, the trio of HV Kamath, 
Sarangadhar Das and BC Ghose, and HN Kunzru. They addressed issues such as the naturalization and 
deprivation processes, the position of overseas of Indians and the question of whether a corporation should be 
a citizen. See Report, pp. 702F-702P. According to its Report, the Committee met four times: on 23 
September, 11, 12 and November 20, 1955. The Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part II-Section 2, No. 49A, 
Monday, November 21, 1955, para. 2, p. 702C.  
317 Ibid., 702G.  
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create too many nationalities. Instead they based their argument in equality, arguing “The 
implied discrimination against [women] should go...”318 After its four meetings in the autumn 
of 1955, the Joint Select Committee did not recommend any changes to the citizenship-by-
descent provisions. 
 When the Bill came up for final consideration in the Rajya Sabha in December, 
Lakshmi Menon, a leader in the All-India Women’s Conference, argued that the provision 
was unconstitutional:  
 Generally speaking, the Bill is much more restrictive than article 5 of our 
Constitution. Here for the first time you find distinctions made between male and 
female, father and mother, married women who are married to foreigners, etc. All 
these, I think, contravene the very generous principles which are embodied in our 
Constitution with regard to citizenship.319 
 
Menon held a law degree from Lucknow University and in 1944 published The Position of 
Women, a short but comprehensive report on the status of women in India.320 If anyone 
understood the implications of the tangle of laws for women’s status it would be Menon.321  
Menon proposed changes to both clause 4 and clause 5. First, she would have opened 
citizenship by descent to both mothers and fathers arguing, “Wherever there is ‘father,’ it 
must say ‘parent.’” Second, for Menon, married women’s independent nationality was not 
enough; she wanted to press the principle of gender equality even further. She moved that 
the non-Indian wife or husband of an Indian citizen be given the choice to register as an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 Ibid.  
319 Rajya Sabha Debates, December 13, 1955, Smt Lakshmi Menon (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for 
External Affairs), around col. 2388.  
320 Menon later served as Deputy Minister or Executive Affairs from 1957-62. Lakshmi N. Menon, The Position 
of Women, Oxford Pamphlets on Indian Affairs 2 (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1944). 
321 As also see discussion of Seeta Parmanand in the footnotes below. She worked on the equally difficult 
Succession law.  
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Indian citizen.322 Menon went on to argue, “…right through the Bill you find this kind of 
discrimination which is unfair and which in my opinion also contravenes the Constitution.” 
Menon derided Pant's earlier argument about the proliferation of nationalities as a “fantastic 
calculation” and “an absurd and a fallacious example given by some very imaginative 
member of the Law Ministry or the Home Ministry.”323 
Recalling the incident later in life, Menon noted that Pandit H. N. Kunzru warned 
her she would be “sacked” from her position as Parliamentary Secretary for deviating from 
the Congress Government’s party line.  Kunzru, a champion of diasporic Indians’ rights, 
nevertheless agreed to speak in support of her position.324 Menon later attributed her 
decision to break with the Government line to her lack of knowledge about Parliamentary 
conventions. Here Menon’s position as a woman's activist conflicted with her prominent 
position in the government. The next day the Deputy Home Minister325 felt obligated to 
clarify that Lakshmi Menon’s amendments were personal, not those of the Government. 
Menon’s amendments, and others like them, were rejected.326  This aspect of the Citizenship 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 She also recommended that “father” in clauses 3(2) (a) and (b) should be changed to parent. These clauses 
dealt with those who would be excluded from citizenship by birth in India such as children of fathers resident 
in India but with diplomatic immunity or who were enemy aliens.  
323 Rajya Sabha Debates, December 13, 1955, Lakshmi Menon (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for 
External Affairs), col. 2388. 
324 Even though Kunzru served on the Joint Select Committee, he was not a member of the group that 
supported changes in these provisions. Lakshmi Menon wrote about this episode in a brief essay on her 
relationship with Nehru. “Once I moved an amendment to the Citizenship Bill because there was a 
discriminatory clause in it which I thought should not find a place in the bill. I was Parliamentary Secretary then 
but was not knowledgeable enough to know that I should not have done it. I was happy when Pandit Kunzru 
said ‘Madam, you will be sacked; but I am going to support the amendment.’ Pandit Kunzru made a moving a 
speech and said that P.M. was not wisely advised etc. Well, I had to withdraw the amendment of course, I was 
not sacked.” In the same essay Menon described Nehru's commitment to resolving the canal waters dispute 
with Pakistan and his position on stateless Indians in Ceylon. This (serial 24) is found in Lakshmi Menon’s 
papers in Personal Paper Collections, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi. Kunzru was a well-
known advocate for the position of Indians abroad. For example, Y.D. Gundevia's memoir notes that at this 
time hew as a minister in Home Affairs, and he turned to Pandit Kunzru for help in trying to influence the new 
citizenship law. See Gundevia’s memoir, Outside the Archives, 50-60.   
325  Balwant Nagesh Datar. 
326Important changes introduced in the Bill after the Select Committee's report included: 1) the question of the 
process refugees from Pakistan would have to go through to register as citizens and 2) a guarantee by Nehru 
barring the grant of citizenship rights to citizens of countries that discriminated against Indians resident there. 
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Act was not changed until 1992.  When the Deputy Home Minister again explained that the 
descent through the male line was based in English and Commonwealth legal principles, 
Lakshmi Menon interrupted to ask, “Can’t we have a law of our own?” after which the 
debate moved on.327 Menon suggested that the post-colonial state would do better by its 
citizens by scrupulously adhering to the principles of gender equality laid out in the 
Constitution and not by accepting patriarchal colonial legal practices.  
 The ICA’s patrilinity was justified by the allowance of married women’s 
independence of nationality, Hindu family law reforms, and appeals to Indian tradition, 
which, in this ideology, simultaneously honored mothers and adhered to the paternal line. 
The paternal line was maintained for diasporic Indians through the citizenship-by-descent 
provision despite criticism that it was unconstitutional and out of line with the spirit of 
gender equality. The Government's response was that allowing citizenship by descent 
through father and mother would create fractured loyalties and unwieldy administrative 
complications.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
This was in response to the concern raised in the Parliament about South African discrimination against 
Indians, since under section 11 reciprocal citizen rights would be granted to Commonwealth citizens.  
327RSD, December 14, 1955, col. 2613-4, debate on clause 4 amendments. Just after the Rajya Sabha approved 
the Bill, another important female MP, Seeta Parmanand, made a brief interruption in the Parliamentary 
proceedings. Parmanand was the author of a piece called “The Hindu Succession Bill and the Socialist Pattern 
of Society” and a member of the Joint Select Committee on the Hindu Succession Bill. Like Menon, she was 
active in the All India Women’s Conference. That her speech came too late, only after the final vote on the Bill, 
did not stop Parmanand from criticizing the citizenship-by-descent provision on Constitutional and human 
rights grounds. The Deputy Home Minister responded by stating only that he would accept the challenge of a 
future amendment to the Bill. Rajya Sabha Debates, December 14, 1955, col. 2657 
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Persons of Indian Origin and Wives, 1955-60 
 The 1955 ICA substantially clarified married women’s citizenship and greatly 
expanded the routes by which Indians resident abroad could apply. Executive discretion at 
the state and national level also continued to play a key role in citizenship law. In June 1958, 
the Rajasthan state government asked New Delhi which pathway to citizenship Pakistani 
women who married Indian men should take. They could either be registered on the basis of 
their six months’ residence in India as “persons of Indian origin” or they could be registered 
on the basis of their marriage to an Indian citizen and one year’s residence in India.  The 
distinctions between these two categories are seemingly minor, but there are some important 
differences.  Under the Act, persons of Indian origin could be deprived of citizenship by the 
Central Government in summary fashion.328 A wife’s claim on citizenship by marriage was 
more secure, though it required twelve rather than six months’ residence.329 Created by the 
ICA, the category of “person of Indian origin” (PIO) has been an enduring one.330 
In August 1958, the Ministry of Home Affairs in New Delhi responded that “there 
was no objection” to such women being registered as citizens by six months’ residence.331 
However, the matter did not end there. Repeating a pattern now familiar, the Rajasthan 
government sent a follow-up question, giving the New Delhi ministries a chance to revise 
their policy. Should “Pakistani ladies” who divorced Indian men be registered under the 
residence provision or the marriage provision? Fateh Singh, by now a Joint Secretary in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 See s. 10 ICA and discussion in A.N. Sinha, Law of Citizenship and Aliens in India, 130-1. 
329 See ICA s. 10(1) on the deprivation of citizenship.  
330 In 2011 it was announced the PIO scheme would merge with the Overseas Citizens of India category (OCI) 
apparently in an attempt to make it easier for overseas Indians to do business in India: “PM Announces 
Merging of OCI, PIO Card-Indian Express,” The Indian Express, January 8, 2011, 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/pm-announces-merging-of-oci-pio-cards/735090/, last accessed April 
21, 2015. 
331  NAI, MHA, File No. 6/48/58-IC 1958. Indian Citizenship Branch-Home Ministry. “Registration under the 
Citizenship Act 1955-Question whether Pakistani women who have come to India on migration certificates can 
be registered as Indian citizens under section 5(1)(a) or section 5(1)(c) of the Citizenship Act, 1955.” 
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MHA, consulted with the Ministry of the Law and decided that these women should, despite 
their divorces, be registered citizens by marriage.332 Fateh Singh reasoned, “… in such cases 
[of divorce] the chances are that the lady concerned will go back to her parents in Pakistan. 
It will only be in exceptional circumstances, e.g. where the lady has nobody in Pakistan to 
look after her, or she has close relatives in India, that she would remain in India. Such 
exceptional cases can be considered on individual merits and the State Government may be 
advised to refer such cases to the Government of India when they arise.”333 The Home 
Ministry recommended that divorced women be registered as previously married citizens but 
if there was any doubt the file should be subject to further scrutiny. It was assumed that 
these women would not want to stay in India. This correspondence shows it was difficult to 
imagine married women as independent legal subjects even when statutory rights had been 
enacted.334 At the same time, providing such women citizenship as married women provided 
protection from summary deprivation of citizenship.335  
 The case of Ram Pyari of Burma prompted several rounds of debate between the 
Ministries of Home and External Affairs in New Delhi. The legal point that provoked this 
extensive exercise in genealogy was whether Burmese women of Indian origin should 
register as wives of Indians or persons of Indian origin. Another example of the difficulty in 
adjudicating identity, the correspondence indicates the “arbitrariness” of claims to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 Fateh Singh's note of October 8, 1958, in NAI, MHA, F. 6/56/58-IC, Home Ministry-Branch Indian 
Citizenship, 1958, “Subject: Registration under the Citizenship Act, 1955 and Registration of Pakistani ladies 
married to Indian nationals and later divorce-Question regarding-(Reference from the Govt. of Rajasthan).” 
333   Ibid., page 4 and Serial No. 2. 
334 A. N. Sinha notes, “According to an official press release twenty-three foreign women married to Indians 
had acquired Indian citizenship till September 1958. These were 12 from Pakistan, 2 from Ceylon, 2 from 
Czechoslovakia, one each from Austria, Burma, China, Luxembourg, Portugal, Russia, and one stateless, The 
Times of India, Delhi dated 9 November, 1958, page 5.” Sinha, Law of Citizenship, 102, n. 111. However, I have 
not been able to locate this clipping in the Times of India’s online archive.  
335 Anupama Roy seems to have come across similar or the same correspondence on this topic, Mapping 
Citizenship, 68-9. 
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citizenship. Despite the clarifications provided by the new statute, the question of married 
women’s citizenship still arose, and discretion was still employed in making decisions.336 
 Should she come on an Indian passport issued to her in Burma, after having been 
registered as a person of Indian origin resident abroad?337 Or, should she come to India on 
an emergency certificate instead, after which she could register upon six month’s residence 
or as the wife of an Indian citizen? Initially, the MEA opposed Ram Pyari's immediate 
registration in Burma, saying “We need not make a gift of Indian citizenship to her for the 
short time that she is going to be in Burma.”338 However, the MHA preferred that she 
register as a citizen in Burma so she could travel on a regular Indian passport. The MEA 
finally accepted this position even though, as its notes showed, “On merits the applicant has 
a poor case.” Ram Pyari had not registered as a citizen under the Constitution when her 
husband did. In the eyes of the MEA this indicated a lack of commitment to India, though 
in reality it could have been the result of any number of factors. As the MEA put it, “The 
only point in her favor is that she is the wife of an Indian national [and] we discourage dual 
nationality in the same family.”339 The MEA was willing to accept the MHA's 
recommendation to immediately register Ram Pyari, but it called for a more consistent 
application of the policy in the future. This time, the MHA prevailed and Ram Pyari could 
register in Burma as a person of Indian origin resident abroad.340  
 The Ministry of Home Affairs provided a list of women who had been in the same 
position as Ram Pyari. It gave five cases of women of Indian origin who were married to 
Indian men in Burma. In three cases, the wives were registered as persons of Indian origin, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 ICA s. 5(1)(b). See Ram Pyari's application at accompanying letters at corres/1-5 of file.  
337 ICA s. 5(1)(b). See page 8 of Ministry of Home Affairs, IC Section, File No. 5/217/59-I.C., 1959, Subject: 1) 
Smt. Ram Ryari w/o Stm. Bahadur Singh-Registration as an Indian Citizen under Sec 5(1)(?) of the Citizenship 
Act, 1955.”  
338 Ibid., 6. 
339 Ibid., 7.  
340 Ibid., 8.  
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on their own merits as citizens abroad. In all three of these cases, the justification involved 
the women’s family ties. The MHA justified these decisions with statements like, “Her 
registration was authorized on the basis of her husband’s nationality.”341 The women's family 
ties, especially their marital ties, provided the basis for these women's registrations as Indians 
resident abroad. 
 But in the other two cases examined, the women had been rejected for citizenship as 
persons of Indian origin. It had been decided that the women were not of Indian origin and 
would have to come to India with their husbands and then register as the wives of Indian 
men after one year's residence. These women seemed not to differ in material ways from the 
women accepted as persons of Indian origin. The different outcomes in the two sets of cases 
are a clear example of the use of discretion by the administrators of Indian citizenship law.  
 These inconsistencies prompted the MHA's Indian Citizenship department to call 
for “a definite policy with regard to the registration of ladies in such cases.” In the end, an 
anonymous Undersecretary recommended “extending the facility of registration under 
section 5(1)(b) of the Act to these ladies on the ground of their husbands’ Indian nationality 
provided their Indian origin is established and there is nothing against them on record.”342  
Above him, Joint Secretary Fateh Singh, whose career working on Indian citizenship 
decisions now touched almost a decade, was not so willing to let “these ladies” into India as 
persons of Indian origin. For example, Singh thought that if the women were of Indian 
origin only by a grandparent, rather than by a parent, the case would need further 
deliberation. In the end, Singh came to the conclusion that “although we should, as a general 
principle, accept the position that such women can be registered under section 5(1)(b), each 
case should be decided on its merits.” The MEA agreed to this position. Though something 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 Ibid., 8. 
342 Ibid., dated December 12, 1959, 9-10 of file. 
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of a clarification, it did not seem to engender the consistency the MEA had originally 
requested.343 Bureaucrats managed to simultaneously claim that they were registering women 
“on their own merits” under section 5(1)(b) of the Act and rely on these women's marriages 
to Indian men as a factor contributing to their status as persons of Indian origin.  
 The ICA provided several routes to citizenship via marriage. The principle of family 
unity underwrote registrations as persons of Indian origin in the case of Burmese women 
married to Indian men. Generally the policy was viewed as a humanitarian policy designed to 
keep families together.344 Even as the statute clarified, bureaucratic thinking continued to see 
women as part of family units and to use these ties in determining wives’ access to 
citizenship. In the final section of this chapter, I turn to the extensive executive powers that 
were used to target Muslim males’ claims to Indian citizenship.  
 
Executive Power, Detention, and Deportation 
Post-1955 citizenship law in India was characterized by the broad scope granted to 
administrative discretion and executive power.345 This led to a targeted application of the 
policy to Muslim males with ties to Pakistan.346 The failure of a citizenship claim could lead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 Ibid., 9-13 of file.  
344 This must be emphasized given the family divisions and trauma created by Partition; see the seminal 
feminist historiography of trauma and violence found in Butalia, Other Side of Silence and Menon and Bhasin, 
Borders and Boundaries.  
345 Ann Dummett and Andrew G.L. Nicol devote an entire chapter of their book, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and 
Others: Nationality and Immigration Law (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1990) to the topic of “Secrecy and 
Discretion.” Throughout the book the authors also point to the growing power of the bureaucracy under the 
executive (see 82 and 148), especially in the twentieth century. The emphasis on secrecy and executive power is 
similar in this section. In their first chapter, they write that “...there is always room within the terms of 
legislation, for functionaries to develop their own rules of practice and make their own judgments on facts. For 
example, if legislation specifies that an alien acquires some privilege after a certain period of residence, what 
evidence for that residence will be accepted?.... Such matters are usually dealt with in detailed regulations issued 
under the legislation, an these are drafted by one set of functionaries and applied by another.” (15) Throughout 
the book, the authors also point to the growing power of the bureaucracy under the executive (see 82 and 148), 
especially in the twentieth century. The emphasis on secrecy and executive power is similar in this section.  
346 I found two cases in the courts aimed at non-Muslims. In 1956 the State of Bombay ordered deportation in 
Michael Anthony Rodrigues vs. State of Bombay on grounds of Rodrigues’s anti-national activity and non-Indian 
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to deportation or a sentence of imprisonment, or perhaps even indefinite detention.347 From 
1956 until 1970, such actions by Indian states produced at least thirty-four petitions before 
the High Courts, almost all of them involving states’ attempts to deport or detain Muslims 
with ties to Pakistan.348 These originated as Indian states, apparently zealously, enforced the 
complex rules surrounding passports and permits under the Passports Act, the Foreigners 
Act, and the new Citizenship Act.349 While the Indian courts did not always uphold these 
exclusionary efforts, they sometimes did.  
Many of the Muslim women discussed in the first part of this chapter could now 
consider registering under the new Citizenship Act’s provisions for citizenship-by-
registration—exactly what Ram Pyari and the Pakistani women were allowed to do. They 
could register either as “persons of Indian origin” or wives of Indian citizens.350 If they did 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
status. Though he was born in Goa, he had long residence in Bombay. The deportation ultimately failed when 
Chief Justice Chagla found his junior judge’s decision in error (AIR 1956 Bombay 501; 729). In Miss Shanti 
Singh vs. Governor of Punjab (AIR 1959 PH 375: 1959 CriLJ 1018), Shanti Singh went to Lahore in 1946. As a 
Government of India employee, Shanti Singh “opted” for India in 1947 but she seems to have remained in 
Pakistan. In 1953, she finally took out a Pakistani passport so she could return to India. The State of Punjab 
(India) ordered her to leave or be deported. She challenged this, claiming her domicile had always remained 
Indian. Justice Dua neutrally applied the test of domicile to Shanti Singh and allowed her deportation. I have 
greatly condensed many of the details of these judgments here.  
347 One 1959 petition succeeded in getting the Andhra Pradesh government to release Abdul Khader upon a 
determination of his citizenship, but only after an eighteen-month detention (In Re: Abdul Khader vs. Unknown, 
AIR 1959 AP 241). Also discussed in Roy, Mapping Citizenship, 58-9. 
348 This count leaves out the litigation around Evacuee Property statutes, also substantial. Zamindar discusses a 
few of these High Court and Supreme Court decisions from the pre-1955 period and highlights the role of 
discretion and arbitrariness. pp. 106-11. It was not until 2010 that the Raja of Mahmudabad settled his claims 
on property in Delhi. See Zamindar, Long Partition, for an excellent discussion of how the evacuee property 
settlements worked. Details can also be found in Nehru’s published correspondence with Mohanlal Saksena, 
the Minister of Relief and Rehabilitation in 1949. Nehru and S. Gopal, ed., Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 
second series, vol. 13 (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1992), 101-9.  
349 Like most twentieth century statutes enacted in India, these three statutes provided broad powers of 
discretion to the appropriate ministries under the executive. The executive power was extensive. The statute 
passed in Parliament was a mere starting point. Once enacted, executive power worked in several ways. There 
was the power to make rules under the relevant Act as well as the power for day-to-day enforcement. There 
were also usually broad powers to enact Ordinances, temporary amendments to the Act that were made as 
emergency provisions but could be quite long-lasting. Under British rule, the Ordinance power was even 
greater than under the Constitution. Under the Constitution, there is a formal requirement that eventually 
Parliament ratify the Ordinance before its expiry. See Austin, Indian Constitution, 208-9.  
350 S. 5(1)(a) and s. 5(1)(c). Which route married women should take was debated at least twice in the Ministry 
of Home Affairs during the 1950s. Fateh Singh, now a Joint Secretary, as usual, was right in the thick of things. 
One series of correspondence involved Pakistani women married to Indian men and another involved Indian 
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not somehow become citizens, though, they could be deemed foreigners in India illegally.  
Indeed, Sherman’s evidence and the lengthy files in the archives both suggest, as Sherman 
puts it, that some “District Magistrates were ‘asked to maintain a look out for their [alleged 
Pakistanis] arrival in their districts and to keep them under surveillance for some time.’”351 
Even after the Citizenship Act, the Constitutional law of citizenship continued to form the 
major subject of litigation, because the Citizenship Act only applied automatically to those 
born after 1950.352 The High Courts engaged in a discussion of minors’ nationality, 
examining to what extent a minor, like a wife, could exhibit independent intent to migrate to 
Pakistan under Article 7. At first the rule of dependent nationality was strictly applied, 
whether that meant the petitioner would be expelled or allowed to remain in India. By 1965, 
the courts resisted using such a strict interpretation of dependent domicile, finding the rule 
of minors’ dependence required modification due to the unique circumstances of Partition.353 
The Supreme Court also put limits on Article 7’s scope in 1963, in another five-justice 
Division Bench decision that involved the same advocates and one of the same justices as in 
the 1955 decision.354  
 The Passport Act punished those who entered the country without a valid passport. 
Two High Court cases about a group of weavers from Uttar Pradesh who went to Pakistan 
after Partition and returned in the late 1950s indicate that the Indian state had difficulty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
women in Burma married to Indian men.  NAI, MHA, Ministry of Home Affairs, IC Section, File No. 
5/217/59-I.C., 1959 re: Smt. Ram Pyari and F. 6/56/58-IC, 1958, “Registration of Pakistani ladies married to 
Indian nationals and later divorce-Question regarding-(Reference from the Govt. of Rajasthan).” 
351 Sherman, “Migration,” 104 and n. 105.  
352 Except for citizenship by registration under s. 5.  
353 Justices suggested India’s experience was unique, but see recent work by Lucy P. Chester that highlights the 
similarities between the cartography and ideology of India’s partition and the division of mandate Palestine. 
Chester, “Boundary Commissions”; Alexandre Kedar, “Nation State Formation and Ethnic Displacement: The 
Enduring Legal Legacy of the British Empire” (lecture, International Law Workshop, University of Michigan 
School of Law, October 13, 2008).  
354 IN Shroff and BN Sen.  
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policing its western border.355 Abdul Hamid was a weaver from Meerut and his wife Latifa 
hailed from Muzaffarnagar, both in Uttar Pradesh.356 Based on the evidence, Justices Kapur 
and Passey were certain that the parents of both respondents went to Pakistan not during 
but after Partition.357 They were also certain that Latifa accompanied her parents, and it 
seemed likely Abdul went with his. The Justices doubted whether the two were really 
married to each other, suggesting Latifa married someone else in Pakistan.358 The Justices 
suggested that Abdul Hamid and Latifa were each Pakistani by virtue of their parents’ 
migration under private international law. They also fell within the ambit of Article 7, 
excluding those who migrated to Pakistan from Indian citizenship. This long discussion of 
their national status was gratuitous, for what really mattered was the fact that they entered 
India without a passport. That rule applied even to those with Indian domicile if they came 
from Pakistan.359 The Justices convicted both husband and wife under the Passport Act, with 
penalties of rigorous imprisonment and fines.360 The judgment stated that the Executive 
Government could decide what to do with the couple after their release, holding out at least 
some hope they would be allowed to stay in India, perhaps by registering. One imagines that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355  Zamindar, Long Partition, discusses the Korakpur crossing. 
356  The State vs. Abdul Hamid and Anr, AIR 1957 PH 86. The case Abdul Rahman...vs. State of UP (AIR 1958 All 
165) also involved weavers going from Tanda, Faizabad district, Uttar Pradesh, to Pakistan. Abdul Rahman 
came back to India “when he found that conditions prevailing in the weaving industry in Pakistan were bad.” 
His wife is briefly mentioned as coming back with him. That petition was dismissed.  
357There is no date given beyond this in the judgment. 
358 Latifa faced a similar problem of proof as the wives discussed in the next chapter. The Justices cast implicit 
aspersions upon her chastity and honesty by suggesting she was not married to Abdul.  In contrast, justices in 
matrimonial litigation strongly disapproved of men’s allegations on a woman’s chastity.  
359 The removal of Pakistan from the exceptions list took place in October 1952. See Abdul Hamid, paras. 17 
and 23. Even if Abdul were found to be Indian, therefore, Latifa could not claim Indian citizenship on the 
basis of her marriage to Abdul. The counsel for Abdul Hamid pointed to a court judgment by a Lahore 
Magistrate that Abdul Hamid was an Indian citizen, but the High Court judge did not accept it. They were not 
being punished under the Foreigners Act but the Indian Passport Act, 1920, read with the Indian Passport 
Rules, 1950. See para. 23 of the judgment, the second ruling is “that Abdul Hamid is not a national of India and 
therefore by marriage (even if its proved) Latifan has not become a national of India.” 
360They ordered a period of imprisonment of three months for Abdul Hamid as well as a fifty Rupee fine. 
Latifa Hamid was punished with imprisonment for one week and a thirty Rupee fine. Then the Judge stated 
that it was for the Executive Government to decide what to do with them after their release.  
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after their imprisonment, assuming it was enforced, there was a good chance they would 
want to leave India. 
 In 1960 the Madhya Bharat High Court gathered 23 petitions and appeals involving 
orders passed under the Foreigners Act of 1946.361 The Foreigners Act as it stood then362 
allowed a Magistrate to order foreigners to leave India within two weeks.363 The various 
petitioners all disobeyed the order and found themselves hauled up for punishment. These 
were their appeals claiming they were not foreigners but Indians. The petitioners all had 
migrated to Pakistan. The major legal question at hand was whether Article 7’s bar on 
migration to Pakistan after 1947 was meant to last forever, or only until 1950, when the 
Constitution took effect. Two of the three justices found the Article had only a limited time 
frame, while one thought it referred to migration to Pakistan any time after 1947.364 The 
former was the more lenient position. It would put an end to the many prosecutions of 
those who at some point went to Pakistan even after 1950. The matter was taken up by the 
Supreme Court. The case of Peer Mohammad and his wife Khatoon were among the appeals 
dealt with by the Madhya Bharat High Court’s initial ruling in 1960.365 The couple lent their 
name to the appeal before the Supreme Court in 1962. 
 Before the five-justice bench of the Supreme Court in 1962, the State’s case was that 
the respondents were not citizens under Article 7 due to their migration to Pakistan. The 
Supreme Court framed the question as, “can the respondents be said to be foreigners at the 
relevant date under Article 7, because they left India for Pakistan after January 26, 1950?”366 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 Firoz Mehrauddin v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Mahasumund, AIR 1961 MP 110. 
362 Foreigners Act s. 14 and the Foreigners Order 1948 clause 7.  
363 JMFC (Judicial Magistrate First Class).  
364 Shrivastava and Newaskar on the one side and Naik on the other. 
365 State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Peer Mohammad and Anr, 1963 AIR [Supreme Court] 645. There the case is named 
after wife Mst. Khatoon (Criminal Appeal No. 388 of 1958).  
366 Para 10.  
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The Supreme Court found that the petitioners were citizens, or at least that they were not 
foreigners. They had migrated to Pakistan, yes, but by making the move after the 
Constitution took effect in 1950, they escaped the effect of Article 7. Now Article 7’s ban on 
migration was confined to only the three-year period between 1947 and the Constitutional 
law of citizenship. Therefore, they could not be prosecuted under the Foreigners Act and the 
case had to be decided by the Central Government.367 Presumably this decision put a halt to, 
or at least a brake on, state enforcement actions against those with Pakistan connections 
under the Foreigners and Passport Acts. At the same time, the petitioners were still not 
home free. The state of Madhya Bharat could still ask the Central government to determine 
whether the petitioners were citizens under the Citizenship Act. But prima facie they were not 
not-citizens. They had to await the central government’s determination about their 
citizenship status under the Indian Citizenship Act. 
 Another set of five petitions before the High Courts came from those who went to 
Pakistan as minors. In each, a male who was a minor at the time of Partition faced challenges 
to his status due to his status as a minor at the time of migration.368 In three of these, the 
petitioner was released from detention under the Foreigner's Act and in the other two he 
was allowed to be expelled. By 1965 the Courts began to question the dependent nationality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 What is also noteworthy in Gajendragadkar’s ruling in Peer Mohammad is that the previous year he had 
written an opinion on another case upholding the powers of the Central Government under s. 9(2)b of the ICA 
to take a foreign passport as proof of taking on foreign citizenship (Izhar Ahmad Khan vs. Union of India 1962 AIR 
1052). This was a divided opinion and Das Gupta (on the bench in Peer Mohammad) had been writing for the 
minority. Gajendragadkar was joined by KN Wanchoo (who with Das Gupta and Gajendragadkar, heard the 
Peer Mohammad case) and N. Rajagopala Ayyanagar. Das Gupta’s minority opinion found this rule invalid, 
though they did not dispute the powers of the Central Government under s. 9 beyond this.  
368 Notably, the Supreme Court ruled in Peer Mohammad that migration to Pakistan for the purposes of Article 7 
only referred to migration between 1947 and the commencement of the Constitution on January 26, 1950. This 
is similar to the “narrow interpretation of migration” discussed by Roy, Mapping Citizenship, in relation to Shanno 
Devi v. Mangal Singh (AIR 1961 SCR 576). See Roy, 60.  
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of minor sons who were Muslim, just as the Supreme Court had done for a Muslim wife a 
decade before in the Rani Sayeedah case.369 
  In Sharafat370and Umar 371 the two minors had both been picked up by their respective 
state governments under the Foreigner’s Act, implying they were not citizens and were in 
India illegally. In both cases the rule of the son’s dependent nationality was applied, though 
the outcomes were different. In Sharafat, the petitioner traveled to Pakistan with his maternal 
uncle in 1955. Both his father and mother remained in India. When his father was murdered 
about a year after the son’s departure, Sharafat came rushing back to Rampur (Uttar Pradesh, 
India) on a Pakistani passport. Since his father's domicile never changed though Sharafat 
himself went to Pakistan, Justice Broome of the Allahabad High Court found that Sharafat 
remained Indian and should be released from detention.372  
In Muhammad Umar, in contrast, the petitioner went to Pakistan with his father and 
then returned to Orissa by himself to reside with his mother and maternal grandfather. 
Muhammad Umar's several attempts to obtain citizenship through the state government all 
failed; the High Court allowed the state’s order imprisoning him for one month to stand.373 
The outcomes of the cases differed, but the principle of a minor's nationality following his 
father's went unquestioned in both. By 1966 and 1967374 the position began to change, and 
Kumar Amar Singh's ruling about the wife's dependent domicile was applied by analogy to the 
give the minor independence of intention. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 Rashid Hasan Roomi vs. Union of India, AIR 1967 All 154; Shree Mohammad Yusuf vs. Union of India, (AIR 1967 
Pat 266).  
370Sharafat Ali Khan vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1960 All 637, decided on April 12, 1960.  
371 Mohammad Umar vs. The State, AIR 1961 Ori 150, decided on July 22, 1960.  
372 Also perhaps on compassionate grounds; his father had been murdered in Rampur and he rushed back to 
India on a Pakistani passport.  
373 In Umar Chief Justice Narasimhan referred to the ICA s. 4 and 8 to point out that the principle that a 
minor's nationality followed his father's had been endorsed by the legislature.  
374 These two cases did not mention each other. However Rashid Hasan discussed Mst. Allah Bandi; Karimunnissa; 
Abdul Hamid; and Muhd. Umar, but their application to the judgment at hand was rejected.  
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Now, in contrast to the bar on subsequent legitimation, the Allahabad High Court 
created a kind of subsequent de-legitimation. It broke the tie between father and son on the 
basis of the father’s desertion in Rashid Hasan at the end of 1965. Even though his father 
migrated to Pakistan, Rashid’s nationality did not follow his father's. For once, the legal 
decision fit well with practical circumstances.375 Notably, Rashid Hasan had successfully 
contested elections for a seat on his town’s committee.376 The High Court suggested that 
Rashid's acceptance by his peers—the electors of his city—implied an additional 
endorsement of his Indian-ness. The case prompted the first fracture between the father’s 
legal identity and the minor son’s.377  
 Though distinguishable from the previous case on certain facts, in Yusuf too the 
Patna High court rejected the dependent nationality of the minor. Here the minor was found 
to have exhibited intention when he went to Pakistan. The decision was penned by the same 
justice who earlier found that Umar should be imprisoned.378 In this case, he also found that 
Yusuf could be deported. Yusuf was found to have exhibited intention in going to Pakistan 
even though his parents had remained in India. This represented an application of the Kumar 
Amar Singh principle by analogy. If a wife was capable of independent volition in going to 
Pakistan—at least for the purposes of Article 7—a minor boy could also be capable of such 
independent will.  The case against Yusuf was helped by his twenty-year's residence in 
Pakistan from 1947 to 1967.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 Under the Foreigner's Internment Order 1962 (as amended up til 1965). The Justice relied upon Private 
International Law by Cheshire, stating that there could be some exceptions to the rule that an infant's domicile 
following its father's.  
376  Losing the first time in 1956 and winning most recently in 1962. Could the case have arisen out of a local 
political dispute, or simply because he had become prominent among the government and bureaucracy and 
thus been “checked out”?  
377 On this topic, these are cited as the main cases along with Debstai in Atul Setalvad, Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed. 
(Gurgaon: LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, 2009), 140 n. 77, 78 and 79.  
378 Narasimhan, now Chief Justice. 
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 The Union of India argued that Yusuf was a foreigner and could be expelled. In 
September 1947, at around age 15, Yusuf opted379 for the railway service in East Pakistan, 
where he married and lived until 1957. Meanwhile, his natal family remained in Bihar. Yusuf 
took out a Pakistani passport for himself in 1950 and for his wife in 1953. In 1957 he came 
to India and then he applied for a citizenship certificate in his home district of Monghyr in 
1959. His application was rejected. Yusuf prayed for reconsideration of his application and 
got the District Magistrate to restrain the government from deporting him. But in 1964 the 
Superintendent of Police in Monghyr ordered Yusuf to leave or be deported under the 
Foreigners Act.380 Yusuf then petitioned the High Court to stay his deportation order. In 
that petition, he argued that his application for Indian citizenship was still pending with the 
Government of India. However, in response to this contention, the Government of Bihar 
noted that the Government of India had rejected his application for Indian citizenship in 
October 1964; Yusuf claimed he never received notification of this rejection.381  
 Yusuf's best argument was that he was a minor when he went to Pakistan. Despite 
his going there, he remained a citizen throughout.382 At the commencement of the 
Constitution, his parent's domicile was Indian, so his domicile was also Indian and he was a 
citizen under Article 5. Against this the State argued for the purposes of Article 7, Yusuf’s 
minority status did not matter. It extended Kumar Amar Singh’s principle of the wife’s 
independent intention to the minor, relying on the Supreme Court’s 1955 position that 
Article 7 overrode Article 5. Therefore, any migration to Pakistan, even if by a minor whose 
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379 Shanti Singh had claimed to opt for India. See discussion of the decision given to government employees 
about which new nation to join--called opting--in Zamindar, Long Partition. 
380 Shree Mohammad Yusuf vs. Union of India (AIR 1967 Pat 266), paras 1 & 2. Under powers granted by s.3(2)(c) 
of the Foreigners Act. 
381 Ibid., para 2. As in Mukhtar Ahmed vs. State of UP and Ors. (1965 CriLJ 22).  
382  Or at least that the Central Government was required to determine he lost it definitively under s. 9 of the 
ICA before it could expel him.  
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the Article 7 bar. Mohammad Yusuf responded that even if Kumar Amar Singh granted a 
married woman independent domicile for the purposes of migration, it did not grant a male 
minor independent domicile.  
The two-justice Bench sided with the argument put forth by the State. Notably, this 
began to mark an explicit break with the principles of private international law: “…the rule 
of private international law regarding the disability of certain classes of persons from 
changing their domicile must give way if on the facts found it can be held that there was in 
fact migration to Pakistan after the 1st of March 1947 as required by Article 7.”383 Previously 
dependent domicile was used to exclude as well as include. Because of Article 7, after the 
Kumar Amar Singh decision, women’s independent intentions could exclude them from the 
nation. Now, likewise, actions taken as a minor deemed to be a legal independent could be 
construed as independent intent.   
Two characteristics marked Yusuf’s intent as his own. First, his earlier testimony 
before the Magistrate stated he went to Pakistan “on the persuasion of others” and against 
his father's wishes.384 That he went to Pakistan against his father's wishes was used to show 
that he had been operating as an independent actor, not a dependent minor: “He was not so 
young as to be incapable of making any choice.” The factual violation of his father’s will 
broke his legal dependence. To this was added the evidence of his ten years' residence in 
Pakistan and his taking out a Pakistani passports for himself and his wife. Given all this, the 
Court could easily find that he was not a citizen at the commencement of the Constitution 
under Article 5. Since Yusuf was not a citizen of India at commencement of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 Shree Mohammad Yusuf, para. 4.  
384 Zamindar labels this the “flight of youth,” Long Partition, 214.  
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Constitution, he was not entitled to a decision by the Central Government of his citizenship 
status under the ICA and he could be deported without further proceedings.385 
 
Conclusion 
 India’s post-colonial citizenship law was structured by some of the deep-rooted 
structures of India's common law heritage, as well as the regimes of citizenship, passports, 
and permits created by Partition.  The developments of 1955 the ICA and the Supreme 
Court's decision in Kumar Amar Singh created important ruptures with the coverture-based 
principles of citizenship law. Kumar Amar Singh allowed women independent volition in 
migration, but only for the purpose of migration to Pakistan. The ICA allowed married 
women's independence of citizenship even though it also limited citizenship-by-descent to 
the paternal line for diasporic Indians.  
Even after these clarifications, bureaucrats still had to struggle with cross-border 
affective ties of families in the application of citizenship policy. It was difficult to disentangle 
married women from their marriages. Partition cases continued to come up in the courts 
well into the late 1960s, as men with Pakistani connections came to the state's notice and 
were threatened with deportation or punishment. The state and national executives largely 
controlled the law of citizenship. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, minors were treated as 
dependents in the matter of nationality, guided by the well-established principles of private 
international law. It was only by the late 1960s that the judiciary moved away from this 
position, applying the principle of women's independent volition in migration to Pakistan to 
the cases of now-men who had been minors at the time of Partition. This shift was driven by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385Shree Mohammad Yusuf vs. Union of India (AIR 1967 Pat 266), para 6. 
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a perception that private international law could not sufficiently account for the uniquely 
traumatic break of Partition.  
Coverture, then, was a difficult doctrine to dismantle. It was sticky because it was 
hidden; like the intertwining cross-border family ties discussed in this chapter, coverture was 
not a discrete doctrine that could be amended, repealed, or read down with the stroke of a 
judge's pen or a vote in Parliament. It was woven into the fabric of the law and thus it had to 
be dismantled, when it could be, in fits and starts. This took place when a Muslim wife and 
then Muslim sons were granted the ability to migrate with independent intention. Their legal 
independence often worked to exclude them from the Indian body politic. Wives’ and sons’ 
legal identity hinged on the location of their husbands and fathers. Dependence of domicile 
held the field, chipped away at only in the arena of a disloyal and disobedient Muslim wife 
who crossed the border to Pakistan on her own volition. The next part of this dissertation 
examines in greater detail the claims of disobedient wives of all religious communities to 









The Origins of the Restitution of Conjugal Rights in India 
 
Introduction  
 The previous chapter examined the status of the Indian wife in twentieth century 
citizenship law. It highlighted how a woman’s status as a wife could influence her access to 
Indian citizenship. So, too, could a man’s pedigree influence his legal relationship to the 
Indian nation. The law sought to tie wives to husbands and sons to fathers, despite the social 
reality of mobility across national lines. It sought to reduce complex and dense webs of 
social relationships, physical locations, and religious, political, and national identities to a 
simple, easily adjudicated national identity, and it usually did so through a patriarchal, male-
headed conception of the family.  
 Here I retain my thematic interest in the role of marital status in structuring liberty 
but shift attention to matrimonial law proper. The next chapters focus on matrimonial 
dispute litigation pursued by husbands and wives in colonial and post-colonial British courts. 
A substantial portion of such litigation was concerned with restitution of conjugal rights and 
maintenance law, and not with litigation under Hindu and Muslim case law or statutes. In 
this chapter, I provide a brief history of how restitution of conjugal rights entered Indian 
law. Restitution of conjugal rights (RCR) suits, like citizenship cases, located the matrimonial 
home with the husband. They sought to provide a singular legal identity for husband and 
wife. Often they sought to protect wives from their husband’s excesses of violence and 
sexual and material greed. And yet, despite the humanitarian impulses that guided many 
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individual judges making decisions about unique factual circumstances, the remedy also 
continued to uphold a husband’s rights over his wife’s body and his control over her 
movements. Given its origins in Christian marriage and English canon courts, the wholesale 
and enthusiastic adoption of RCR suits into Indian law may at first seem surprising. Indeed, 
the routes of incorporation were winding and complex and drew on a variety of sources, 
including Ecclesiastical law, Hindu law, Muslim law, principles of natural justice, and judicial 
discretion.  
The Privy Council incorporated RCR into Indian law through two important 
judgments in 1856 and 1867. Together these decisions imported RCR into Indian law but 
removed it from the ambit of Ecclesiastical law, placing it instead under the umbrella of 
specific religions’ personal laws. The 1856 and 1867 judgments are also valuable sources for 
the earlier history of RCR in Indian law, starting at the turn of the nineteenth century.  
By the mid-nineteenth century, when the Privy Council decided the first case here, 
conjugal rights had built up a body of at least fifteen known precedents. Even in the very 
earliest days of its existence in Indian law, members of diverse religious groups asked the 
courts to enforce conjugal rights. This finding contributes to one of the larger arguments of 
this dissertation, that members of diverse religious groups used conjugal rights suits and such 
suits formed a substantial portion of matrimonial litigation in India.  The two mid-
nineteenth century judgments that are the subject of this chapter, Aradaseer Cursetjee from 
1856 and Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem of 1867, together resolved the question of the jurisdiction 
of conjugal rights suits. In so doing, the Privy Council preserved patriarchal right in India 
but removed it from a specifically Christian and European jurisdiction of the High Court. It 
placed conjugal rights within the ambit of Hindu and Muslim personal law, making a 
specifically English Ecclesiastical remedy available to litigants of all religious communities.  
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Over the course of the nineteenth century, conjugal rights suits gained greater 
prominence, likely through the definitive rulings issued by the Privy Council, leading one 
commentator to state that after the Privy Council opened the way for conjugal rights suits 
for Muslim litigants in 1867, Hindus had taken up the remedy “like a flock of sheep.”386 The 
success of RCR as a civil, non-religiously specific legal procedure, with origins in English 
Ecclesiastical law, undercuts the division of Indian personal law into watertight 
compartments of Hindu and Muslim.  
The encouragement granted to conjugal rights suits by the High Courts and then the 
Privy Council had several underlying reasons. The Courts preserved the matrimonial home, 
its location with the husband, and the obligation of cohabitation. Restitution of conjugal 
rights was based on the notion that a wife had a right to be maintained by her husband, if at 
all possible, within his home and with some modicum of decent treatment. If he could or 
would not, he was obliged to maintain her separately. In a body of law that did not allow 
divorce, English Ecclesiastical law, conjugal rights suits presented an alternative method of 
matrimonial dispute resolution. Such suits delineated the residence of husband and wife and 
their material rights of maintenance and property against each other. As this chapter and 
subsequent chapters will show, the remedy of RCR suits was not a static one that always 
worked in one way or the other over its long centuries of existence either in England or 
India. It could be used by wives and husbands for different purposes. Even though wives 
could sometimes use it for their own ends, and win such suits, restitution of conjugal rights 
rested on the fundamental assumption that the husband had the right of physical access to 
his wife and that her proper location was with the husband, wherever that may have been.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 The commentator was Rukhmabai’s lawyer, Latham; quoted in Sudhir Chandra, Enslaved Daughters: 
Colonialism, Law, and Women’s Rights, 2nd ed. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008), 76. 
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This chapter first provides a brief background on equity jurisdiction and 
Ecclesiastical jurisdiction in England and India. Second, it examines conjugal rights suits 
from the first half of the nineteenth century, the very earliest such suits in India. Third, it 
examines the 1856 decision of the Privy Council in Ardaseer Cursetjee and Perozeboye,387 which 
pulled conjugal rights suits out from the ambit of the Ecclesiastical division of the Bombay 
High Court.  Fourth, it studies the Privy Council’s decision in the 1867 case of Moonshee 
Buzloor Ruheem and Shumsoonissa,388 which allowed conjugal rights suits to be interpreted 
through Muslim law within the Indian courts’ general civil jurisdiction. Fifth, it looks at the 
cause célèbre of Rukhmabai, the Hindu wife who sought to defend herself against her 
husband’s conjugal rights suit in the mid-1880s.  
Conjugal rights suits were incorporated into Indian law through complex pathways 
that drew on diverse sources of law, including Ecclesiastical law, Indian religious personal 
laws, colonial expediency, and judicial discretion. Over the course of their life in India, 
conjugal rights suits shifted the balance between these factors at different times. In the 
second half of the nineteenth century, conjugal rights suits were adjudicated through the 
framework of Indian religious personal laws, reflecting the decline of Ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction and the imperative of post-Mutiny governance to protect Indian religions. As we 
shall see in subsequent chapters, even when the framework for adjudicating conjugal rights 
shifted, the remedy itself remained the first step in most matrimonial litigation. In other 
words, the remedy of RCR, once incorporated into Indian law, was enormously enduring 
and sticky. Even today, it is an important arena for matrimonial jurisprudence, whereas in 
England itself the remedy was abolished in 1970.389 Conjugal rights suits provided an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 Ardaseer Cursetjee v. Perozeboye (6 MIA 348). 
388 Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shamsoonissa Begum (11 MIA 551). 
389 Cretney, Family Law, 149; Chandra, Enslaved Daughters, 206-7. 
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important arena for matrimonial cruelty jurisprudence. Nineteenth century courts used 
comparison and analogy to delineate husbands’ rights over their wives. They granted 
husbands extensive, though not unlimited, rights of physical control over their wives. In the 
second half of the nineteenth century, then, the idea of matrimonial rights became firmly 
entrenched, and the husband was deemed to have rights to his wife’s cohabitation and body. 
Physical control and the wife’s liberty, or lack of it, were at the heart of conjugal rights. 
There are diverse and interwoven strands that constitute legal patriarchy. Patriarchy cannot 
be boiled down to one factor, such as a particular religion or culture. In India, over two 
centuries of practice, these strands wove together, influencing and reinforcing each other. 
 
Equity, Ecclesiasty, Exception 
The non-common law jurisdictions of equity and Ecclesiastical law played important 
roles in nineteenth century matrimonial litigation. Equity, a specific, non-common law 
jurisdiction in England, was important to conjugal rights suits because it allowed the courts 
discretion to make decisions outside the strict standards of common law precedents. The 
basic idea of equity was that every wrong had an appropriate remedy and equity jurisdiction 
in England was designed to provide relief when the common law courts could not. For 
example, at common law, someone wronged by the breach of contract could only collect 
damages. But at equity, he could achieve specific performance of the contract, such as in 
delivering unique property for which damages could not compensate. 
Equity occupied a different position in India than it did in England. The first 
Attorney-General of independent India, M.C. Setalvad explained, “in India the principles of 
English law whether they be the principles of common law, the statute law or of equity were 
all introduced as legal principles comprised in the principles of ‘justice, equity and good 
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conscience.’”390 Moreover, courts need not apply equity in India if they deemed it unsuitable. 
Equity covered areas such as restitution of property, specific performance, part performance, 
rectification, cancellation of instruments, and trusts. In England, equity was not fused with 
common law until 1873 under the Judicature Act. Setalvad stated that the fusion of equity 
and common law took place far earlier in India than in England. In fact, Setalvad set the date 
of arrival of equity in Indian law to 1600, when Elizabeth I’s charter “gave the Company 
‘power…to make, ordain and constitute such and so many reasonable laws…as to them shall 
seem necessary…so always that the said laws…be reasonable and not contrary or repugnant 
to the laws, statutes, customs of this our realm.”391 Setlavad also notes, “In India equity 
worked through and not in opposition to the common law.”392 From the start of the colonial 
encounter, royal charters and pursuant legislation provided great scope for discretion in the 
colonial courts for the purposes of expediency and addressing the perceived unique 
circumstances of Indian life. The idea that equity could compel specific relief for a wrong 
underwrote the courts’ understanding of conjugal rights between spouses. A violation of the 
husband’s rights of access to his wife could be remedied by compelling her to live with him 
or punishing her if she would not.  
 RCR suits had their origins in English Ecclesiastical courts. Tussles over the correct 
jurisdiction and body of law to use in determining matrimonial disputes were not a peculiar 
feature of English rule in India, such disputes having a pedigree of about seven hundred 
years. The main vehicle for such disputes in English Ecclesiastical courts was the writ of 
prohibition, which a litigant could attempt to use to block his adversary from pursuing relief 
in the Ecclesiastical courts. Baker states, with regard to the relationship between canon and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 M.C. Setalvad, The Role of English Law in India, Hebrew University Lionel Cohen Lectures (Jerusalem: Magnes 
Press, 1966), 24. 
391 Setalvad, Role of English Law, 6, citing H. Cowell, Tagore Law Lectures 1872, 5th ed., 12-13.  
392 Setalvad, Common Law in India, 57.  
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common law in England, that “The conflicts of jurisdiction were not typically disputes 
between an embattled Church and a hostile royal power; there was rather a conflict of laws, 
caused by the existence of two systems of equal validity which claimed to operate within the 
same geographical territory.”393 He goes on to state that such disputes did not occur at the 
level of ideological conflicts between popes and kings but instead “jurisdictional conflicts 
were fought out between private litigants in particular cases…”394  
 Such disputes gave rise to writs in 1285 and 1315 that more carefully stated what 
matters the Ecclesiastical courts could address: “the Church courts had an unquestioned 
jurisdiction over marriage and bastardy, testate and intestate succession to personal property, 
and punishment of mortal sin, such as fornication, adultery, or gluttony.” 395 Moreover, as 
Baker states, “In case of conflict, the king’s law prevailed. This principle was applied even to 
limit papal authority.”396 Baker points out the importance of the conflict over jurisdiction as 
part of deteriorating relationships between the King and the Church in the run-up to the 
Reformation, a counter-weight to narratives that emphasize the importance of the personal 
desire for divorce as a key cause of the Reformation.397 Baker’s account also emphasizes an 
important point about Ecclesiastical law in the post-Reformation period: though papal 
authority was abrogated in 1534, the system of canon law continued to exist. In the post-
Reformation period, “Some kind of fusion [of canon and common law] was seriously 
contemplated,” but died, predictably, in a law commission.398 Nevertheless, Baker states, the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century saw a chipping away of church courts’ powers to resist 
writs of prohibition. This did not yet affect family law and probate law, only the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths Lexis Nexis, 2002), 128.  
394 Ibid., 128.  
395 Ibid., 129. The two writs were the Circumspecte agatis (1285) and the Articuli cleri (1315).  
396 Ibid., 129.  
397 Ibid., 130.  
398 Ibid., 131. Baker also points out that later “A commission was finally appointed, under new statutory 
powers, in 1552; but its report was shelved,” 131, n. 27.  
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Ecclesiastical courts’ criminal and civil jurisdiction.399 The key sources of Ecclesiastical law in 
England were compendia of decretals rather than law reports.400 While common lawyers 
were trained and credentialed by the Inns of Courts, lawyers in the Ecclesiastical courts were 
doctors of civil law trained at Oxford and Cambridge.401 Their courts (as well as the 
Admiralty Court) were housed in the Doctors’ Commons, so-called because to practice there 
one had to be a Doctor of Civil Law.402 
In the first third of the nineteenth century, the Ecclesiastical courts’ right of appeal 
was changed to the Privy Council,403 which did not affect its day-to-day rules or procedures, 
but foreshadowed the general decline of the Ecclesiastical courts. In 1857 the Ecclesiastical 
courts’ authority over most personal matters was abolished in England, limiting their 
jurisdiction “to Church matters, such as faculties to alter or sell consecrated property and 
disciplinary proceedings against clergy.”404 The new Court for Divorce and Matrimonial 
Causes took over matrimonial litigation. It was responsible for administering the new 
divorce procedure. Husbands and wives still instituted conjugal rights suits, but they did so 
in the new Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes.405  
For the duration of their existence, the Ecclesiastical courts in England could not 
conceive of divorce in the modern meaning of the term.406 The only way to get a divorce was 
by a Parliamentary bill, a practice that Henry VIII pioneered when he abolished appeals to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 Ibid., 131.  
400 Ibid., 126.  
401 Although it seems that not much training went on in either institution; in his biography of the civil lawyer 
Stephen Lushington, Waddams states that “such that what law was learned [at Oxford] was learned by private 
study.” S.M. Waddams, Law, Politics, and the Church of England: The Career of Stephen Lushington, 1782-1873 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1. 
402 S.M. Waddams, Law, Politics, and the Church of England: The Career of Stephen Lushington, 1782-1873  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 4. 
403 Baker, Introduction, 132.  
404 Ibid. 
405 Cretney, Family Law, 144. 
406 Ibid., 161. 
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the Pope. After Henry’s use of the special Parliamentary Bill, Lord Roos revived it in the late 
seventeenth century. In 1857, the Matrimonial Causes Act transferred the previous authority 
of Parliament to grant divorces after an Ecclesiastical grant of a separation (divorce a mensa et 
thoro), to a new entity called the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes.407 This created a 
simpler procedure for divorce that made it far more accessible.  As Cretney points out, “As 
has happened over and over again, changes in procedure did affect perceptions of the law,” 
making divorce more popular by making its procedure clearer and easier to obtain.408 
Nevertheless, the point that it was extremely difficult to get a divorce, and impossible within 
Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, remains. For most of its history, divorce was an exceptional zone 
in English law, requiring extraordinary measures.  
 The cases of the long histories of the Ecclesiastical and equity jurisdiction point out a 
crucial feature about English common law. The confusion arises because of two different 
definitions of the term “common law.” A narrow definition of the term would refer only to 
the “jurisprudence [of] of those unwritten legal doctrines embodying English custom and 
English tradition…[and] would not include and would be different from the English statute 
law which has from time to time modified the common law.”409 However, in India, and 
often in England and the United States as well, the term “common law” takes on a broader 
definition to include “…not only what in England is known strictly as the common law but 
also its traditions, some of the principles underlying the English statute law, the equitable 
principles developed in England in order to mitigate the rigors of the common law and even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 Both Baker and Cretney emphasize that the 1857 Act was a procedural reform and divorces could be 
attained before the Act. Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century, 161. Lawrence Stone, The Road to Divorce: 
England 1530-1987 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) has a longer discussion of the case of Lord Roos, 309-13. 
Stone also describes in detail some other early Parliamentary divorce cases.   
408 Cretney points out, “As has happened over and over again, changes in procedure did affect perceptions of 
the law,” making divorce more popular by making its procedure clearer and easier to obtain. Cretney, Family 
Law, 165-6. 
409 Setalvad, Common Law, 3.  
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the attitudes and methods pervading the British system of the administration of justice.”410 
Common law, narrowly defined, sat in an uneasy relationship with other forms of 
jurisdiction, which lacked the same fidelity to rule of law the common law valued. In theory, 
for at least seven hundred years, matrimonial litigation existed outside of the common law 
and outside a firm commitment to the precedent based system of the rule of law.411  
Naseer Hussain points out the complexity of the rule of law in the colonial setting: 
“If a rule of law was the settled theoretical standard of colonial politics, the institutional 
practices of the colonial state constantly fell short of such a standard.”412 Hussain defines 
emergency as in phrases such as “the peculiar way in which law contemplates and provides 
for its own failure.”413 Hussain then goes on to argue that colonialism—and specifically 
colonial violence—structured this relationship between emergency and rule of law.414 
Together, the discussions by Hussain and Setalvad highlight the contradictions between 
“rule of law” and discretion. The colonial state’s powers of discretion were introduced at the 
moment that British common law and with its specific ideas of rule of law were introduced 
in India. Rule of law could not exist without discretion and, indeed, violence. In the Indian 
colonial context, Ecclesiastical law and equity were used in a colonial common law 
framework shaped by the imperatives of colonial governance. Matrimonial decisions 
reflected this tension between rule of law and discretion. Violence and force were often 
required to preserve the state power needed to uphold the rule of law. The specter of the use 
of state force to enforce conjugal rights suits haunted many of the judgments. Colonial 
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judges feared to tread too far into the Indian home but were also devoted to upholding 
husbands’ and wives’ rights within a legal framework.415 
 In an important 1989 article, Richard W. Lariviere noted, “the creation and 
development of modern Hindu law has been predicated on well-intentioned 
misunderstanding and innocent irony.”416 Eighteenth century colonial officials read Indian 
law and religion through their own religious and intellectual frameworks that understood 
matters of the Hindu religion’s personal law as “precisely the ones that would have been 
within the jurisdiction of Ecclesiastical courts in England.”417 In particular, colonial officials 
“reduc[ed]…dharma until it was equal to religious law.”418 I agree with Lariviere on this point 
as well as on his analysis of the effects it had on the practice of Indian law. However, I want 
to be clear that the point I am making is different. The process outlined below was one in 
which a particular Ecclesiastical procedure (restitution of conjugal rights) was directly 
imported into Indian law as an import via the Ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Bombay 
Supreme Court as well as by general appropriation in Bengal. In Lariviere’s analysis, certain 
topics (such as those related to marriage) were denoted personal because they were the 
topics dealt with by the Ecclesiastical courts in England, and then these were sought to be 
administered under Hindu or Muslim law. But in the process I am describing, there was no 
pretense that restitution of conjugal rights was an originally Hindu or Muslim procedure. 
Rather, it was directly drawn from the Ecclesiastical law of England. It was then firmly 
ensconced in India’s civil law and used by litigants of all communities. 
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Early Nineteenth Century Suits 
 In its 1856 and 1867 decisions, the Privy Council provided a brief outline of the 
history of restitution of conjugal rights in Indian law. The historical analysis took two 
prongs. First, it examined the records of the Supreme Court and Recorders’ Court for 
unreported cases that showed the use of Ecclesiastical law “by natives of India or other 
Asiatics for any causes matrimonial.”419 The listing of unreported cases is especially valuable 
because these records would be otherwise difficult to compile. Second, it looked to reported 
decisions as well. Members of a variety of religious communities used RCR in India right 
from the turn of the nineteenth century.  
Ten unrecorded suits were found in the courts’ records: seven of these were filed by 
Parsi litigants, two by Armenian litigants, and one by Muslim litigants.420  
1. Anna Petruse v. Jacob Petruse—Armenian—Bombay, filed 1802, decided March 1805 
–alimony (“Libel”)—wife won  
2. Dustayool Joannes v. Gregory Johannes—Armenian—Bombay, filed 1811, dismissed by 
consent 1812—divorce a vinculo (“divorce and separation from the bed and board 
and mutual cohabitation”) 
3. Shaibnaboye v. Shaikjee Zarah—Mahomedan—Bombay, filed 1815, not pursued; to 
void marriage—wife [?] had been granted in forma pauperis 
4. Perozeboye v. Aradaseer Cursetjee—Parsee—Bombay High Court, filed 1843, decided 
1843--a demand for Ardaseer to take back the wife and “treat her with conjugal 
kindness”—wife lost—she sought and was granted leave to appeal but did not 
pursue the appeal 
5. Buchooboye v. Merwanjee Nasserwanjee I—Parsee—Bombay Supreme Court, filed 
1844, decided 1846—“for decree…[to] take home and receive the said Buchoboye his 
wife, and treat her with marital affection and to render her conjugal rights”—wife 
won 
6. Perozeboye v. Nanabhoy Framjee—Parsee—Bombay Supreme Court, filed 1844, 
decided 1846—for same cause as above—wife won 
7. Buchooboye v. Merwanjee Nasserwanjee—Parsee-Bombay Supreme Court, filed 1849, 
for divorce and separation, struck 1851 due to death of wife—for divorce 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419 Ardaseer Cursetjee and Perozeboye, arguments before the Privy Council, 375. 
420 The Armenians were a “mercantile diaspora” deemed by the British judges not to “have religious law in the 
same way that Muslims and Hindus did.” Justice Jackson, in Aratoon v. Aratoon (1868) noted he saw “no reason 
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8. Perozeboy v. Ardaseer Cursetjee—Parsee—Bombay Supreme Court, filed 1853, 
decided 1856—for husband to “take back his lawful wife…and treat her with 
conjugal kindness, and to provide for her alimony in the event of the said Ardaseer 
Cursetjee refusing to receive her back”—wife won, wife requested and received leave 
to appeal to Privy Council 
9. Awaboye v. Nasserwanjee Merwanjee—Parsee-Bombay Supreme Court, filed 1853,--
“for decree that [husband] take back his wife…and render her conjugal rights, 
alimony, pendent lite”—wife did not purusue suit  
10. Khursedball v. Bazenjee Dossaboy Baxterna—Parsee—Bombay Supreme Court—filed 
1854, decided 1855—“for alimony”—wife won421 
 
These precedents highlight several features of conjugal rights in early nineteenth-century 
India. Members of three of India’s minority religious groups used the idea of conjugal rights 
in the first half of the nineteenth century to pursue alimony and cohabitation rights under 
the Ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Bombay Supreme Court. Of the ten suits, four were 
dropped for various reasons. Of the remaining six suits, five wives won their cases. The one 
suit in which the wife lost (#4) was overturned upon her appeal (#8). This dispute then gave 
rise to the 1856 Privy Council decision in Aradaseer Cursetjee and Perozeboye, discussed in the 
next section.422 The courts usually though not always were sympathetic to wives, providing 
them with maintenance (1,10); ordering the husband to take the wife home and treat her well 
(5,6); and for these two remedies together (8). There seems to have been a large gap between 
the use of the remedy by Armenian and Muslim litigants in the period between 1802 and 
1815 and its use by Parsis beginning in 1841.  
Along with the set of ten unreported precedents gathered from the records of the 
Bombay Supreme Court and Recorder’s Court, there were three additional reported 
precedents on conjugal rights discussed in Ardaseer Cursetjee that proved important to the 
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Privy Council’s reasoning.423 The most important of these was Mihirwanjee Nuoshirwanjee,424 
which was important to the final judgment in the Privy Council’s decision in Aradaseer 
Cursetjee. It showed that conjugal rights suits could be pursued under the civil jurisdiction of 
the Indian courts, rather than Ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 
The Privy Council decision in Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem from 1867 brought forward 
additional precedents that showed the use of RCR in civil courts.  These all involved Muslim 
litigants: Maulvi Abdual Wahab v. Mussumat Hingu (1832);425 Mussumaut Ameena v. Kuttoo Khan 
(1841);426 and Mussumat Doeen Beebee v. Sheikh Mennoo (1832).427 Buzloor Ruheem used these 
precedents before the Privy Council to make the point that “a suit for restitution of conjugal 
rights will lie in the Civil Court.”428 Coming as these did from the Bengal Sudder Dewani 
Adalat (appellate court for civil matters in Bengal),429 these suits showed that there were 
precedents that allowed RCR outside of the Ecclesiastical side of the Bombay High Court. 
The practices of the lower courts on the civil side in Bengal as well as on the Ecclesiastical 
side in Bombay (until stopped by the Privy Council in 1856) each supported the use of 
conjugal rights suits.  
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I. Mihirwanjee Nuoshirwanjee v. Awan Bae, 1825, (discussed on 353, 383).  
II. Buchaboye v. Merwanjee Nasserwanjee, 1844, mentioned by both of the Bombay Supreme Court’s 
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(discussed on 353, 371) Perry’s Oriental Cases, 73; in Perry’s Oriental Cases, it is spelled “Buchaboye v. 
Merwangee Nasserwangee.” 
III. Beebee Muttra’s case, 1833  (discussed on 365, 368, 369) 
Andries v. Andries and Lindo v. Belisario (1 Hagg. Cons. Rep. Appx. 9), about the Jewish use of London 
consistory courts, was also discussed on 371.  
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427 Sel. Rep., 103; discussed Ibid., 570. 
428 Ibid., 570.  
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Though a full account of the development of early nineteenth century marital 
litigation is beyond the scope of this dissertation, a cursory and hypothetical narrative of the 
incorporation of conjugal rights is possible from the brief account presented above. Some of 
the very earliest conjugal rights suits involved Armenian Christians on the Ecclesiastical side 
of the Bombay High Court; they were likely descendants of India’s long-standing Armenian 
trading communities. As noted, though Christians, Armenian Christianity was deemed to 
lack religio-juridical apparatus suitable for application in the British courts in India, so 
instead Armenians used English law.430 As Christians, it perhaps made sense to turn to the 
Ecclesiastical courts in the Bombay Supreme Court. But this was not an entirely religious 
matter. To contemporary lawyers, the Ecclesiastical courts would also have been natural 
forums for such arguments because many aspects of matrimonial and personal relationships 
were litigated in the Ecclesiastical division.431  
Then, Parsis effectively took up the same remedy in the Bombay Ecclesiastical 
division.432 This was relatively successful until barred by the Privy Council in 1856. This 
seems to be a yet another example of the Parsi facility and persistence in using the common 
law in India. Reiterating the argument made by Mitra Sharafi, one could hypothesize that 
enterprising Parsi lawyers took up the practice of using the Ecclesiastical courts through 
observation of earlier Armenian and Muslim use of the courts for conjugal rights, as in cases 
1-3. But it should also be reiterated that Ecclesiastical jurisdiction was one natural forum for 
such suits. 
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Simultaneously, lower civil courts in Bengal also heard conjugal rights suits under 
their general civil jurisdiction during the first half of the nineteenth century, as in the three 
Muslim cases brought forward by Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem. This showed that conjugal 
rights suits were not limited to Bombay or its Ecclesiastical jurisdiction. It also suggests that 
the practice may have developed along two separate trajectories with independent origins, 
primarily in the Ecclesiastical courts in Bombay Presidency (mostly Bombay city), and on the 
civil side in the Bengal Presidency. Finally, looking at the chronology of the cases, and the 
gap in dates between its initial use in Bombay and Parsi use in 1840s Bombay, we might 
surmise that Parsi lawyers drew on the more recently reported Bengal precedents in reviving 
its use in Bombay. This, however, does not explain why they turned to Ecclesiastical courts 
while their counterparts in Bengal used civil jurisdiction. 
 
Ardaseer Cursetjee and Perozeboye, 1856 
The aforementioned records were unearthed by the 1856 Aradaseer Cursetjee 
proceedings, which called into question the validity of this earlier use of Ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction. The Aradaseer Cursetjee decision by the Privy Council in 1856 sprang out of the 
unhappy 1830 marriage of two Bombay Parsis. The wife did not go to live with her husband, 
nor consummate the marriage, until three years later. Even after this, she frequently returned 
to visit her natal home, in part due to her young age. On one such trip, her husband failed to 
invite her back to his home. Her father corresponded with the husband’s father and 
eventually the wife was returned to her husband’s home. But there she met with her 
husband’s continued ill-treatment of her, and he finally expelled her from the matrimonial 
home.433 	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For the rest of her father’s life, he supported her in his home but, after his death, she 
fell on hard times and was forced to sell her possessions and take on loans. Meanwhile, her 
husband had married a second wife and borne children with her. The first wife asked the 
Bombay Supreme Court to order her husband to take her back “and treat her with conjugal 
kindness” or, barring that, to at least provide her maintenance to live separately as well as her 
maintenance in arrears at the high rate of Rs. 1,000/month.434 The husband protested that 
Ecclesiastical courts could not entertain such suits between a Parsi husband and wife, 
especially given that a Parsi husband could, under Parsi law, contract a second marriage, 
while this was not possible under Christian law.  
When the case came before the Ecclesiastical division of the Bombay Supreme 
Court, it produced two different opinions on the question of whether Parsis could use 
Ecclesiastical jurisdiction to obtain orders of cohabitation and “conjugal kindness.”435 Chief 
Justice Yardley and Judge Jackson each offered separate opinions. Each opinion accepted 
the general existence of the Ecclesiastical courts as well as the continued use of them for 
some forms of matrimonial relief. However, the junior Judge, Jackson, rejected the use of 
Ecclesiastical courts for enforcing cohabitation among Parsis. 
The Chief Justice’s position prevailed because he was the senior judge. He argued 
that Parsis could use Ecclesiastical courts to enforce conjugal rights for three main reasons. 
First, marriage was a total status with certain rights and privileges that could not be separated 
out from each other. As Chief Justice Yardley put it, “it is suggested that the wife, in a case 
like the present, might sue her husband, either on the equity or plea side of the Court, and 
that at all events persons supplying her necessaries might sue him [since he was her legal 
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representative].”436 The problem with such a contention, according to Justice Yardley, was 
that the rights upon marriage especially for the Parsi wife went far beyond just “the right to 
be maintained at the expense of her husband” and “under it a female acquires a status, rights, 
and privileges which would be very inadequately vindicated by any action for necessaries.”437 
It was only in the Ecclesiastical side of the court that the wife could enforce her non-material 
rights, such as her right of cohabitation and even “conjugal kindness” by the husband, rights 
that were a part of total package of rights and obligations of marriage.438 
Second, the Chief Justice reasoned, Ecclesiastical law was imported directly to India 
without many modifications so that it should be practiced in India as much as possible as in 
England, “so far as was consistent with the circumstances of the country and its 
inhabitants.”439 If an English wife could sue for conjugal rights in that forum, so too could 
an Indian wife. Third, the Ecclesiastical jurisdiction over conjugal rights had the force of 
time and institutions working for it. The Chief Justice stated that the practice of hearing such 
suits in the Ecclesiastical division met Lord Mansfield’s standard of “‘a rooted and 
established practice.’”440  
The junior judge, Jackson, made clear his pains to protect Parsi women’s rights, but 
suggested that Ecclesiastical jurisdiction in India did not extend to include ordering 
cohabitation. Jackson put forward two main reasons for ending the practice of allowing suits 
for cohabitation by non-Christians on the Ecclesiastical side of the Bombay Supreme Court. 
The first reason involved Jackson’s statutory interpretation of the early charters founding the 
Calcutta and Bombay Supreme Courts. These statutes and subsequent legislation delineated 
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two separate categories: “British subjects” and “inhabitants of Bombay.” The two groups 
had different relationships to Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, Jackson argued: British subjects, as 
well as “native Christians” and “Portuguese,” could avail of Ecclesiastical jurisdiction.441 
Inhabitants of Bombay could use the Ecclesiastical division but their ambit was more 
limited, primarily “to Probates and Letters of Administration.”442 Here Judge Jackson 
reasoned that, unless some discrimination in the use of Ecclesiastical jurisdiction had been 
intended by the charters, two separate categories of subjects of the law would not have been 
delineated in the charters. In this way, for the most part, non-Christians would be excluded 
from Ecclesiastical jurisdiction.  
This first reason contributed to Jackson’s second, culturalist reason, that applying 
Christian marriage standards to a Parsi or other Indian marriage would be incorrect most 
especially because of the problem of polygamy (or strictly speaking polygyny). The obligation 
of cohabitation, “appears to me to be an adjudication applicable to Christians only, and 
somewhat anomalous when applied to Asiatics…”443 Were the court to grant this right to 
members of other Indian religions, it would be doing an injustice to the historic right of 
India’s religions to maintain their own personal laws as well as to Christian religious morality. 
Parsi marriage was different than Christian marriage. According to Jackson, in contrast to 
Christian marriage, Parsi marriage did not enjoin an obligation or right of cohabitation:  
…I think we should hesitate before we introduced among Asiatics so peculiar a form 
of proceeding as this. The jurisdiction to compel cohabitation seems to flow 
peculiarly from the Canonist’s notions of indissolubility of a Christian marriage, and 
the obligation, under dread of spiritual censure, to perform all conjugal duties, and is, 
therefore, I think, inapplicable to natives, who are not bound by any law that I know 
to live with their wives, and are allowed great facilities of divorce. If a suit of this 	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nature can be entertained, we may be called on hereafter to compel a native woman 
to return to her husband’s roof, under which he has other wives, who monopolise 
his attentions, or we may compel a Mussulmanee to return to her husband’s house, to 
be divorced the minute afterward, by an imprecation.444 
 
Judge Jackson wanted the Christian law to have no part in endorsing polygamy, which it 
would if it helped a Parsi wife return to a polygamous marriage. Presumably, in Jackson’s 
view, the more appropriate remedy would have been to require the husband to maintain the 
wife separately. 
One of the key points distinguishing the two views revolved around the status of the 
wife. The Chief Justice found that the Parsi wife could turn to the Ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
for ordering cohabitation because of her status as a wife, a status that could not be pulled 
apart into separate rights with separate remedies. On the other hand, Jackson argued that the 
Indian wife was a feme sole (unmarried woman, in law French) or at the very least was usually 
treated as one by the Indian courts. Her rights as a married woman differed from that of a 
Christian feme covert. The chief difference between the two was that the Christian feme covert 
could not claim damages against her husband in civil court since at law they were one 
person.445 In contrast, the Indian wife, as “feme sole,” could sue her husband for damages in 
civil court if her husband refused to maintain her at his home or she could claim for 
maintenance in equity. Jackson thus separated out the various rights and privileges of 
marriage from each other. According to Jackson, the three major Indian religions under 
consideration (besides Christianity), Islam, Hinduism, and Zoroastrianism, all treated the 
wife as feme sole rather than feme covert. He stated, “she seems to have just the same right to sue 
in respect of this breach, as any other person has to sue for any other breach of contract.”446 
As an adjunct to this, Jackson argued that the wife, since she was a feme sole, could obtain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 Ibid., 370-1. 
445 Doggett, Marriage, Wife-Beating and the Law, 35, 83, 98, describes the victory of the fiction of marital unity. 
446 Ardaseer Cursetjee, opinion of Jackson, from the Bombay Supreme Court, 373. 
 129 
maintenance in a non-Ecclesiastical jurisdiction such as in equity jurisdiction.447 Her ability to 
obtain a remedy in another forum obviated the need for her to use Ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 
Contemporary historians debate the import of marital status in determining women’s rights 
and social status. This difference of opinion within the Bombay Supreme Court shows that, 
in the nineteenth century as well, marital status had no one fixed meaning. It played an 
important role in adjudicating matrimonial disputes but its status was not always clearly 
defined or obvious.  
 
Privy Council decision, 1856 
These differing opinions gave rise to the Privy Council appeal by the husband, who 
sought vigorously to block his wife’s use of the Ecclesiastical division in her case. By the 
time the Privy Council reached its decision in 1856, the husband and wife had been litigating 
for at least thirteen years, since Perozeboye filed her first suit (which she lost) in the Bombay 
Supreme Court in 1843 (#4).  
The Privy Council came to the same conclusion as Jackson, though for different 
reasons. It ruled that Parsis (and presumably Hindus and Muslims) could not bring a suit for 
conjugal rights on the Ecclesiastical side of the Bombay Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the 
Privy Council still maintained the possibility that RCR could be entertained under the civil 
jurisdiction of the court, leaving it open to the husband to institute a new suit in the civil 
jurisdiction. The author of this judgment was the great canon judge Stephen Lushington, 
writing along with the Right Honorable T. Pemberton Leigh and the Right Honorable Sir 
Edward Peel.448 A reformer, a Whig, anti-slavery campaigner, and sometimes radical, 
Lushington served as a judge in the Consistory Court from 1828 to 1858 and as a judge in 	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the Court of Arches from 1858 to 1867.449 The Consistory Court was the Ecclesiastical court 
of the Diocese of London. The Court of Arches was the “highest English Ecclesiastical 
court.”450 Lushington surely knew that matrimonial jurisdiction would be excised from 
Ecclesiastical jurisdiction when he made his decision in Ardaseser Cursetjee, because he sat on 
the commission that recommended such a change.451  
Since Aradeseer Cursetjee had married a second wife, or at the very least was 
adulterous, the Privy Council was prohibited from using Ecclesiastical law to endorse such 
an arrangement. Lushington argued that the wife could not, under Christian law, be ordered 
to return to either a bigamous or an adulterous marriage. Lushington’s condemnation of 
bigamous marriage had racial and religious overtones, suggesting the superiority of a 
Christian sacramental, monogamous marriage that the law made difficult to end. Lushington 
was reluctant to use Christian law to endorse bigamy. Notably, Justice Jackson’s earlier 
rejection on the ground of the Parsi wife as feme sole played no role here.  
Lushington distinguished adjudication by Jews in the Ecclesiastical courts in England 
from the Parsi use of Ecclesiastical jurisdiction in India. Lushington noted that “the 
Ecclesiastical Courts in England have exercised jurisdiction with respect to Jewish marriages, 
ascertaining their validity by Jewish laws; but the very great difficulties attending such 
investigation, and the almost absurd consequences to which they lead, would not induce us 
to follow those precedents further than strict necessity requires.”452 Lushington did not 
pursue a detailed rationale for distinguishing the two cases of minority religious groups’ use 
of Ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Perhaps he considered Zoroastrianism more unknowable than a 
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fellow Abrahamic religion like Judaism.453 Again, perhaps the Parsi allowance of polygamous 
marriages was also a distinguishing factor. 
There is a second important point that bolsters the idea that polygamy was a 
distinguishing factor. In the Bombay case, Perozeboye asked the court to require her 
husband to accept her in his marital home. This was not the standard practice in English 
suits, however. Lushington pointed out that an English wife would not request the court to 
return her to the matrimonial home in the case of a second marriage, though she might 
request separation and alimony. As Lushington put it, “In England, the wife, on account of 
such an intercourse would be entitled to a separation from bed and board and alimony; but a 
prayer for restitution is, under such circumstances, wholly unheard of.”454 The Parsi wife 
sought a different remedy than the English wife would have. Restitution of conjugal rights 
was a flexible concept and a remedy that litigants took up to serve a variety of ends. In the 
case of Perozeboye, succeeding in her suit would have restored her to her “status” as wife 
with rights of residence in her husband’s home despite his second wife. If she failed, she 
could at least claim a substantial sum of alimony from him. Foreshadowing a pattern found 
in later cases as well, Perozeboye used a demand for conjugal rights as an initial proof of her 
husband’s refusal to maintain her in the matrimonial home that could be leveraged for a 
demand for alimony. 
Ultimately Perozeboye lost her suit. Having brought her suit in the incorrect forum, 
she would now be forced to turn to the civil courts, as prescribed by Lushington. 
Lushington suggested that, in the civil courts, each individual religion’s law would be 
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administered to its adherents.455 For Lushington, the precedent Mihirwanjee Nuoshirwanjee v. 
Awan Baee indicated that Parsi law had been administered to Parsis on the civil side of the 
Bombay Supreme Court in the past.456 Therefore, a wife like Perozeboy would not be 
without recourse even if she could not bring her suit under the Court’s Ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction. 
There are several ways to read the Privy Council’s banning of the practice of 
ordering cohabitation and conjugal rights in the Ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The Privy Council 
may have sought to keep India in sync with developments in England: if English 
Ecclesiastical courts would no longer administer matrimonial law, why should Indian courts 
administer it to Parsis?  The decision can also be read as an exemplar of colonial masculinity, 
in that the Privy Council upheld the husband’s jurisdictional dodge, denying the wife the 
remedy she sought.457 Its rationale rested on racial, religious, and cultural assumptions. Such 
racial and religious concerns centered on the possibility of the colonial courts endorsing 
polygamy within a Christian religio-legal framework. Gayatri Spivak coined the phrase 
“white men are saving brown women from brown men”458 to describe this rationale. But in 
the case of Ardaseer Cursetjee, the Privy Council went so far as to save the brown wife from 
herself and her (perceived) anomalous desires to be restored to a bigamous marriage.459 
Lushington’s judgment could not countenance her desire to be restored to her matrimonial 
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home within the framework of Ecclesiastical law and, because Parsi law purportedly allowed 
bigamy, he could not simply nullify the second marriage.460 As Mitra Sharafi has shown, the 
decision prompted something of a moral panic among those Parsis who wanted to reform 
Parsi marriage. They claimed that it led to an increase in polygynous marriages: the court’s 
refusal to grant the wife her restitution of conjugal rights was interpreted as an endorsement 
of Parsi polygamy, even though this was not what the decision actually stated. It actually 
found that the Ecclesiastical division was the incorrect jurisdiction.461 This misperception, in 
turn, added fuel to the demand for the Parsi Marriage Act of 1865, which did definitively 
outlaw polygamy for Parsis.462 
The failure to accept the adjudication of conjugal rights on the Ecclesiastical side did 
not sound the death knell of the practice in India—far from it. The decision had 
implications far beyond the narrow ambit of Parsi personal law. Instead, the Aradaseer 
Cursetjee decision pushed conjugal rights litigation firmly into the civil jurisdiction of the 
Indian courts, where it also already had a start. There it took on a life of its own. 
 
Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem and Shamsoonissa, 1867  
Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem sat on the other side of the great dividing line of the Indian 
Mutiny from Ardaseer Cursetjee. Its outcome reflected the renewed colonial imperative to 
protect Indian religions, lest religious tampering prompt further rebellion. But it also 
reflected a longer body of precedents and developments in Indian matrimonial litigation. 
Decided in 1867 by the Privy Council, the Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem judgment comprised two 
property suits and one conjugal rights suit. The litigation involved the Moonshee Buzloor 
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Ruheem of 24 Paragannas, a zamindar (estate owner) who was wealthy in land, but by the 
time his legal troubles began, “embarrassed” by his lack of liquidity.463 It was his second wife, 
Shamsoonissa, whose property rights and obligations to suffer physical violence and restraint 
were the subject of this case. She had entered the marriage with considerable wealth, some 
of which she had inherited upon her father’s death. The property consisted of jewelry and 
other valuables, shares in two gardens (Dum-Dum and Narain Mundul, near Calcutta), and a 
considerable amount of Company paper.464   
There are many fascinating stories interwoven into this long case. One involves the 
transformation of a matrimonial dispute dealt with through local means into a formal legal 
plea. While the twentieth-century litigants discussed in subsequent chapters could turn to a 
well-established legal form of RCR, Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem shows how a local dispute 
wended its way through the courts to help create that later legal form. It drew on particular 
factual circumstances; precedents and textbooks of Muslim law; and the lawyers’ own 
innovative legal arguments and research. 
Though the judgment occupied the post-Mutiny moment, most of the relevant 
events took place in the decade before the Mutiny. Widow Shamsoonissa married Moonshee 
Buzloor Ruhem in 1847, and added to her brood of five children by having a daughter with 
him. Conflicts over a complicated series of property transactions from 1847 until the 
breakdown of the marriage in 1855 seem to have driven Shamsoonissa from Buzloor 
Ruheem’s home in Sealdah, Calcutta.  
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This series of legal transactions began when the husband of one of Shamsoonissa’s 
daughters approached the Magistrate for Shamsoonissa’s release.465 The Magistrate forced 
the husband to grant Shamsoonissa some degree of freedom, though acknowledging that the 
marriage tie persisted. Husbands’ control over their wives’ mobility was a tactic that could 
limit wives’ access to property and freedom. When she complained to the Magistrate [local 
judge] “of ill-usage on his part, she was allowed by the Magistrate of the Twenty-four 
Pergunnahs to leave his house. They have since lived separately…”466 The Magistrate gave 
“her the option to live where she chose, but declaring that she was not thereby separated 
from her position as the Wife of the Appellant; and, to prevent the commission of any acts 
that might lead to an affray, the Appellant was bound over, by recognizance in Rs. 10,000 for 
a year, liberty being given to the Respondent to sue for having been beaten and confined by 
the Appellant.”467 The initial order by the Magistrate evinced violence between husband and 
wife, especially since the Magistrate placed a bond of considerable value on the husband to 
guarantee his good behavior with her.  
It should be noted that such compromises and bonds of good behavior had very old 
antecedents, reflecting the local Magistrate or Ecclesiastical judge’s role as a “a rather heavy-
handed marriage counselor” as much as a legal authority.468 Scholar of English medieval 
matrimonial litigation R. H. Helmholz states that judges could “impose a guarantee (cautio) 
on the husband to treat his wife fairly and honestly” and this was a very common practice in 
wives’ suits for divorce a mensa et thoro (separation), resulting in the wife returning to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, 556. The husband’s restraints on the wife and the wife’s relatives’ efforts to have 
her released are very similar to R. v. Jackson described in Doggett, Marriage, Wife-Beating and the Law, 1-4. 
466 Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, 582 [Privy Council’s judgment, case history], 554  
467 Ibid., 554.  
468 R.H. Helmholz, Marriage Litigation in Medieval England, Cambridge Studies in English Legal History (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1974), 101.  
 136 
husband’s home instead of the wife’s pursuit of the separation suit to its conclusion.469 
Helmholz notes that the guarantee in medieval England did not need to be in property; such 
guarantees could also include “men willing to stand behind his good behavior” or even “the 
man’s oath alone.”470 The judge’s local knowledge and authority, and the litigants’ integration 
in local networks of knowledge, respect, and surveillance, gave such an outcome some hope 
of efficacy. This was a common practice in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Doggett 
states, “from the eighteenth century [such a request by a wife] never seems to have been 
refused.”471 Likewise, here Shamsoonissa and her family members and the Magistrate sought 
to regulate the husband’s behavior through the use of the bond and local surveillance. 
This agreement having been reached in December 1855, four months later 
Shamsoonissa instituted a property suit against her husband, in the spring of 1856.472 In 
response, and “on the same day,”473 Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem filed his restitution of 
conjugal rights suit against Shamsoonissa.474 In the restitution suit, the Zillah [district] judge 
in the court of first instance, found that the husband had, by virtue of becoming a 
Freemason, outcasted himself and thereby relinquished his conjugal rights to his wife.475 On 
appeal, the Sudder Ameen, or Indian judge of second class,476 ruled in favor of 
Shamsoonissa. The husband appealed to the Calcutta Supreme Court, but he lost his appeal 
there as well.477 Finally, he appealed to the Privy Council. There he met with somewhat more 
success: the Privy Council determined that Indian Muslims could use conjugal rights suits 	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under Muslim law. It remanded the case to the Calcutta High Court for trial on the facts.478 
In line with the course endorsed in Aradaseer Cursetjee, it made clear that conjugal rights suits 
could be pursued in Indian civil courts by Muslim litigants but should be adjudicated under 
Muslim law.  
The husband contended that Muslim law should apply to him, and put forward a 
fundamentally different interpretation of Muslim law than the wife. His interpretation 
required the wife’s residence with her husband and allowed the husband a great extent of 
physical violence. Even if his behavior had exceeded the limits of violence allowed to a 
husband by Muslim law, he contended, the wife should still be ordered to return to him with 
only a bond to guarantee his good behavior.479 The husband argued that his patriarchal right 
lay under Muslim law, and the courts must enforce Muslim law.  
The wife argued, first, that Muslim law did not allow this and, second, even if it did, 
Muslim law did not necessarily apply in this scenario. Since there was uncertainty, there was 
scope for the courts to make decisions based on justice and good conscience, the wife 
contended.  
In court each side can put forward several different arguments that may mutually 
exclude each other in an attempt to achieve the best outcome for the litigant. Here the wife 
argued both that the husband had violated her rights within Muslim law and that, even if he 
had not, his behavior had exceeded the bounds of “justice, equity, and good conscience.” In 
sum, there were three arguments at play here: i) the husband had a right to his wife’s person 
under Muslim law and the government must respect this (husband); ii) the wife had a right to 
live apart because her husband had violated her rights under Muslim law (wife); iii) the court 
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could, under its broad scope for equity, determine that the husband’s behavior violated a 
general standard of “equity, justice, and good conscience” (wife).480   
 The rhetoric of cruelty can be contrasted with both earlier and later language. In the 
very earliest cases on ordering a wife to return to her husband, the language was not of 
cruelty at all, but of the husband’s positive obligation of conjugal kindness and marital 
affection. In Aradaseer Cursetjee, the wife sought a hybrid: Her demands for residence and 
decent treatment by her husband were framed by the assessor for the Privy Council as a suit 
for restitution of conjugal rights.481 In Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, much of the discussion was 
taken up with the idea of the husband’s and wife’s rights against each other. A personal 
status was brought into the framework of rights language. This process began in Aradaseer 
Cursetjee when the case was classified as a “restitution of conjugal rights suit” even though 
the original language of the plaint requested simply that the husband “be ordered to take 
back his wife, and treat her with conjugal kindness,” or maintain her.482 It received much 
further support with Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, the Privy Council making clear that such 
restitution of conjugal rights suits were valid in India. While the earlier suits may also have 
sought to enforce rights between husbands and wives, it is significant that such conjugal 
disputes came to be framed squarely within the language of rights. 
In part because it was the husband suing the wife, the formula was different in 
Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem. That the husband had some forms of conjugal rights over his wife 
was not at question: the only question was whether his behavior had crossed the line that 
would abrogate that right. Shamsoonissa was a “young widow” and the court attributed the 
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husband’s cruelty to his greed and their property disputes.483 Notably, the husband’s cruel 
behavior was not described in great deal in the original hearing: “there was no evidence 
given of any specific ill treatment” besides his attempt to control Shamsoonissa’s property.484 
Despite the lack of specificity, the lower court (the Sudder Ameen) found that the wife was 
“in danger of her life.”485 The Calcutta High Court decision gave further details: Moonshee 
Buzloor Ruheem “ill use[d] her, and shut her up as if in prison,” forcing her, “lately a rich 
widow,” to leave his home “with [only] the bare clothes on her back.”486 In the Privy 
Council’s final judgment, the wife was deemed to have provided insufficient evidence of her 
husband’s cruelty, since her contention mainly rested on “the proceeding of the Magistrate” 
that originally released her, its slim evidentiary value represented by its treatment as “the 
record of an act done by a Police Officer” and not a legally proven and validated record. 487 
The Privy Council noted the evidence that she could have put forward, but did not, such as 
calling the Magistrate as a witness to testify to her condition or giving her own testimony.488  
The Privy Council decisively rejected the wife’s argument that justice, equity, and 
good conscience could be the basis of the court’s decision in a suit for conjugal rights 
between Muslims. The Privy Council declared that Muslim law included a husband’s 
patriarchal right over his wife. Restitution of conjugal rights could be enforced under Muslim 
matrimonial law.  The decision established decisively the space for conjugal rights within the 
jurisdiction of Indian Muslim law. Since Shamsoonissa was deemed not to have sufficiently 
proved her husband’s cruelty, the Privy Council remanded the suit to the Calcutta High 
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Court for a retrial on the facts. The decision thereby imported an English remedy into 
Anglo-Muslim law.  
 
Sources of Decision 
 There were three different sources for the Privy Council’s decision that the Indian 
courts did have jurisdiction to entertain RCR suits for Muslim marriages, under Muslim law. 
These three sources were: 
1. precedents and authoritative textbooks on Muslim law (specifically the Hedaya and 
the Hingu judgment from 1832);  
2. statute (Bengal Regulation IV of 1793, s. 15);  
3. and, “the nature of the thing:”489 the imperatives of colonial governance, specifically 
that since “the rights and duties resulting from the contract of marriage vary in 
different communities”490 there was no alternative to turning specifically to the “the 
particular law of the contracting parties.”491  
 1. Authorities/Precedents 
 The Privy Council identified at least three sources for the Muslim husband’s right: i) 
the general husbandly authority found in the Hedaya; ii) an even broader source in the 
“framework of Oriental society…”; iii) prior practice, as found in the Hingu precedent.  
 Let us take the first two together. The Hedaya was a primary source of Muslim law 
for the colonial legal system. It was a twelfth-century manual of jurisprudence (fiqh) compiled 
by Ali ibn Abu Bakr al-Marghinani (d. 1196) in Central Asia. It was adopted by Indian jurists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




of the same Hanafi school (madhab) of religio-legal adjudication.492 Colonial courts relied 
heavily on this text as a guide to Muslim law. However, the version they used had been 
translated, first by Indian scholars from Arabic to Persian, and then by Charles Hamilton in 
1791 to English.493 The complex and inherently selective and political process of translation 
fundamentally changed the text, as did its deployment in the precedent-based common law 
courts. This leads scholar Scott Kugle to conclude that, in commissioning Hamilton’s 
translation of the Hedaya, Sir Warren Hastings “did not just find a text, he created one.”494 
While there were a multitude of textbooks on Islamic jurisprudence and compendia of 
fatawa, or non-binding but authoritative legal rulings on how to live a pious and correct life 
available, it seems that colonial judges, for simplicity’s sake, usually defaulted to the Hedaya, 
as was the case in Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem.495 
The Privy Council noted the Hedaya gave a strong right to the husband over his wife, 
though the manual did not specifically enumerate the husband’s right to compel his wife’s 
residence with him. The Privy Council found that  
it seems implied though, that she, from the time she enters his house, is under 
restraint, and can only leave it legitimately by his permission, or upon a legal divorce 
or separation, made with his consent. In fact, the principle of keeping a man’s hareem 
in seclusion and under his control, is so essential a part of the framework of Oriental 
society, that it is naturally assumed and then and taken for granted by the Mussulman 
expounder of the law.496  
The Privy Council extrapolated the husband’s rights to his wife’s cohabitation from the 
general patriarchal right of the Muslim husband.497 From the fluid, contextual fatawaat of the 
Hedaya, the Privy Council built an edifice of a husband’s hard and fast legal right. 	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Three earlier precedents in the civil courts served as guides to the state of Muslim 
law for the Privy Council. Based on its analysis of these precedents, the Privy Council came 
to the conclusion that Muslim law, like Christian law, required cohabitation grounded in the 
patriarchal right of Muslim law. The Privy Council used Maulvi Abdul Wahab v. Mussumat 
Hingu from 1832498 for the position that a Muslim wife could not initiate a divorce.499 The 
Privy Council used this feature of Muslim law to support a vision of the husband’s 
patriarchal authority over his wife. It used a similar precedent from 1841, Mussumat Ameena, 
to support the obligation of cohabitation under Muslim law, although that case did not result 
in a restitution order due to the wife’s young age.500  
These precedents supported the use of restitution of conjugal rights in Indian law; 
the Privy Council found: “according to the Mahomedan law, by which the question was to 
be decided, the Plaintiff had a right to the possession of his Wife, and she was compelled to 
return to him.”501 The Privy Council noted, “From some passages it might be inferred that in 
the event of disobedience the Wife was to be given bodily into her husband’s hands.”502 
However, the Privy Council pointed out that, by 1867, the time at which it was writing, 
India’s civil procedure had changed and the new Civil Procedure Code of 1861 would not 
countenance ordering the wife to her husband’s home as a method of enforcement. Instead, 
enforcement was to be through imprisonment or attachment of property.503 In England, the 
method of enforcement had changed from excommunication to imprisonment in 1813.504 In 
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1884, imprisonment for failure to resume cohabitation upon a RCR was abolished. Now 
refusal to resume cohabitation simply meant guilt for desertion.505 Despite this change in the 
method of enforcement, the Privy Council used the Hingu and Mussumat Ameena precedents 
to support the jurisdiction of the Indian civil courts to try conjugal rights suits according to 
Muslim law. Though Moonshee Buzloor consolidated the use of conjugal rights suits in Indian 
law, it did not create it.  
The Privy Council reiterated that it was adjudicating its decision according to Muslim 
law, and not according to any external standard of equity, justice, or good conscience. 
Though it came to a similar position in the end, it rejected Judge Jackson’s analysis that the 
husband had “oppressed” the wife, since Jackson failed to consider whether such oppression 
was allowable under Muslim law, instead making his decision outside of its ambit.506  
 
2. Statute  
The Privy Council’s analysis also relied on the Bengal Regulation IV of 1793 s. 15.507 
This series of regulations had created new procedures for Bengal courts. It was part of a 
larger package of reforms that included the Permanent Settlement and that attempted to 
separate revenue from judicial power.508  
 
3. Imperatives of Colonial Governance 
The third reason for conjugal rights within Muslim law involved the imperatives of 
colonial governance. While it made no specific reference to the Mutiny, the rationale was 
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very much in line with post-Mutiny colonial concerns about the need to protect Indian 
religions to avoid further discontent. The Privy Council stated that “they [i.e. their 
Lordships] can conceive nothing more likely to give just alarm to the Mahomedan 
community than to learn by a judicial decision, that their law, the application of which has 
been thus secured to them, is to be overridden upon a question which so materially concerns 
their domestic relations.”509 This statement indicates the key feature of post-Mutiny 
jurisprudence, the protection of Indian religions. Ultimately it boiled down to “the nature of 
the thing:” since there was no general rule of marriage in India, “the rights and duties 
resulting from the contract of marriage…can be ascertained by reference to the particular 
law of the contracting parties.”510 
The Privy Council stated that the Ecclesiastical courts in England sometimes took 
positions which an individual judge may not have wanted to take in what later judges would 
term a “hard case.” It held up the need to enforce the “positive law”511 despite the 
humanitarian instincts of individual judges. Indeed, there are several examples in this 
dissertation of judges noting that they would have preferred to make a decision in favor of a 
wife, but they were constrained by positive law and their need to uphold the rule of law.512 
 
Limits on Marital Violence 
  
 Though the Privy Council found that the Muslim husband had many rights of 
physical violence over his wife, it also found that Muslim law put some limits on his 
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behavior. Even though it read all this through the lens of Muslim law, it employed analogy to 
determine what behavior could or could not be tolerated, drawing on English law:  
As to personal violence, there are certainly passages in the Hedaya which founded on 
a text in the Koran, imply that the Husband may use it for correction; but this right of 
corporal chastisement is expressly said to ‘be restricted to the condition of safety:’ 
and it may be questioned whether these authorities go the full length of the Futwa at 
p. 14 of the record…The Mahomedan law, on a question of what is legal cruelty 
between Man and Wife, would probably not differ materially from our own, of which one of the 
most recent expositions is the following:--‘There must be actual violence of such a character 
as to endanger personal health or safety; or there must be a reasonable apprehension 
of it.’ ‘The Court,’ as Lord Stowell said, in Evans v. Evans (a), ‘has never been driven 
off this ground.’513 
 
This was the closest the Privy Council came to defining the bounds of the law. Yet it did not 
give completely clear guidance as to what might or might not be acceptable behavior on the 
husband’s part. It remanded the case to the High Court for trial on facts.  
The Privy Council stopped short of going into the details of the sexual relationship 
between husband wife, stating that “The Cannonists [i.e. Canon rulings] lay down many 
things concerning the relative duties of man and Wife which the Courts Christian, at least of 
our Country feel compelled to leave as duties of imperfect obligation.”514 Even though the 
Canon courts would not directly compel sex, leaving it only a “duty of imperfect obligation,” 
they would go so far as to order cohabitation. The Privy Council quoted from the Attorney 
General’s arguments that “‘They are content to take the Wife to the Husband’s door and to 
leave her there.’”515  These statements acknowledged that colonial courts could not compel 
sexual intercourse between husband and wife. They also showed that they were well aware of 
the possibility that a wife would be forced into sexual intercourse if returned to her 
husband’s home.  	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The Problem of Proof 
The Privy Council had now decided the question of jurisdiction. Muslim law, read 
largely through the Hedaya, was to be applied. The husband had a clear right to his wife’s 
cohabitation, unless she could prove cruelty. To adjudge this, it had to evaluate the evidence 
of the husband’s cruelty. The Privy Council went on to dismantle the value of the evidence 
brought forward by the wife.  
Recall that the wife’s son-in-law petitioned a Magistrate for her release on the ground 
of the ill-treatment by Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem and that she left his house. As described 
by the Privy Council, “… it is clear that she carried nothing with her out of his house…”516 
Moreover, it emerged from the Privy Council judgment that prior to the Magistrate’s order 
obtained by the son-in-law, the Magistrate had been approached once before: “…in June 
1854, a petition had been presented to the Magistrate, complaining of his [the Moonshee’s] 
ill-treatment of his Wife. He, no doubt, denied the charge, and treated it as emanating, not 
from his Wife, but from discharged servants; and the Magistrate then considered that the 
charge was unfounded.”517 This petition was followed up the next year by the son-in-law’s 
successful petition for the release of the wife.518 Since these early legal actions were not a 
conviction, nor was the husband present for them, the Privy Council would not accept them 
as evidence of the husband’s cruelty in the conjugal rights suit.519 Moreover, “It was treated 
by the Nizamaut Adawlut [court of appeal in Bengal in criminal cases] as being the record of 
an act done by a Police Officer, and not the judicial proceeding of a Magistrate.” The wife’s 
proof rested on her earlier allegations before lower courts, which had produced a legal 	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record that could be presented at law: the Privy Council went on to state about this same 
evidence that “at most it proves only that the Magistrate set the Lady free from what he 
considered improper restraint.”520 This was insufficient to prove the husband’s cruelty to the 
extent that the wife had good ground not to live with the husband.  
The judgment went on to outline other forms of evidence the wife could have 
introduced. She could have introduced the Magistrate’s direct testimony as a witness, 
evidence of her ill-treatment such as she had used in her property suit, or her own testimony. 
Since she did not, the Privy Council stated “She has failed to do any of these things; and it is 
impossible to say that the Courts below had before them in proof, the facts from which any 
Court could infer that a defence on the ground of cruelty had been established.”521 The Privy 
Council did not want to immediately order the wife to return to her husband because 
“Enough has been shown to render it doubtful, whether she can be restored to his zenanah 
with safety, at least whilst the relation of Debtor and Creditor continues subsist between 
them....”522 Therefore the Privy Council ordered a retrial before the High Court.523 The Privy 
Council, albeit in dicta, recommended an informal settlement “by amicable agreement rather 
than by further litigation” instead of pursuing the expensive course of a retrial at the High 
Court.524   
The Privy Council’s analysis was stretched. Though the two lower courts found a 
general jurisdiction outside of Muslim law, even after the Mutiny, thereby refusing the 
husband his suit, the Privy Council instead argued that conjugal rights existed under Muslim 
law. They read cruelty jurisprudence into Muslim law and stated there were some limits on 
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the husband’s rights to chastise his wife. This was a useful step for wives. However, the 
larger picture must be examined as well: the overall husbandly right was extensive. The Privy 
Council clothed its importation of restitution of conjugal rights into Indian law as a 
protection of Muslim law. Even when it did so, it continued to refer to Christian marriage 
law as an analogous example that guided its understanding of Muslim marriage. Finally, it 
insisted upon proof of the husband’s cruelty sufficient to deprive him of his right to his wife. 
Shamsoonissa, in this case, lacked the requisite proof. This was a problem that would plague 
other wives in subsequent conjugal rights suits as well.  
Between 1802 and 1867, conjugal rights underwent several changes in India. First, it 
was pushed out of the Ecclesiastical courts and into a general civil jurisdiction. Second, with 
Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, the Privy Council firmly established that conjugal rights could and 
should be enforced and adjudicated under Indian religious personal law. Third, Moonshee 
Buzloor Ruheem marked an increasing formalization of the legal plea. Initially, wives sought to 
be returned to their husband’s homes and treated with some modicum of decent marital 
behavior. It was the conjugal rights of the wives that were to be ordered. However, with 
Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, we see the wife seeking to avoid her husband’s demands that she 
return home so that he could avoid maintaining her separately and control her property. As 
we shall see in subsequent chapters, in twentieth century India, both husbands and wives 
used conjugal rights suits in similar patterns.   
 
Rukhmabai, 1884-8 
 Many of the debates about the proper place of conjugal rights in Indian law were 
recapitulated in Rukhmabai’s struggle with the remedy in the Bombay High Court from 1884 
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to 1888.525 The initial suit before the Bombay High Court526 and the appeal to a Division 
Bench527 highlighted the variety of different positions on this issue and how they could be 
mobilized in the service of litigants’ goals. The single-judge bench of Justice Pinhey ruled in 
favor of Rukhmabai, but the two-justice Division Bench, consisting of Chief Justice Sargent 
and Justice Bayley, ruled in favor of husband Dadaji.  A contemporary critic of child 
marriage and supporter of Rukhmabai’s cause, B.M. Malabari, termed the Division Bench’s 
decision “the brutal embrace.”528 Sudhir Chandra’s account contains an enormous amount of 
detail about the legal, political, and social context of Rukhmabai’s experiences with marriage, 
the courts, and the press. The case actually raised two key legal issues: first, whether a child 
marriage taken out without the wife’s consent could be valid, and which body of law should 
decide this; and, second, if the marriage were valid, the nature of the conjugal rights available 
to the husband. Here I will confine my analysis to the legal issues raised by the case and 
specifically the question of RCR. 
 The original terms of eleven-year-old Rukhmabai’s marriage to twenty-year-old 
Dadaji did not intend for her to reside with her husband, but rather that Dadaji would come 
to live with Rukhmabai’s family, in hopes of furthering his education and prospects in life 
under their salutary influence.  However, Dadaji resisted this arrangement and lived with his 
uncle instead. When Rukhmabai turned twenty-two, Dadaji initiated the restitution of 
conjugal rights suit against her, spurred on by the 25,000 Rupees Rukhmabai had inherited 
from her father.529 Rukhmabai argued that she was not required to live with Dadaji because 
he did not have “a suitable house and maintenance,” and also claiming that since she had 
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been a child at marriage and the marriage had not been consummated, it was invalid and 
Dadaji had no rights over her.530 Rukhmabai also wrote letters to the Times of India that 
criticized child marriage and the difficulties of the Hindu wife.531 She decided to fight the suit 
rather than capitulate and go live with Dadaji. In front of the single-judge bench of Pinhey, 
Rukhmabai successfully defended herself against her husband’s suit. Justice Pinhey used the 
standard of good conscience to avoid sending Rukhmabai to live with her husband.  
When Dadaji appealed this decision to a Division Bench, however, he met with 
success. The Division Bench did not directly order Rukhmabai to go to Dadaji’s home, 
instead deciding only the relevant points of law and sending the suit to a lower court for re-
trial. There, the judge did indeed order Rukhmabai to go to her husband’s home.532 
However, and fortunately for the colonial state, Rukhmabai’s plan to appeal the decision 
meant that the state did not need to immediately execute the order and imprison Rukhmabai 
or attach her property for non-compliance.533 To do so would have put the state in a very 
awkward position, especially given the enormous publicity around the case. Before her 
appeal could be heard, the couple came to a compromise wherein Dadaji agreed not to 
execute the order for Rs. 2,000 from Rukhmabai.534 However, one scholar has found that, in 
the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, women were indeed imprisoned for failure to 
resume cohabitation after a RCR order, three in 1892 and two in 1893.535 
 Before moving on to examine the legal treatment, we must note the recursive nature 
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individual fact scenarios, and these rulings then took on new life as statements of general 
law. Later court cases argued about how that law should be applied to the facts. The earlier 
precedents, Ardaseer Cursetjee and Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem played important roles in the legal 
deliberations in Rukhmabai. Ardaseer Cursetjee was used to prove the authority of British 
courts to deal with restitution of conjugal rights suits.536 For Dadaji, the problem was that 
neither Aradasser Cursetjee nor Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem involved Hindus, opening him to the 
charge that there was no place for restitution of conjugal rights within Hindu law.  
 There were subsequent Hindu suits in Indian courts that drew on these earlier 
precedents, however. This gave weight to Dadaji’s contention that Hindu husbands also 
could institute conjugal rights suits.537 These three suits together showed that husbands and 
wives of diverse religious communities (Zoroastrianism, Islam, Hinduism) used conjugal 
rights suits. Rukhmabai gave several reasons as to why she should not have to comply with 
her husband’s order of conjugal rights. First, the marriage itself was not valid. This led to a 
long discussion of the Hindu law of marriage validity and with it a long discussion of 
jurisdiction. Should English standards of “equity, justice, and good conscience” or a Hindu 
law determine the issue? The second issue was whether Dadaji could maintain Rukhmabai at 
his home. The third issue was whether Rukhmabai could indeed be ordered to return to her 
husband’s home, or whether she should be imprisoned or have her property attached 
instead.  
 Justice Pinhey ruled in favor of Rukhmabai. His reasoning was grounded in a 
standard external to any religious law. He stated, “no court had ever ordered ‘a woman who 
had gone through the religious ceremony of marriage with a man, to allow that man to 
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consummate the marriage against her will.’”538 Pinhey’s analysis came to the closest to 
acknowledging that the colonial courts were on the verge of positively endorsing marital 
rape. He used a general standard to avoid having the colonial courts send an unwilling wife 
to her husband. 
 Pinhey found for a general standard external to the Hindu law drawing on what 
Chandra terms “legal-humanitarian frameworks.”539 Pinhey’s ruling did not stand before the 
Division Bench. The Bench’s reversal of Pinhey’s judgement was a strong reading of 
patriarchal right into Anglo-Hindu law. It reiterated the positions of Aradaseer Cursetjee and 
Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem: conjugal rights could be applied to Indians, so long as it was done 
within the framework of the litigants’ religious personal laws.540 In each of these three cases, 
the courts found that each religion’s law could countenance conjugal rights under some 
circumstances. In so doing, the courts each time turned to Christian marriage as an 
analogous example that also countenanced restitution of conjugal rights. It was as if, by 
drawing on the model of Christian marriages, colonial judges could somehow accept and 
normalize the violence inherent in that remedy for the Indian wife as well. It was through 
this lens that the Division Bench in Rukhmabai’s case also ruled that the wife’s consent was 
not essential to Hindu marriage, finding her marriage valid, though it had occurred without 
her consent. With the marriage deemed valid, so too were Dadaji’s conjugal rights over her.  
 
Discussion 
Comparison and Analogy 
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 As in Ardaseer Cursetjee and Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, the Rukhmabai judgment by the 
Division Bench adopted a comparative framework for evaluating women’s rights. It 
compared women’s rights in Hinduism to those in Christianity. The courts compared 
women’s rights along several axes. For example, in the conjugal rights cases examined here, 
one axis was the wife’s ability to divorce and leave her husband: she could do so with a 
contractual marriage under Islam but not under sacramental marriage in Hinduism and 
Christianity.541 Another axis was the extent of the woman’s property rights; again, the 
Muslim wife was deemed to have greater property rights than the Christian in Moonshee 
Buzloor Ruheem. This comparative framework associated social advancement with women’s 
status, though sometimes non-Christian wives were deemed to have superior rights. For 
Indian marriages, the husband’s rights to a second marriage acted as a marker of inferiority 
when compared to Christian marriages. It was for this reason that Indian litigants could not 
use Ecclesiastical law but could use civil law to enforce conjugal rights. In general, the 
comparativist view adopted in the courts was not exactly the same as the dominant strain of 
liberalism found in Maine or Mill.542 It used a calculation, almost quantitative, of legal rights 
to adjudge the status of Indian religious law against Christian/English matrimonial law. This 
was a variation on the standard comparison of religion or women’s social status. It was more 
concerned with legal status and comparing rights than with actually existing social status. 
The comparative view drew bright lines between various religions, even when it found 
similar rights for the husband in each religion. 
Such a framework haunts contemporary understandings as well.  The comparativst 
approach persisted into recent scholarly treatments of Rukhmabai’s legal struggle. For 
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example, Chandra points out that, in their analyses of Rukhmabai’s case, both Antoinette 
Burton and David Gilmour misinterpreted the contemporary understanding of restitution of 
conjugal rights and imprisoning an unwilling wife as specifically un-English. This 
misinterpretation prevailed despite the fact that contemporary observers very clearly noted 
that restitution of conjugal rights suits were a feature of English law.543 Chandra wryly notes, 
“Stereotypes generate various ways of defying facts.”544 Relatedly, and more perniciously, this 
comparative framework has persisted into popular political discourse in India.545 In the 
aftermath of the Shah Bano decision in 1984 and the Muslim Women’s Act of 1986, Hindu 
nationalists, and much of mainstream Indian opinion, deemed Muslim men to have been 
unfairly removed from the ambit of criminal procedure.546 Indeed, the media “framed it as a 
battle between ‘fundamentalist, orthodox, obscurantist male chauvinists’ and ‘modern, 
secular, pro-women rationalists.”547 Such competitive and comparative frameworks zero in 
on a particular issue and then seek to quantify each religion’s approach to women’s rights. 
However, a longer and wider historical framing highlights that India’s religious personal laws 
are oftentimes more alike than different, and that they have common origins and trajectories 
due to the shared experience of colonial common law. 
Another mode of analysis employed by the courts in these cases was analogy. Even 
though the courts were keen to decisively place conjugal rights suits within the ambit of 
Indian religious-personal laws, they also continued to refer to Christian marriage as an 
exemplar of how marriage could and should be structured. For example, in Moonshee Buzloor 	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Ruheem, the Privy Council noted that there were some limits on the husband’s rights of 
violence over the wife under Muslim law, but that this standard would be similar to the 
standard for the English husband. 
 
Rape and Liberty 
 One issue at the heart of all the conjugal rights cases examined here was the extent to 
which colonial courts could compel certain behaviors on the part of husband or wife. 
Regardless of the chances of their orders actually being followed, the courts were issuing an 
official ruling on the colonial state’s position on women’s rights and obligations in marriage. 
Conjugal rights suits raised the thorny issue of compelling cohabitation and the possibility of 
forced sexual intercourse. The question of the marital sexual relationship between husband 
and wife was a vexed issue for the courts. On the one hand, sexual intercourse and 
procreation were ostensibly the reasons for cohabitation, though the factual circumstances 
of litigants showed that spouses’ motivations for demanding cohabitation were in reality far 
more varied. The courts did not use the terms marital rape, or rape at all, or even something 
along the lines of forced sexual intercourse, when engaging this question.  At the same time, 
as noted in the discussion of Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, lawyers and judges recognized the 
limits of what the courts could compel; recall the statement that “the Courts Christian, at 
least of our Country feel compelled to leave as duties of imperfect obligation” and that 
“‘They are content to take the Wife to the Husband’s door and to leave her there.’”548 As the 
cases of both Shamsoonissa and Rukhmabai showed, courts recognized that ordering a wife 
to return to her husband’s home would make her vulnerable to his physical and sexual 
violence. In each case, the appellate court refused to order her home but also left open the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
548 Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, 607. The Attorney-General was apparently quoting Lord Stowell.  
 156 
possibility that the lower court to which the case was remanded for trial on facts would do 
so. And, indeed, in Rukhmabai’s case, this is exactly what happened, though the issue 
became moot once she agreed to a compromise.549  
Even today, marital rape is an exception to the rape provisions of the Indian Penal 
Code.550 Marital rape was only made a crime on par with non-marital rape in England in 
1991.551 In India, though the 1891 Age of Consent Act made marital rape of an under-12 
child wife a crime, the Act did nothing to undercut the general acceptance by the Indian 
Penal Code of marital rape between an of-age wife and her husband.552 
Physical control over wives was at the heart of the question of conjugal rights. This 
fact was aptly emphasized by a phrase used in the Privy Council’s judgment in Moonshee 
Buzloor Ruheem, stating that “It seems clear to them that if cruelty in a degree rendering it 
unsafe for the Wife to return to her husband’s dominion were established, the Court might 
refuse to send her back.”553 Behind the idea of dominion was the husband’s politico-social 
domination of his wife as well as his physical control over her. It marked out a relationship 
of sovereignty as well as a relationship of physical control.554  
Control over wives’ physical movements was central to husbands’ strategies for 
controlling their wives’ bodies and property, wives’ contentions in courts suggested. For 
example, in Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, Shamsoonissa noted that her husband wanted to 
control her property and that is why he had instituted a conjugal rights suit against her. If she 
were compelled to return to his home, her property suits and rights might also have been 
threatened by his physical control over her. Likewise, in Rukhmabai, Dadaji seemed to be 	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after his wife’s considerable wealth and pursued this end through the legal remedy of 
conjugal rights, which would have allowed him physical control and through that, he 
imagined, control over her wealth. While this may not be surprising, it shows an important 
point about the legal history of marriage and coverture. Though coverture is often collapsed 
to married women’s property rights, it should not be forgotten that legal marriage also 
brought with it the husband’s ability to control his wife’s body and sexuality.  
An adjunct to this, as we have already seen, was the courts’ single-minded locating of 
the marital home with the husband. There was a mismatch between the social realities of 
marriage and the law’s requirement of a single matrimonial home. Sharafi makes this point in 
her analysis of the Aradaseer Cursetjee decision. She re-frames what the law termed bigamy and 
adultery as something closer to consecutive marriages.555 Likewise, in Rukhmabai’s case, the 
original intention had been for the husband to live with her family in a practice known as 
ghar-jawai, in which the son-in-law lived in the wife’s natal home.556  As with the citizenship 
cases examined in the previous chapter, the courts sought to reduce complex social 
circumstances to the model of the patriarchal family, with the matrimonial home located 
solely with the husband.  
 
Conclusion  
During the nineteenth century, the Privy Council and Indian high courts read such 
conjugal rights into individual bodies of Indian personal law, whether Parsi, Muslim, or 
Hindu. In each body of law, the husband was deemed to have a right to his wife’s 
cohabitation unless his behavior exceeded acceptable bounds of violence. In Moonshee Buzloor 
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Ruheem, the Privy Council clearly stated that the husband had rights of corporal chastisement 
over his wife approximately along the same lines as the English husband.557 Though these 
were not unlimited, neither did the wife have an absolute right to a non-violent marriage. 
Courts used comparison and analogy to delineate husbands’ and wives’ rights; the key 
distinguishing feature of Christian and Indian marriage was the difference on the question of 
polygamy. Husbands and wives each used the remedy of conjugal rights suits to attain 
different ends. These suits were also closely tied to concerns about property and material 
rights of maintenance between husband and wife.   
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the idea of conjugal affection and 
cohabitation became formalized into a more uniform structure of “conjugal rights,” in which 
the spouses each had a right to cohabitate with the other. That rights language was used to 
describe such claims should not be allowed to obscure the remedy’s heavily patriarchal bias. 
The matrimonial home was located with the husband and he had a right to access to his wife 
in his home. While it can be argued that the wife, too, had a right to reside with her husband 
and receive his financial support, she had no countervailing right to a violence-free marriage 
or to demand his residence with her. It is interesting that the remedy was so firmly 
ensconced in the language of rights and that it was open to either spouse to use.  
These seemingly progressive features of the remedy should not obscure its patriarchal bias 
and the way in which assumed the wife’s dependence on the husband, either by the 
requirement that she live with him or by the requirement that he maintain her. Here we see 
that coverture structured this important arena for matrimonial litigation. After the 
endorsement of this remedy by Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, it became even more popular in 
India, as we shall see in the next set of chapters. Many of the same issues raised in Moonshee 	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Buzloor Ruheem, such as the specter of marital rape, husbands’ desires to control their wives’ 
wealth through control of their liberty, and the question of the limits of matrimonial 
violence, structured twentieth century conjugal rights litigation as well.
      160 
Chapter Three 
Restitution of Conjugal Rights in Uttar Pradesh 
 
 
This chapter uses an important 1939 Oudh Chief Court decision on restitution of conjugal 
rights to begin a discussion of the history of the procedure in the north Indian state of Uttar 
Pradesh (UP). Often the discussion of Indian personal law collapses diverse regional patterns into 
national analyses. Such discussions miss the nuances of jurisdictional differences, local cultural 
patterns, and differing historical trajectories. Though there are some notable exceptions,558 histories 
of Indian personal law lack the regional diversity that characterize other sub-fields of Indian history. 
However, since the 1935 Government of India Act, personal matters, especially marriage, divorce, 
adoption, succession, and inheritance (with the important exception of agricultural land) were 
considered concurrent powers, topics on which both the provinces and federal center could 
legislate.559 This division of powers remained in the 1950 Indian Constitution.  
For eight decades, then, legislative powers over many personal affairs have been shared by 
India’s federal center and its states. This has produced important regional differences in the 
trajectories of Indian personal laws. Moreover, as this and the following chapters show, much of 
Indian personal lawmaking has taken place entirely outside of the legislative arena. Muslim and 
Hindu statutory personal law reforms in the final decade of colonial rule were johnny-come-latelys 
to the arena of personal law in India. The previous chapter made this amply clear by showing that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
558 Nita Verma Prasad, “The Litigious Widow: Inheritance Disputes in Colonial North India, 1875-1911,” in Behind the 
Veil: Resistance, Women and the Everyday in Colonial South Asia, ed. Anindita Ghosh (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2007), 161–90; 
G. Arunima, There Comes Papa: Colonialism and the Transformation of Matriliny in Kerala, Malabar, c. 1850-1940. (New Delhi: 
Orient Longman, 2003); and Devika, En-gendering Individuals. 
559 Government of India Act 1935, Seventh Schedule, List III (Concurrent Legislative List), items 6 and 7.  
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the Privy Council and the High Courts were the institutions that defined the place of restitution of 
conjugal rights (RCR) in Indian law in the nineteenth century. 
I have selected the period from 1939 to 1970 because the late colonial and early post-
colonial period saw many legislative reforms to Hindu and Muslim personal laws. Such legislation 
interacted with the pre-existing judicial adjudication of matrimonial disputes in complex ways. These 
legislative reforms have often been analyzed as a discrete field for their political and cultural 
implications. My aim here is to put the legislation in dialogue with the longer history of judicial 
adjudication of matrimonial disputes in order to show a.) how the bulk of law-making on personal 
law in India occurred within the courts, and b.) that while legislation reinforced religious-communal 
dividing lines within Indian society, judicial law-making operated with a different vocabulary that 
oftentimes transcended religio-communal dividing lines. This is not to contend that the legislative 
reforms were unimportant, but rather to suggest that from the point of view of legal history, they 
operated within a larger frame of matrimonial dispute resolution in the courts.  
It is useful to briefly survey the legislative framework of Hindu and Muslim personal law in 
this period to provide a better understanding of the timeframe chosen. First, in the late colonial 
period, there were two important reforms to Hindu women’s property rights. The 1929 Hindu Law 
of Inheritance Act and the 1942 Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act (aimed at mothers, sisters, 
daughters, and widows) expanded women’s property rights. Also aimed at property rights was the 
Shariat Application Act of 1937. This Act explicitly stated that Anglo-Muslim law—and not local 
customary laws—would apply to Indian Muslims in matters of property, succession, and inheritance. 
The Act, especially in the Punjab, expanded some women’s property rights since a Muslim daughter, 
under Muslim but not customary law, had a hard and fast entitlement to a share of her father’s 
property upon his death. The Shariat Act, Minault argues, was more important as a symbolic marker 
of the consolidation of a South Asian Muslim identity, one aligned with expanding Muslim women’s 
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property rights, than in actually improving the status of Muslim women especially in rural areas 
where tribal customary law “retained undeniable significance.”560  
These property acts were important touchstones in debates about the progress, or lack 
thereof, of Indian women’s rights. However, the focus of this dissertation is narrower: it aims at the 
dyadic relationship between husbands and wives. In this vein, two new statutes of the last decade of 
colonial rule, the 1939 Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (DMMA) and the 1946 Hindu Separate 
Residence and Maintenance Act or the (HSRMA) are significant. Each provided extensive lists of 
grounds for the wife to attain her divorce or separate residence and maintenance. Within these lists 
of grounds for relief, each Act provided an expanded and delimited definition of cruelty. The 
DMMA was a statutory reform to the law of Muslim marriages and divorces. It granted the wife a 
long list of grounds for divorce. One impetus behind the Act was a historical critique that argued 
that British rule incorrectly froze the development of Muslim jurisprudence, preventing Muslim law 
from adapting to changing social standards. The Act also removed the need for tentative judicial 
reasoning by making it very clear that the Muslim wife had a right to divorce on numerous grounds, 
providing a clarified and systematic approach to Muslim women’s divorce rights.  
This major Muslim personal law reform statute was followed seven years later by the 1946 
Hindu Women’s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act (HSRMA). It provided an 
extensive list of grounds for the Hindu wife to obtain separate residence and maintenance—as close 
to Hindu divorce as the late colonial state was willing to come. This late colonial Act was a prelude 
to the larger package of reforms enacted by the Hindu Code in 1955 and 1956. The Hindu Code was 
a series of four pieces of legislation that addressed many aspects of Hindu familial relations: the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
560 Gail Minault, “Women, Legal Reform, and Muslim Identity,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle 
East, XVII, no. 2 (1997): 6-7; David Gilmartin, “Customary Law and Shariat in British Punjab,” in Shariat and Ambiguity 
in South Asian Islam, ed. Katherine Pratt Ewing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 57; Newbigin, Hindu 
Family, 19-20 and 125-6; Rachel Sturman, The Government of Social Life in Colonial India: Liberalism, Religious Law, and 
Women’s Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 213-22.  
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Hindu Marriage Act (1955); the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act (1956); the Hindu Succession 
Act (1956); and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act (1956). For the purpose of this 
dissertation, and its focus on matrimonial disputes and matrimonial cruelty, the most important 
legislative benchmarks were the 1939 DMMA; the 1946 HSRMA; and the 1955 Hindu Marriage Act 
(HMA). Each of these major legislative reforms will be explored, where relevant, in subsequent 
chapters. 
This dissertation argues that these statutory reforms together with the practice of family law 
in the courts constituted a common legal field. Therefore, I have used the starting date of 1939 to 
begin my longitudinal survey of High Court decisions on matrimonial disputes. The survey’s start 
date of 1939 marks the first year in which a wife could have used the DMMA to dissolve her 
marriage, though in fact, the All India Reporter did not publish the first High Court judgment on the 
DMMA until 1944.561  
This and subsequent chapters are based on a longitudinal survey of the development of legal 
responses to marital cruelty in one Indian state. The cases were selected by surveying the indices of 
the Allahabad and Oudh All India Reporters (AIR) from 1939 until 1970 and recording all cases that 
involved family disputes.562 Hindu, Muslim, and Christian cases have been included. In the period 
between 1939 and 1955, I identified approximately ninety-eight reported High Court decisions on 
matrimonial disputes. In the period between 1956 and 1970, I identified approximately fifty-three 
such High Court decisions. However, I was not able to examine all of these 151 decisions in this 
dissertation because they focused on diverse bodies of law, including restitution of conjugal rights, 
maintenance, guardianship and adoption, and property and inheritance disputes. Instead, I narrowed 
the focus to those disputes that focused on the relationship between husbands and wives, rather 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561 Mt. Badrulnisa Bibi v. Syed Mohammed Yusuf, AIR 1944 All 23, from District Gorakhpur. Without a more thorough 
survey of lower court records, we cannot stay what was the first UP case that employed the DMMA. 
562 1939-1949: AIR Oudh & Allahabad; 1950-5: AIR All Series; the Oudh Chief Court became the Lucknow Bench of 
the Allahabad High Court and all decisions are published in the AIR All series. 
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than inter-generational disputes about property or guardianship and adoption. I further subdivided 
those specifically matrimonial disputes into i.) restitution of conjugal rights suits; ii.) maintenance 
disputes under any form of maintenance law (Muslim, Hindu, or criminal); and iii.) disputes specific 
to Muslim law under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act. Reported cases on Hindu law 
involved sisters, daughters, and widows more often than wives. However, because such disputes 
most often involved inter-generational property disputes and the property rights of widows, they 
have been excluded from my analysis, in order to retain the focus on the dyadic husband-wife 
relationship and the nature of wife’s rights to liberty within marriage and the development of 
matrimonial cruelty jurisprudence.563 
These cases are simultaneously very significant and unrepresentative. This is because they 
represented the decisions of the premier courts in Uttar Pradesh about how to properly apply laws. 
The High Court judgments interpreted and applied the law (sometimes statutory and sometimes 
common) to individuals who sought state support for a rearrangement of the physical, economic, 
and legal aspects of their familial relationships. The judgments also set precedents which in theory 
even if not uniformly in practice were followed by the district courts. If a lower court failed to apply 
a precedent correctly then a litigant would have a good case for appeal to the High Court because of 
the error of the lower courts.  
The High Court was not required to accept all appeals from the District Magistrate. For the 
High Court to accept an appeal, the case had to raise a significant legal point or argue that the judge 
of a lower court made an error in applying the law. The cases that were reported in the key sources 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563 Prasad termed widows from the late nineteenth century as “litigious” as well. She points out that one source of 
widows’ litigation was the 1856 Hindu Widow’s Remarriage Act which preserved widows’ rights to their dead husband’s 
property if this was the custom of the community. Prasad, “The Litigious Widow.” My examination of cases from the 
1940s and 1950s suggests that such litigation resulted from 1929 Inheritance Act that preserved customs of exclusion of 
female relatives even while it granted female relations inheritance rights. Such cases examined whether the custom of 
excluding these relatives was valid and produced mixed results. The 1937 Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act also 
prompted litigation in its turn. But even before these two statutes, the question of the widow’s right of maintenance 
from transferred property resulted in complicated property disputes largely involving widows’ rights.  
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for this survey, the All India Reporters, were selected for publication out of a larger body of all High 
Court decisions because they represented decisions on important points of law. Many High Court 
decisions went unreported. For a judgment to be reported, it had to raise a significant and interesting 
point of law. To wit, the editors of the AIR in 1955 decided to publish the Notes on Unreported Cases 
(NUC), brief notes on some of the many judgments from all of India’s appellate courts that the AIR 
volume for each province’s High Court had not been able to reproduce in full. The 1955 NUC ran 
to two volumes of 6163 columns. However, seemingly because of the costs of printing these 
voluminous additions, and because the unreported cases could only be reported in brief, in 1956 the 
AIR stopped publishing the NUCs.564 The short-lived experiment in publishing the NUCs indicated 
what a small proportion of judgments the AIR published in full. Nevertheless, unpublished 
decisions could serve as precedents.565 We saw this, for example, in Ardaseer Cursetjee when the 
Bombay Supreme Court examined its records for unreported cases to determine whether the 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction over restitution of conjugal rights suits. Or, take for example the 
first page of the 1956 edition of The Code of Criminal Procedure: it solemnly warned advocates, “Use old 
books and lose good cases/Case-law is the life-blood of a law book.”566 The major sources for this 
chapter are, out of all family disputes, the sub-set of cases that were i.) heard by the UP appellate 
courts; ii.) published by the AIR; and iii.) involved wives’ allegations of marital cruelty.  
Restitution of conjugal rights was open to either husband or wife to use. A husband could 
use a RCR suit to prove he wanted to keep and maintain his wife, thereby fending off her 
maintenance suit. A wife usually, but not always, pursued a maintenance suit under the Code of 
Criminal Procedure in order to obtain a monthly payment from her husband for her sustenance and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
564 AIR, Notes on Unreported Cases, vols. 1 and 2, 1955; AIR Journal Section, January, 1956, p. 5: “The New Year.” 
565 Setalvad, Role of English Law in India, 27, citing Vinayak Shamrao v. Moreshwar, AIR 1944 Nagpur, 44, 46. See also 
Setalvad, Common Law in India, 47-50.  
566 V.V. Chitaley and S. Appu Rao, The Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898), 5th ed., vol. V (Nagpur: The All India 
Reporter, 1956), title page. 
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the sustenance of her children. A husband’s RCR suit, if successful, proved the husband made a 
good faith offer to maintain his wife at home. In this case, she was at fault for not residing with her 
husband and could not win maintenance. In this way, the civil remedy of restitution of conjugal 
rights, with its own muddled origins, and the Code of Criminal Procedure’s regulation of 
maintenance intersected with each other. Together the two were not a matrimonial code like either 
the post-colonial Hindu Code or the late colonial Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (DMMA), 
which by the late 1930s were considered necessary to unify and ease the administration of family 
law. Still, they became a robust and sophisticated system for dealing with marriage disputes, the 
more so because wives and husbands could use the laws to pursue a variety of ends following several 
different trajectories. Indeed, my survey shows that litigants were far more likely to use these 
nineteenth century remedies than the late colonial statutes.  
Historian Charu Gupta has briefly examined debates over restitution of conjugal rights in 
late nineteenth century Uttar Pradesh. She notes that this debate took place over the enforcement of 
restitution of conjugal rights suits under section 260 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 in the 
aftermath of the Rukhmabai dispute. The debate was over whether wives should be sent to live with 
their husbands or simply imprisoned if they refused to go. However, in the restitution of conjugal 
rights cases that I have examined, only one mentioned the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). This makes 
sense because, as shown in Chapter Three, restitution of conjugal rights was first imported via 
general common law lawmaking by various justices in both Bengal and Bombay. Gupta’s research 
shows that in late nineteenth century UP, some factions in Hindu society supported imprisonment 
for a wife who refused to follow an order of restitution of conjugal rights. Other conservative 
Hindus such as the Hindu Samaj in Allahabad supported reverting to the older system of forcing the 
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wife to return to her husband, rather than imprisoning her. In late nineteenth century UP some 
women were indeed imprisoned under the CPC, three in 1892 and two in 1893.567  
 
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Its Courts 
 Today, Uttar Pradesh is India’s most populous state. In the colonial period the province was 
known as the United Provinces, reflecting the integration of two separate provinces of Oudh and 
the Northwestern Provinces in 1902. In 1949, its name was changed to Uttar Pradesh, which means 
“Northern Province” in direct translation. In addition, two princely states of Rampur and Tehri 
Garhwal were added to the state. By the middle of our period, in 1961, the state was 113,654 square 
miles with a population of 74 million. According to political scientist Paul Brass, in 1961 there were 
seventeen cities with a population over 100,000.568 Some of these important cities were Lucknow, 
the former capital of the kingdom of Oudh and the site of the Oudh Chief Court (High Court); the 
industrial center of Kanpur; the city of Varanasi on the banks of the Yamuna, holy to Hindus; and 
the political center of Allahabad, which until 1949, was the capital of the state and the site of the 
Allahabad High Court.  
Uttar Pradesh is unusual in consisting of one state with two separate benches of its High 
Court. This again was a product of the amalgamation of the two separate provinces of the 
Northwestern Provinces and Oudh. It is especially unusual because in contemporary UP, the 
political capital of the state is located at Lucknow but the main bench of the High Court is at 
Allahabad, with a subordinate bench of the High Court sitting at Lucknow. Let us take the evolution 
of the Allahabad High Court first. Under the 1861 High Courts Act, the colonial government was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
567 Singh, “Women, Law, and Criminal Justice in North India: A Historical View,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 28, 
no. 7, (Jan.-March 1996): 29, n. 26. Singh found these records in jail reports from the respective years. Also see Charu 
Gupta, Sexuality, Obscenity, Community: Women, Muslims, and the Hindu Public in Colonial India (Delhi: Permanent Black, 
2001), 130-1.  
568 The foregoing details have been taken from Brass, Factional Politics, 5-10.  
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authorized to establish High Courts wherever it deemed them necessary in areas outside the 
jurisdiction of the High Courts at Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. In 1866, therefore, the Allahabad 
High Court was established. The previous chief court for province had been the Sadr Dewani Adalat 
at Agra (formed in 1831) and it took three years for the full operations to be transferred from Agra 
to Allahabad.569 Meanwhile, the kingdom of Oudh was famously annexed to British India in 1856, 
providing one major source of discontent that contributed to the Mutiny of 1856-7. After the 
Mutiny, the province of Oudh was administered by the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-western 
Provinces, and the two provinces were formally merged into the United Provinces in 1902.570 
Between 1856 and 1925, the highest court in Oudh was called a Judicial Commissioner’s Court, 
which operated on a shoestring staff of at most three permanent judicial commissioners. In 1925, 
the Oudh Courts Act was passed, which established the Oudh Chief Court with five Judges for most 
of its life. Finally, in 1948, after Independence, the Oudh Chief Court was combined with the 
Allahabad High Court and the Chief Court with the head bench at Allahabad and a subordinate 
bench at the state capital at Lucknow.571 Not all Indian states have such a system of multiple 
benches; however, some commentators have called for an increase in the number of benches in UP 
and other Indian states to increase judicial efficiency and legal literacy and access.  
 
Argument and Plan of Chapter 
 
I argue nineteenth century remedies structured matrimonial litigation in twentieth century 
India. As already discussed, the remedies of maintenance and RCR were incorporated in Indian law 
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in the nineteenth century. Now this dissertation turns to the trajectories of these remedies in 
twentieth century India. 
The end point of this chapter is a 1939 decision by the Oudh Chief Court called Ram 
Bharosey v. Mt. Sheo Dei. The Ram Bharosey case from 1939 illustrates the role restitution of conjugal 
rights suits played in a larger landscape of matrimonial litigation. An individual suit could occupy 
three timescales: i.) there was the “progress” of one individual suit: here, the decision in Ram 
Bharosey’s appeal to the High Court; ii.) there was the meso-level timeframe of a suit amongst one 
set of litigants as part of their other legal entanglements with each other; ie. before Ram Bharosey 
filed the initial RCR suit and the two appeals, Sheo Dei also initially filed a maintenance suit; iii.) 
there was development of precedent as part of the larger landscape of matrimonial jurisprudence. In 
the Ram Bharosey case, the individual restitution of conjugal rights appeal before the High Court, 
between filing and decision, took three years (timeframe i). Ram Bharosey’s RCR suit was under 
consideration by the various courts for over ten years from 1929 until 1939, at least a full decade 
from the time the husband filed his first suit until the third and final dismissal of it by the Chief 
Court (timeframe ii). And finally, this individual case relied on and incorporated precedents from 
1867 until 1939, seven decades, indicating the much longer timeframe of the inter-linked precedents 
that interpreted the law. One conclusion is that a historical analysis of continuity and discontinuity 
built around either seizing or transcending rupture cannot capture the process in which Justice 
Yorke was engaged in here. The process here was multiplex572 and striated. 
To understand that suit, and its decision on the relationship between restitution of conjugal 
rights and religious personal law, it is important to understand the precedents that played a role in 
that decision. We have already examined the Privy Council’s decision in Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 Bernard Cohn, “From Indian Status to British Contract,” in An Anthropologist Among the Historians (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 467; citing Max Gluckmann, The Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia (Manchester, 
1955), 19. 
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precedents that played an important role in Ram Bharosey drew on Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem and 
applied it in the Uttar Pradesh High Courts. There were three such precedents: a decision about a 
Scottish matrimonial dispute by the Appeals Council in 1896 called Mackenzie and Mackenzie; the 
1906 decision of the Allahabad High Court called Husaini Begam; and the 1927 Oudh Chief Court 
decision Mt. Maqboolan v. Ramzan. These are examined in chronological order before turning to an 
analysis of their use in the 1939 Ram Bharosey decision.  
Each of these suits played an important role in individual litigants’ legal trajectories and 
simultaneously influenced the development of subsequent law. Each judgment distrusted the 
husbands’ intentions and therefore ruled in favor of the wife without making a strong statement 
directly and solely against physical abuse. A category of “legal cruelty” that emerged focused on 
damage to the wife’s reputation. Each avoided deciding thorny legal questions about patriarchal 
dominion and marital violence by drawing a composite picture of the husband’s behavior. The 
structure of restitution of conjugal rights retained the husband’s physical dominion over his wife. 
The courts tended to minimize the physical violence experienced by the wife and focused on the 
category of legal cruelty and the damage to the wife’s reputation.573  
In examining Mackenzie, in particular, I hope to show that the story of patriarchal dominion 
in Indian matrimonial disputes was not a linear corruption of progressive English laws that helped 
wives by Indian husbands, for the benefit of Indian husbands. Padma Anagol argues that over the 
course of the nineteenth century, “Indian elites overturned the [initially pro-wife] implications” of 
RCR and that English laws developed into “a tool for oppressing women” in a process initiated by 
“Indian male agents with little assistance from their British counterparts.”574 I think the story is far 
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more complex. First, the form of RCR and the kinds of arguments husbands made in RCR suits 
were not limited to India, as Mackenzie shows; second, wives continued to benefit from RCR, usually 
winning their suits; and, third, even when individual wives won their suits, RCR maintained a model 
of marriage based on patriarchal dominion whether in England, Scotland, or India. I agree with 
Anagol that wives exercised agency to initiate suits and that to do so they may have overcome 
formidable challenges, and that “Indian women were resisting a system of marriage that perpetuated 
maladjusted conjugal unions.” However, I cannot agree that such maladjusted conjugal unions were 
unique to India or that “Indian societal structures” were uniquely responsible for the tamping down 
of rebellious wives.575 Patriarchal aspects of both British and Indian legal cultures reinforced each 
other and that the patriarchal features are deeply rooted in both the form and practice of law. Such 
features cannot be neatly uprooted through a mass of wives’ victories and neither can they be neatly 
inserted through the simple efforts of Indian patriarchs. 
The cases showed that litigants of all religious communities used RCR. The Scottish case 
Mackenzie shows the structural similarities and parallel legal issues raised by restitution of conjugal 
rights as a legal form rather than a religious (or religio-legal) product. Husbands of all religious 
communities used arguments about both geographic and religious personal law jurisdiction to 
attempt to avoid RCR suits. Matrimonial litigation in UP was shaped by many different forces 
especially the durable and widespread procedure of restitution of conjugal rights, which sought to 
preserve the marriage tie.  
 
Mackenzie and Mackenzie  (1895)  
 
The Mackenzie case centered on a husband’s sustained regime of draconian social control of 
his wife: he restrained his wife in his home, his mother closely supervised her, and, together, he and 	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his mother removed her infant daughter from her arms by force. The case involved the Scottish 
equivalent of the restitution of conjugal rights action, called an action of adherence. Just like 
restitution of conjugal rights, the action of adherence allowed the husband to claim his rights to his 
wife’s physical presence and control. In Mackenzie, the validity of this remedy was not at question. 
The question involved the grounds available to the husband and wife under the two different 
Scottish statutes. The question was whether the standards for the redress should be the same under 
the law that governed each. The distinction between the grounds a wife or husband could use to 
obtain relief, and the differing forms of relief available, is one we shall return to in subsequent 
chapters. 
The two different marital remedies under discussion in the Mackenzie case were the action of 
adherence and the statutory remedy of divorce a vinculo under the Scottish Divorce Act of 1573. 
Divorce a vinculo was a ruling of the Ecclesiastical courts that voided a marriage “by reason of a 
‘dirimentary impediment’.”576 It was an annulment, not a breaking of the marriage tie, but a 
statement that the “chains [of marriage] were never there.”577 Though not a divorce in the modern 
sense, the advantage of divorce a vinculo over an informal separation was that spouses could remarry 
since in law the marriage never even took place. The sixteenth century Scottish Divorce Act was 
amended by the Conjugal Rights Amendment (Scotland) Act, 1861. That Act changed the procedure 
for divorce so that action of adherence was no longer necessary; it made it easier to move directly to 
divorce, skipping over the action of adherence/restitution of conjugal rights stage. The language of 
the Act shows how the 1861 Amendment modernized the procedure and incorporated, rather than 
swept away, older legal forms in the same fell swoop:  
…it should not be necessary, prior to any action for divorce, to institute against the defender 
any action of adherence, nor to charge the defender to adhere to the pursuer, nor to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576 Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, 491.  
577 Ibid. The term meant the same thing in England and Scotland though the process redress differed due to the 
differing structures of Ecclesiastical jurisdiction in each country. 
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denounce the defender, nor to apply to the presbytery of the bounds, or any other judicature 
to admonish the defender to adhere.578 
 
Some of the practices mentioned, such as charging the defender, denouncing the defender, and 
“apply[ing] to the presbytery of the bounds…” to require the wife to prove why she should not have 
to live with her husband indicate the archaic and local, community-based nature of this matrimonial 
litigation. The question of the local authority (“the presbytery of the bounds”) indicated the legacy 
of community regulation of marriage, reputation, and behavior. Such concerns about local 
reputation also played a role in Indian matrimonial regulation, as we will see in the many subsequent 
cases in which the courts put great store in the harm individuals did to wives’ reputations via false 
criminal charges. 
While the divorce-upon-desertion standard of four years created by the 1861 Scottish Act 
may not seem speedy by today’s standard, the 1861 Act stepped toward speedy divorce.579 In 
England, Scotland was known for its easy marriage and divorce laws, though the divorce procedures 
were apparently not widely used.580  
Though aimed at making divorce a vinculo easier to attain, the 1861 Act put the action of 
adherence into an uneasy relationship with the 1573 statute. Each produced a slightly different 
position on the question of the grounds required for the deserting spouse to prove a reasonable cause 
to avoid either divorce a vinculo or adherence. In Mackenzie, the husband’s argument was that the wife 
must show the husband’s bad behavior was “worse” when she defended herself against his action of 
adherence than when she defended herself against his divorce action. Mackenzie pitted several 
different understandings of a wife’s good ground to live apart from her husband (and thus escape 
the charge of desertion, divorce, and resultant loss of property) against each other. It put forward a 
scale of forms of marital redress, with a graded scale of attendant standards to achieve the redress. 	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579 Stone, Road to Divorce, 5. 
580 Ibid., 5 and 130-1. 
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In Mackenzie, the two different forms of redress under consideration were i.) separation and ii.) 
action of adherence. The first required a “higher” standard of cruel behavior. The statutory reforms 
of 1861 to the sixteenth century Scottish statute prompted the long judicial conversation about the 
standards of behavior to attain these two separate redresses. 
The husband argued that though his behavior may have justified the wife’s leaving him for 
good cause under the 1573 Divorce Act, it did not do so under the law of the action of adherence. 
As Lord Herschell put it, “The object of the Act of 1861 was only to simplify the procedure and not 
to alter the matrimonial law…under the [original law of 1573]…no circumstances could afford 
‘reasonable cause’ which would not have been an answer to the action of adherence.”581 The court 
had to decide whether the punishment (of an adherence order issued to the wife) fit the “crime”—
the wife leaving his home without justifiable cause. The justifications for such a behavior differed 
depending on the law, so the husband contended.  
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Figure 1: Arguments in the Mackenzie  case 
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In the end, Mackenzie avoided deciding this tricky question by ruling that the husband’s 
behavior had been cruel enough to justify the wife’s leaving under the 1573 standard, the higher 
standard. Thus the difference in the standard of cruelty was irrelevant because of the facts of the 
husband’s behavior. The wife successfully defended herself, but the larger legal issue of the 
relationships between the standards for cruelty and the form of redress remained unsettled.583 
Because of the court’s reading of the specific facts in the Mackenzie saga, the judgment did not 
decide the legal question of whether the standard for adherence differed from that for separation.  
The case is directly relevant to Uttar Pradesh’s legal history because Lord Herschell’s 
position on matrimonial cruelty subsequently was used in several UP High Court rulings. Each of 
the three opinions in Mackenzie (of a five-judge bench) found that the husband’s behavior met the 
standard of cruelty that would justify the wife’s divorce a vinculo and therefore she also had a good 
defense to avoid the action of adherence. But since it was Lord Herschell’s words that were picked 
up and applied in UP, it is worthwhile to consider them in their original context. Herschell wrote,  
It seems to me open to question whether the Courts ought in all cases to disregard the 
conduct of the party who invokes their aid in an action for adherence, and to decree it in all 
cases where a matrimonial offence cannot be established by the defender. It is certain that a 
spouse may, without having committed an offence which would justify a decree of 
separation, have so acted as to deserve the reprobation of all right-minded members of the 
community. Take the case of a husband who has heaped insults upon his wife, but has just 
stopped short of that which the law regards as s’vitia or cruelty; can he when his own 
misconduct has led his wife to separate herself from him, come into Court, and allowing his 
misdeeds, insist that it is bound to grant him a decree of adherence?584  
 
This is the portion of the opinion that was drawn on in later UP High Court decisions. In fact, 
Herschell’s words here were obiter dicta, or comments made in passing that could only claim 
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persuasive but not binding authority because they were not part of the actual ruling. The real ratio for 
his decision was that the husband’s behavior, on the facts, rose to the standard of mis-behavior 
required for divorce a vinculo, and therefore certainly to the standard required to repel the action of 
adherence. Nevertheless, it was Herschell’s hypothetical statement that even if the husband’s 
behavior stopped just short of cruelty that the court could exercise its discretion and deny the 
husband the remedy he sought that was reproduced in the UP High Courts.  
 Even though Herschell found in favor of the wife, he minimized the violence she 
experienced. He stated, “Although the violence was considerable, it did not result in any serious 
consequences [to the wife].”585 Herschell did not consider the psychological trauma the wife may 
have experienced from her husband’s violence. Moreover, his analysis here conflicted with his 
comments in other parts of judgement: “Considerable violence was used. About this there can be no 
real doubt, the marks left upon the respondent’s wrist by the appellant’s grip” having been witnessed 
by several people.586 Lord Herschell stated, “Now, there are, no doubt, cases in which a single act of 
violence would not afford sufficient ground for a decree of separation; if the assault did not cause 
any serious injury, if it were the result of sudden passion, and were repented of as soon as 
committed, and above all, if there was no reason to anticipate its repetition, the Court might not 
regard it as amounting to s’vitia or cruelty.”587 Herschell’s statement did not reject marital violence. 
He stated that such martial violence, if minor, would not necessarily give the wife a legally valid 
ground to live apart from her husband. Here we find a repeated pattern: the courts found in favor of 
the wife but did not condemn marital violence wholesale. The condemnation of the behavior of the 
individual husband sat alongside the judicial acceptance of marital violence. 
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 Alongside its incorporation into Indian law, Mackenzie is noteworthy for the history of 
Indian matrimonial cruelty because it showed that husbands across the common law world used 
similar strategies to maintain control over their wives’ bodies and property. This observation 
questions the overly simplistic association of Indian patriarchy with Hinduism or Islam. Mackenzie 
exposed the ways in which marriage restrained wives’ liberty, though the wife succeeded in repelling 
her husband’s suit. The details in the judgment showed the clear-cut reality of husbands’ restraints 
on wives. Lord Chancellor Herschell noted that Mackenzie yanked his nursing child away from his 
wife while her and his mother, Lady Mackenzie, each restrained her by her wrists which “marks left 
upon the respondent’s wrist by the appellant’s grip” were witnessed by several people.588  
Mackenzie sought to control his wife physically on a larger scale as well. The Council did not 
look kindly upon Mackenzie, described as a “Highland gentleman of good family, of austere mind 
and exacting nature.”589 In response to the wife’s attempt to repair relations, the husband acquiesced 
but only under the condition of his complete supervision of her:  
I most emphatically warn you that, as your husband and the head of the family, I feel I shall 
be obliged to enforce the terms of the assurances I asked for, and I shall require you never 
again to enter Pool House [where his brother and sister-in-law lived], never to associate with 
persons in this parish of Gairloch who are not on friendly terms with me without my 
especial permission, nor leave me for short or long intervals without my consent, or by the 
advice of my medical man.590  
 
Mackenzie sought to closely control his wife’s movement and sociality even if she agreed to return 
and live with him after their initial separation. In this way, Mackenzie did not much differ from 
husband Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem and other husbands in this chapter.  
O.H. Mackenzie of Gairloch Parish/Rossshire in Scotland held a “very exalted sense of the 
dignity and supremacy of his position as husband, and of the absolute deference which he was 
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590 Ibid., judgment of Lord Chancellor Herschell. 
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entitled to exact from his partner in life.”591 These “peculiarities” coupled with his mother’s 
maleficent influence, in Lord Watson’s view, caused the pathological treatment of his wife by an 
otherwise normal man.592 As Lord Watson went on to say, “He appears to have assumed that he was 
justified in adopting any means that occurred to him for the purpose of enforcing what he deemed 
to be his rights; and that the infliction of mental distress even to the aggravation of her bodily 
ailments, physical restraint or personal violence were, should he think it was advisable to resort to 
them…”593 The social reality of what Mackenzie or Ram Bharosey or any other husband thought 
cannot be exactly known. However, it is clear that in each case the husband’s legal argument sought 
some sanction for violence or beating within marriage, rejected by the courts on facts.  
Lord Herschell’s judgment also draws out how keenly related the jurisdiction and law were in 
the husband’s mind. When, after the birth of their child, the wife returned with her husband to his 
home at Rosshire, “On their way they spent a night at Edinburgh” which allowed the husband to  
…consult his legal adviser as to his rights with respect to the child. As the result of the 
interview he informed his wife that he had consulted Mr. Adam, and that now it was across 
the Tweed [the boundary between England and Scotland] his power over the child was quite 
absolute, and that he could stop her seeing it if he chose…This seems the clue to much of 
his conduct: it was for him to maintain to the uttermost the rights which he deemed the law 
allowed him; it was for her to submit without question to their assertion.”594  
 
Here there is a strong resemblance to the behavior of Abigail Bailey’s husband, described in an 
article by Hendrik Hertog. Asa Bailey tricked his wife into traveling with him from New Hampshire 
to New York because of his (likely mistaken) belief that state’s more patriarchal laws would favor 
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him.595 Throughout the common law world, husbands sought to use differing legal jurisdictions to 
amplify their rights over their wives. 
Lord Chancellor Herschell discussed Mackenzie’s psychology and his attempt to “use 
physical means in order to subdue her [the wife’s] will and to reduce it to absolute submission to his 
own.”596 These words indicated that marriage did not necessarily extinguish the wife’s independent 
will. The husband’s control over the wife’s mobility limited her liberty; her will existed but it was 
ineffectual, invoking the idea of social death. Yet a husband could not go to any extremes; there 
were limits on his patriarchal authority. In the end, the court did not make any new ruling that 
unseated the rule that the wife was subject to at least some element of her husband’s control. It did 
not modernize the law of cruelty, finding instead that on the facts of the case, the husband’s 
behavior rose to the standard of the older, sixteenth century statute and so denied his relief.  
 The Mackenzie decision is important in at least two ways. First, Herschell’s comments in dicta 
about allowing the courts to examine the totality of the husband’s behavior and his intentions were 
quoted in UP High Court decisions. Second, as a model of the kinds of conflicts husbands and 
wives faced, and the way these were litigated in courts, it shares several features with the Indian 
cases. Mackenzie, like Indian husbands, sought to control his wife’s behavior and physical mobility. 
And, like them, he sought to use procedural dodges to claim his behavior did not amount to cruelty 
that would give his wife a good defense to his action of adherence/RCR suits. In these ways, 
Mackenzie did not much differ from the Indian husbands examined here. The legal structure of 
marriage requiring the wife’s residence with the husband in the absence of any reasonable excuse 
encouraged this pattern of legal behavior.  
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Husaini Begam: Mackenzie in Uttar Pradesh 
In 1906, the Mackenzie decision was incorporated into UP law with the Muhammad Rustam Ali 
Khan v. Husaini Begam decision. The case involved two wealthy spouses, the husband from Dholpur 
and the wife from Moradabad. They married in 1877 and began living together in Dholpur, a small 
princely state on the border of present-day Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan, in 1883. The wife left the 
husband in 1896 to return to her father’s home in Moradabad, claiming she did so due to “her 
husband’s misconduct.”597 The wife had married the husband with the guarantee of the astronomical 
sum of 500 Rupees per month as “pin money” from the husband’s father.598 When the payment of 
this pin money halted (probably around 1896, when she returned to her father’s home), she sued the 
husband’s father for the arrears and succeeded in obtaining a compromise order for the amount due 
to her. When the father-in-law failed to pay that, she instituted a second suit in 1903, losing at first 
but winning on appeal. While this second suit was wending its way through the courts, her husband 
instituted a RCR suit against her. However, the husband shot himself in the foot at the beginning of 
his conjugal rights suit, for “In his plaint…[he made] serious charges against his wife, alleging not 
merely that she had become immoral, but that she had actually committed adultery” and was 
pregnant from her adulterous relationship.599  
The wife’s response to his plaint was interesting because it both stated that she felt 
threatened by him and expressed her willingness to live with him in her own hometown of 
Moradabad. She stated that “she has strong apprehension of danger to her life” and “alleges acts of 
immorality on the part of her husband” and that her father-in-law had pressured her husband into 
accusing her adultery.600 On the other hand, she noted that she owned “what she describes as 
magnificent houses of her own in the city of Moradabad, and that she is willing that her husband 	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should live with her in that city as he formerly did” or that he could find his own house in 
Moradabad where he could live nearby or they could live together.601  
The husband’s original allegation was partially reproduced in the High Court judgment, and 
indicated that the woman’s free agent status was a contributing factor to the husband’s portrayal of 
her as immoral: “Although her parents are dead, yet the defendant lives alone at Moradabad, where 
there is no near relative of hers who may look after and take care of her. She wanders about 
wherever she likes and has become immoral.”602 This quote evinces the specter of the free agent 
woman, detached from natal or marital relationships and living on her own. It suggested her 
sexuality was ungoverned by any higher authority and that in the absence of supervision she had 
given in to her baser, sexual nature by engaging in adulterous sexual intercourse.  
Three separate characteristics were associated: her sexuality, her free will, and her physical 
movement (“wandering”). In her analysis of conjugal scandals in the late nineteenth century Bengal, 
Tanika Sarkar notes that women’s mobility—and even a wife’s visits to her natal home, much less 
her independent existence603—prompted “deep male fears about the erosion of boundaries, about 
women’s exposure to men, and to different castes.”604 Sarkar also uses the term “wander:” “The 
orthodox, on the other hand, insisted that the woman’s holiest space lay within the family, in 
devoted service to the household and the family deity. It was only an immoral woman who used a 
religious pretext to wander outside the home.”605 Sarkar argues, in the late nineteenth century, 
colonial legislative reforms and highly publicized court cases about women’s sexuality contributed to 
a process in which “Hindu patriarchy was appropriating certain new turns that colonial laws had 
given to the structure of disciplinary mechanisms that ruled the woman, transferring the jurisdiction 
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and execution from the hands of a large kin group to those of the husband.”606 Both Sarkar and 
Charu Gupta point out that this concern about wandering women was particularly fraught around 
new technologies of mobility (such as the railway) and the greater access to religious pilgrimages 
such technologies enabled.607 While Husaini Begam did not have any religious purpose behind her 
residence apart from the marital home and her natal family, the loss of patriarchal control over her 
movement was used to contribute to the portrayal of her alleged adulterous behavior and 
ungoverned sexuality. The settled existence of a married woman, resident with her husband, was 
counter-posed to the free agent, immoral, wandering woman.  
In fact, the term “free agent” was used in the eighteenth and nineteenth century in referring 
to women’s status. In Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, the Privy Council stated a husband could exercise his 
conjugal rights as long as his wife was a “free agent” who was “not detained by others,” perhaps her 
relatives or a paramour.608 A 1735 treatise criticized wives’ positions as under their husbands’ 
dominion. The treatise stated wives might be “punish’d as free agents for Treason,” but held 
criminal immunity for other criminal acts because of “the private Royalties of Husbands….”609 In 
her analysis of rape trials in India, Baxi also notes, “The judicial discourse on rape classifies women 
into those who can potentially be integrated into structures of alliance as distinct from those women 
who are found to be ‘habituated’, ‘loose’ or exhibiting easy virtue.”610 The free agent woman haunts 
many family disputes as well as rape trials. 
The decision quoted Mackenzie because that decision supported the position that the court 
could look at the husband’s general behavior and intentions even if they did not necessarily rise to a 	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legal standard of cruelty.611 The High Court saw that the husband instituted his RCR suit only in 
response to the wife’s suit for her pin money: “This suggests the idea that the suit was not instituted 
with a view to renew happy connubial relations, but with the sinister object of giving trouble and 
annoyance to his wife.”612 The court evaluated the husband’s intentions based on his legal 
harassment.  
Moreover, as already noted, when the husband instituted the conjugal rights suits he charged 
his wife with immorality. The High Court gave this special attention, inserting a sort of class-based 
relative morality into the husband’s accusations: “In view of her parentage, position and fortune, this 
charge if untrue, is sheer cruelty.”613 Moreover, the Court pointed out that if the husband was 
making accusations of the wife’s adultery, it seemed reasonable to think that he would not want his 
wife to return to him, and, if she did, she would not be treated well.  
The High Court went on to state that the wife had been ready to compromise by having her 
husband live with her at Moradabad.614 The High Court then stated that if the husband did not fulfill 
this compromise, or for some reason the wife did not allow him to reside with her, the husband 
could institute a second suit for conjugal rights against her.615 At first this may have seemed a gesture 
in the husband’s favor (if the wife did not allow him to reside with her, he could return to the court 
to try to enforce his conjugal rights). But it may also have been a gesture in the wife’s favor (if the 
husband instituted a second conjugal rights suit, the wife could once and for all repel him by putting 
forward her evidence of his cruelty). In particular, the fact that the wife would be returning to her 
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husband in Dholpur, raising the fear that in “a native State, in which she could not invoke the 
protection of the British law, she will be subject, to maltreatment and violence.”616  
Despite the court’s sympathy to the wife, however, the decision was not an all-out victory. 
She only received a compromise: as she had offered, the husband could live with or near her in 
Moradabad and she need not reside with him at Dholpur. The court allowed the wife’s appeal but 
with a condition upon the wife, that the husband’s suit would be dismissed “upon the defendant’s 
undertaking…to live with husband in Moradabad and there resume conjugal relations with him.”617 
If the wife did not fulfill this obligation, the husband was allowed to take out another RCR suit.618 
This was a compromise and less than a total victory for the wife. The judgment certainly did not 
come out strongly against marital violence.  
Three important features emerge from Husaini Begum. First, it used Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem 
to find that Muslim law should apply to Muslim litigants and that the Muslim wife had some good 
defenses against restitution of conjugal rights under both Muslim law and the court’s discretion (as 
found in Mackenzie). Second, the Court focused on the legal cruelty of the husband in making 
accusations about the wife’s adultery; it noted the legal record of physical cruelty but focused on the 
legal cruelty and reputational damages. Third, it came to be used in subsequent decisions to show 
the incorporation of Mackenzie and Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem to law in UP. 
 
Mt. Maqboolan and others  v .  Ramzan (1927) 
 Mt. Mabooln and others v. Ramzan, decided by the Oudh Chief Court in 1927, involved an all-
star legal team. The two-justice bench consisted of the Chief Justice, Stuart, and Justice Wazir 
Hasan. The wife, Maqboolan, and her family were represented by Ali Zaheer, son of Sir Wazir 
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Hasan, and Shaukat Ali.619 Ramzan, the husband, was represented by Khaliq-ur-Zaman.620 The 
husband brought a successful suit for restitution of conjugal rights against his wife in the Munsif’s 
court. The wife appealed to the subordinate judge but lost. In the meantime, the husband instituted 
criminal complaints against another man, also named Ramzan, and the wife’s family members under 
the Indian Penal Code, sections 497 (adultery) and 498 (enticing or taking away or detaining a 
married woman). These complaints were dismissed. The wife appealed the RCR decision in favor of 
her husband to the High Court, and pleaded to enter her husband’s false criminal complaints into 
the evidence. This evidence was entered and it was interpreted by the High Court as an accusation 
of adultery against the wife. The High Court saw these accusations as legal cruelty and, as such, it 
gave the wife the right to live separately from her husband. The ruling stated, “An unfounded 
accusation of adultery by a husband against his wife is certainly a violation of marital rights.”621 The 
High Court did not enter into a detailed analysis of the physical violence but focused on the legal 
cruelty. 
The Maqboolan decision drew on Husaini Begam’s quoting of Mackenzie. Mackenzie was used 
to justify the Court’s application of “justice, equity, and good conscience.”622 The Maqboolan decision 
found that the husband acted without bona fide intentions in his RCR suit and that his allegations of 
adultery against his wife constituted cruel behavior sufficient to give the wife a good ground for 
living apart. The husband’s spurious criminal charges against the wife’s mother and brothers and his 
implication that she had committed adultery proved the malicious motivations of the husband. 
Therefore he lost his RCR suit. As in Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, and as in Husaini Begam, the public and 
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legal accusations against the wife were deemed to be a special form of humiliation of the wife that 
violated her marital rights.  
It is also worth noting the question of jurisdiction in Maqboolan. The High Court ruled in the 
absence of “any positive rule of Mahomedan Law,” it should look to the rules of justice, equity, and 
good conscience.623 This view was bolstered by the Oudh Laws Act,624 which allowed the Oudh 
Courts to apply justice, equity, and good conscience in the absence of the positive law.625 It was also 
bolstered by the Mackenzie decision. Specifically, Maqboolan quoted Lord Herschell’s statement, “It is 
not a motion [sic-notion] strange to our law that the Court should refuse its aid to one who does not 
come into it with clean hands.”626 The decision then noted that these rules had been applied in 
Allahabad in Husaini Begam, and so too could they be applied in Oudh. Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem and 
Mackenzie both played important roles in the early twentieth century jurisprudence of RCR in UP. 
Each precedent was used to show the courts’ discretion to make decisions about the totality of the 
husband’s behavior. In a pattern we shall see in additional suits, in Maqboolan the High Court put 
great stock in the husband’s besmirching of the wife’s character.  
Ram Bharosey v .  Mt. Sheo Dei (1939):  Facts and their Interpretation 
We have now examined some of the sources for restitution of conjugal rights as it was 
adjudicated in the Oudh and the Allahabad High Courts in the run up to the 1939 Ram Bharosey 
decision. The cases all involved Muslim litigants. The Ram Bharosey case raised the question of 
whether the rules for Hindu litigants would be the same.  
  Sheo Dei and Ram Bharosey married in 1915 in Safipur, Unnao district, about thirty-five 
kilometers due north of Kanpur and fifty-eight kilometers west of Lucknow. Marital troubles that 	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left legal traces began only in 1929. Beginning with a criminal complaint against Sheo Dei’s father 
for kidnapping her, throughout the early 1930s Ram Bharosey used the Indian Penal Code to slander 
and harass his wife.627 Sheo Dei left her husband for good and returned to her father’s home in 
1933. In April 1935, she applied for maintenance under the Criminal Procedure Code (CCrP), 
alleging that her husband beat her and threw her out of his house. Successful, she was awarded 
maintenance of six rupees per month.628  
Three months later, as a last-ditch effort to escape this monthly maintenance burden, Ram 
Bharosey filed a RCR suit against his wife in the Munsif’s court in Safipur. Ram Bharosey lost his 
suit for RCR because the Munsif (lower-court judge) found him “guilty of legal cruelty.”629 The 
husband appealed that decision to the District Judge in Unao. When he lost there, he appealed to 
the Oudh Chief Court in Lucknow. The purpose of his conjugal rights suit was to demonstrate his 
willingness to accept his wife at their marital home. This would remove the wife’s ground to claim 
maintenance from him by showing that he was entirely willing to maintain her at his home, and that 
she had no legally valid reason for living apart.630  
After dismissals by both the Munsif and District Judge, Ram Bharosey’s chances for success 
were slim by the time K.P. Misra stood to represent him in December 1938. Ram Bharosey recalls 
Bacchi Singh of Kanpur. Bacchi Singh went crazy in the course of searching for a lawyer who would 
accept his case until he met K.N. Katju, who then launched his career with an unlikely first victory 
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for the destitute and deranged, yet determined, client.631 In Ram Bharosey’s case, the two lower 
courts had already accepted the wife’s evidence of his cruelty and ruled Sheo Dei had a good defense 
to his RCR suit. Ram Bharosey and his advocate Misra could not dispute the facts before the Chief 
Court, only the legal interpretation of those facts. Advocate K.P. Misra certainly made an admirable 
effort but was not as successful for Ram Bharosey as Katju had been for Bacchi Singh. 
Unsurprisingly given these odds in December 1938, the Chief Court, like its two subordinate courts 
before it, dismissed the husband’s suit.  
In this relatively routine case, a persistent husband with the means to pursue his wife to the 
High Court did just that, either out of stubbornness or a calculation that it would be cheaper to cut 
off at the pass his lifelong maintenance obligations to his wife.632 The significance of the case lay in 
the husband’s arguments against a standard rule of cruelty that applied across religious community 
on Hindu-religious grounds, and the Chief Court’s rejection of those arguments.  
Though the husband’s jurisdiction objections were spurious, his advocate, K.P. Misra, raised 
them in skillful fashion, pushing Chief Justice Yorke to clarify the law of cruelty in Oudh. The AIR 
decided to publish the Chief Justice’s well-written and thorough opinion. The decision confirmed 
the fact of the husband’s violence, denied the Hindu husband’s unlimited rights to beat his wife, and 
declared a standard of reasonable expectation of harm as a good defense to RCR. Justice Yorke’s 
clarifications included ruling that a husband’s behavior need not rise to the level of legal cruelty in 
order for the court to deny his suit for RCR. Rather, the Court could examine whether the 
husband’s intentions made it “reasonable” to think that there would be “serious danger to her [the 
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wife’s] health and safety by reason of her” returning to his home.633 Most importantly, this standard 
for the husband’s behavior applied no matter his religious community.  
In Ram Bharosey’s appeal, Justice Yorke decided two important legal issues: the standard for a 
wife to successfully repel a husband’s RCR suit and whether this standard applied across all 
communities. The jurisdiction and standard were closely intertwined. Justice Yorke’s major question 
was, what was the standard to repel a RCR suit, outright physical cruelty, or, in the absence of 
physical cruelty, a broader category of “legal cruelty”? Following this, did this standard differ by 
religious community? K.P. Misra, the husband’s advocate advanced the argument that the standard 
to condemn a husband’s behavior varied by religious community. Justice Yorke examined the 
precedents that incorporated restitution of conjugal rights in UP. Moreover, Justice Yorke clarified 
that the Hindu husband did not hold a positive right to employ violence against his wife in the case 
of her “disobedience.”  
Despite its extensive discussion of marital cruelty, the judgment did not declare violence 
within marriage a sole ground to give the wife a good defense to bar a RCR suit. Instead, Justice 
Yorke stated, “In my opinion the conduct of the plaintiff in making charges of theft and immorality 
against his wife certainly constitutes a matrimonial offence of a very objectionable kind such as can 
be raised as a defense to a suit for conjugal rights, particularly when there are also acts of physical 
violence. It also throws grave doubt on the bona fides of the plaintiff in instituting the present 
suit.”634 As Justice Yorke wrote it, the chief event was the cruelty by legal persecution, then the 
husband’s violence, and each of these weighed along the overall vision of the husband’s past record 
and future intentions. 
The decision in Ram Bharosey affirmed the standard of a likely “serious danger to her [the 
wife’s] health and safety” as a good reason for a wife to avoid living with her husband. Because both 	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lower courts found Ram Bharosey guilty of physical cruelty, he could not call into question the fact 
that he beat and threw out his wife. He instead staked his argument on the legal point that this 
behavior did not rise to the standard of cruelty that would give his wife a good ground for living 
apart. This maneuver was similar to what Mackenzie attempted in his case. The Justice Yorke 
reproduced a summary of K.P. Misra’s arguments for the husband, as if to use the occasion of his 
judgment to publicly denounce Ram Bharosey’s position as a punishment for the husband’s earlier 
use of legal harassment.  
K.P. Misra defended the husband’s behavior using two arguments. The first was that Hindu 
husbands had “…a right to inflict corporal punishment on a wife with a light instrument” and Ram 
Bharosey had only beaten his wife “… on three occasions, on two of which she was beaten with 
fists and kicks only…”635 The husband argued for his relative good behavior over the years despite 
three isolated incidents of violence. His second argument was that this violence “…was 
justified…because the wife was declining to leave the appellant’s village Makhi and go to live with 
him at the various places where as a District Board School Master he was posted…[and] a Hindu 
husband is entitled to demand obedience …”636 His sources for this point were books on Hindu law 
from 1912 and 1878 and several nineteenth and early twentieth century precedents.637 
Against these older precedents and authorities, Justice Yorke accepted the more recent 
precedents presented by the wife’s advocate, L.P. Misra. This allowed him to take a complete view 
of the husband’s behavior rather than to quantitatively measure the instances of violence. The 
ultimate ratio for the decision was that the husband acted without bona fide intentions in his demand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
635 Ibid., 68, 70. 
636 Ibid., 68, 70.  
637 Ibid., 68 at 70, 71. The two texts were D. N. Mitter’s 1912 University of Calcutta thesis, “The Position of Women in 
Hindu Law” and Gooroodas Bannerjee’s 1878 Tagore Law Lectures, The Hindu Law of Marriage and Streedhana. The 
judgment noted places in which other decisions cited by the husband, all but one from the nineteenth century, did not 
apply.  
      192 
for RCR. The wife faced a likely expectation of physical or mental harm if the Court compelled her 
to return to his home.  
Ram Bharosey’s false criminal complaints also weakened his case. He criminally charged the 
wife with “theft and immorality” on three separate occasions between 1930 and 1933 and accused 
her of adultery with his criminal charges. In his complaints, he further compounded this charge by 
stating she had caused “injury to the family honour.”638 The criminal charge was by its nature public. 
Courts took a dim view of such public assaults on a wife’s reputation. The mere act of filing the 
criminal charge achieved the husband’s end even before a case went to trial: it was a form of public 
humiliation. After such a drastic step, it was hard to accept such his claim of good intentions in 
wanting his wife back. The Chief Court made it clear it would not force a wife back to him if it 
doubted his intentions. It doubted Ram Bharosey’s intentions in this case because of his beatings 
and his use of the law to inflict social cruelty. This was the substantive point of law: reasonable 
apprehension of harm gave the wife a good excuse for not living with her husband.  
The discussion of Sheo Dei’s conflict with her husband highlights the important role of 
mobility and work in marriage. The conflict developed initially because the husband was a 
schoolmaster who would be sent to different villages to work, and Sheo Dei did not want to leave 
Makhi, the husband’s original village. Ram Bharosey argued that this was disobedience and therefore 
his violence against her had been justified. The law and practice of government service intersected 
with husbands and wives’ matrimonial litigation. Like Husaini Begam, the wife in this case was 
considered disobedient because of her refusal to live with her husband. 
Ram Bharosey attempted to win his appeal and dodge his wife’s maintenance claim by 
arguing the law of cruelty in RCR suits differed by religious community. In refuting his spurious 
argument, Justice Yorke examined a chain of precedents beginning in 1867. Ram Bharosey 	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challenged the relevance of these precedents, arguing that since all cases in this line of incorporation 
involved non-Hindu, mainly Muslim, litigants, they did not apply to him as a Hindu husband.  
We have so far outlined the arguments and precedents put forward by the husband to show 
that he should have a right to his wife’s conjugal company. On the other hand, there was a set of 
five precedents used by the wife’s advocate, L.P. Misra, which showed that the wife did not need to 
prove physical cruelty in order to deny her husband’s restitution of conjugal rights suit. The 
judgement noted that the five recent cases639 from the wife “indicate[d] the progress of opinion such 
as might be expected from the seed sown” in the older cases put forward by the husband.640 These 
were all from the decade between 1924 and 1937 and involved decisions from many different High 
Courts in India: Allahabad, Bombay, Lahore, Madras, and Rangoon. The 1924 Allahabad decision 
was a short judgment that in one paragraph neatly dismissed the husband as a bad actor who simply 
sought to get a RCR order against his wife so that he could get her maintenance order cancelled. 
Therefore, the court would not send her back to her husband’s home with a RCR order.  
It is also worth noting that the decision detailed how the wife had already proceeded to claim 
her maintenance and the husband had refused: “When the woman endeavoured to obtain the money 
that was due to her the husband refused to pay it and she had to attach his property and to arrest 
him and place him in custody to execute the order. At the end of this he has applied for RCR against 
her and has advanced the somewhat amazing argument that although he has suspected her chastity 
for twenty years, now that she has claimed an order of maintenance against him, his suspicion has 
been allayed.”641 The wife had “a reasonable apprehension of bodily injury if she returned to her 
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640 Ram Bharosey v. Sheo Dei, AIR 1939 Oudh 68 at 71.  
641 Babu Ram v. Mt. Kokla, AIR 1924 All 391, Justices Stuart and Mukerji, S NO. 633 of 1922 from DJ Pilibhit; quotes 
from p. 392.  
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husband” and therefore the husband could not win his suit.642 A 1937 Rangoon decision found that 
a husband could not win his RCR suit because he was only trying to avoid paying the maintenance 
of his wife, who left him for good cause.643 
As Justice Yorke reiterated, Ram Bharosey presented a “similar state of affairs” to these recent 
legal harassment cases because the husband acted without good intentions.644 In other words, the 
Justice adopted a broad but not unlimited definition of cruelty. Because Ram Bharosey’s suit was not 
bona fide, “it is reasonable to hold that if a decree is given against the wife and the wife in obedience 
to that decree goes back to the husband there will be serious danger to her health and safety by 
reason of her so doing.”645 The Justice read Ram Bharosey’s legally motivated intentions and past 
record of physical violence as indicating a likelihood of the wife’s harm if she were forced to return 




The following discussion brings together the preceding cases in order to examine the 
development of arguments in UP restitution of conjugal rights suits along three inter-related axes: i.) 
the definition of cruelty; ii.) the geographic jurisdiction of the courts over restitution of conjugal 
rights; and iii.) the jurisdiction of the courts as it related to the religious personal law of litigants.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
642 Babu Ram v. Mt. Kokla (1924) 11 AIR All 391: 79 IC 634: 46 All 210: 46 All 210: 22 ALJ 68. Cited in Ram Bharosey v. 
Mt. Sheo Dei AIR 1939 Oudh 68 at 72, rt. col.  
643 Maung Saw Pe v. Ma Dan Sein [Pyu], 1937 AIR Rang 506: 174 IC 121. Cited in Ram Bharosey v. Mt. Sheo Dei AIR 1939 
Oudh 72, rt. col.  
644 “The plaintiff [husband] did not institute any suit for restitution of conjugal rights until his wife actually obtained 
against him an order for maintenance under s. 488, and even when that order was sought by her he repeated his 
accusations of immorality.” 
645 Ram Bharosey v. Mt. Sheo Dei, AIR 1939 Oudh 68 at 72-3.  
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Definition of Cruelty 
 The position taken by the judgment in Mackenzie, and the way in which Mackenize was used 
in UP, were different. In Mackenzie, the final ratio for the decision was based on the facts of the 
husband’s behavior. The Privy Council deemed his behavior to have met the higher standard that 
would have allowed the wife to deny his divorce a vinculo. Therefore he also met the lower standard 
required for her to successfully deny his restitution of conjugal rights suit. The portion of Lord 
Herschell’s decision quoted in the UP courts was used to bolster the position that the courts could 
use their discretion to evaluate the husband’s intentions. They could look at a complete picture of 
his behavior and his intentions in pursuing a RCR against the wife. There were a variety of harms a 
wife could experience in marriage. Lord Ashbourne’s final sentence in his opinion in the Mackenzie 
judgment highlights three constitutive elements of the package of goods or benefits conceptualized 
in marriage. “Name, home, and fortune” can be translated to a claim to a status, both social and 
legally, of approved wife; the right to residence in the matrimonial home, maintenance, and aspects 
of her husband’s legal identity such as domicile; and, perhaps most importantly in this case, her 
rights to her husband’s property and wealth.  
The position taken in Mackenzie, and adopted in UP, was that courts could exercise 
discretion to evaluate the husband’s behavior. This was then taken up in the 1906 Husaini Begam 
decision in which the husband made accusations about the wife’s immorality and adultery. The judge 
evaluated the husband’s behavior as motivated by negative intentions to harm the wife and this was 
used to deny him his RCR suit. Though there was some evidence before the lower courts of his 
violence, the High Court focused on his legal cruelty in making these accusations in coming to its 
decision to order a compromise. In addition, the husband’s allegations against the wife were 
determined to be particularly egregious because of the wife’s origins in a wealthy family.  
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 In Maqboolan, the Oudh Chief Court looked to the Husaini Begam decision to make a similar 
ruling about the role of legal cruelty and reputational harm in to the wife in bringing false criminal 
accusations against her. The husband’s accusation of adultery was determinative. In Ram Bharosey, 
Justice Yorke found the standard to be determined by the English law and judicial discretion 
therefore the standard was not one of Hindu law. Because RCR was an import, and it was 
specifically an import from equity, there was space for discretion in the adjudication of the standards 
in line not with an international standard, or even an imagined reasonable man. Rather the standard 
was the adjudgement of the husband’s behavior by the court such as “entire conduct,”646 “bona fides,” 
and “intention.” The continued emphasis on legal cruelty and harassment diverted attention from 
matrimonial violence. It emphasized public spaces rather than private spaces and easily proved 
harms to the wife as against those that took place in a private space that were harder to prove.  
Allahabad and Oudh developed a particular line of thinking and precedents in adjudicating 
matrimonial cruelty. A comparison with other states’ law is beyond the scope this dissertation, 
though the discussion in Ram Bharosey indicated that the UP High Courts were in step with other 
High Courts. These cases show that the UP courts developed a judicial conversation and outlook 
about marital cruelty based in diverse ethical influences and shaped by RCR and maintenance 
litigation within the province.  
 
Jurisdiction - Geographic 
 In each of these cases the location of the matrimonial home played a very important role. 
When it came to the question of the geographic jurisdiction in Mackenzie, we note that i.) the law 
differed in Scotland and England; and ii.) the husband was keenly aware of this.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
646 Ram Bharosey, 72, lft. Col. 
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Chief Justice Stanley made a similar point in Husaini Begam because the wife was from 
Moradabad, about 160 km east of Delhi, in British India and her husband was from the princely 
state of Dholpur. The previous chapter showed that domicile, jurisdiction, and the tricky question of 
the matrimonial home structured Indian citizenship law. The jurisdiction questions raised here show 
the same is true for Indian matrimonial litigation within the confines of the territory of late colonial 
India. Chief Justice Stanley made it clear that he was in the business of saving Indian women. The 
husband had charged the wife with “the vilest insults,” in which case he asked, “can we say that the 
defendant has not any ground for reasonable apprehension, that, if she return to Dholpur, a native 
state, in which she could not invoke the protection of the British law, she will be subject to 
maltreatment and violence[?]”647  
As in Chapter One on the Partition cases, jurisdictional concerns allowed the courts to break 
the hard and fast rule between the husband’s location and the matrimonial home. In Rani Sayeedah’s 
citizenship case in 1955, the Supreme Court acted to sever the wife’s tie to her matrimonial home in 
order to exclude her from the territory of the Indian nation-state. In Husaini Begam’s case, Chief 
Justice Stanley acted to sever this tie as well, in order to protect Begam from the perceived inequities 
and backwardness of law in a princely state. His action would encourage her to remain in British 
India. In the 1906 compromise, the husband was ordered to live with or near his wife, where she 
had access to her property as well as British law. The judgment relocated the matrimonial home with 
her, in part on the grounds that she would otherwise lose the protection of British laws. However, 
this wife-centric location of the matrimonial home was not an option by the time of Maqboolan or 
Ram Bharosey.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
647 Muhammad Rustam Ali Khan vs. Husaini Begam 1907 ILR 29 All 222, para. 7.  
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Jurisdiction - Religious 
 The question of different religious personal laws did not arise directly in Mackenzie. 
However, the example of that case shows that husbands’ behavior more often conformed to the 
legal dictates of the English or British laws than to a particular religion or culture. For example, he 
sought to control his wife’s movement just like husbands Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem and Husaini 
Begam’s husband, Muhammad Rustam Ali Khan. He was aware of his differing rights based upon 
the jurisdiction in which he lived. In Husiani Begam, the Allahabad High Court did not see any 
problem with drawing on Mackenzie to bolster the position that the court could look at the totality of 
the husband’s behavior to determine his intentions and what risks the wife would face if ordered to 
return. The High Court drew on the Scottish precedent of Mackenzie right alongside the Muslim 
precedent of Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem. Maqboolan adopted a similar position. It was these two 
decisions that gave rise to Ram Bharosey’s contention that the rules differed for Hindus and Muslim 
husbands in restitution of conjugal rights suits, since they did not involve Hindu litigants. 
In Ram Bharosey, Justice Yorke rejected the husband’s contention that the Maqboolan standard 
applied only to Muslims. Justice Yorke pointed out that Maqboolan adopted the position taken in the 
judgment of Lord Herschell in Mackenzie (1895): it allowed the husband’s conduct to be used in 
evaluating cruelty.648 In Justice Yorke’s interpretation of Mackenzie, “…the principles stated in this 
case [Mackenzie] are of general application and not limited to cases of restitution of conjugal rights 
where the parties are Mahomedans.”649 Therefore it mattered not that the parties in Maqboolan were 
Muslims while those in Ram Bharosey were Hindu. The Maqboolan decision made clear the 
applicability of the Mackenzie standard in Oudh. As such, the law created by it applied to Hindu 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
648 The case in question was Mackenzie v. Mackenzie (1895) AC 384. In his decision the Lord Chancellor [Herschell] raised 
one important issue for the present case. There he stated, “It is not a notion strange to our law that the Court should 
refuse its aid to one who does not come into it with clean hands” (quoted Ram Bharosey v. Mt. Sheo Dei, AIR 1939 Oudh 
68 at 70). 
649 Ram Bharosey v. Mt. Sheo Dei, AIR 1939 Oudh 68 at 70 
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litigants as well as Muslims and so by 1939 Ram Bharosey lost his suit. Justice Yorke decided in 
favor of the wife’s position, against the husband’s use of a personal law argument to take her away 
her claim for a good reason to live apart.650 Under this relatively broad jurisdiction, his Court could 
rule that the husband’s baseless criminal allegations were marital cruelty. He also relied on the 
position in Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem that “an Indian Court might well admit defence founded on the 
violation of marital rights.”651  
 The Ram Bharosey decision illustrated how successful Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem and restitution of 
conjugal rights had been in Indian law. After seventy-two years, a complex and diverse body of case 
law had developed around this procedure. Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, in its post-Mutiny moment, read 
into Indian law the secure right for a Muslim to pursue RCR under his own personal law, 
adjudicated by the standards of that law, as determined by the lower and appellate courts. In so 
doing, Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem confirmed the space for restitution of conjugal rights within Indian 
law. It was not a general rule but a right assigned under each personal law. The device was imported 
but the standards were personal. To be sure, Ardaseer Cursetjee (1856) and other prior precedents also 
moved in this direction but Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem solidified the position for a religious community 
much larger than the Parsis, Indian Muslims. It clarified that Indian law could and should use 
restitution of conjugal rights, but the standards for a wife to have a good defence to the suit were to 
be determined by the individual personal law. Finally, it articulated a standard within Muslim law for a 
wife’s good ground for living apart from her husband in defense to a restitution of conjugal rights 
suit (an import from English personal law). The English standard—“There must be actual violence 
of such a character as to endanger personal health or safety; or there must be reasonable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
650 The case in question is Maqboolan v. Ramzan (AIR 1927 Oudh 154). It involved Muslims. In that case, decided by 
Chief Justice Stuart and Justice Wazir Hasan, the “Cases may therefore frequently arise in which Courts would act on 
principles of justice, equity and good conscience when such principles are not in conflict with any well-defined positive 
rule of law.” This is from page 155 of that decision. Notably, the wife-appellant was represented by Ali Zaheer and 
Shaukat Ali and the husband-defendant was represented by Khaliq-ur-Zaman.  
651 Mt. Maqboolan and others v. Ramzan, AIR 1927 Oudh 154 at 155.  
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apprehension of it”652-- was found by the Council to have a near equivalent in Muslim personal law 
as well. The Privy Council emphasized, “…all these are questions to be carefully considered, and 
considered with some reference to personal law.”653   
In the intervening seventy-two years, significant differences in the position on religious-
personal jurisdiction had developed. The Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem judgment emphasized the need to 
adjudge the standards of RCR under Muslim law. In Ram Bharosey, however, the standard was a 
different one, external to either Hindu or Muslim law. In Ram Bharosey, the standard hinged on the 
individual husband’s behavior and the courts adjudgment of that behavior by a standard of bona fide 
intentions, and “reasonable apprehension” of harm.  
The use of Mackenzie helped move the courts in that direction. Here Justice Yorke found in 
Ram Bharosey that the scope of the court’s adjudication was based in English Ecclesiastical law, not 
Hindu law. The standard hinged on the individual husband’s behavior and the courts adjudgment of 
that behavior by a standard of good intentions, bona fide intentions, and “reasonable 
apprehension.” In 1939, the standard advanced in Ram Bharosey was decidedly not one aligned with -- 
or attempted to be aligned with -- the language of individual human rights, individual norms, or 
women’s universal rights that might be familiar now. Instead rights were paired with obligations, and 
they were firmly situated within the dyadic and unequal relationship of heterosexual marriage. 
Moreover, such marriages were situated in further complex networks of class and religion. 
 
Conclusion 
The import of RCR was a great success in India. As in England, the terms of engagement 
changed over its long use in India. For example, the structure of jurisdiction had changed. The 
standard of violence had not changed greatly. In both Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem and Ram Bharosey, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
652 Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, 614. 
653 Ibid., 616. 
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wife benefitted due to the adjudgment of her husband’s behavior in composite. Neither decision 
wholeheartedly disavowed violence.  
The Ram Bharosey case also illustrated the important role of equity jurisdiction in the UP 
High Courts. Courts retained and expanded their jurisdiction in evaluating marital disputes drawing 
on equity jurisdiction. This formed the basis of a kind of Uttar Pradesh common law with a broad 
definition of cruelty. Due to the problem of proof and the existence of understandings of cruelty 
that embraced non-physical interpretations, physical violence was not the only or primary deciding 
factor in most of these cases, whether under the older Ecclesiastical remedies or the newer statutory 
remedies. RCR was a nineteenth-century remedy applied across religious community. It emphasized 
the husband’s patriarchal control over the wife and her location with his identity, location, and 
home. RCR persisted because though courts were willing to admit individual husbands abused their 
husbandly rights over their wives, they never unseated the general rule of patriarchal dominion. This 
patriarchal dominion consisted of both rights and duties, and when the husband failed in his duties, 
he was punished by losing access to his wife. In theory, even if wives usually won in practice, the 
husband maintained a right of access to his wife as well as, perhaps again only in theory, the ability 
to physically harm his wife and the right to socially or mentally harm his wife. Husbands Mackenzie 
and Ram Bharosey’s physical abuse and public and legal depredations suggest there was a link 
between the law and social practice because husbands and their advocates defended physically 
abusive relationships in courts of law. 
  








Maintenance as an Imperial Legal Form 
 
Introduction  
Maintenance refers to a husband’s obligation to provide sustenance for his wife and children. 
In India, for the most part (though not entirely), maintenance has been governed by the law of 
criminal procedure. In this chapter, I track the history of maintenance along several axes: jurisdiction 
(civil, criminal, and religious); chronology (nineteenth and twentieth century); geography (England, 
India, empire, locality); and agency (individual, Parliament, judge). In using these frames to analyze 
the history of maintenance, I question the religious-secular binary through which Indian law is so 
often viewed. I argue that maintenance was an imperial legal form because maintenance as it was 
practiced in India was motivated by concerns both specific to colonial governance and shaped by a 
longer history within Britain.654 The concern was to limit the movement of “free agent” women who 
lacked familial ties that would guarantee they would not become wards of the state, vagrants, or 
prostitutes. In so doing, the population became more legible, easier to track, and less of a threat to 
colonial stability.655 Specifically, unchecked mendicancy, vagrancy, and movement threatened the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
654 Sinha, Colonial Masculinity, developed the idea of an imperial social formation as an analytical lens for taking account of 
a “context…that included both Britain and India” and examines “not only the intersection of the imperial with 
categories of nation, race, class, gender, and sexuality, but also to the essentially uneven and contradictory nature of that 
intersection.” (3).   
655 A thorough examination of the colonial state’s ideology of vagrancy and settlement on the order of James Scott’s 
Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1998) has yet to be drafted. However, a seminal effort in this regard is Radhika Singha’s brilliant A Despotism of Law: 
Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). There Singha argues that “men on the 
road” “seemed to elude the reach of taxation and policing; their way of life was considered motley and suspect,” 
prompting the development of categories of criminal tribes and castes and draconian restrictions on them (186; 188). 
The historiography on English poor law suggests that the need for a flexible, docile, and ready workforce drove many 
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security of the colonial state and a docile and stable labor supply. Overlapping Indian and British 
patriarchies emphasized and legally implemented the control of wives. 656    
 A careful study of the history of maintenance highlights the multiple arenas of law that 
shaped it. Such a study raises questions about the chronology and scope most useful for 
understanding its history. The history of maintenance intertwines marriage law, property law, and 
criminal law. The correct chronology and frame with which to examine maintenance is over the 
entirety of the early modern and modern period with an eye toward the empire-wide institutional 
and personal connections that structured it. Rooted in common law and poor law, nineteenth 
century reforms created particular procedures that restrained wives’ mobility, instituting a choice 
between being maintained by the husband and under his restraint, or pursuing maintenance via the 
state and living under its strictures.  
The pattern was what marked maintenance as a specifically imperial legal form. There were 
three key features: it operated to preserve the marriage tie; it operated through local institutions; and 
it tied the wife to her husband at law or physically. Relationships between violence and liberty were 
adjudicated in the same way across the diverse bodies of law (criminal, Hindu, civil) examined here. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reforms to the Poor Law. This is reiterated by Singha as well: “The criminal regulations of the Company were also 
supposed to encourage the spirit of industry but through the agency of the police and the penal regime” wherein 
vagrants and robbers “would have to make reparation for his predatory existence on the industrious” (34). Pinch picks 
up Singha’s thread and amplifies it for the post-Mutiny [1857] period, suggesting that religious mendicants were cast as 
the agents of sedition, labeled “political sadhu[s].” William Pinch, Peasants and Monks in British India (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1996), 6-9. Harald Fischer-Tine’s Low and Licentious Europeans (Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan Private 
Limited, 2009), 79 and 141-65, explicitly juxtaposes the colonial state’s policy towards European vagrancy with English 
poor law. This is a thread I attempt to pick up here by expanding beyond Fischer-Tine’s focus on “white” European 
migrants. As Fischer-Tine puts it, “Vagrancy was seen as a sort of inheritable weakness of character” and an 
“incorrigible disinclination to work” (80). This scholarship suggests a guiding concern of imperial policy was to track (as 
groups or in some cases individuals) and manage potentially disruptive populations.  While the specific inflections of the 
poor law/criminal law of maintenance reflected the priorities of the colonial state, it is also worth noting that vagrancy 
was also perceived as a law-and-order threat in early modern England. For example, McIntosh notes that in the second 
half of the sixteenth century those “able-bodied people” who “asked for charitable assistance, preferring the freedom 
and interest of travel, perhaps interrupted occasionally by casual employment, to staying home with a regular job. These 
wanderers, commonly termed ‘sturdy beggars’ or ‘rogues in the statutes, were especially worrying when they traveled in 
groups, were former soldiers, or used dishonest or illegal means to supplement their incomes. For constables, 
responsible for the only form of policing, unknown strangers were far more difficult to control than their own 
neighbors; they might therefore be willing to apply to disruptive vagrants the physical punishments required by statute.” 
Marjorie Kenniston McIntosh, Poor Relief in England, 1350-1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 142.  
656 Sinha, Colonial Masculinity, 7.  
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The adjudication of maintenance tied wives to their husbands and to their husbands’ localities and 
identities.  
Indian law’s emphasis on relational statuses such as marriage and kinship and its relentlessly 
genealogical state policies are often attributed to the moral imperatives of the country’s religions and 
the British colonial attempt to buttress and protect them.657 Even revisionist scholarship focuses on 
the ways in which the British colonial state mis- or re-interpreted indigenous values as expressed in 
religio-legal texts and scriptures.658 At best, this scholarship critically re-examines the constitution of 
either Hindus or Muslims, accepting the colonial state’s division of Indian society into discrete 
spheres of religious and secular, and Hindu and Muslim. This is a religiously-essentialist 
interpretation that ignores the institutional and legal forms that knitted England to the Empire. The 
ties that bound Indian women to their husbands not only grew out of Hinduism or Islam, though 
they were sometimes found in those religions’ respective laws. Rather, they grew out of English poor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
657 For example, in the aftermath of the revolt, Queen Victoria’s Proclamation of November 1, 1858, stated, “We 
disclaim alike the right and desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects.”  
658 A quick scan of the University of Michigan Law Library’s open stacks collection on Indian family law and women’s 
rights reveals the following: there are four monographs devoted to Muslim law in India. There are nine books devoted to 
aspects of Hindu law in India. There are a few books devoted to both Muslim and Hindu law. These include Gerald 
Larson’s edited volume, Religion and Personal Law in Secular India. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001); Rina 
Verma Williams’s monograph Postcolonial Politics and Personal Laws: Colonial Legal Legacies and the Indian State (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), Flavia Agnes, Shoba Venkatesh Ghosh, and Majlis’s edited volume Negotiating Spaces: 
Legal Domains, Gender Concerns, and Community Constructs (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012); Archana Parasher 
and Amita Dhanda’s edited volume Redefining Family Law in India: Essays in Honour of B. Sivaramayya (New Delhi: 
Routledge, 2008); Gopika Solanki’s monograph Adjuciation in Religious Family Laws; and Narendra Subramanian’s 
monograph Nation and Family: Personal, Cultural Pluralism, and Gendered Citizenship in India. However, these treat Muslim 
and Hindu law within separate chapters, as discrete fields of analysis. Through its examination of one family and case, 
Chandra Mallampalli’s book Race, Religion and Law in Colonial India: Trials of an Interracial Family (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011) suggests a more nuanced view of identity formation over a longue durée in one particular family. 
Three books suggest more theoretical feminist analyses of Indian law and politics without being devoted to family law in 
particular: Nivedita Menon’s Recovering Subeversion: Feminist Politics Beyond the Law (Urbana: Permanent Black/University of 
Illinois Press, 2004); Ratna Kapur’s Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics of Postcolonialism (London: Glass House Press, 
2005); and Rajeswari Sunder Rajan’s The Scandal of the State: Women, Law, and Citizenship in Postcolonial India (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2003). Jaya Sagade’s book Child Marriage in India: Socio-Legal and Human Rights Dimensions (Oxford: 
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structure the practice of Indian law at the appellate (and likely lower) court level.   
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law and common law, and became so well-entrenched in India that they continue to operate today 
across many bodies of law, whether Hindu, civil, criminal, Muslim, or Christian. Rooted in the parish 
or locality and aimed at restricting mobility and ensuring order and stability, maintenance in India 
represented the triumph of poor law governance. This effect was based in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure’s English model of maintenance, not in a Hindu or Muslim religious law or idiom.   
Arguing that wives almost always won their maintenance suits, in this light, replaces the 
sheen of humanitarianism with which judicial decisions were sometimes cloaked and suggests that, 
perversely, providing for a wife’s mere sustenance was a method of social control that pitted her 
liberty against her survival. This chapter examines several aspects of maintenance: relief, grounds, 
procedure and jurisdiction, and administrative machinery.  
 
Social Control and Settlement in India 
The practice of maintenance law, often read through the lens of the secular/religious divide 
or through the lens of women’s rights, must be seen as part of a form of governance that 
emphasized social control and that had its roots in colonial settlement and metropolitan poor law. 
First, several scholars have noted that in nineteenth- and twentieth-century India the colonial state 
went to great lengths to settle and control mobile and vagrant populations.  Some scholarship on 
vagrancy in India has focused on colonial efforts at regulating lower class Europeans. Harald 
Fischer-Tine’s research indicates the racial and civilizational stakes in maintaining a check on white 
vagrancy. It shows that the colonial state saw European vagrancy as a potential source of Indian 
criticism of the empire and a symbol of the failure of the civilizing mission. Such post-Mutiny 
concerns drove the push for a Vagrancy Act in the 1860s and 1870s. This took the form of two 
committees appointed by the Government of Bombay in the 1860s.659 The eventual 1871 Act 	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implemented criminal provisions against vagrants, and allowed for arrest, confinement in a 
workhouse, and deportation of European vagrants. Fischer-Tine argues that the approach to 
vagrancy was driven by an “external imperial civilising project” aimed at India and Indians; and a 
“subsidiary internal civilising mission addressed the lower orders of white society, [that] was based 
on hierarchies of class and was carried out as clandestinely as possible.”660 Workhouses were duly 
founded, or created out of Strangers’ Homes, in Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Allahabad, Jabalpur,661 
Nagpur, Lahore, and Rangoon.662 There were many factors contributing to the Vagrancy Act; one of 
the most sensational included the murder of three Marwari merchants by four English “‘men 
knocking about the town without employment’”663 who attacked their shop in 1866. The men were 
tried, convicted, and executed the next year. Avoiding such embarrassing exercises and attendant 
criticisms from the Indian press prompted by such events, the Vagrancy Act came into being.664 In 
1874 the Act was revised so as to exclude Eurasians and Indians from “the privilege” of admission 
to a workhouse.665  
More widespread and disturbing were the ways in which the colonial state sought to settle 
mobile or otherwise fractious Indian populations. Vinayak Chaturvedi’s book Peasant Pasts 
compellingly portrays how the colonial state allied with dominant caste groups in Kheda district, 
Gujarat, in structuring the lives of the so-called criminal tribes, the Kolis and the Dharalas. 
Chaturvedi shows beyond a shadow of a doubt how social control measures were initiated by 
colonial statutes and regulations—and vigorously enforced—at the local level by these dominant 
groups.666 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
660 Ibid., 183-4.  
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662 Ibid., 170.  
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664 Ibid., 157-8.  
665 Ibid., 164-5. 
666 Keith Wrightson highlights the important role of “neighbourhood opinion” in the definition of delinquency and in 
the bringing in of delinquents to the courts in his essay “The Nadir of English Illegitimacy in the Seventeenth Century,” 
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 The peasant cultivators in Kheda district — including tracts only recently encouraged to be 
brought under regular cultivation — were designated criminal tribes. As such they had to attend 
daily roll calls. The origins of such colonial control lie, like maintenance law, in the 1860s, in the 
Village Police Act (VII of 1867), which bolstered each village mukhi’s [headman’s] powers to 
monitor and punish peasants. Though earlier in the nineteenth century dominant local leaders 
resisted such colonial efforts, by the post-Mutiny period they were already well-established “colonial 
emissaries,” to borrow Chaturvedi’s phrase.667  
The colonial state privileged well-established settled landowners by increasing land rental 
rates so that the Dharalas, the erstwhile cultivators, could no longer afford the land.668 This allowed 
dominant local groups like the Patidars and Kanbis to reap the benefits of Dharala labor. In essence, 
the colonial state used Dharalas and other criminal tribes in northern India as shock troops for 
colonizing new lands that were then handed off to upper caste peasant cultivators.669 The colonial 
state and its agents exercised numerous forms of social control over the Dharalas. Dharala and Koli 
resistance to such measures was interpreted as further evidence of their criminality.  
As colonial efforts to surveil drilled ever deeper into Indian society, they too failed in their 
attempts to control human movement. Thus mukhis and headmen, tasked with controlling the 
Dharalas and Kolis, came in themselves for criticism and greater surveillance and control by the 
colonial state; in fact this was mandated by the Village Police Act of 1867.670 It was followed soon 
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after by the Criminal Tribes Acts (CTA) of 1871 and 1911 that was aimed at the already-settled 
Dharalas, some of whom were engaged in political protest and/or raids.671 The Criminal Tribes Acts 
were far-reaching: each Dharala had to register, providing fingerprints and basic details. Though the 
CTAs aimed at communal punishment, as Chaturvedi argues, this was somewhat paradoxical 
because the registration process itself “invidivdualiz[ed] each member of the community to make 
him or her ‘identifiable’ and ‘controllable.’”672 Many Dharalas had to “attend hajri (roll call) twice 
daily: at sunrise and at eight o’clock in the evening.”673 They also required passes to travel outside the 
village and were subject to random nighttime searches.674 The daily roll calls were inefficient and 
wasted a lot of peasants’ time. Moreover, Dharalas were forced to live in the shadow of the law: 
registration under the CTA could be used by Patidars as a threat to coerce labor.675 The Acts 
required registration of women and children as well as adult males, “even though public opinion on 
this issue ‘consider[ed] the application of the CTA to women degrading,”676 the more so because 
women who registered were touched by the officials in order to obtain their fingerprints.677 
To this long list of social control mechanisms — and after a decades-long effort to settle and 
pacify the Dharalas — the colonial state removed and resettled about one hundred Dharala families 
to a camp to serve as a deterrent, deemed cheaper than resorting to the costlier imprisonment, in the 
wake of the non-cooperation movement.678 The camp was designed to enforce work discipline for 
the labor market, and was in part a response to failed in situ social control measures.679 The 
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resettlement of selected families was designed to serve as deterrent to the most fractious Dharalas. It 
was aimed at controlling mobility and tying mobile populations to a particular locale. 
Along with Chaturvedi’s work, scholarship by Sandria Freitag and Sanjay Nigam places the 
lens on north India. It shows the gradual evolution of small-scale to such larger “social engineering 
efforts”680 as large-scale resettlement of Sansiahs at Kheri, United Provinces/Uttar Pradesh. Freitag 
shows how the colonial state’s social engineering ideology even extended to arranging what it 
deemed appropriate marriages between the denizens of its resettlement project at Kheri. She also 
argues that a covert legal system coexisted alongside the colonial state’s formal legal system. This 
legal system was aimed at controlling criminality and displayed no regard for due process. As an 
adjunct to this, Freitag also points out that evidentiary standards for prosecution under criminal 
tribes and castes legislation differed from the standards under the larger criminal law. Two 
constituent elements of this covert legal system were its purported temporariness and its emphasis 
on communal punishment.  
These internment and confinement efforts were more or less contemporaneous with turn of 
the century famine relief and plague observation camps in Gujarat. And, the efforts in the United 
Provinces were equally unsuccessful: the camp at Kheri had a 75% attrition rate.681 Freitag shows 
that after such failures, colonial state ideology shifted away from settling rural nomadic populations 
toward regulating urban “gangs.”682 Nigam’s approach is to study the development of colonial 
knowledge about the criminal tribes. None of these resettlement efforts was very successful. They 
show how important geography and locality were in the colonial effort to monitor its subjects. 
Settling unsettled populations was a priority of the colonial state in the post-Mutiny period when 
uncontrolled movement was seen to threaten its stability. It was this imperative of colonial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
680 Sandria Freitag, “Crime in the Social Order of Colonial North India,” Modern Asian Studies, 25, no. 2 (May 1991): 250. 
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governance that also underwrote the maintenance provisions examined in this chapter, and this is 
why maintenance was governed under criminal procedure rather than under civil or religious 
personal law. Mobile and unknown populations were a threat to colonial stability.  
 
Poor Law and Maintenance 
 The term settlement has as a second, relevant meaning in the context of maintenance law. 
Settlement refers to the idea that each person in England (and Wales) had a set parish to which he or 
she belonged, and it was this parish that was responsible for maintaining the person in the absence 
of his or her own self-sustenance. This system stemmed from the Poor Laws of 1597 and 1601.683 A 
central feature of the Poor Laws was that, “Whenever there was any doubt about a pauper’s place of 
birth or residence, overseers attempted to reduce the burden of their own community’s poor rates 
by shunting the applicant off to another parish…”684 As the Poor Laws developed, this basic 
building block remained in place, albeit with revised systems and modernized forms. They required 
husbands to maintain their wives and tied wives to their husbands through the reimbursement 
system.  
The New Poor Law, based on the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, tied wives to their 
husbands and required the latter to maintain them through the reimbursement system. This involved 
local institutions of the criminal courts and their considerable administrative machinery. A wife took 
on her husband’s settlement upon marriage685 and Cretney points out that 1834 Act “treated relief 
given to the wife as being given to the husband.”686  The Webbs claimed that the Central Authority 
found that “a woman may be restrained by the control of her husband from leaving the workhouse” 
if she so sought to leave. “If he declines to use his marital control” to prevent her from leaving, the 	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husband himself could have been barred from relief.687 From 1868, a husband was required to pay 
his wife’s maintenance, reimburse the guardians [in his parish] for their expense of maintaining the 
wife, or show good cause as to why he could not pay.688 The standard procedure was, prior to 1878, 
to assign a deserted and destitute wife to a workhouse until her husband’s maintenance could be 
obtained.689  
 From this period several reforms lead to a gradual separation of wives’ maintenance from 
poor law. The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1878 gave the wife a procedure to obtain maintenance if 
her husband were convicted of assaulting her. In the main, the 1878 Act allowed “magistrates to 
make orders that a wife be no longer bound to cohabit with a husband who had been convicted of 
assaulting her.”690 Eight years later, the 1886 Married Women (Maintenance in Cases of Desertion) 
Act took a further step toward the creation of the modern maintenance regime. It was technically 
only a procedural reform to the wife’s already-existing/inherent right to maintenance. Yet it 
spawned, according to Cretney, not just standardized and long-lasting maintenance procedures but 
indeed became “the basis for magistrates’ matrimonial jurisdiction for more than 70 years.”691 The 
1886 Act gave a wife who had been deserted by her husband a direct financial remedy against him. 
Instead of being compelled to enter the workhouse until the Poor Law authorities were able to take 
action and force her husband to meet his maintenance obligations, she could take out a summons 
against him to compel him to pay her.  
The Act also added desertion to the ground of assault conviction for obtaining separate 
maintenance. To desertion, a further reform in 1895 added “persistent cruelty, or willful neglect to 
provide reasonable maintenance, provided that the cruelty or neglect had caused her to leave and 	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live separately and apart from him.”692 As we shall see, the Indian law of maintenance included 
habitual cruelty from 1861 and from 1898 any “just ground” was deemed by the judge as good 
grounds for wives to live apart.  
A similar logic structured an empire-wide maintenance apparatus. To state that wives won 
their suits is not to conclude that they went on to achieve the cash payments owed to them. 
Examining the question of enforcement provides an opportunity to further explore the imperial 
network of institutions devoted to obtaining maintenance for abandoned spouses. This dense 
network of laws, regulations, offices and officers, and husband and wives undergirded an imperial 
network of financial and legal transactions that tied husbands and wives to particular jurisdictions. 
Institutions of local governance were linked in a trans-imperial network. In 1921 the 
Government of India passed the Maintenance Orders Enforcement Act.693 Under this Act, other 
British territories could pass ordinances to enter into a reciprocal agreement with the Government 
of India to enforce maintenance orders, as did the government of Ceylon in 1939. The maintenance-
seeker applied for a maintenance order in her local court. The local court forwarded this order to the 
Police Court in the district where the maintenance-ower was supposed to live. The Chief Clerk of 
the Police Court was to “enter it in his register on the date on which he receives it in the same 
manner as though the Order had been made at his Court, distinguishing it from the other entries in 
such manner as he may find most convenient….”694 Once the Order was confirmed the Court could 
direct that the maintenance-ower should make payments to the Court’s designated officer, who 
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would then “send the monies…to the Crown Agents for the Colonies, through the Colonial 
Treasurer,”695 to be paid to the person who was owed maintenance.  
This network of local institutions was designed, like the jurisdictional requirement in the 
Code of Criminal Procedure itself, to provide some check on the indigence of husbands and wives 
whose mobility was enabled and required by the Empire. The file noted that this reciprocal 
arrangement applied to British India, the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, New Zealand, New South 
Wales, Uganda, Mauritius, and Grenada.696  
The model for this was initially found in the arrangements created by South African states 
for maintenance orders amongst themselves and with other dominions by 1907. Some in London, 
like Lord Elgin, sought to emulate this across the empire.697 Elgin’s urge to the contrary, it was 
rejected on grounds of expense until after World War I. As New Zealand’s Attorney-General and 
Ministry of Justice John Findlay termed it, despite a strong sentiment in favor of the proposal, the 
various territories in the empire remained “almost exactly like foreign nations.”698 Eventually the 
deterrent effect was deemed more important, leading to the 1920 Maintenance Order (Facilities for 
Enforcement) Act.699 The 1907 South African model and subsequent 1920 Act proved to be very 
enduring, providing the “basis for international maintenance agreements, such as the 1956 New 
York Convention [on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance (a United Nations convention)], which 
are still in force to this day.”700 According to Levine-Clark, though the Act was originally mooted in 
1913, it did not fructify until after World War I in part because “[t]he desire to get back to ‘normal’ 
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after the war included a push on many fronts to return to rigid gender roles, with women out of the 
public sphere, dependent on men who were responsible for their welfare or on government support 
standing in for men who failed in their responsibilities… the state had a clear role in protecting 
women from husbands who did not meet the standards of British manhood.”701 After the war, the 
deterrent effect was valued more than the cost, despite the protests of the Local Guardians’ Boards 
who thought the cost was of greater concern.702   
While the Act had close ties to the Poor Law, by the time it was passed, these ties were 
obscured. Some of the language of a 1911 Imperial Conference resolution on the matter was 
changed, Marjorie Levine-Clark points out, to obscure the Act’s roots in the poor law. For example, 
the purpose of “relieve[ing] both wives and children and the poor relief burdens of the United 
Kingdom and her dependencies” was replaced with the goal of “secur[ing] justice and protection for 
wives and children who have been deserted by their legal guardians either in the United Kingdom or 
any of the Dominions.” This was because, as Levine-Clark explains, “‘Relief’ was a word intimately 
connected with the Poor Law, and its connotations were only strengthened by its association with 
‘poor relief burdens’ in the text.”703 In Levine-Clark’s analysis, ensuring that British men fulfilled 
their duties of citizenship, such as to maintain their wives, was the primary motivation for passing 
the 1920 Act.   
Likewise, concerns over domicile and jurisdiction played an important role in divorce in the 
imperial context. A very significant Probate Division decision in 1921 (Keyes v. Keyes) found that a 
person not domiciled in India could not use the Indian courts for a divorce but would ihave to 
revert to the courts belonging to his domicile.  The decision impinged not just on divorce of 
Europeans in India but across the British Empire: “…it would in all probability be found impossible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
701 Ibid., 315, citing Nicoletta Gullace and Susan Kent’s Making Peace, and others.  
702 Ibid., 313. 
703 Ibid. 
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to confine the scope of legislation of this nature to India [legislation aimed at ameliorating the 
conditions for divorce after the Keyes decision], and to avoid raising the large and controversial 
questions connected with the assimilation of the conditions under which divorces are obtainable 
throughout the Empire.”704  In response to this conundrum the Indian and Colonial Divorce Act 
was enacted. It allowed those merely resident in India, with domicile in England or Scotland, to file 
for divorce in Indian courts. Even prior to the Keyes decision, these questions were at the heart of 
the understanding of personal rights as those that inhered in status, whether religious, racial, or 
relational, and that traveled with the person, not the territory. In this way, the British Empire had a 
significant effect upon the development of private international law. For example, Albert Venn 
Dicey, the great Constitutional theorist and international law treatise author, and Arthur Berriedale 
Keith, the Sanskritist and colonial official, exchanged many letters on the thorny question of divorce 
within the British holdings around the world.705 Domicile structured India’s citizenship law and was 
even written directly into the Constitutional law of citizenship.706 Domicile was, like maintenance, an 
imperial legal form, and the two were closely related to each other. Moreover, they were also both 
closely related to the family system embodied in English poor law.  
The foregoing discussion suggests that the British Empire devoted considerable energy and 
attention to pinning the expense of maintaining wives to their husbands. One wonders whether it 
would have been much less expensive to simply re-direct the money spent on administration to what 
were likely paltry sums for the wives’ maintenance. Maintenance policy operated to preserve the 
marital bond and followed certain patterns that emphasized the patriarchal family structure, 
especially the husband’s dominion over his wife, and her physical tie to him. Similar patriarchal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
704 Letter from JE Ferard, Secretary, Public Department, India Office, London to the Secretary to the Government of 
India, Home Department, No. J&P-4116-21, dated July 21, 1921, in Uttar Pradesh State Archives, File No. 69 of 1922, 
Judicial (Civil) Department, Box 241, File 398.  
705 A. V. Dicey and Arthur Berriedale Keith, Constitutional Reflections: The Correspondence of Albert Venn Dicey and Arthur 
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706 Chapter One, “Entering and Leaving the Body Politic.”  
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family structures restrained wives’ liberty in both secular and religious family laws in India. Thus, 
along with the influence of British law and jurisiprudence, the roots of Indian patriarchy, specifically 
the husband’s dominion over his wife and the location of the matrimonial home with him, produced 
restraints on wives’ liberty. The origins of this system, “utterly contradictory to all ideas of 
freedom,”707 lie as much in Restoration London as in the textual and legal traditions of Hinduism 
and Islam.708  
The Poor Law is central to Indian history because it was a mode of governance whose 
disciplinarian and controlling tendencies fit well into the context of post-Mutiny colonial rule. Just as 
the Queen’s Proclamation declared the protection of Indian religions in 1858, crucial aspects of 
Indian intimate relations were to be managed through criminal procedure, a system that continues to 
the present. Sturman argues that “the family became a privileged site of colonial governmentality” 
both through personal adjudication and administrative efforts such as tax collection.709 This poor law 
mode of governance was shaped around disciplining and controlling intimate relations, and the 
patriarchal marriage tie stood central in India, as mandatory to ensure a governable, if not knowable, 
population.  
 
Maintenance in Late Colonial Uttar Pradesh 
 The histories of colonial efforts to control Indian mobility as well as English poor law’s 
emphasis on settlement each provide important contexts for this chapter. The setting for this study 
is late colonial Uttar Pradesh. My survey of the Allahabad and Lucknow High Court found twenty-
one reported decisions on maintenance. Wives nearly always won their maintenance suits. If the wife 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
707 Thomas Malthus describing the 1662 statute that consolidated the settlement system: T. R. Malthus, Population: The 
First Essay, forward by Kenneth E. Boulding (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959 [1798]), 32. Quoted in 
Rose, The English Poor Law, 25. 
708 See Michael Rose, “Settlement, Removal and the New Poor Law,” in The New Poor Law in the Nineteenth Century, ed. 
Derek Fraser (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), 25.  
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used the maintenance provisions within criminal prodecure, she was likely to be successful. The 
variety of these maintenance decisions at the Appellate Court level indicates the diversity of 
jurisdiction in maintenance law, an insight allowed by surveying all bodies of law. Among the 
twenty-one appeals on maintenance heard by the High Courts, fifteen were criminal, two were civil, 
and four came under the Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance 
Act, a new statute for Hindu wives that took effect in 1946.710 In other words, there were several 
bodies of law under which a wife could pursue her maintenance suit: criminal, civil and, after 1946, 
statute.  The advantage of the criminal suit was that it was relatively fast and effective: wives nearly 
always won. However, the amount of relief under the criminal law was limited to 100 rupees. If 
larger amounts were at stake, wives could use civil law to obtain non-cash maintenance orders as 
well as larger cash amounts.  
After the legislative reforms in 1946, a Hindu wife could also pursue maintenance under the 
Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act. The unwieldy name of 
what I will call the 1946 Hindu Residence and Maintenance Act (or the HRMA) illustrates how far it 
went to empower women, granting Hindu wives unquestionable rights to separate residence and 
maintenance but stopping just short of granting divorce. The Indian Parliament granted all Hindus 
the ability to divorce in 1955 under the Hindu Marriage Act (part of the Hindu Code), though even 
prior to this a great many Hindu wives enjoyed customary rights to divorce.711 Christian, Muslim, 
and Hindu litigants commonly used the Code of Criminal Procedure even after the 1946 Act took 
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effect. For example, Sheopiari, Maiki, and Chameli712 were all Hindu wives who filed maintenance 
suits in a criminal court even after the 1946 Act gave them a right to maintenance under Hindu law.  
 
History of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
The Code of Criminal Procedure (CCrP) was first enacted in 1861; a revised version in 1872. 
These first two versions of the criminal procedure code applied only to provinces, not to the 
presidency cities of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay.713 It was not until 1882 that the CCrP began to 
apply to all of British India.714 It was revised one more time under the Empire to reflect subsequent 
amendments and enacted again in 1898. Finally, a new and revised version of the Code was re-
enacted by independent India in 1973.715 Of course, the Code was not static between 1898 and 1973 
but was amended numerous times. The 1898 version of the Code was sprawling with 595 sections.  
The Code of Criminal Procedure was developed simultaneously with Macaulay’s more 
famous Indian Penal Code so that the new penal code would have an appropriate system of criminal 
procedure alongside it.716 Like the Penal Code, the CCrP took a long time to enact. The First Law 
Commission drafted and submitted it in 1848 but it was not enacted until 1861, taking effect at the 
start of 1862.717  
Most recent historians have focused their attention on colonial debates over racial difference 
and justice that the Code brought to the fore. One question was whether Europeans in mofussil (the 
interior, non-Presidency town regions of British India) would be subject to trials by Indian judges. In 
the 1872 Code, a special exception was developed so that European subjects would not have to be 	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713 Ratanlal Ranchhoddas and Dhirajlal Thakore, The Criminal Procedure Code, 7th ed. (Bombay: Bombay Law Reporter 
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tried by Indian judges.718 The 1872 Code was “overlaid with cases,” meaning that it did not hold up 
well under judicial interpretation in the Courts, and Whitley Stokes drafted the 1882 version.719 The 
following year the Ilbert Bill controversy erupted when Law Member Courtenay Ilbert attempted to 
make criminal procedure totally uniform by allowing Europeans to be tried in courts presided over 
by Indian judges and magistrates.720 This controversy resulted in the compromise position that 
Europeans in the mofussil could be tried by juries that were at least half white (European or 
American).721 Kolsky states, “While historians of modern India have situated the Ilbert Bill as a 
defining moment in the birth of the anti-colonial nationalist movement, the Bill must also be placed 
in the context of the longer fight for and against uniform legal equality and the contested project of 
codification.”722 
Though very interesting, these debates are tangential to the role that criminal procedure 
plays in this chapter. Among the many, sprawling parts of the CCrP, the part that concerns us is 
section 488, which deals with the husband’s obligation to maintain his wife and children.  The 
CCrP’s maintenance provision remained remarkably stable over its long history. For our purposes, 
there were two important parts that are worth quoting and that will help define the contours of 
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maintenance. The first part stateds simply that a local judge could order a man to pay maintenance 
to his wife:  
If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or his 
legitimate or illegitimate child unable to maintain itself, the District Magistrate, a Presidency 
Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of 
such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance 
of his wife or such child, at such monthly rate, not exceeding one hundred rupees in the 
whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate 
from time to time directs.723 
 
The amount of maintenance allowable under the Code of Criminal Procedure had been increased 
from fifty to one hundred rupees in 1923.724 Section 488 then goes on to state that if a person was 
ordered to pay maintenance but failed to do so, he could be imprisoned for up to a month.  
Appended to this was an important proviso that stated that, if the husband offered to 
maintain the wife, and the wife still refused to live with the husband, the Magistrate could look at 
her reasons for refusal. The proviso reads as follows:  
Provided that, if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, 
and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated 
by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is 
satisfied that there is just ground for doing so.725 
 
A third important section must be read alongside this proviso. Section 488(4) listed three 
conditions in which a wife would not be “entitled to receive an allowance:” a wife who was “living in 
adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are 
living separately by mutual consent.”726 The judge had wide discretionary scope to decide whether a 
wife had good reason for not living with her husband. The law’s emphasis on maintaining the 
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marriage tie at a matrimonial home located with the husband can be seen in the denial of 
maintenance to a couple who lived apart by mutual consent.  
 
The Concept of Relief 
The major advantage of a maintenance suit under the CCrP was that it was “summary” and 
therefore relatively quick, when compared to the timeframe for more complicated civil maintenance 
suits.727 The civil award was limited only by the “status or means of the party liable,”728 while the 
criminal remedy had a limit of one hundred rupees per month for the wife and any children. 
Moreover, under civil law the maintenance could come as a “charge on the property” that could be 
“enforced against [the husband’s] property in case of his death.”729 Such questions required 
considerably more argument and investigation while the CCrP mandated speedy but limited relief. 
Whether it involved ten rupees or ten thousand, maintenance required a continued tie between 
husband and wife. Maintenance could not be granted to a divorced wife or a wife who lived apart 
from her husband without a valid excuse. In other words, maintenance preserved the marriage tie. 
Muslim wives whose marriage ended in divorce were entitled to dower as provided for in the 
marriage contract. This remained the case until the 1973 revision of the CCrP in which “the 
meaning of ‘wife’ was expanded to include not only a ‘currently married’ woman, but also ‘a woman 
who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried.”730 This was the 
change that prompted the famous Shah Bano controversy over the application of the CCrP’s 
maintenance provisions to Muslim husbands in 1985. However, from 1862 until the 1973 revision, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
727 Chitaley and Rao, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 2682-3. The footnote (n. 4 on p. 2683) gave several cases, the most 
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the CCrP’s maintenance provision only granted maintenance to wives. It would seem unlikely, then, 
that an already-divorced Muslim wife would sue under the CCrP for maintenance during this period. 
The crucial thing to understand is that as long as a woman remained a wife, she had a right to her 
maintenance, barring her failure to meet certain conditions that will be discussed below.  
It is important to distinguish between relief and grounds when discussing the landscape of 
matrimonial disputes in Indian law. Maintenance is but one example of this. Depending on the law, 
the wife could obtain different kinds of relief. For example, a Muslim woman could choose whether 
to pursue the relief of maintenance or of recovering her dower under the marriage contract. Or, a 
neglected wife could pursue restitution of conjugal rights (RCR) if she wanted her husband to take 
her back at the matrimonial home, as we saw in chapter two. A wife could also pursue maintenance 
under civil or criminal procedure law. My focus here is on the grounds for attaining relief, not the 
amounts attained. The relief varied depending on the law, which reinforces the standard view of 
India as a legally plural society with separate compartments for each religious community. However, 
the ways in which the court adjudicated the grounds to obtain this relief were largely the same across 
the many laws available to wives. The law provided diverse forms of redress but adjudicated that 
redress within a shared body of jurisprudence.  
Law in India was not only or always an elite phenomenon. Three cases illustrate how wives 
of differing social classes used maintenance provisions to attain differing amounts of relief. In a 
1944 case, the wife’s suit in pursuit of her husband’s seemingly considerable wealth had to be 
brought under the Hindu civil law to extract an appropriate proportion of his assets for her 
maintenance. She requested Rs. 1500/month and won Rs. 650, along with cash to buy a car, the 
right to be maintained in a separate house, and maintenance in arrears at a rate of 500 Rupees per 
month. Though it involved exorbitant sums outside the reach of most litigants, the case was cited in 
subsequent treatises for the position that the amount of the husband’s maintenance obligation was 
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in part determined by the wife’s expectations of living standards and lifestyle, in other words by her 
social class.731  
In sharp contrast, and far more common, maintenance under the CCrP could be awarded 
quickly and in small amounts. It was usually, but not always, awarded in cash. In Punn Debb (1950), 
the husband agreed to give his wife a house and land as a compromise in response to her 
maintenance suit against him. This was in the district of Almora in Ranikhet, in the foothills of the 
Himalayas,732 where weather and landscape favored wealth in agricultural land rather than cash. The 
husband did not adhere to the terms of the compromise and did not allow his wife to harvest her 
crops; instead he “cut away the crops of the field.”733 The wife therefore succeeded in her suit for 
ten rupees per month in cash maintenance rather than the previous agreement of access to his fields. 
Likewise, in Smt. Maiki v. Hemraj, the wife won maintenance at ten rupees per month on the grounds 
of her husband’s bigamy.734 Ram Bharosey also instituted a RCR suit against his wife in response to 
her maintenance suit for six rupees per month. In Dhani Ram v. Mst. Ram Dei, the husband 
challenged the wife’s successful maintenance suit against him by arguing that he did not have the 
means to pay for her maintenance as he represented by his lack of tangible property. Specifically, he 
argued that the magistrate had not positively found that he had the means to support his wife at the 
ordered rate of twenty-five rupees/month. He referred to a 1926 Madras ruling that “the word 
‘means’…did not mean the husband should be possessed of any tangible property, but if a man was 
healthy and able bodied he must be taken to have the means to support his wife.”735 The emphasis 
on the husband’s obligation to work and provide for his wife is reminiscent of the obligation in 
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English poor law that it was first and foremost the husband’s obligation to support his wife, and that 
her relationship with the state was mediated through him.  
These cases illustrate that both very wealthy wives and those of modest means benefited 
from the provisions for maintenance. In other words, though justice could be slow and expensive, it 
could also be (relatively) swift and accessible.  
 
Good Grounds for Living Apart 
Having examined the different kinds and amounts of relief available, let us now return to the 
point that grounds for relief remained largely the same across civil, Hindu, and criminal law. 
Imperial concerns centered around preserving the marriage tie, avoiding expense, and settling the 
population. A specifically English link among these concerns was the pinning of the wife to her 
husband in physical, financial, and legal terms. The grounds used to adjudicate Indian maintenance 
law reinforced a patriarchal common law family structure in which the husband held physical 
dominion over his wife. This section will examine substantive law regarding cruelty.  
The husband’s failure to maintain gave rise to the wife’s initial ground for claiming 
maintenance. The definition of refusal to maintain was quite broad. 736  If the wife lived with her 
husband and he neglected her, refused her sustenance, deserted her, or otherwise refused to 
maintain her, she could expect to win an order for maintenance. The husband could only escape his 
obligation to maintain if she did not live with him and had no reasonable excuse, if she were living in 
adultery, or if they lived apart by mutual consent.737 The 1898 CCrP changed “habitual cruelty”738 as a 
good ground for maintenance to any “just ground,” a broader category that gave the Magistrate 
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wider powers of discretion to decide in favor of the wife.739 In most cases before the High Courts, 
the wife could prove her good ground and therefore won her maintenance suit.  
Although most wives won their maintenance claims, they nevertheless faced problems in 
proving cruelty as a good ground for living apart from their husbands. This was the problem of 
proof: it was difficult to prove the husband’s sexual and physical violence or even abusive words in 
the absence of witnesses willing to support the wife’s claims, or without some other form of 
documentary evidence. In contrast, it was relatively easy to prove to the court acts of what I call 
“social cruelty:” those that, by definition, produced witnesses or other forms of proof. Adultery and 
especially bigamy were the most prominent of these forms. As we saw in the previous chapter, legal 
harassment was also easy to prove. This is a prime example of the ways in which individual litigants 
can benefit from decisions in their favor while the overall jurisprudence remains relatively 
stagnant.740 The wife’s duty to obey and reside with her husband was matched by his duty to 
maintain her.  
 
Cruelty 
Despite wives’ preponderant success in obtaining maintence, then, demonstrating cruelty 
remained a vexing problem. By examining two different kinds of cases - the sole instance that I 
could find of a wife losing her suit and then the far more common case of one succeeding - we will 
see that wives faced the problem of proving cruelty because they lacked evidence. It is only by 
examining cases in which wives won on grounds other than cruelty that the full picture of the 
jurisprudence of cruelty emerges. Even if a wife could not prove cruelty, she might still win her suit 
if she could show other good grounds to live apart from her husband.  
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In the maintenance cases examined here, the sole loss by a wife was the outcome of a 
protracted legal battle that involved two separate legal procedures, first the husband’s RCR suit and 
then the wife’s maintenance suit. The evidence and findings of the initial RCR suit dictated the 
wife’s defeat in her maintenance suit.741 The legal battle exposed how the preservation of the 
marriage tie, the location of the matrimonial home with the husband, and the husband’s physical 
dominion over his wife grew out of the nineteenth-century remedies of restitution of conjugal rights 
and maintenance.  This structure underpinned both civil and criminal maintenance law. Moreover, 
these features structured subsequent statutory reforms as well, as seen in both the 1946 Hindu 
Separate Residence and Maintenance Act and the 1955-6 Hindu Code.  
The history of Zubeda Khatoon’s pursuit of maintenance shows that the courts were caught 
between a humanitarian desire to grant it to a deserving wife and the need to respect previous 
courts’ decisions about evidence. Initially, before the lower court, Mohammad Siddiq, her husband, 
won a RCR order, dodging a lifelong commitment to pay his wife monthly maintenance. When 
Khatoon appealed to the District Magistrate, she won. On Siddiq’s second appeal to the Allahbad 
High Court, he won on the basis of his earlier success in the RCR suit against her.  
Originally Khatoon lost to her husband’s RCR suit, although her return to his home 
depended on his paying her one hundred and thirty rupees. Around the same time she successfully 
pursued suits for her dower debt, but since Siddiq did not pay it she did not return to his home. 
Though she won her dower suit, she could not actually get her dower from him, and turned to a 
maintenance suit to achieve cash directly from him. Her husband defended himself in this suit on 
the ground that after the RCR order, she never returned to live with him and therefore was living 
apart without valid excuse. The High Court found that Khatoon did not have a good ground for 
maintenance because of the previous court’s RCR order requiring her to live with her husband. She 	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“deliberately refused to obey the orders of the Civil Court.”742 Justice Kidwai encapsulated the wife’s 
position:  
It is no doubt true that the Magistrate has discretion but that discretion must be exercised 
upon judicial principles and it is not in accordance with sound judicial principles to compel a 
husband to maintain a wife who contumaciously refuses the order of a civil Court directing 
her to live with her husband.743 
 
The word contumacious indexes the Ecclesiastical origins of restitution of conjugal rights.744  After the 
Ecclesiastical courts lost their power to excommunicate in 1813745 as a method of enforcement in 
England, Ecclesiastical courts could request the Chancery Courts to issue a writ of de contumace 
capiendo against a person who refused to obey the former’s orders.746 This writ “empowered sheriffs 
to jail offenders until they submitted to the dictates of the courts.”747 This shift from 
excommunication to imprisonment foretold first the decline of748 and then the end of the 
Ecclesiastical jurisdiction over marriage.749 Though no specific writ of de contumace capiendo lay in 
India, Kidwai’s comments signaled the much longer history of disobedient wives hauled up before 
the court for refusal to live with their husbands. Wives could also sue for alimony in the 
Ecclesiastical courts before they were abolished, a further dimension of Ecclesiastical law’s influence 
on maintenance law.750 An unruly wife could be labeled as such in India even after Independence in 
1947 and until about nine months ahead of the 1950 Constitution, the Ecclesiastical law of family 
relations structured many arenas of Indian law.  
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see discussion in Chapter Two.  
745 Ecclesiastical Courts Act (1813).  
746 Black’s Law Dictionary, s.v. de contumace capiendo. 
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Justice Kidwai went on to state that a criminal court had to follow the findings of the Civil 
Court “that the wife left the protection of her husband upon no justifiable grounds, and that there 
was no cruelty as alleged by the wife.”751 Kidwai was bound by the lower court’s decision on this 
point; the principle of res judicata prevented him from re-examining the Zubeda Khatoon’s 
evidence.752 Once a legal issue has been decided, the courts, except under limited exceptions such as 
the finding of significant new evidence, cannot re-examine the matter.  
 The physical dominion of husband over wife could restrain her liberty but also her rights to 
property. Kidwai examined the wife’s argument that she would be prevented from pursuing her 
property suits for dower against her husband if she returned home to live with him. He balanced the 
wife’s fears about her legal autonomy against the husband’s “privilege of her company.”753 She 
claimed her lack of physical autonomy would necessarily interfere with her legal autonomy. In this 
case, her husband’s dominion over her was made clear in very real physical terms: she feared that if 
she lived with her husband, her legal autonomy would be limited by his control. A lower court 
decided for her husband and Kidwai followed because of res judicata. Relying on the lower courts’ 
earlier decisions in RCR suits was one of the major ways to block a wife’s victory in a maintenance 
suit, when she otherwise had very good chances of winning the court’s sympathies.   
Just because the wife’s maintenance suit failed, however, we cannot assume she would 
follow the earlier RCR order and return to live with her husband Zubeda Khatoon, for example, 
may very well have remained in her parental home.754 Yet her legal loss would have redounded on 
her immediate cash resources and her long-term prospects, especially since her husband also failed 
to pay her dower. Khatoon moved from a device with its origins in Ecclesiastical law (restitution of 	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753 Mohd Siddiq v. Mt. Zubeda Khatoon, AIR 1952 All 616b. 
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conjugal rights) to criminal procedure (maintenance law). Both of these relied on the marriage tie. 
She could also have turned to her original marriage contract, forfeiting most of her dower, for a 
divorce. She was not exactly a free contracting agent under the Islamic contract because she paid a 
penalty for divorce and she could not negotiate on equal terms. She may have been closer to a free 
contracting agent, however, than she was under British Indian law. The legal record does not, of 
course, show whether she took additional steps to attain redress. She also could have turned to the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (discussed in the next chapter) to obtain a divorce with a 
longer list of grounds. Colonial rule of law did not engender a movement from status to contract, at 
least in Maine’s sense.755 The record was far more mixed; a variety of jurisdictions overlapped and 
worked together.  
Whatever the benefits of Islamic contractual marriage to wives, if Zubeda Khatoon needed 
speedy maintenance, or for some other reason could or would not divorce, the nineteenth century 
CCrP tied her to Siddiq in a continuing marriage contract if she wanted to be maintained. Khatoon’s 
case illustrates this point well: by virtue of losing the RCR suit, she was tied to him. But if she won 
her maintenance suit, she would have been tied to her husband as well in a continuing state of 
marriage. It was the Islamic marriage contract that protected her ability to enter and exit marriage to 
some small degree before the 1939 Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act and to a much greater 
extent after. This suggests that the colonial experience reinscribed status-based regimes rather than 
liberating individuals into a state of free contracting. This effect was based in the CCrP’s English 
model of maintenance, aimed at preserving the marriage tie, not in Hindu or Muslim religious law or 
idiom.  
There were several intertwined strands in the genealogy of this practice. From the point of 
view of expediency, it made sense perhaps to include maintenance in the criminal procedure code. 	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Just as marriage in England escaped from Ecclesiastical jurisdiction and started to form its own sub-
set of civil law with the Matrimonial Causes Act (1857), the failure to maintain a wife was placed 
within the ambit of criminal procedure in India in 1861. Second, under the English Poor Law the 
fiscal and moral motivations of local poor law boards tended towards preserving the marriage tie in 
order to reduce welfare charges. Third, Ecclesiastical law had also inscribed the obligation to 
maintain as a moral and religious obligation.  
Zubeda Khatoon lost her maintenance suit on the basis of an earlier restitution of conjugal 
rights suit. Sheopiari’s case highlights how each spouse could use RCR and maintenance in a delicate 
legal dance that approximated judicial separation. Sheopiari’s husband in this case, Devi Prasad, 
succeeded in a RCR suit against her. She successfully appealed the RCR order to the Magistrate. In 
the meantime she took out her own maintenance suit against Prasad. The Magistrate erroneously did 
not grant her maintenance because of her husband’s initial success in the RCR suit, somehow 
overlooking the wife’s later success in defending against the RCR suit. Sheopiari then appealed her 
loss in the maintenance suit to the High Court in Allahabad, successfully. The High Court deemed 
the Magistrate’s position incorrect: the Magistrate should not have barred Sheopiari from her 
maintenance just because her husband earlier filed a RCR suit against her. However, the matter did 
not end there. It was remanded to the Sessions Judge to examine whether Sheopiari had lived apart 
from Prasad by mutual consent that, if it were found to be so, would bar her maintenance suit.756  In 
both Zubeda Khatoon and Sheopiari, the wife’s ultimate success in the maintenance suit depended on 
her earlier success in fending of their husbands’ RCR suits. Zubeda Khatoon lost her maintenance 
suit because her husband had succeeded in his RCR suit. We do not know what happened to 
Sheopiari’s suit after it was remanded to the Sessions Judge. However, her case shows how 
dependent the fate of a wife’s maintenance suit was on the results of a RCR suit. We saw this in the 	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previous chapter when Ram Bharosey sought to ward off his wife’s maintenance claims with a RCR 
suit against her.  
It is possible to see Indian wives’ success in obtaining maintenance before the British Indian 
courts as a validation of colonial reformist ideology. In this view, English liberalism’s individual 
rights remedy the indigenous patriarchal excesses of Hindu and Muslim men. In contrast, I argue 
that wives’ success in obtaining maintenance was driven by the need of British Indian law, 
influenced significantly by English poor and Ecclesiastical laws, to reduce welfare expenses and 
prevent prostitution by preserving the marriage tie. That wives rarely won matrimonial redress on 
the ground of cruelty undercuts the humanitarian claim of the maintenance law. The husband’s 
patriarchal dominion is best illustrated in the Zubeda Khatoon and Sheopiari cases; in each, the wife lost 
due to the RCR’s emphasis on the husband’s rights to his wife’s presence in his domicile. 
 
The Category of Social Offenses  
For a wife to win her case, she needed to explain her good ground for living apart from her 
husband. The grounds that succeeded were those that by definition involved a third party. I label 
these social offenses. By relying on social offenses, courts found other grounds besides cruelty to grant 
wives maintenance claims under the CCrP and avoided the problem of proof. Most commonly, 
wives won maintenance suits on the ground of bigamy or adultery.  
On paper, Kalawati’s difficult marriage757 would have seemed to be a prime example of the 
kinds of situations the late colonial legislature aimed to ameliorate when it enacted the 1946 Hindu 
Separate Residence and Maintenance Act (HSRMA). However, her husband B. Ratan Chand’s legal 
persistence, and the innovative arguments of his lawyers, indicated that statutory success was only 
the first among many steps required to create and then defend Hindu womens’ legal rights. The long 	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legal battle indicated the relatively unimportant role of cruelty jurisprudence in wives’ success at 
attaining marital redress. The direction of the legal arguments and the courts’ requirement of proof 
of cruelty pushed the judicial debates and controversies away from cruelty within marriage and 
towards the question of the husband’s bigamous behavior. Ultimately, Kalawati won her case, but 
the long journey required to achieve this success crystallized some of the key reasons Indian 
jurisprudence focused on the wife’s location and support and skirted around the role of marital 
violence.  
 Specifically, Kalawati argued before the original court that she was entitled to maintenance 
from Chand under the HSRMA. This Act provided a list of seven grounds for which a wife could 
obtain separate residence and maintenance. These were, in brief and simplified form, “loathsome 
disease not contracted from her;” “such cruelty towards her as renders it unsafe or undesirable for 
her to live with him;” desertion; second marriage; conversion to another religion; keeping or residing 
with a concubine; and “any other justifiable cause.”758 In providing this long list of grounds, the 
HSRMA was comparable to the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act as we shall see in the next 
chapter. With specific regard to cruelty, the Act provided a fairly specific definition of what the 
judge could look at in making his determination: “such cruelty towards her as renders it unsafe or 
undesirable for her to live with him.” And yet in practice the addition and clarification of this section 
made little difference because it was most often on the basis of social cruelty that the wife won her 
suit. In Kalawati’s case, she put forward two marital wrongs committed by the husband: cruelty and 
adultery. Before the trial court in 1955, she won only on the ground of adultery. As the High Court 
recounted, “On the issue of cruelty, the trial court came to the conclusion that the entire story of the 
husband’s cruelty towards the wife was totally false.”759  
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 Both spouses each appealed the decision that B. Ratan Chand was obligated to pay 
maintenance. For a husband to appeal maintenance order was de rigeur because, if successful, he 
would escape the lifelong obligation of a monthly maintenance payment to his wife. What made this 
case unusual was that Kalawati also appealed the trial court’s decision on cruelty. This presented a 
situation of “cross-appeals.” The wife’s cross-appeal could indicate that she and her legal counsel 
were convinced of the validity of her cruelty allegations. A second more cynical interpretation held 
that she simply used her appeal as a counter-blast to her husband’s appeal: a legal strategy designed 
to exhaust the husband’s financial and temporal resources. A third explanation held it was designed 
to shame the husband in a public forum.  
 Both Kalawati and Chand lost their appeals to the Civil Judge. Chand appealed this second 
decision against him to the Allahabad High Court. Here his legal strategy turned to questions of 
statutory interpretation, specifically the question of the retrospective application of the 1946 
HSRMA: should it apply to a marriage undertaken in 1935, a decade prior to the Act? Surprising 
though it may seem, he actually had some firm legal ground upon which to stand; several High 
Courts in other jurisdictions that had taken this position. Justice Gurtu of the Allahabad High Court 
briefly declared that he agreed with the husband’s position.760 He specifically referenced the Bombay 
High Court’s reasoning, summarized in Gurtu’s words as, “the said Act was remedial in character 
and imposed a new liability on one party and conferred fresh rights on another and it was not 
retrospective.”761 Therefore it could not retrospectively apply. 
Despite Justice Gurtu’s decision against her, Kalawati appealed the case to a two-justice 
bench.762 She met with success this time, but only five years later, by 1960. Her counsel argued that 
in the intervening time since Justice Gurtu’s decision against her, the 1956 Hindu Adoptions and 
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Maintenance Act (HAMA, part of the Hindu Code) was enacted and took effect. The HAMA was 
designed to more clearly address the question of retrospectivity than did HRMA. Indeed, Justice 
Gurtu’s decision joined the body of cases that must have highlighted a need for such a change in the 
HAMA. Rather than pinning the wife’s right of maintenance on the husband’s date of second 
marriage, as the HRMA did, the HAMA (section 18) allowed maintenance to a wife “if he [her 
husband] has any other wife living.”763 This cut out the question of when the second marriage took 
place; for the wife to get relief she had only to show that a second wife did exist, whenever the 
second marriage took place. Because the second wife was still alive, the High Court had good 
grounds to find that the wife had a prima facie right to maintenance from her husband.  
Therefore, in 1960, finally the two-Justice bench of Chief Justice Mootham and Justice S.N. 
Dwivedi granted the wife her maintenance claim, bringing to a successful conclusion an eleven-year 
legal saga. Despite her success, though, Kalawati took a significant financial hit. Her initial claim for 
maintenance had been for Rs. 50 a month alongside a claim of maintenance arrears for Rs. 900, 
presumably for the time between the husband’s second marriage and when she filed her initial 
maintenance suit. But the two-justice bench only granted her maintenance from the date they felt 
her claim entered firm legal ground, that is the date the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act took 
effect, in 1956, effectively cutting her out of close to twenty years of maintenance arrears. Moreover, 
against her claim of Rs. 50, the court granted her only Rs. 25 per month.  
 There is an unanswered question about this case. Why did Kalawati and her lawyers choose 
to litigate under the HRMA and not the Code of Criminal Procedure? The amount she was claiming 
was relatively low and would have been attainable under the CCrP. I suspect it was because she filed 
her suit prior to a 1949 amendment to CCrP that provided a wife with relief in the case of her 
husband’s mere adultery, and not necessarily bigamy. 	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The 1949 Amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure 
In 1949, after Independence in 1947 but before the Constitution took effect in 1950, India’s 
Parliament amended the Code of Criminal Procedure to make it more favorable to wives by 
clarifying that they could obtain maintenance for the husband’s bigamy or adultery. In other words, 
he need not have taken out a second marriage for the wife to obtain the relief of maintenance. The 
Amendment added the provision, “If a husband has contracted marriage with another wife or keeps 
a mistress it shall be considered to be just ground for his wife’s refusal to live with him.”764 If the 
wife could prove the husband’s adultery, this Amendment provided a clear good ground for her to 
live apart from him. Prior to this 1949 Amendment, only bigamy was considered a good ground on 
which a wife could win her maintenance suit. If she could not prove her husband’s second marriage, 
then she would have had difficulty winning. The 1949 Amendment remedied this situation by 
allowing a wife to get maintenance from a man who “keeps a mistress.”765  
 This substantiates the idea that the social offense, which could be proved by the existence 
of a third party, played an important role in the landscape of matrimonial litigation.  After the 
Amendment, Srimati Maiki won Rs. 10 maintenance/month on this ground.766 Likewise Srimati 
Hassan received maintenance from her husband because he took a second wife after the new 
Amendment.767 These two cases differ from Kalawati in that they used the CCrP, not the new Hindu 
statute. Similarly, in Dhani Ram v. Mst. Ram Dei, the husband argued in his appeal to the High Court 
that the Magistrate did not give an express ruling about his alleged cruelty. Justice Asthana in his 
judgment for the High Court wrote that the Magistrate, indeed, had not given “an express finding 
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that the applicant [husband] has maltreated his first wife and turned her out of the house, but from 
the trend of the judgment it appears that he believed the evidence produced on this point by the 
wife.”768 Asthana stated that it would have been better if the Magistrate had “expressly mentioned it 
in the judgment that he was believing the evidence on behalf of the wife.”769 As a result, the husband 
argued that he had not mistreated his wife and therefore she was not deserving of maintenance. 
Since he had admittedly taken a second wife, however, his case was weakened and the High Court 
found in the wife’s favor on this ground. This is a further example of the problem of proof: the 
Magistrate had been reluctant to make a definitive ruling on the question of violence within the 
marriage, preferring instead to focus on the social crime of bigamy.770 Maintenance was only for 
wives with living husbands who remained married. Once the marriage tie was broken, whether by 
death or divorce, the wife had to turn elsewhere for relief.  
We cannot pass this without a discussion of the Amendment’s timing. Of course, the period 
between 1946 and 1950 is now well studied from the perspective of the Constituent Assembly. Here 
we see the other side of the coin—the Constituent Assembly’s Parliamentary side. As Ambedkar was 
the Law Minister during this period, it is possible he was the moving force behind the effort. 
Another possibility was that there was a well-known case that prompted swift action on the 
Amendment. Whatever the ultimate reason, the 1949 Amendment played a pivotal role in expanding 
Indian wives’ abilities to pursue legal redress and financial restitution as a result of marital failure. 
Between the pre-Independence DMMA and the HMA enacted by the Indian state, the Amendment 
served as a key stepping stone to the legal recognition of women’s rights within matrimonial law.  
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Jurisdiction: Personal 
 The previous section examined the substantive law of maintenance. Husbands also resorted 
to procedural arguments about jurisdiction in this period. These arguments were similar to the kinds 
of arguments that Shah Bano’s husband made in the famous Indian Supreme Court case of 1985, 
when he contended that the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure’s maintenance provisions should not 
apply to him as a Muslim husband and that he had a right to be governed under his (Muslim) 
personal law.  That argument — and the Supreme Court’s insensitive handling of it — prompted a 
major political firestorm and resulted in the passage of the 1986 Muslim Women’s (Protections of 
Rights on Divorce) Act.771 Well before this, husbands of all kinds argued the need to apply their 
personal law to them, rather than civil, criminal procedure, or other forms of “general” law. They 
did this in an effort to achieve the best possible outcome for their matrimonial litigation, and likely 
not out of religious conviction. They made several different kinds of arguments about jurisdiction, 
both about the geographic jurisdiction of their suits and the religious personal jurisdiction. 
Husbands of all communities averred that they did not owe maintenance under their personal law, 
and that religious personal law took precedence over the Criminal Code. The Courts rejected such 
arguments, finding that because of the criminal nature of the law, it applied to all husbands. For 
example, in Shamsher Khan the husband argued that under Muslim personal law the wife did not have 
custody of the children. In this case, he argued that under Muslim personal law he was entitled to 
the children’s custody. Since the children remained in the wife’s custody, he did not owe her 
maintenance. Justice Misra rejected this argument because “the statutory liability [under the CCrP] is 
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distinct from the liability under the personal law.”772 The wife won her suit for maintenance of Rs. 
30/month on grounds of her husband’s physical and legal cruelty.  
Indian secularism of the late colonial and early post-Independence period propagated an 
approach to the family that emphasized social control, represented in Justice Misra’s rejection of 
Shamsher Khan’s contention that the Criminal Procedure should not apply to him. In some ways, 
the idea of legal secularism put forward here reinforces that image of tolerant, multi-stranded 
Nehruvian, rather than, say, a form of Hindutva secularism that emphasizes strict equality. However, 
this is not what I intend to suggest. Instead, I argue that legal secularism preserved a domain of state 
control of the marriage tie, women’s movements, and wealth in marriage. Legal secularism operated 
to preserve the marriage tie, not in the interests of morality, but out of a concern for social control 
that reified a patriarchal family structure that put significant restraints on wives’ liberty. In a context 
in which mobility was deemed a threat, if a wife’s location could be pinned to her husband’s, half the 
battle for controlling and surveilling the population had been won, at least in theory The criminal 
jurisdiction of maintenance, moreover, suggests that looking at Indian domestic relations through 
the lens of religion ignores the social control features of criminal and poor law. Perhaps social 
control and criminality are more apt lenses through which to view Indian family laws.  
The elements of social control demonstrated in the form of maintenance clustered around 
three major features: first, maintenance aimed at preserving the marriage tie; second, maintenance 
created significant restraints on wives’ liberty by tying them to their husbands via marriage; third, 
maintenance restrained wives’ liberty by tying them to local institutions for its enforcement. The 
criminal form of maintenance of the nineteenth century CCrP, coupled with the RCR remedy, 
created large amounts of case law, secondary legal literature such as treatises for working lawyers, 
forms, and institutions around this particular family structure. The nineteenth century maintenance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
772 Shamsher Khan v. Sm. Siddiqunissa and Ors., AIR 1953 All (Lucknow Bench) 720 at 721, para. 8. The husband was 
ordered to pay her Rs. 30/month.  
      239 
and RCR procedures in India structured subsequent Hindu and Muslim law and, crucially, many 
other arenas of Indian law such as the domicile requirement in Indian citizenship law.773   
As should be clear from the above discussion, the courts made no distinction between 
Hindus and Muslims in the application of the criminal maintenance law. Christian husbands also 
resorted unsuccessfully to the personal-jurisdiction argument. A 1955 decision under the Christian 
Divorce Act made clear that the maintenance requirements also applied to Christians: “This [i.e. 
right to s. 488] statutory right is not restricted to any nationality or creed, and is available irrespective 
of the personal law to which she is subject.”774 The decision clarified that because Christians had a 
separate Divorce Act, there was a difference between maintenance proceedings under the CCrP and 
the Divorce Act. Once the wife started her divorce proceedings under the Divorce Act, she could 
not apply under the CrPC for maintenance but had to pursue redress under the Act.775 However if 
she could not obtain a divorce under the stringent requirements of the Divorce Act or for some 
reason wanted to claim maintenance instead of pursue divorce, she could apply for the summary 
remedy of maintenance under the criminal code.  
Given that maintenance operated to reinforce the marriage tie, wives would lose their rights 
to maintenance upon divorce in communities where there were pathways to divorce. This is because 
the CCrP was aimed at protecting wives as wives. A Christian wife was entitled to maintenance as 
any other wife would be until she started her divorce proceedings.776 In Abdul Shakoor, an unreported 
case, the High Court did not grant the wife maintenance after her husband divorced her. It did grant 
her maintenance for the iddat period. In Muslim personal law, this usually three-month period is 
aimed at ensuring the wife is not pregnant and that the divorce is final. During this period, the 
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husband owes the wife support and must also return her dower to her.777 At least since 1929 the rule 
stopping maintenance with divorce had been the explicit rule of the Oudh Chief Court.778 I suggest 
that this was not out of deference to the separateness of Muslim law but because maintaining the 
marriage tie was a constituent aspect of maintenance law, bolstered by the similar position in which 
Christian litigants found themselves. Therefore if the wife could obtain her divorce by some other 
method, she was no longer eligible for maintenance.   
A further illustration of this rule can be seen in the cases of wives who sought to pursue 
maintenance claims against their husbands. For example, in the unreported case from 1955, a wife 
had successfully achieved maintenance against her husband but he died before she could collect the 
arrears. She had applied to the court to be paid from his estate that had devolved on his minor sons. 
The court made two rulings about her pursuit. First, she could not collect maintenance out of a dead 
person’s estate. Second, whether her husband was dead or alive, it was not the wife herself who 
could apply for the execution of a maintenance order; rather, this was the responsibility of the 
District Collector.779 Likewise, in another 1955 Allahabad High Court decision by a Full Bench of 
three judges,780 the two wives of a deceased man had applied for maintenance out of some property 
he had mortgaged to another man, some of which had then been sold to a third man. The widows 
claimed a right of residence on the property, interpreted as a right to maintenance. However, the 
High Court ruled that they did not have any right of maintenance once the husband had died. 
Rather, their rights to succeed to his joint family property would govern any rights they had to the 
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property. The High Court deemed the wife’s right of residence a “personal right against the 
husband.”781 
The emphasis on protecting wives as wives therefore originated in the criminal and not in 
the religious domain of Indian law. To ignore this salient feature is to overdraw the distinction 
between Hindu (indissoluble/sacramental) and Muslim (contractual) marriage by focusing merely on 
the question of divorce. It is also to ignore the over-determined nature of maintenance in India, 
which was not shaped by Hindu provisions on maintenance but rather shaped by poor law, 
Ecclesiastical law, common law, and criminal law.  
Jurisdiction: Geographic 
Husbands resorted to jurisdiction claims to get their wives’ maintenance suits thrown out, 
but they usually lost. The CCrP provided a broad but not unlimited list of jurisdictions in which the 
wife could claim her maintenance. This geographic-jurisdictional requirement operated to tie wives 
to their husbands in ways that mapped onto a patriarchal family structure. Usually wives won such 
suits because Justices construed the jurisdiction requirement broadly; in only one case did a wife lose 
her suit for lack of jurisdiction.  Nevertheless the jurisdiction requirement operated with a virilocal 
definition of the family. The district was the basic unit of governance in colonial India. To whit, a 
wife would first take her suit to a local judge and then could appeal to the District Magistrate. The 
CCrP gave three options for the district where the wife could pursue her maintenance suit against 
her husband. It could take place “in any district where he resides, or is, or where he last resided with 
his wife, or as the case may be, the mother of the illegitimate child.”782 This requirement was added 
in 1898 but was not found in the 1861, 1872, or 1882 Codes of Criminal Procedure.783  
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On the one hand, the list of three locations for the wife to pursue her claim and the 
judiciary’s broad interpretation of residence provided a good chance for her to fend off her 
husband’s jurisdictional dodges. On the other hand, the list was limited and followed a patriarchal 
structure. In line with the restraints on mobility and the need to create a “settled” population, the 
CCrP required wives to go to their husband’s locales—whether it was his present locale, either 
permanent (where he resides) or temporary (is), or his past locale. The wife, for example, could not 
expect to successfully pursue the suit in her natal district, where she might enjoy the resources and 
social support of her family. The determining factor in all three cases was where he resided. The 
CCrP’s attempt to provide speedy and summary justice was undercut by this requirement. The 
British Indian common law insisted on locating the matrimonial home with the husband and this 
had implications for wives’ mobility and liberty. They could succeed in their maintenance claims 
against their husbands but they needed to bring such suits in the appropriate location.  
In Rifaqatullah, the wife lost because she brought her suit in her husband’s father’s district, 
Shahjahanapur. Even though the husband’s father lived there and the husband “may be a welcome 
guest in his father’s house from time to time,” the husband did not reside in the district. In fact, 
though the family came from Shahjahanpur and the husband’s father returned there after retirement, 
“There is no evidence that the man against whom proceedings were taken has any property in 
Shahjahanpur or has ever lived there.”784 Rather the Court found that “to reside means to live or to 
have a dwelling place or an abode.”785  The wife would now need to bring her suit in the district 
where the husband was then residing and therefore lost her maintenance suit.  
Rifaqatullah was an exception; wives usually won their suits in the face of such geographic-
jurisdictional arguments by their husbands. Mohammad Rasool was guilty of gross physical violence 
against his wife. Because he could not contest the factual findings of the lower courts proving his 	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cruelty, he turned to geographic-jurisdiction as a last dodge to escape her maintenance claim. (This 
was similar to Ram Bharosey in the previous chapter; he could not contest the facts of cruelty so he 
turned to religious jurisdiction arguments.) He argued that he did not reside in Lucknow and his 
wife’s suit in that city’s trial court should fail. However the court found it was he who had brought 
the wife from nearby Barabanki District to Lucknow for medical treatment apparently resulting 
from his cruelty. Both the Lucknow trial court and Sessions Court (the urban equivalent of District 
Magistrate’s court) believed they had jurisdiction and the Sessions Court denied his appeal.  The 
husband’s second appeal in the High Court turned on the question of whether his five-month stay 
with his wife in Lucknow was “only a casual visit” and not a residence that would give the wife 
jurisdiction to lodge her suit.786  
The Justice looked at the point raised by a Lahore High Court case, whether the visit was 
casual or a temporary residence.787 He went on to point out that a prior Allahabad High Court case 
noted the difficulty of determining the tipping point between a casual visit and temporary residence 
but in the earlier judgment even two months residence satisfied the requirement.788 He then noted 
that a Madras case that looked at the “entire case law” found that the Code required more than a 
casual visit but it was “not equivalent to something in the nature of having a domicile in a particular 
place.”789 The Justice found that “[i]n my opinion a stay for above five or six months with the 
intention of having one’s wife treated cannot be called a casual visit. It amounts to a temporary 
residence and, therefore, it is enough to confer jurisdiction.”790 Chandrawati also won her suit for 
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maintenance despite her husband’s appeals on the ground of jurisdiction.791 The jurisdiction was 
associated with the husband. This mirrors somewhat the parish-based relief system of the English 
Poor Law. It was intensely local, and was dependent on the local exercise of state power and the 
realities of enforcement, as the discussions over the boundary between residence and visitation 
showed. Judges’ discretion ultimately determined the matter in hard cases. It also reflects the English 
Poor Law in that the wife’s identity played no role in determining the location of the proceedings. 
Another similar but slightly separate vestige of English Poor Law was the strong preference 
for the husband’s residence as the site of the matrimonial home. This parallels the earlier chapters’ 
discussion of the identification of the wife’s domicile with the husband’s concerning citizenship and 
RCR. However, in line with their sympathy toward troubled wives and their broad discretion, in 
Srimati Chameli, the Court denied the husband’s claim of an agreement to live apart, reversing two 
decisions in his favor by the lower courts. The decision in Srimati Chameli relied on a 1937 Allahabad 
precedent that mutual consent should be defined narrowly. The 1937 judgment was designed not to 
preserve the marriage tie out of a moral commitment to indissoluble marriage, necessarily, but rather 
to protect the wife.792 If the husband and wife lived apart because he forced her out, he could dodge 
the maintenance claim by stating they were living apart through mutual consent, challenging her to 
show she had been forced out. So, according to Justice Randhir Singh, the crucial question was 
whether the two truly mutually agreed to live apart or whether the husband forced the wife to agree 
to the arrangement. The state had a positive duty to protect the wife in her status as a vulnerable 
person. In this case, he found that the husband actually threw the wife out of the house and 
therefore had no good ground to dodge her maintenance claim. The two lower courts’ decisions 
were overturned and the husband, a vakil, was ordered to pay Smt. Chameli Rs. 20/month on his 
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stated income of Rs. 100-125/month. Despite the sympathy to wives, the overarching rule of 
determining the jurisdiction for maintenance through the husband’s locations did not change. 
The first case discussed in this article, wherein a fabulously wealthy husband sought to avoid 
his wife’s maintenance claims,793 highlighted the international dimensions of maintenance law in 
ways that show how the preference for the virilocal matrimonial home might overlap in different 
bodies of law. In this case the wife was a refugee from Germany who came to Shimla and married 
her husband there. One strategy the husband used to dodge his large maintenance obligations was to 
discount the wife’s right to bring such a suit, labeling her an enemy alien. He did this by suggesting 
her domicile remained in Germany, arguing she broke the dependent domicile rule by virtue of her 
enemy alien status and therefore was the exceptional married woman with an independent domicile. 
The husband’s arguments were easily rejected by the Court; the ease with which it rejected them 
indicates how well-entrenched was the idea of the wife’s dependent domicile even beyond 
citizenship law. In the present case, this worked in the wife’s favor. The wife, while not necessarily a 
citizen or British subject, was also not a non-subject as she would have been if deemed an enemy 
alien. Therefore, as already discussed, she could and did quite successfully pursue her civil suit.  
 
Conclusion 
 While Indian maintenance law developed earlier and in a more simplified form than did 
English maintenance law, both reflected the idea of settlement. A particular wife’s legal identity was 
tied to her husband’s identity, and her husband occupied a specific location and jurisdiction. A wife’s 
access to maintenance was mediated through her husband’s geographic location. As in RCR suits, 
judges had wide scope to decide whether wives had good reason for living apart from their 
husbands. Most often, social offenses—those that could be easily proved such as bigamy, adultery, 	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and legal harassment—were used to grant the wife her desired relief.  The colonial imperative to 
settle the population and to attach each colonial subject to a particular jurisdiction was reflected in 
the Criminal Procedure Code’s requirement that a maintenance suit be filed in a particular district 
tied to the husband’s location. Husbands of all religious communities used both geographic and 
religious jurisdiction arguments to desuit their wives as part of a legal strategy designed to avoid 
taking on lifelong maintenance obligations to their wives.  
 So far, this dissertation has examined how nineteenth and twentieth century legal 
procedures, statutes, and ideas tied wives to their husband in twentieth century India, both before 
and after the Constitution. These included domicile in citizenship law, restitution of conjugal rights 
in civil law, and maintenance in criminal procedures. All of these procedures operated to reinforce 
the marriage tie, tie the wife to her husband, and tie the married couple to a particular locale or set 
of locales, These chapters have shown how in these non-religious domains of twentieth century 
Indian law, English legal ideas based in social control and a specifici legal interpretation of Christian 
marriage as indissoluble structured Indian marriage. These chapters have laid the groundwork for a 
non-religious paradigm for considering Indian marriage and set out the nineteenth and twentieth 
century origins in England of some important features of this paradigm. The following chapters turn 
to examining how this framework interacted with India’s twentieth century Muslim and Hindu 
marriage statutes. I show that the framework structured by maintenance and restitution of conjugal 
rights continued to play an important role in the adjudication of marriage under “new” twentieth 
century divorce statutes such as the 1939 Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (Chapter Five) and 
the 1955 Hindu Marriage Act (Chapter Six).  
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Chapter Five 
Cruelty and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939-55 
 
The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (DMMA), passed in 1939, was a statutory reform 
to the law of Muslim marriages and divorces. It grew out of a critique of the administration of 
Muslim law in the subcontinent that argued that British rule incorrectly prevented Muslim 
jurisprudence from changing in response to new social conditions.794  The Act granted the wife a 
long list of grounds for divorce, removing the need for tentative judicial reasoning by making clear 
Muslim wives’ right to divorce for numerous reasons.  
 The DMMA was the first modern divorce code in India. This statute is still in effect in India, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh: it has proved as enduring as it was wide reaching. Moreover, at least until 
the enactment of the Hindu Code and the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA) in 1955, the DMMA was the 
most important statement of what was exactly marital cruelty in Indian law. Prior to the Act, Muslim 
wives had multiple routes to marital redress under Anglo-Muhammadan law, dower suits, divorce-
by-apostasy, and divorce- or separation-by-decree. The Act provided a clarified and systematic 
approach to these rights that eased women’s rights to divorce. Specifically, the DMMA labeled many 
kinds of behavior as cruelty, including the husband’s physical violence. The category of cruelty was 
also broadened enough to include laan, a procedure by which a wife could obtain a divorce in 
response to her husband’s false accusations of adultery against her. The decisions on laan indicate—
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as in Ram Bharosey--that the husband’s recourse to disparaging his wife’s reputation, as well as his use 
of criminal charges against her family, were powerful weapons that required effective legal 
counterweights.  
While the DMMA was very important both politically and legally, this chapter will show that, 
in practice, Muslim husbands and wives continued to litigate their matrimonial disputes in much the 
same way. The previous chapters showed that there were Muslim wives who sought maintenance 
under the Criminal Procedure Code. More importantly, despite the newly delineated grounds of 
cruelty in the DMMA, wives most often won not by arguing and proving their husbands’ physical 
cruelty within marriage but by finding other marital wrongs that were easier to prove. Indeed, within 
the judgments under the DMMA the courts continued to accommodate some violence within 
marriage. Examining litigation under this Act allows for a more nuanced view of the difference that 
twentieth century statutory reforms to marriage law made, and the answer was not as much as one 
would think. The similar patterns followed by litigants from a variety of religious backgrounds (all 
Muslims in this chapter) in the course of matrimonial litigation show that there was a shared 
matrimonial jurisprudence in pre-HMA Uttar Pradesh (UP) structured by English and Indian legal 
ideas about the patriarchal nature of the family and the rights of husbands and wives within it. 
Husbands and wives used a variety of legal strategies to attain the best possible outcomes for 
themselves, and they did this under Hindu, civil, criminal, and Muslim law.   
This chapter bases these arguments on eight cases pursued under the DMMA found in the 
longitudinal survey of the Oudh and Allahabad High Courts in the period between 1939, after the 
Act’s immediate passage and 1955, with the creation of the Hindu Marriage Act [HMA]. The chapter 
proceeds by first examining pre-DMMA forms of matrimonial redress under Anglo-Muslim law, and 
then turns specifically to how cruelty was litigated under the DMMA. Guided by the cases found in 
the longitudinal survey and the arguments litigants made, the chapter then examines the fate of laan 
      249 
in the High Courts, and concludes with an examination of the extent to which the High Court 
decisions can be deemed representative of Muslim matrimonial disputes in UP.  
 
Muslim Marital Redress Prior to the Act  
Before 1939, important methods of marital redress included wife-initiated forms under 
Hanafi law, informal separation (probably the most common form), the much rarer but politically 
important category of divorce-by-apostasy, and the category of divorce by judicial decree based in 
the Courts’ equity jurisdiction.795 I base this on my analysis of three treatises just before, or 
immediately after, the passage of the DMMA: A. C. Ghose’s Lawyers’ Anglo-Muhammadan Law (1935); 
Kashi Prasad Saksena’s Muslim Law as Administered in British India (1937); and Faiz Hassan Badruddin 
Tyabji’s Muhammadan Law: The Personal Law of Muslims (1940). I do not intend to describe the full 
field of Hanafi law but rather the various forms that might have been available to a lawyer prior to 
the 1939 Act as opposed to, for instance, the landscape of how Muslim law actually operated in a 
particular community or how a particular religious commentator viewed things. Treatises also 
provided an opportunity to present alternative legal positions and suggestions for reform in the form 
of the author’s comments on controversial decisions. 
The most important and widely used form of divorce, talak, amounted to the husband’s 
unilateral right to dissolve the marriage contract. The wife’s four methods to divorce her husband 
were all conditional in contrast to his unilateral right. These forms were: if her husband agreed 
(mubarat); at her instance with her husband’s consent, for a consideration, usually part or all of her 
dower (khula); if her husband delegated her the right to divorce him under specified conditions in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
795 Ghose, Lawyers’ Anglo-Muhammadan Law; Kashi Prasad Saksena, Muslim Law as Administered in British India (Allahabad: 
Agarwala, 1937); and Faiz Hassan Badruddin Tyabji, Muhammadan Law: The Personal Law of Muslims (Bombay, N.M. 
Tripathi, 1940).  
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the marriage contract, and those conditions took place (talak-i-tafwiz);796 and finally if she had been 
married to her husband before puberty and by a guardian other than her father or grandfather (the 
option of puberty).797 These routes to divorce were all based in the contract of Muslim marriage 
signed at the time of the wedding (nikahnamma), did not require the colonial’s state sanction or 
intervention. It is difficult to say how widely practiced such forms of divorce were.  
A separation was probably a much more common form of redress. Less visible and 
disruptive, this would have been a much simpler way to ease marital tensions. The wife could try to 
claim part of her dower or other moveable property left at her husband’s place. This was not the 
long-term, repetitive monthly claim of maintenance or alimony but rather an attempt to get some 
return on the money invested in the wife’s marriage. In the British courts, once the wife won her 
right to dower, the amount was subject to negotiaton between the two parties. In each of the two 
cases that I examined, the Justices chose an amount between what the husband offered and the wife 
demanded.  
For example, in Mohammad Taqi v. Farmoodi Begum798 the wife left her husband’s home after a 
long marriage though the decision gave no specific reason for her departure. The High Court 
rejected the husband’s argument that consummation of the marriage negated the wife’s right to 
prompt dower.799 She retained a right to her prompt dower — though the Court awarded her less 
than she would have liked -- though she was not able to completely dissolve the marriage. Likewise a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
796 Lucy Carroll, “Talaq-i-Tafwid and Stipulations in a Muslim Marriage Contract: Important Means of Protecting the 
Position of the South Asian Muslim Wife,” Modern Asian Studies 16, no. 2 (1982): 277–309.  
797 See Ghose, Lawyers’ Anglo-Muhammadan Law, 200Q to 200W. Ghose stated that there were various procedures to 
effect the option of puberty. He writes “it may be done in a good many ways” such as starting a divorce suit, marrying 
someone else, and as a defense to restitution of conjugal rights. See Ghose, 200(v). One wife used the option of puberty 
and the High Court affirmed an interpretation of the timing of her repudiation of the marriage although the case was 
remitted to the District Judge for further finding on the facts. No specific ground or details about the incident that may 
have prompted the dissolution were given in the report. Ahmad Husain v. Mt. Amir Bano (AIR 1940 All 63). 
798 Mohammad Taqi v. Farmoodi Begum, AIR 1941 All 181. 
799 Much of the case was taken up with determining the correct amount of prompt dower. As I will explain in greater 
detail in chapter six, the term “prompt dower” refers an amount of property or money stipulated in the Islamic marriage 
contract. It is given to the wife at the time of marriage. 
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few years later wife Rehana Khatun won her suit for prompt dower against her husband.800 In late 
colonial Uttar Pradesh, to the extent that wives pursued marital redress, the above two forms 
(Hanafi divorce methods and informal separation) likely dominated. The following two, divorce-by-
apostasy and divorce-by-decree, would have been more rare.  
Ameer Ali, like other treatise writers, suggested that divorce-by-apostasy was specific to the 
historical conditions of colonial India.801 The use of divorce by apostasy began in the British courts 
as early as 1870.802 In Ameer Ali’s analysis, the view of apostasy presented in important legal manuals 
like the Fatawa-i-Alamgiri and the Hedaya envisioned a state authority that could enforce physical 
punishment of the husband and imprisonment of the wife in the case of apostasy. The wife’s 
imprisonment was designed to allow her to return to Islam and then remarry her husband.803 
Whether this practice was actually enforced when these works of jurisprudence were written is an 
open question. Ameer Ali noted that the procedure did not work properly given the constraints of 
British rule in India; the state could not imprison the wife for apostasy.  The British Courts 
interpreted Hanafi law so that a husband’s or wife’s apostasy from Islam created an automatic 
divorce804  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
800 Rehana Khatun v. Iqtidar Uddin, AIR 1943 All 184.  
801 Ameer Ali, Mahommedan Law: Compiled From the Authorities in the Original Arabic, vol. 2, 4th ed. (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink 
& Co., 1917). 
802 These were the 1870 case of Zuberdast Khan v. His Wife 2 NWPHCA 370 and the 1906 case of Iman Din v. Hasan Bibi 
184 PLR 1906. See Ghose, 200(c) and Saksena, 265-6.  The earliest case noted in Muhammad Khalid Masud, Iqbal’s 
Reconstruction of Ijtihad (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1995), is Ghaus v. Musammat Fiji from Lahore 1915, see 175 fn. 11(3) for 
many additional cases. Chitaley and Rao give a case from Rangoon in which the legal point of contention was 
maintenance. A Muslim wife apostatized herself by converting to Buddhism causing a divorce, which negated her right 
to maintenance under the CCrP: Sona Ulla v. Ma Kin ARI 1919 Low Bur 150. See Chitaley and Rao, Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 2703. 
803 See Saksena, Muslim Law, 264.  
804 Ali, Mahommedan Law, 442. The treatise was first published in 1880. Jamil’s explanation was that “The procedure 
suggested by the Muslim jurists to put a stop to women renouncing Islam for the purpose of getting rid of their 
husbands could not be applied to Modern Indian conditions and therefore the Courts in India had no option but to 
apply the principle of law [i.e. divorce by apostasy] in its bareness.” Mohammad Jamil, Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage 
in Muslim Law, revised ed. (Lahore: Law Book Company, 1946). See page 158 for discussion of Preamble to the Act. 
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Ameer Ali criticized the position taken by the British Indian courts, arguing that a Muslim’s 
conversion to another Abrahamic religion should not cause an automatic divorce.805 But in 1910 the 
Allahabad High Court rejected this view finding that even conversion to another Abrahamic religion 
should trigger divorce. The Justices based their views in the early modern sources of Hanafi law, 
Fatawa-i-Alamgiri and the Hedaya, and two earlier cases from the Punjab.806 
Outside of the British courts, Maulana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi dealt with a case of a wife using 
apostasy to escape a persistent or demanding husband as early as 1913. According to Masud the 
number of such cases in the British courts “increased suddenly around 1920-5” perhaps due to 
Iqbal’s public mention of the problem in 1924.807 Thanavi’s sustained interest resulted in his writing 
of the 1933 al-Hilat al-Najizah l’il Halialat al-Ajizah (A successful device for the frustrated wife). This 
important text justified what eventually became the DMMA.808 Calls for Muslim divorce reform in 
1930s, therefore, could be aimed not at Hanafi law per se but rather at its British interpretation, which 
prohibited the import of divorce grounds for the wife’s marital redress despite good authority.809 
Those who favored these changes argued that British rule artificially froze Hanafi jurisprudence, 
preventing it from adapting to changing social circumstances and making use of other schools’ more 
progressive rules of Muslim law.810 As Minault has shown, this argument allowed “reformers, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
805 Reasoning that women could marry Abrahamic non-Muslims (Jews and Christians) and therefore conversion among 
these religions was not a ground for divorce, Ameer Ali critiqued these developments, stating, “It is absurd and contrary 
to the principles of justices that one part of the rule should be enforced whilst the other should be ignored.” See Ali, 
Mahommedan Law, 445. 
806 Ghose’s treatise explained that the 1910 Allahabad High Court “felt themselves unable to disregard the opinion 
expressed in Baillie and Hedaya and two old decisions (r) of the Punjab Court.” The decision was Amir Beg v. Soman 33 
All 90:7 A.L.J. 956:7 I.C. 342. The two Punjabi cases were 2 NWPHC A 270 and 85 PR 1906. See also Masud, Iqbal’s 
Reconstruction of Ijtihad, 200.  
807 Masud, Iqbal’s Reconstruction, 155-6.  
808 Fareeha Khan, “Traditionalist Approaches to Shari’ah Reform: Mawlana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi’s Fatwa on Women’s 
Right to Divorce,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2008), 4; Minault, “Women, Legal Reform, and Muslim 
Identity,” 7-8; Masud, Iqbal’s Reconstruction, 166-71; However, Thanavi’s advocacy for the appointment of Muslim kazis 
did not succeed.  
809 Masud, Iqbal’s Reconstruction, 202-3. 
810 Khan, “Traditionalist Approaches,” 12, 76, and passim. In the case of the DMMA, this meant borrowing the Maliki 
rule that allowed women to initiate divorce. To Thanawi, this represented a better option than simply abrogating the 
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politicians, and ulama”811 to work together to get the DMMA passed in Parliament.812 Muslims’ fear 
of losing adherents to Christianity in a climate of numerically driven political competition gave the 
project of divorce reform added urgency.813 In this argument, Hanafi jurisprudence was portrayed as 
a central core of law that had been modified or enforced – incorrectly - by British rule. In their view, 
Hanafi jurisprudence was neither static nor immune to social change; it was British precedents that 
had frozen it in time.  
The fourth form of marital redress in colonial India, divorce-by-judicial decree, also involved 
turning to the British Indian courts. This form of divorce operated from the equity jurisdiction of 
the British courts though its validity and jurisdictional position were not always certain. Courts could 
give judicial divorces on the grounds of impotence and false accusations of adultery.814 Ameer Ali 
and other treatise writers suggested that cruelty, infidelity, and failure to maintain should be grounds 
for judicial divorce as well. There was a developing line of legal reasoning among certain High 
Courts that took Ameer Ali’s position,815 though this was rejected by other Courts.816 This discussion 
indicates the difficulties women faced in getting a divorce-by-decree: they had to approach courts 
that were themselves uncertain about acceptable grounds.   
 To sum up the four important categories of marital redress in colonial India: First were the 
Hanafi approved forms like the husband’s unilateral right of divorce and the more limited subsidiary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Hanafi school of law (madhab) by enacting a law that granted Muslim wives divorce. See Khan, “Traditionalist 
Approaches,” 78.  
811 Minault, “Women, Legal Reform, and Muslim Identity,” 7-8. 
812 Ibid., 8. 
813  Ibid., 7-8. Masud in Iqbal’s Reconstruction of Ijtihad suggests it was one missionary in particular who may have been 
behind these conversions. See his footnote 20 on page 176. 
814 Khan states that Thanawi argued for the grant of divorce on ground of impotence but there were several conditions, 
“Traditionalist Approaches,” 96-104.  
815 With one case each from the Burma and Sindh High Courts: Khalila Rahman v. Marian Bibi 13 Bur LT 89: 59 IC 804 
and Hafizan v. Saidino AIR 1925 Sind 22: 86 IC 301. Ghose, Lawyer’s Anglo-Muhammadan Law (1935), 259. 
816 Ghose, Lawyer’s Anglo-Muhammadan Law, 259. Ghose provided two cases where Ameer Ali’s position was accepted:  
Khalila Rahman v. Marian Bibi 13 Bur LT 89: 59 IC 804 (footnote t) and Hafizan v. Saidino AIR 1925 Sind 22=86 IC 301 
(footnote u). The case that rejected the ground of inability to maintain for divorce was Asmati Bibi v. Saimuddi Pathan AIR 
1925 Cal 533: 79 IC 991 (footnote v). For this rule, Saksena, Muslim Law as Administered in British India (1937) also gives: 
Hamidulla Khan v. Fakhirjahan Begam 8 OLJ 650: 1922 Oudh 109: 85 IC 452 p. 346, footnote (v).  
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forms the wife could exercise. These were conceived of as divorce under Hanafi law and did not 
require state sanction as a matter of course. Second was de facto separation. Third was the 
controversial route of divorce-by-apostasy. In the context of religious competition apostasy attracted 
outsize attention.817 Fourth was the similarly difficult route of turning to the British courts for a 
judicial decree of divorce on limited grounds. This drew on the Courts’ equity jurisdiction. Because 
most forms of marital redress did not require state sanction it is difficult to determine how often 
each of the forms described above were used relative to each other; given its ease, it seems likely 
informal separation ranked first.818 
Prior to the Dissolution Act, Hanafi law and the law of the British courts were pitched 
against the wife, though some forms of marital redress for her were possible. Approaching courts 
required social and financial resources, the more so when the husband could appeal all the way to 
the High Court. Based on the evidence of the UP High Courts, the DMMA made it easier for wives 
to obtain divorces by substantially clarifying and expanding the numerous grounds on which they 
could petition. The difficulties women faced in getting a divorce on their own initiative and the 
specter of this driving Muslim wives to apostasy drove the DMMA’s adoption in 1939. Yet once 
enacted, the DMMA’s structure of decisions in cruelty cases did not differ much from those cases 
presented in other chapters. The courts did not wholesale condemn physical violence and they 
continued to weigh heavily social crimes like false accusation of adultery.  
 
Cruelty Under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
817 Minault, “Women,” 7. 
818For example, talak relied on the husband’s speaking of certain words in ritually prescribed manner to effect a divorce. 
As Ghose’s treatise noted, “A dissolution of marriage being such an easy affair for the husband, it is seldom necessary 
for him to resort to a divorce suit [in the British courts];…” Lawyers’ Anglo-Mahomedan Law (1935), 239 at footnote (j), 
relying on Kulsambi v. Abdur Kadir, 45 Bom., 151: 22 Bom. L.R. 1142: 59 IC 433 for the point that “the Court declined to 
make a decree inasmuch as the husband had his remedy by divorce.”   
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From several points of view, the DMMA was a major success: it was simple and clear, it has 
endured in three different countries, it benefitted wives, and it represented a political and religious 
victory for Muslims in India.819 The Act replaced the judicial divorce and divorce by apostasy 
described above with a clarified and consolidated statute. The new Act was significant both for the 
development of cruelty jurisprudence in Indian law and for its impact on the internal development 
of Anglo-Muhammadan law. 
The Act’s scope was wide: it included nine grounds for divorce, listed in Chart 5.1. The last 
two of these grounds—cruelty and the savings provision—indicate its broad and sweeping nature. 
The savings provision preserved all prior existing grounds for divorce “recognized valid under 
Muslim law” and, as previously discussed, there were several available to the wife such as khula, 
mubarat, and laan. The option of puberty was preserved in a separate sub-section.820  
The cruelty ground was further divided into six categories covering a wide range of 
behaviors.821 These were (see also Chart 5.1):  
a) husband habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable even if such conduct does 
not amount to physical ill-treatment 
b) associates with women of evil repute or leads an infamous life 
c) attempts to force wife to lead an immoral life 
d) disposes of her property or prevents her exercising her legal rights over it 
e) obstructs her in observance of religious practice  
f)  does not treat wives equally if he has more than one 
Wives and their lawyers used the DMMA to apply for marriage dissolutions.822 Between 1939 
and 1955, the two High Courts in the United Provinces heard and reported eight appeals under the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
819 Minault, “Women,” 8; De, “Mumtaz Bibi’s Broken Heart,” 106.   
820 In section 2.vii with the age of puberty listed as 15.  
821 DMMA 1939, s. 2(viii).  
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DMMA.823 These suits used the new grounds for dissolution discussed above, especially the cruelty 
ground (s. 2(viii)), the ground of failure to maintain (s.2(ii)), and the broad savings provision.  
Lower courts’ decisions usually, though not always, favored wives. In six of the eight 
reported appeals, wives won their suits for dissolution. Of the six successful wives’ suits, three 
centered on physical violence and marital cruelty and three suits centered on false accusations of 
adultery, laan. Cruelty was broadly defined and in line with its roots in equity courts were granted 
wide powers of discretion, especially in judging the husband’s intentions.  
 
The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act before the High Courts 
 In the first suit under the DMMA in 1944, the wife, Badrunissa Bibi, won her suit for the 
return of prompt dower but lost her suit for dissolution.824 This decision juxtaposed the wife’s prior 
legal strategy of making dower claims with the new availability of dissolution. The decision left her 
in an ambiguous position. The Court’s decision rested in the common law principle that neither the 
husband nor the wife should be able to take advantage of his or her own wrongs, and in this case, 
Badrunissa was the guilty party because she left her husband’s home.825 It granted her dower because 
the marriage had clearly broken down, the husband remarried, and the Court likely thought she 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
822 Such cases followed a standard process. They were heard in a local level court, sometimes called the court of first 
instance or the trial court. The losing litigant could then appeal to the Civil Judge of the District. This Judge could 
examine both the law and evidence and reach a different outcome than the court of first instance. This was usually called 
the First Appeal. If the losing litigant had the means and will, he or she could pursue an appeal to the High Court, where 
it would be heard by a single Justice bench. This was called the Second Appeal. Here the High Court was confined to the 
legal questions and could not directly examine the evidence. put forward in the two lower courts. This is where most 
suits ended but under certain conditions there was a final right of appeal, the right of letters patent. 
823 More precisely, the reporters for these two High Courts published eight judgments on the DMMA between 1939 and 
1955.   
824 Badrunissa Bibi v. Syed Mohammed Yusuf, AIR 1944 All 23. 
825 DMMA sections 2(ii); 2(iv); 2(viii)(a, d, or f). Badrunissa Bibi v. Syed Mohammed Yusuf, AIR 1944 All 23. This case was 
briefly discussed in Jamil, Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage (1946), supp. p. 7, for the point that if the wife leaves her 
husband’s home she cannot obtain a dissolution “for that will be giving her a benefit arising from her own wrongful 
acts.” R.B. Sethi, Muslim Marriage and Its Dissolution (Allahabad: Law Book Co., 1955), 93-6 discusses the case as well. 
Sethi glossed the case this way: “Where a wife either of her own accord or out of misguided love for her parent’s [sic] 
fails to go to the husband’s place and the husband getting disgusted with the attitude adopted by the wife and their 
parent marries a second time, the first wife cannot seek dissolution of marriage on the ground that she has not been 
treated equitably. In fact the husband has had no chance to treat her at all, either equitably or inequitably.” (118-19).  
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deserved some compensation for the substantial amount of dower involved.826 However, the Court 
did not make full use of the DMMA, instead denying Badrunissa’s dissolution because she had failed 
to remain with her husband. 
 In Sofia Begum (1947), the Allahabad High Court was convinced of the husband’s cruelty to 
his wife and granted her dissolution suit.827 The High Court’s decision criticized the lower court for 
deciding against the wife when the evidence of cruelty was clear. It rejected the husband’s argument 
that violence against his wife was only simple chastisement and did not rise to the standard of 
habitual cruelty. It also rejected the argument that such chastisement was acceptable under the 
DMMA. The decision pointed out that the DMMA considerably “enlarged” the wife’s rights.828 
Nevertheless, the Court also noted in dicta that “a few slaps administered gently by a loving husband 
to a beloved wife” did not constitute marital cruelty.829 The Court found for the wife but it avoided 
finding that all violence within marriage created a ground for divorce. The violence in this case was 
seen to be egregious or exceptional; the routine violence that the Justice seemed to assume 
accompanied many marriages was granted some legal space.  
The third case, also reported in 1947, Shamim Fatma showed how RCR continued to play a 
significant role even after the DMMA. Shamim Fatma occupied a position of higher legal authority 
than the other decisions discussed here. This was an appeal to a two-Justice Division Bench from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
826 “Prompt dower” refers to mehr, which is an amount of property or money stipulated in the Islamic marriage contract. 
There are two kinds of mehr, prompt and deferred. Prompt dower is given to the wife at the time of marriage. Sylvia 
Vatuk, “Moving Courts: Muslim Women and Personal Law,” in The Diversity of Muslim Women's Lives in India, ed. Zoya 
Hasan and Ritu Menon (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 29-30; Lucy Carroll, “The Muslim Family 
Laws Ordinance, 1961: Provisions and Procedures—A Reference Paper for Current Research,” Contributions to Indian 
Sociology, n.s. 13, no. 1 (1979): 138-9. 
827 Mt. Sofia Begum v. Syed Zaheer Hasan Rizvi, 1947 AIR All 16. In D.F. Mulla and Sir Syed Sultan Ahmedseth, Principles of 
Muhammadan Law, 13th ed. (Calcutta: Eastern Publishing House, 1950) this case was cited for the point that cruelty was a 
good ground for refusal of restitution of conjugal rights. The same footnote for this point cited a long line of cases that 
began with Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsoonnissa Begum (1867) 11 MIA 551 at 615; Meherally v. Sakerkhanoobai (1905) 7 
Bom LR 602 at 608; Husaini Begam v. Muhammad (1907) 29 All 222; Hamid Husain v. Kubra Begam (1918) 40 All 332, 44 IC 
728; Benu Meah v. Begummah Bibi 33 A.R. 322 and the Sofia Begum case. See footnote (m) pp. 246-7. The case is also briefly 
discussed in Sethi, Muslim Marriage and Its Dissolution (1955) on pages 85 and 113.  
828 Mt. Sofia Befum v. Syed Zaheer Hasan Rizvi, AIR 1947 All 16, para. 17.  
829 Ibid. 
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the decision of a single Justice bench. While the High Court possibly intended this decision to clarify 
the position of the DMMA in Uttar Pradesh, it was not cited or discussed in any of the legal treatises 
I have examined.830 The two lower civil courts found in favor of the wife: she could obtain 
dissolution on the ground of her husband’s cruelty. A single Justice ruled in favor of the husband. 
His wife then appealed to a two-Justice Division Bench. The wife lost her case because the Court 
was barred by res judicata from the examination of her evidence of cruelty against her husband.831 
From a legal point of view, the most important part of the High Court’s decision was its emphasis 
on respecting the previous RCR case decided by the two lower courts.832 The Court couched its 
decision against the wife as one it had no choice but to make. As long as the RCR suit had already 
been decided against the wife, the Court could not look into the evidence of the husband’s cruelty.  
Defeated on that point, the wife’s second major argument was that she was entitled to 
dissolution on ground of the husband’s failure to maintain. This ground was the same ground used 
in the Badrunissa suit.833 The wife’s lawyers argued that a husband had an obligation to maintain his 
wife “even if she refuses her husband’s company.” The wife still had an “absolute right to 
maintenance” and in its absence good ground for dissolution.834  
The High Court also found this an untenable position. It would have allowed a wife to take 
advantage of her own wrongdoings. This was anathema to equitable considerations of marital rights 
and wrongs. The decision reminded its readers, “It must be remembered that the wife is not entitled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
830 Tyabji, Muhammadan Law (1940), Jamil, Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage in Muslim Law (1946), Mulla, Principles of 
Muhammadan Law (1950), Sethi, Muslim Marriage and Its Dissolution (1955), Ali, Mahommedan Law (1965).  
831 Mt. Shamim Fatma v. Ahmad Ullah Khan, AIR 1947 All 3.  
832 The decision did not specify which two lower courts or the dates of the decisions. This Second Appeal case no was 
SA No. 1236 of 1943, dated November 1, 1945.  Mt. Shamim Fatma v. Ahmad Ullah Khan, AIR 1947 All 3.  
833 Bardunissa Bibi v. Syed Mohammed Yusuf, AIR 1944 All 23.  
834 Sethi, Muslim Marriage (1955), 119, discussed Bardunissa under the husband’s obligations to provide maintenance to the 
wife under DMMA 2(ii). He discussed it along with Jamila Khatun v. Kasim Ali Abas Ali 1951 Nag 375 and Mt. Khatijan v. 
Abulla ILR 1942 Kar 535:1943 Sind 65. His discussion of these three cases and others noted the Courts’ findings that the 
husband was only required to maintain his wife up to the requirements of Muslim law but not “absolutely.” A more 
liberal decision of Lahore in 1942 was overturned three years later in favor of the position outlined here in Zaffar Husain 
v. Mt Akbari Begum (ILR (1945) Lah 517: 1944 Lah 336).   
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to a decree for dissolution unless there is a failure on the husband’s part. The Act does not mean 
that the husband is bound to follow his wife wherever she may go and force money or food or 
clothes upon her.”835 The husband’s earlier success in getting RCR against his wife further indicated 
his readiness to maintain her at his home; thus, he won his appeal. The decision’s comments indicate 
close association of the husband’s location with the matrimonial home, and the matrimonial home 
with the husband’s will. The earlier decision against the wife limited her ability to get a dissolution. 
In the Sofia Begum case from 1947, M.A. Kazmi appeared for the wife and won. In the 1953 
case of Fakharuddin v. Mt. Hamidan836 Kazmi appeared for the husband and lost.837 Kazmi had 
originally authored and introduced the DMMA in the Legislative Assembly.838 That he appeared for 
both a husband and wife, and that the mover of the DMMA could lose a case under it, indicates 
how different the lawyer’s practice was from the politician’s. In the arena of keen competition for 
legal briefs, especially at the start of one’s career, paid briefs likely trumped politics as a 
consideration in whether or not to take a case. By the time one reached the end of a long career like 
Kazmi’s, motivations were likely more varied. Kazmi’s position as counsel to both husband and 
wife—as well as his important role in getting the Act passed—serve as a useful reminder of the 
differences between legal and political practice in mid-twentieth century India. 
Against Kazmi’s arguments that the wife was in the wrong—she had left the husband--
Justices Agarwala and Mukerji upheld a concept akin to constructive desertion.839 This idea of 
desertion did not involve the location of matrimonial home per se. Rather it looked at the behaviors 
of the husband in their social context to understand whether he deserted his wife or not. In this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
835 Mt. Shamim Fatma v. Ahmad Ullah Khan, AIR 1947 All 3 at 4.  
836 Fakharuddin v. Mt. Hamidan, AIR 1953 All 571. Discussed briefly in Sethi, Muslim Marriage (1955), 87 and R.B. Sethi, 
Muslim Marriage and Its Dissolution, 2nd ed. (Allahabad: Law Book Co., 1961), 145. Also in K.N. Ahmed, A Commentary on 
the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (Karachi: Legal Publications, 1955), 28 under the heading “constructive desertion.” 
837 Kazmi served in the Central Legislative Assembly from 1934-45. He then returned to national service from 1949-50 
as a member of the Constituent Assembly. When he took briefs in Sofia Begum (1947) and Fakharuddin (1953), therefore, 
Kazmi’s primary occupation was likely practicing in the High Courts. 
838 Minault, “Women,” 7; De, “Mumtaz Bibi,” 120.  
839 The case is discussed under the heading “constructive desertion” in Ahmed, Commentary, 28. 
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case, the Court allowed dissolution to a wife whose husband did not invite her to return from a visit 
to her natal family. Instead of locating the matrimonial home with the husband, this decision put 
forward an idea of social desertion, wherein the husband left his marital duties unfulfilled. This 
failure gave a good ground to the wife to dissolve the marriage. Although she originally lost before 
the Munsif, she won her appeals before the Civil Judge and the High Court.840  
 While the DMMA provided wives many grounds for divorce, there were also some 
limitations. Badrunissa (1944) indicated that wives who did not remain with their husbands could not 
come bona fide or with clean hands to the Court. But, if the husband egregiously violated a social 
expectation as in Fakharuddin v. Mt. Hamidan (1953), a two-justice bench saw fit to accept this as his 
failure and granted a dissolution to the wife. Sofia Begum (1947) made it clear that extreme violence of 
the sort found in that case was unacceptable, but left open the question of the validity of simple 
chastisement. Shamim Fatma (1947) made it clear that courts could not revisit earlier decisions about 
cruelty. Lower courts’ findings on restitution of conjugal rights were barred by res judicata from 
further examination in dissolution suits. Moreover, wives did not have an absolute right to 
maintenance. The High Courts disapproved of egregious violence and legal harassment but insisted 
that, in general, the wife had an obligation to remain with her husband. 
 
Marital Defamation Under Anglo-Muhammadan and English Law 
 Along with apostasy, laan proved to be a useful remedy for wives in British India during the 
1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Laan allowed wives redress for the husband’s false accusations of adultery. 
Like apostasy, the use of laan in this way was recent, drawn from Hanafi law but developed in the 
British Indian Courts. Laan drew on a different dimension of publicity than the wife’s act of 
apostasy—the husband’s use of criminal charges under the Penal Code to slander the wife. Criminal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
840 According to the case history provided in Fakharuddin v. Mt. Hamidan, AIR 1953 All 571, para. 2. 
      261 
charges gave charlatan husbands of all communities an ultimate weapon and a public forum in 
which to humiliate their wives. The Courts took a strict view against such behavior and in each of 
the three cases decided in favor of the wife. After the DMMA, laan was still valid under the savings 
provision, but a 1952 decision showed how the Act’s broad definition of cruelty made the strict use 
of laan unnecessary. These husbands’ tactics were no different than Ram Bharosey’s. Whether via 
claims of equity jurisdiction as in that case, or within the procedure of laan, as in the cases discussed 
here, the UP High Courts adjudged legal harassment as a form of cruelty and afflicted wives 
deserving of dissolution. 
 What exactly is laan? As the treatise writers saw it, laan represented an opportunity for a wife 
and husband to settle a husband’s accusation of adultery against the wife. The most succinct 
explanation probably comes from Justice Knox’s opinion in Zafar Husain in 1919:841  
…[W]hen a Mahomedan makes an allegation against his wife and the wife denies the same, 
both parties can go to the Kazi. The husband, in the presence of the Kazi, four times over 
repeats his allegation of misconduct before the Kazi, strengthens it by an oath, that oath 
being accompanied by the use of the word ‘laan’ or curse of God. The wife gives testimony 
also four times over and accompanies her testimony by the use of the word ‘ghazab.’ If 
either of the persons refuse to make laan the Kazi is to imprison that person who refuses 
until he or she makes the laan. If both husband and wife have made their respective oaths, 
etc., the Kazi can effect separation between them.842 
 
This was the formal procedure of laan. The 1919 decision confirmed that laan was a remedy available 
to Muslim wives in British India. Under the prevailing legal fiction, the British courts acted as the 
Kazis. Since they could not imprison the husband, just like in cases of apostasy, the courts granted 
judicial divorces instead. Once that was established, husbands’ legal defenses changed from denying 
the validity of laan to claiming that the accusations were validly retracted so that the courts should 
not grant a separation to the wife. In so doing, the husband gained another opportunity to repeat his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
841 Zafar Husain v. Umaat-ur-Rahman, AIR 1919 All 182. Asaf A.A. Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law (Calcutta: Oxford 
University Press, 1949), 143, is also useful.   
842 Ibid. 
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accusations. In her turn, even if the husband retracted his allegations, the wife retained the ability to 
make a criminal charge of defamation against him.843  
 Laan only took off as a legal strategy for wives to gain divorces from 1919 onwards with the 
Zafar Husain ruling.844 There seems to have been only one nineteenth-century case.845 In this way laan 
in the British Indian courts seems similar to the apostasy argument in that it also only gained 
popularity in the 1920s. Zafar Husain may have represented an increase in wives’ use of this legal 
strategy to obtain divorces in the courts or it may have prompted the development of such a 
trend.846 
In England, sexual slander was dealt with by the Ecclesiastical courts until 1855. However, 
Ecclesiastical cases did not usually involve a husband’s accusation against his own wife. Waddams’s 
study of Ecclesiastical decisions found only one example of a suit by a wife against her husband.847 
From 1855, when Ecclesiastical jurisdiction over sexual slander was abolished, until 1891 sexual 
slander was not legally actionable at all. In 1891, Parliament enacted the Slander of Women Act, “the 
effect of which was to permit a woman to bring an action at common law for words imputing 
unchastity, without proof of special damage.”848 Because the action lay at common law and not at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
843 Section 500, IPC. Ghose, Lawyer’s Anglo-Muhammadan Law, 1935 p. 255. 
844 The 1894 and 1917 editions of Ameer Ali’s treatises did not discuss any judicial decisions, instead relying on textual 
sources: Fatawa Alamgiri; M. Sautayra; Fatawa Kazi Khan; Fusul Imadiya; Sharaya; Kitab ul Anwar; D’Ohsson, vol. III; 
Bishop On the Law of Marriage and Divorce; Jamaa-ush-Shittat; Irshad Allamah; Sharaya. See Ali, Mahommedan Law, 4th 
ed. and Ameer Ali, Mahommedan law: compiled from authorities in the original Arabic, 2nd ed. (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co., 
1894).  
845 [1865] 3 WR [Weekly Reporter] 93, see Ghose, Lawyer’s Anglo-Muhammadan Law, 254. Spelled in the original decision as 
Jaun Beebee vs. Sheikh Moonshee Beparee. 
846 The apparent recent development of the use of this device could have many possible causes that require independent 
substantiation. For example, did a change in jurisdiction make this a more appealing strategy? Did the number of 
husbands and wives wanting divorces increase for some reason, perhaps because it was less taboo option in the late 
1920s than in the 1880s? Had there always been a large group of Muslim litigants requiring divorce but lacking the 
means to pursue these in the British Indian courts, and, now, in the 1920s these means were more readily available? All 
we can say from the limited evidence here is that the High Courts were more likely to address such cases in the 1920s 
than in the 1880s. 
847 S. M. Waddams, Sexual Slander in the Nineteenth-Century England: Defamation in the Ecclesiastical Courts, 1815-1855 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 29-30. In that case, the suit was dismissed because the facts did not fit the 
complaint. The husband’s friend, not the husband, was sued by the wife, but the words were found to be uttered by the 
husband.  
848 Waddams, Sexual Slander, 187.  
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Ecclesiastical law, it was more expensive. Notably, men were now excluded from bringing action. 
And, unlike the pre-1855 Ecclesiastical law, truth was a good defense at common law. In Waddams’s 
estimation, these changes and others made it more difficult for women to bring sexual slander suits 
in common law courts than it had been in the Ecclesiastical courts.849 Apparently under the 1891 
statute the wife could sue her husband for sexual slander.850851 
In India, the only reported nineteenth century case involving laan found the husband’s 
charge of adultery did not provide a good ground for divorce. Even there, the husband’s accusations 
were not really at the crux of the case — he lost because of his failure to pay the wife’s dower. The 
issue of his treatment of the wife (“the allegation of torment by plaintiff and his second wife”) 
required re-examination by the lower courts and so the suit was returned there.852 It was Zafar Husain 
in 1919 that made it clear that the wife could get relief on grounds of the husband’s false accusation 
of adultery. Zafar Hussain set the rule that the Court would “strictly construe” the husband’s 
retraction, meaning it would subject the husband’s retraction to high standards.853 In practice, this 
would allow decisions in favor of wives without abolishing laan entirely. Faiz Hassan Badruddin 
Tyabji’s narrative emphasized that it was the first edition of his 1913 treatise (The Personal Law of 
Muslims) that proposed an actual procedure for laan using the Oaths Act of 1873.854 
After the DMMA came into effect, the Uttar Pradesh High Courts continued to decide cases 
on laan. Specifically, three were reported between 1939 and 1952. Each wife claimed divorce on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
849 Another problem noted by Waddams was that “…her prior reputation was relevant to damages, and, as the common 
law of defamation then stood, prior sexual misconduct could be proved for that purpose.” Ibid., 188.  
850 Would this kind of sexual slander provide good ground for divorce? And, could wives bring defamation suits against 
their husbands?  
851 In 1832, an Ecclesiastical reform commission recommended creating a sexual slander crime but this was not adopted. 
Waddams, Sexual Slander, 189.  
852 1865 WR 93. Civil Courts of Kamroop.  
853 After Zafar Husain, one important resulting legal question was how, exactly, to adjudicate the husband’s retraction 
under different circumstances. Apparently the High Courts differed in their views although the Oudh Chief Court 
allowed a husband’s retraction in Fakrhe Jahan Begum v. Hamidulla Khan. Tyabji, Muhammadan Law, 241 n. 12, discussion of 
husband’s option of retraction.   
854 Tyabji, Muhammadan Law, 243 s. 194: “The procedure suggested in that work has since been followed by the Courts.” 
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ground of the husband’s false accusation of adultery. Each husband put forward evidence of his 
retraction of the accusation as good reason to deny the divorce. Each of the three High Court 
benches found in favor of the wives.855 
That the Courts disallowed husbands’ retractions and granted wives’ dissolutions is in line 
with Tyabji’s description of how the courts arrogated to themselves the jurisdiction to intervene in 
favor of wives in general.856 Tyabji read this general trend and the specific way the law of laan had 
developed as of a piece with each other. If the husband refused to take any action in the case of 
laan—neither taking the oath nor giving proof of his accusation against the wife—Tyabji argued that 
“the Court would then be authorized to dissolve the marriage on the ground of justice, equity, and 
good conscience.”857 He justified this by pointing out that, even prior to the DMMA, the Courts 
gave “declaratory decrees” dissolving Muslim marriages on a variety of other grounds such as the 
false accusation of adultery, cruelty, desertion, and the husband’s disappearance.858 Tyabji argued 
also that the British Indian Courts should consider dissolving a marriage even when the wife was 
guilty of adultery, suggesting, “It [the Court] may be of opinion that no useful object is served by 
keeping undutiful wife tied to dissatisfied husband.”859 Tyabji’s discussion also indicated that the 
Evidence Act superseded any pre-Evidence Act “Muslim law of evidence.”860 He suggested that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
855 Ibid.,, 241 n. 12 E(b) 1928 4 Luck 168.  
856 Tyabji showed the five “stepping stones” used by the British courts to make lian work for wives: first the idea that the 
husband’s imputation of adultery gave the wife a right to divorce; second that the husband’s retraction had to meet 
certain strict requirements; third that the husband did not have to be given an “express opportunity of retraction”; 
fourth that “compliance with formalities held unnecessary,” a reference to the required series of oaths and counter-
oaths, and fifth, that the husband’s retraction had to come during the hearing and not upon appeal. This last issue had 
been at the heart of the husband’s case in the 1927 Fakhre Jegan Begum wherein the Oudh Court thought the husband 
acted in good faith in retracting his statements and therefore the marriage was not dissolved. Ibid., 241-3, s. 193.  
857 Ibid., 243, para. 194. Specifically Tyabji gave the following analysis: “It was said in earlier edition: “if necessary, Court 
will no doubt call in aid maxim: boni juicis est ampliare jurisdictionem, & also reasoning similar to that in Vadaka Vitil Ismail v. 
Odaket Birjakutti Umah (1881) 3 Mad 347.” This has since happened: see s. 210A. Proceedings of like nature not 
unknown in Eng.: William v. Innes (1808) 1 Camp. 364; Daniel Pitt, ibid. 366 n.t. Lloyd v. Willan (1794) 1 Esp. 178; Price v. 
Hollis (1813) 1 M& S 105.” 
858 Tyabji, Muhammadan Law, 249-50, para 210A and footnotes 5 and 6. 
859 Ibid., 242-3, n. 21.  
860 Ibid., 241-2 n. 14.  
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husband could attempt to block the dissolution by proving his charge under the terms of the 
Evidence Act. 
Like Tyabji, Kashi Prasad Saksena critiqued Anglo-Muahmmadan law in his 1937 treatise, 
published from Lucknow. Laan was one of the seven topics treated in Saksena’s section on 
“Decisions of Doubtful Authority by the British Indian Courts.”861 Mulla’s treatise—authored by 
George Rankin862—seemed to agree with this point though it lacked the extensive editorializing of 
Saksensa’s treatment.  
After the DMMA, the High Courts continued to emphasize that the husband had limited 
rights of retraction. Between 1939 and 1955, the UP High Courts heard three cases. The first, Banno 
Begum, set a requirement for the husband to act bona fide in his retraction. The Kalloo case established 
that the DMMA did not allow the husband to retract at all. The 1952 Abbas Ali decision allowed 
husband’s criminal charges against the wife to be brought under the DMMA’s category of cruelty. 
This indicated that the cruelty category was quite broad; it obviated the need to enter into the 
intricacies of the procedure of laan.  
 In Banno Begum the husband criminally charged his wife’s alleged adulterer. Banno Begum, 
his wife, claimed this was a false accusation of adultery and good ground for divorce under the 
DMMA. The husband criminally accused one Chhotey of “keep[ing] my wife as his own wife.”863 
Later the husband recanted this accusation in order to ward off his wife’s maintenance claim. But 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
861 The others were legitimacy, batil and fasid marriages, remission of dower, option of puberty, equality [of marriage], 
and alienation by a de facto guardian. According to Saksena, the British Indian courts had “been led away by the idea of 
false accusation” when in fact “according to the Muslim system of jurisprudence, it matters little whether the accusation 
is false or true, the important point being the taking of the prescribed oaths of li’an.” He argued that the British Indian 
courts were concerned with the question of false accusation of adultery and the husband’s retraction of such a false charge but 
the real concern of laan was the sacral oaths. Saksensa took this confusion seriously and concluded his section on this 
topic by stating that because li’an effected legitimacy and dower it “should be treated as part of the Anglo-Muslim Law 
and all its provisions be fully enforced.” Saksensa, 60. Saksena’s fn. I points to Dr. M.U.S. Jang’s dissertation “The 
Muslim Law of Li’an.” I have not attempted to trace this text or figure.  
862 D. F. Mulla and George C. Rankin, Principles of Muhammadan Law, 11th ed. (Calcutta: The Eastern Law House, 1938), 
241.  
863 Quoted in Banno Begum v. Inayat Hussain, AIR 1948 All 34 at 35.  
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the Justice set a high standard for the Court to accept the husband’s retraction. His standard 
included such benchmarks as “honest admission that the accusation was false,”864 “genuine or 
honest” withdrawal that would result in a “vindication of the honour of the wife,”865 or a “frank 
withdrawal of the charge.”866  Here the husband acted mala fide and the wife got her dissolution. In 
this case, the key legal issue was the procedure of laan: its existence as well as the high standard for 
the husband’s recantations, both validated by Zafar Hussain in 1919.  
Decided the following year, Kallo v. Mt. Imamam867 addressed in more specific detail the 
position of a husband’s retraction under the DMMA. The single-Justice bench found that the 
DMMA entirely did away with the husband’s right of retraction under laan. As in the previous case, 
the husband accused the wife of adultery, and then waited until she sued for dissolution to retract 
his accusation. She lost her suit before the trial court because it deemed her husband’s retraction 
sufficient.868 But on appeal, first the Civil Judge in Orai and then the High Court found for the wife.  
The husband’s appeal before the High Court turned on the savings provision of the DMMA, 
which allowed dissolution on “any other ground which is recognized as valid…under Muslim 
law.”869 The husband’s lawyer argued the savings provision included the entire procedure of laan 
“even as regards retraction.” In other words, the full procedure of laan was still intact and a husband 
who retracted did not have to succumb to the wife’s divorce suit.870 Banno Begum had not engaged 
this second question, instead finding the husband’s retraction invalid.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
864 Ibid., 36, para 8.  
865 Ibid., 36, para. 10. 
866 Ibid., 36, para. 11.  
867 Kalloo v. Mt. Imamam, AIR 1949 All 445 at 447-8 para 10 and 14.  
868 The trial court found that the husband’s retraction was valid because an accusing husband had “locus penitentia either to 
affirm or deny the imputation alleged to have been made by him” until the taking of evidence in the dissolution suit was 
closed. In other words, the husband had a long timeframe—until the closing of evidence-taking in the dissolution suit—
to withdraw his retraction. As the High Court later noted, a 1943 Peshawar case also reached this conclusion: Mian Said 
Ahmad Jan v. Mt. Sullan Bibi, AIR 1943 Pesh 73. This is discussed in paras. 3 and 13 Kalloo v. Mt. Imamam, AIR 1949 All 
445. In other words, according to the Civil Judge, the DMMA took over the entire field of Muslim marriage dissolution 
in India; previous substantive remedies or procedures were now only valid if included in the DMMA. 
869 The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, s. 2(ix).  
870 Kalloo v. Mt. Imamam, AIR 1949 All 446, para 4 
      267 
In Kallo v. Mt. Imamam,871 Justice Ahmed reasoned “[t]he formality of laan, if strictly 
observed, embraces a number of declarations which appear to have been deemed as too artificial in 
modern society, and that is why we find no provision in our statute as preserving any of those 
rules.”872 While the overall position is similar to Tyabji’s, the specific terminology of the mismatch 
between oaths and the modern society seem to have been Justice Ahmed’s own.873 He neatly skirted 
around the issue of laan by reclassifying the husband’s multiple charges of criminal behavior not as a 
“false accusation of adultery” but rather as legal cruelty.  
In Justice Ahmed’s analysis, the DMMA neglected to provide a procedure for retraction by 
the husband. But, the implication of this fact was not that all retractions were valid, as the husband 
would have it. Instead, it indicated that the legislature did not intend to provide for the husband’s 
retraction at all.  The nineteenth-century Indian Evidence Act had already “preempted Muslim rules 
of procedure.”874 The Evidence Act was a “complete enactment,” with the DMMA coming decades 
later to fill in certain gaps.  Supporters of the DMMA’s reforms like Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanavi 
might have disagreed with this interpretation of the place of Muslim procedure in British India 
because it suggested Hanafi law was largely invalid. Ahmed’s judicial reasoning, however, supported 
the wife’s case and the soundness of her authorities. Significantly this was later rejected in 1962 (as 
discussed in the next chapter).875 
After the 1950 Constitution, Abbas Ali was the first published decision involving laan. Justice 
Bhargava entirely avoided laan by reclassifying the husband’s multiple criminal charges directly as 
cruelty under the DMMA. Cruelty was broadly interpreted to include the husband’s legal 
harassment. In this case, the husband’s behavior was extreme, extending to seventeen criminal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
871 Ibid., All 445 at 447-8, para 10 and 14.  
872 Ibid.  
873 Specifically Tyabji stated “inter-mixture of adjective & substantive law may be too close to admit of proof of infidelity 
in any other mode than in compliance with the strict requirements of Islamic law of evidence; but whether this is so, 
must surely be adjudicated upon by the Courts as matter of law.” Tyajbi Muhammadan Law, 241-2 n. 14.  
874 Kalloo v. Mt. Imamam, AIR 1949 All 445 at 447-8, para.12. 
875 Tufail Ahmed v. Jamila Khatun, AIR 1962 All 570.  
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charges against the wife including charges under Indian Penal Code s. 494  (bigamy) and 497 
(adultery). He claimed that as he withdrew these charges, this constituted a valid retraction and 
therefore his wife’s dissolution suit should be denied.  
Given the husband’s egregious behavior, the High Court unsurprisingly rejected this 
argument. Specifically, Justice Bhargava wrote, “The act of bringing a criminal complaint in Court 
against a wife and dragging her into Court as an accused can be considered as a circumstance 
constituting legal cruelty irrespective of the nature of the criminal complaint.”876 Therefore an 
extended discussion of l’aan was not necessary as the husband’s behavior was clearly cruel. Justice 
Bhargava stated this rule should apply to other cases: “In all such cases, the fact of bringing a 
criminal complaint and dragging the wife into Court as an accused can still be considered for the 
purpose of holding whether the life of the wife has been made miserable by the husband or not.”877 
In contrast to the pre-Constitution cases, this decision did not cite any other precedents - only the 
DMMA.878 The Justice neatly skirted the issue of laan by reclassifying the husband’s excessive 
charges of criminal behavior not as a “false accusation of adultery” but rather as legal cruelty in 
itself. Notably, this decision was very similar to Ram Bharosey’s case. The husband’s criminal 
charges indicated his mala fide intentions and constituted cruelty in themselves.  
The High Courts decided for the wives in all three of the appeals involving a husband’s false 
accusation of adultery. This indicates their dim view of such public attacks on wives’ honor and of 
husbands’ continued harassment. The High Court pursued a different line of reasoning in each of 
the three appeals. The last decision examined here suggested that laan was no longer relevant with 
the DMMA’s passage. The contortions undergone to preserve this remedy no longer mattered and 
in Abbas Ali a husband’s legal harassment was deemed cruelty. But whether examined under a sort 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
876 Abbas Ali v. Mt. Rabia Bibi, AIR 1952 All 145, para 4.  
877 Ibid. 
878 Ibid. 
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of UP common law as in Ram Bharosey, the Anglo-Muhammadan law of laan, or the DMMA’s cruelty 
provision, public accusations against the wife counteracted husbands’ legal vindictiveness and barred 
him from his desired legal relief. 
 
Representativeness 
As already noted, the High Court cases examined in these chapters were significant as 
statements of law by the highest courts but were, by their very nature, unrepresentative. Only 
appeals that raised thorny points of law would be heard by the High Courts and only significant 
decisions on those legal questions would be published in the All India Reporters. Without a thorough 
sample and survey of lower court matrimonial litigation, it is difficult to state the extent to which the 
cases presented here represent litigation in the lower courts in the same period. And, even if such a 
survey were carried out, it would likely not provide much insight into how the vast majority of 
couples resolved matrimonial disputes using informal or quasi-legal means. Thus this study has not 
purported to reflect the state of marriage in UP but rather to reflect the state’s legal position on 
marriage in the relevant period. That said, a chance find in the UP State Archives allows for some 
analysis of the extent to which the cases presented in this chapter were representative. 
 In 1950, in the Uttar Pradesh State Assembly, Mohammad Asrar Ahmad asked the 
Government of UP how many people had applied for marriage dissolutions and, out of these, how 
many of these went to court and, out of those, how many applications had been made by women 
and how many by men.879 This prompted the state government to write to all District Judges to reply 
with the relevant statistics. Notably, Ahmad did not ask about the religious community of the 
applicants nor did most of the District Judges (hereafter DJs) reply with this information, though a 
few did.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
879 UP State Archives, Judicial (A), File No. 17AQ/50, “Assembly Question No. 28 regarding the “dissolution of 
marriage ties” asked by Shri Mohd. Asrar Ahmad MLA.” 
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Across the state’s twenty-nine districts, 1296 applications for dissolution of marriage were 
filed in 1948 and 1949. Only fifty-one of these were filed by husbands and the other 1245 by wives. 
The Government’s tabulated results showed the various grounds on which such applications were 
filed. There were twelve categories it considered. The first ground contained the most applications 
by a drastic margin: 1109 applications for dissolution were filed on the ground of cruelty, 
misbehavior, and neglect. The second most popular ground was “immorality of husband” with 
forty-eight applications.880 This suggests that wives and their lawyers saw these grounds as the easiest 
way to dissolve a marriage. That they were largely successful should not obscure one of the larger 
points of this dissertation: just because a wife could obtain marital redress on the ground of cruelty, 
courts condemned matrimonial violence wholesale. In many cases, as the High Court cases have 
shown, the category of cruelty was widened to include easily provable offenses such as legal 
harassment or adultery. The forty-one applications by husbands cover the following three grounds: 
immorality of wives (38), refusal to come with the husband (7), and misbehavior by wives (6). For 
this last group, there were six cases, four from Farukkhabad alone. This suggests perhaps a particular 
lawyer met with success with this legal strategy or a particular judge was known for granting 
dissolutions on this ground.  
 Four districts together accounted for 534 of the 1296 applications in toto and for 498 of the 
1245 applications filed by wives: Meerut, Kanpur, Moradabad, and Aligarh. The number of 
husbands in this group is negligible except in Kanpur. Kanpur was unusual because it had a large 
number of cases from husbands compared to other districts—it had twenty-one applications filed by 
husbands all on the ground of the “immorality of wives.” Oddly, a large number of wives in Kanpur 
as well applied for dissolution by accusing their husbands of unnatural offenses—there were forty-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
880 The other potential grounds listed by the Government in its tabulated results were desertion or inability to maintain; 
refusal by woman after attaining majority; insanity; impotency; immorality of wives; refusal to come with husband, etc.; 
misbehavior by wives; of unbecoming features; of committing unnatural offence; leprosy.  
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five such applications on this ground in the whole state in the period with forty-one from Kanpur 
alone and four from Fatehpur district.881  
 Because data were not consistently reported, it is difficult to get a nuanced view of the range 
of actions that the lower courts viewed as cruelty. We can make some observations, however. Again, 
by far most of the applications for dissolution were filed based on the husband’s “cruelty, 
misbehavior, or neglect.” But each district reported its data differently. For example, Basti and 
Barabanki Districts both reported wives filing cases against their husbands “on account of torture” 
(Basti) or because their husbands “neglected them and put them under tortures” (Barabanki). 
Ghazipur used the category of “misbehavior and ill treatment” and Budaun listed the ground as 
“men were of immoral character and used to harass their wives in some way or another.” In 
Saharanpur the parallel category was “cruelty, drunkard, and harsh statement.” The variety of ways 
in which husbands’ behavior was described shows the general constellation of behavior courts and 
litigants deemed unacceptable. It also shows the extent to which judicial discretion operated at the 
local level in adjudging such behavior as well as in deciding how to report it. As such cases made 
their way through the appeals process, the fine-grained details of individual behavior were lumped 
into the larger category of cruelty.  
 Most of the districts did not report whether the applicants won or lost their dissolution suits. 
However, a few districts did report this information. This data was not reported in the tabulated 
results presented by the state government but I was able to cull it from the individual responses that 
each District Judge sent to the state. In Basti District, twelve total applications were reported and 
data on the outcomes of ten of these was given. Of these ten, only three went to a full trial: two 
were decided in favor of the husband and one for the wife. Five were “decided otherwise” (meaning 
perhaps a compromise) and two remained pending. In Kumaun, one Christian wife applied for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
881 Such analyses could continue but my reading of the file suggests that the data are muddied because each district 
categorized their cases differently. 
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dissolution but later withdrew her suit. And in Rampur there were eight suits, of which four were 
pursued to the end by the time of the data reporting. Of these four, a wife won definitively in only 
one case. In two of the remaining three, one suit was dismissed in default; one was decided in favor 
of the husband. Another suit was also dismissed because the judge seemed not to accept the wife’s 
ground that she and her husband were within prohibited degrees of each other. 
  Based on this very limited data, it is possible to surmise that wives filed the vast majority of 
suits but did not always win them. These data would suggest that wives lost in most cases, because in 
those suits for which we know the outcomes, seven total went to trial and wives won only two of 
these. However, if we turn to the four cases from the High Courts studied in the first part of this 
chapter (Sofia Begum, Shamim Fatima, Banno Begum, and Kallo) and examine the record before the 
lowest courts, we see that three wives won their suits. Again acknowledging the limitations of the 
data, it still seems plausible to conclude that wives had better chances of winning than their 
husbands did. And this observation is strongly bolstered by the fact that almost all of the dissolution 
applications were filed by wives, so it seems likely that they and their lawyers thought they had 
reasonable chances of winning, perhaps even better than the limited data above would suggest. 
Perhaps the editors of the Reporters felt a duty to reform Indian society and published decisions that 
provided clear pathways to victories for wives and that condemned husbands’ bad behavior. Yet the 
admittedly limited data here also suggest that if a wife did lose her suit in the trial court, her best 
chance was to appeal it to the High Court, where she had a much better chance of winning. Even 
then, the High Courts did not condemn all marital violence, finding ways to rule in favor of wives 
without fundamentally challenging husbands’ dominion over them. 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter has traced out the development of matrimonial litigation under the DMMA. It 
examined the forms of matrimonial redress available under Anglo-Muslim law prior to the Act and 
then explained how the Act delineated in far greater detail than before the various grounds that 
women could petition for a divorce under Muslim law. It showed how litigants used– and not used -
the new Act: the specific availability of a cruelty provision under which wives could claim divorce 
did not lead to an efflorescence of cruelty litigation. Rather, the pattern of the courts looking at the 
totality of the husband’s behavior and focusing on easily provable offenses such as adultery and laan 
proved to be more effective for wives pursuing divorce. Nonetheless, effectiveness did not 
necessarily translate into guaranteed success: based on my research, women could often lose 
dissolution cases and husbands’ dominant role within the marriage was generally upheld.  
 On the one hand, the DMMA marked the continued religious-ization of Indian marriage 
law. Its delineation of cruelty generally consolidated the ways in which Indian law dealt with marital 
cruelty to that point. The next chapter turns to the 1955 Hindu Marriage Act (HMA), which played a 
similar role for Hindu law. It both codified the law of cruelty in marriage (for Hindus) and marked 
the continued religious-ization of marriage law. Adjudication under each statute was structured by 
the long chains of precedents under several pre-existing bodies of law, including restitution of 
conjugal rights and maintenance law. Adjudication under each statute was uneven, with the new 
statutes’ clarifications no guarantees of wives’ successes in gaining marital redress. The DMMA and 
the HMA marked a to a new era of Indian-legislated, post-British statutes. Sometimes these statutes 
are seen to rest uneasily with India’s Constitution because religiously-differentiated marriages laws 
are viewed as a perceived violation of secular standards. These statutes and others do, in my view, sit 
uneasily with the Constitutional regime. However, this is not so much because of their marking of 
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the female citizen as Hindu or Muslim but because of their marking the citizen as a wife. This 
chapter and the next show that in applying the new Hindu and Muslim statutes, the English model 
of husband-located residence, commitment to preserving the marriage tie, and the husband’s 
physical, social, and sexual rights over his wife structured marriage adjudication in both Hindu and 
Muslim law.  
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 Figure 2. Muslim Marital Redress Before and After the DMMA 1939 
Marital Redress Prior to the DMMA 
 
Husband initiated dissolution 
i) the husband-initiated form of talak 
 
Wife initiated divorces  
ii) mubarat 
iii) khula 
iv) delegated talak 
v) option of puberty 
 
Other forms of redress 
vi) separation and dower claims 
 
Forms specific to late colonial India 
vii) divorce by apostasy 
 





Section 2 of the DMMA 1939:  
Nine grounds for divorce 
 
i. husband not heard from for four years or more 
 
ii. neglect or failure to provide maintenance for two years or more 
 
iii. husband sentenced to imprisonment for seven years or more 
 




vi. insanity for two years or more; leprosy; virulent venereal disease 
 
vii. the wife’s exercise of her option of puberty if she were married prior to age 15 
 
viii. cruelty (see Cruelty under Section 2(viii) below) 
 
ix. a catch-all provision: “on any other ground which is recognized valid under Muslim law” 
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Cruelty under Section 2(viii) 
 
a. husband habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable even if such conduct does not 
amount to physical ill-treatment 
b. associates with women of evil repute or leads an infamous life 
c. attempts to force wife to lead an immoral life 
d. disposes of her property or prevents her exercising her legal rights over it 
e. obstructs her in observance of religious practice  









Matrimonial Litigation after the Hindu Marriage Act 




This chapter examines how courts decided matrimonial disputes in Uttar Pradesh after the 
passing of the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA) in 1955. The Hindu Marriage Act was part of the Hindu 
Code, a series of four statutes enacted in 1955 and 1956. The Code, a package of four laws, sought 
to establish a uniform and comprehensive set of laws related to marriage, divorce, inheritance, 
adoption and maintenance for Hindus.882 “[A]nomalies and uncertainties” resulting from the 1937 
Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act led the Government to appoint the Hindu Law (Rau) 
Committee in 1941. The Rau Committee called for the codification of Hindu law in stages. The first 
proposed bills were published, circulated for opinion and introduced in the Legislative Assembly in 
1942 and 1943.883  Thus began the effort for the codification of Hindu law, which would traverse 
Independence and Partition and lead to Dr. B. R. Ambedkar’s resignation as Law Minister in 1951 
before the Code was passed in 1955. The Hindu Code was passed by the Indian Parliament around 
the same time as the Indian Citizenship Act, discussed in Chapter One. The Hindu Marriage Act 
unequivocal lifted the prohibition on divorce in Hindu personal law. Prior to the HMA, many 
communities could argue that their community allowed divorce under customary law and receive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
882 The Hindu Code includes the Hindu Marriage Act, passed in 1955, and the Hindu Succession Act, the Hindu 
Minority and Guardianship Act, and the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, all passed in 1956.  
883 See Appendix 1, Resolution No. F-208/1/43-C & G in Hindu Law Committee, Report of the Hindu Law Committee 
(Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1947), 40.  
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endorsement for divorces in the courts. To do so they had to bring forward evidence of the custom 
to the courts. Now the HMA made it clear in no uncertain terms that any Hindu could obtain a 
divorce. Though the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property and Separate Residence Act of 1946 came 
close to this position by allowing separate residence and maintenance, it stopped just short of 
divorce, instead preserving the marriage tie. The HMA replaced these half-measures with a rule that 
all Hindu wives could divorce on a variety of grounds. Along with divorce (s. 13), the HMA also 
outlined a procedure for judicial separation (s. 10) and a procedure for restitution of conjugal rights 
(s. 9).  
This chapter studies how the Hindu Marriage Act and the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act fared alongside other statutes as they were used by litigants in the Uttar Pradesh 
(UP) courts. The HMA was, like the DMMA, yet another effort to create a clear uniform legal code 
to regulate marriage and the consequences of its dissolution. Yet, the HMA co-existed alongside 
earlier laws and precedents that litigants could invoke and to which judges could turn. Moreover, 
states like Uttar Pradesh sought to modify this national legislation. I argue that the fate of the HMA 
in Uttar Pradesh was unique in all of India. Seven years after its passing, UP availed of its powers 
over personal law to amend the Act to make it easier to get a divorce. The UP changes to the HMA 
were only emulated with similar national changes fourteen years later. Utter Pradesh, then, served a 
pathbreaking role as the one state to enshrine womens’ total access to divorce, and thus their 
autonomy vis-à-vis marriage, in the new Indian nation. Thus, while HMA was a key benchmark in 
the creation of a uniform family law, it also served as a means for individual states to go beyond it in 
enshrining women’s rights into law.  
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The sources for this chapter are the UP appellate High Court decisions on matrimonial 
disputes between 1956 and 1972. All told, there were forty-three such decisions.884 Twenty-three of 
these came under the new HMA and four came under the new Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance 
Act (HAMA) of 1956. Eleven came under the Code of Criminal Procedure’s (CCrP) maintenance 
provisions. Four came under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (DMMA) and one on 
restitution of conjugal rights (RCR) under the Civil Procedure Code. However, this breakdown is 
not fully reflective of the course of matrimonial litigation because disputes included both a 
husband’s RCR suit and a wife’s maintenance claim or other similarly complex configurations. Also, 
many of the HMA cases involved minor procedural issues about the wife’s rights to maintenance 
pendite lite during the course of HMA proceedings or the correct forum for the HMA suit. This 
chapter has two main and related purposes. First, the chapter studies the impact of the HMA had on 
wife’s rights and on cruelty jurisprudence. Second, it seeks to understand the local dimensions of 
marriage law in UP. Why was Utter Pradesh the state that amended the HMA to make it easier to 
get a divorce in UP in 1962? What was it about its particular local configurations that compelled it to 
be more far-seeing than other Indian states?  
Despite the advent of the HMA, matrimonial disputes continued along much the same 
patterns established in the prior chapters. I argue even as the courts widened their view of cruelty to 
give greater weight to psychological cruelty, they refused to confront the sexual and physical 
violence allowed by the marriage tie. In fact, the medicalization of marriage led courts sometimes to 
engage in traumatic examinations of the intimate details of wives’ physiology and sexual lives in 
open court. While the burden of proof generally plagued wives’ accusations of physical and sexual 
cruelty, courts resorted to invasive medical examinations of wives.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
884 This includes one appeal to the Supreme Court of a court originating in the Allahabad High Court as well as a 
constitutional challenge to the HMA in that court, decided first by a single judge bench and then a Division Bench.   
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Husbands used RCR suits to attempt to repel wives’ maintenance suits though Hindu 
husbands did so under the new HMA instead of under the Civil Procedure Code. They also sought 
judicial separation and divorce. There were twelve such cases. Wives used the HMA far less 
frequently: three times to attain judicial separation or divorce and once to attain RCR. If appellate 
court records are any indication, wives preferred to use maintenance claims to attain redress. They 
were often put in the position of using the HMA to repel their husbands’ attempts at separation. In 
such cases, they had to claim cruelty and other marital wrongs in order to preserve the marriage. 
Social offenses were the easiest for wives to prove. The most important ground for wives to 
claim redress continued to be the husband’s bigamy. The courts heard false imputation of unchastity 
cases as well. However, in the 1960s, two separate cases determined husbands’ retractions of such 
accusations and took away wives’ ground to claim redress.885  
Despite the advent of the Hindu Code, and the opposition to it from Hindu conservatives 
who sought to protect Hindu law from state intervention and reform, the distinctions between 
religious laws were not terribly significant. The definition of cruelty, as the courts interpreted it and 
applied it to the litigants’ circumstances, drew on new statutes as an additional layer on top of the 
legal-historical definitions of cruelty developed over long decades of litigation in the UP High 
Courts. They drew on diverse sources, such as previous Indian courts’ decisions on cruelty, English 
appellate court rulings, and English statutes. Cases involving Hindu litigants also defined cruelty 
with reference to the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, and an important case on the DMMA 
drew on precedents involving Hindu litigants.  
This chapter is organized in four sections covering seventeen of the forty-three cases 
surveyed. The first section examines six cases in which wives won. The second section examines six 
cases in which wives lost. The third section examines two cases in which community arbitration and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
885 Tufail Ahmad v. Jamila Khatun, AIR 1962 All 570, and Smt. Prabhawati Devi vs. Radhey Shyam Tripathi, AIR 1965 All 598. 
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compromise played an important role, showing that the new statutes overlaid community dispute 
resolution systems. The fourth section examines the development of the 1962 UP Amendment to 
the Hindu Marriage Act by studying the debates over the Amendment in the UP legislature as well 
as litigation under the Act.  
 
Restitution of Conjugal Rights Cases in which the Wife Won 
A 1965 case decided by the Allahabad High Court, Kusum Lata v. Kampta Prasad,   
addressed the question of a husband’s cruelty to his wife.886 The husband used the HMA to pursue 
RCR against his wife while the wife used the HMA to seek a judicial separation. The wife claimed 
that the husband had falsely accused her of unchastity, neglected her when she needed medical 
treatment, and forced her into nonconsensual sex.  
The trial court dismissed each spouse’s petitions. The wife’s allegations were not sufficiently 
proved and her judicial separation suit was dismissed. The trial court also found the husband’s 
behavior had given the wife “an apprehension that if she lived with her husband she would be 
criminally neglected and colossal indifference on the part of the husband would lead her one day to 
the grave.”887 She had good reason not to live with him. The trial court’s finding was incongruous. If 
the husband was sufficiently cruel for the wife to avoid a RCR order, then he was sufficiently cruel 
for her obtain judicial separation.  The wife appealed her loss in the judicial separation suit to the 
District Judge. The District Judge agreed with the trial court that the wife had not proved the 
husband’s cruelty.888  
The wife appealed to the High Court. The wife made two arguments. First, the husband lost 
his RCR suit, and the facts and findings in that case were res judicata: the lower court had determined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
886 Kusum Lata v. Kampta Prasad, AIR 1965 All 280.  
887 Ibid., para. 2. 
888 Ibid., para. 3.  
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the husband was sufficiently cruel to bar a RCR suit, the husband had not appealed that finding, and 
now the question of facts could not be re-opened before the High Court. Second, the two lower 
courts had not properly determined the meaning of cruelty under section 10 of the HMA.  
The High Court sided with the wife, drawing on diverse sources to bolster its interpretation 
cruelty under the law. The ruling’s discussion showed that while the HMA was an important 
addition, it did not exist in a vacuum. Cruelty need not be only physical; it could also include 
psychological cruelty. The ruling reviewed the HMA’s definition that to achieve judicial separation, 
cruelty must “‘…cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be 
harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party.’”889 The ruling compared this 
definition of cruelty with other definitions. One was located in two late nineteenth century decisions 
in Russel v. Russel.890 In Russel, cruelty was defined to mean, “there must be danger to life, limb, or 
health, bodily or mental, or a reasonable apprehension of it…”891 The Justice also turned to the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act to bolster his position, stating that the DMMA “contains a 
definition of cruelty which includes cruelty by conduct ‘even if such conduct does not amount to 
physical ill-treatment.’”892 The Justice noted the DMMA played an important role in expanding the 
definition of cruelty to “cruelty by conduct” or psychological cruelty. The HMA “could not be held 
to lay down a more restricted definition of cruelty than can be found in the case of [Russell v. Russell] 
decided at the end of the 19th century, or in the DMMA, unless such an intention was clear from the 
words used in the statute itself.”893 Such older definitions should be used in interpreting the new law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
889 Ibid., para. 10.  
890 Russell v. Russell, 1895 P. 315 at 322 and Russell v. Russell 1897 AC 395 at p. 430.   
891 Russell v. Russell, 1895 P. 315 at 322, quoted in Kusum Lata v. Kampta Prasad, AIR 1965 All 280, para. 12. The Justice 
noted, “The importance of this definition [found in Russell v. Russell] for us is that it was adopted and applied by our 
High Courts to cases under the Indian Divorce Act” as in Baron v. Baron (AIR 1959 All 516 at p. 518). 
892 Kusum Lata v. Kampta Prasad, AIR 1965 All 280, para. 12.  
893 Ibid., paras. 12, 13. The Justice pointed out that the HMA’s definition of cruelty was “somewhat more advanced” 
than the Russell definition “inasmuch as the mental condition and the temperamental qualities of the petitioner, 
depending partly upon the background, the psychological make up, and other facts and circumstances peculiar to the 
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of cruelty under the HMA. The Justice noted the Indian Parliament was surely aware of these 
definitions when it drafted and enacted the new act.894 The High Court encouraged the lower courts 
to consider psychological considerations of cruelty claims. It even encouraged parties in matrimonial 
litigation or the courts to consult with psychiatrists.895 Similar language was used by the High Court 
in a wife’s suit for maintenance. She could not quite prove physical cruelty but the High Court 
opined, 
Where evidence of physical violence is not per se sufficient to warrant a finding of cruelty 
the Court is bound to take into consideration the general conduct of the husband towards 
the wife and if this is of a character tending to degrade the wife, and subjecting her to a 
course of intense indignity injurious to her health, the Court is at liberty to pronounce the 
cruelty proved.896 
 
In the present case, given the broad definition of cruelty, the Justice deemed the husband’s false 
accusations of unchastity against the wife cruelty. The husband accused the wife of unchastity in his 
testimony in court and in a letter he sent to her. He used her unmoored status to allege her immoral 
behavior and call her respectability into question.897 The ruling turned to the discussion of false 
accusations of adultery found in Abbas Ali v. Mst. Rabia Bibi,898 a case on false accusation of adultery 
discussed in the previous chapter. Cruelty jurisprudence, even after the HMA, drew on diverse 
sources of law not limited by any religious community. Based on all of these sources, the High Court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
petitioner, may have to be taken into account.” He found further support for this in a similar statement in a 1963 book 
on English matrimonial law. 
894 Kusum Lata v. Kampta Prasad, AIR 1965 All 280, para. 12.  
895 Ibid., para. 29. The judge encouraged this even though “competent psychiatrists…are, unfortunately, very scarce in 
this country.” The High Court pointed to a Kerala High Court decision that “‘The harm apprehended may be mental 
suffering as distinct from bodily harm, for, pain of mind may be even more severe than bodily pain, and a husband 
disposed to evil may create more misery in a sensitive and affectionate wife, by a course of conduct addressed only to the 
mind, than if, in fits of anger, he were to inflict occasional blows upon her person.’” Kusum Lata v. Kampta Prasad, AIR 
1965 All 280, para. 30, citing Sarah Abraham v. Pyli Abraham, AIR 1959 Ker 73 at p. 78. 
896 Smt. Pancho v. Ram Prasad, AIR 1956 All 41, para. 3. In that case, the wife also had a ground under HSRMA because of 
her husband’s second marriage. The High Court deemed the HSRMA to have retrospective effect.  
897 Kusum Lata v. Kampta Prasad, AIR 1965 All 280, para. 16. For example, the husband’s petition before the court stated, 
“The separate and independent living at various places” was “objectionable” for the husband, “who belongs to a very 
respectable family.” 
898 Abbas Ali v. Mst. Rabia Bibi, AIR 1952 All 145 
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thought that false accusations of cruelty fit into the “modern view of cruelty of one spouse to 
another.”899  
 Easily proven social offenses allowed wives to win their suits most often, as in this case. The 
judge prioritized the husband’s false accusation of adultery in finding against him. It was harder for 
the wife to prove other aspects of her husband’s cruelty and the judge doubted her proof. Though 
the High Court found the husband guilty of falsely accusing the wife of unchastity, it noted that 
accusations of social offenses were sometimes plagued by the problem of proof. The High Court 
argued for sensitivity to spouses’ individual dispositions: “If the complaining spouse was quite 
insensitive to a particular kind of insult of accusation, which may cause a nervous break down to 
another spouse, the test to be applied in the case of such a spouse will be different.”900 In this case 
the husband’s false accusations of adultery were designed to harm and intimidate the wife and the 
accusations had a negative impact on her. The High Court reprimanded the trial court, stating, “In 
such cases, there is usually some exaggeration, sometimes considerable exaggeration by each side. It 
is, therefore, particularly necessary for courts to be careful so as not to allow the fact that mountains 
were made out of some molehills to induce a belief in them that even the mountains are mole-
hills.”901 The judge’s point was that even if some of a wife’s claims were exaggerated, not all of them 
necessarily were.  
 The wife’s second charge against her husband was that he neglected her by not taking her 
for medical treatment when she was sick. The trial court had not accepted this as cruelty in the 
husband’s RCR suit, claiming the wife was exaggerating.902 The doctors who examined the wife for 
the purpose of the trial also found that the child of the couple was “undernourished.”  The trial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
899 Kusum Lata v. Kampta Prasad, AIR 1965 All 280, para. 18. Halsbury’s Laws of England also noted that a judge could 
consider “The impact of the personality and conduct of one spouse on the mind of the other.” Here the Justice was 
citing Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol. 12, 3rd ed., 270 para. 516.  
900 Kusum Lata v. Kampta Prasad, AIR 1965 All 280, para. 21. 
901 Ibid., para. 23. 
902 Ibid., para. 25. 
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court discounted this, blaming the child’s malnourishment on parental ignorance rather than willful 
maltreatment.903 It did not count this against the husband. While the High Court condemned such 
lower courts’ treatment of the wife’s testimony as too hurried to discount the wife’s claims, it also 
argued that “There are other instances in which the complaints made by the wife may have been 
rather exaggerated and unjustified, in a way in which feminine complaints can often be, but the 
remarks passed by the courts below appear to me to be both improper and unjustifiable.”904  Here 
the High Court gave some credence to the position that wives would exaggerate, but also criticized 
the lower courts for taking this presumption too far.905 In so doing, it minimized its recognition of 
the harm claimed by the wife. It also echoed the courts’ bias in rape cases that women are prone to 
exaggeration and regularly make false accusation of rape.906  
 The problem of proof also plagued the wife’s accusations of sexual mistreatment in the 
lower courts. The High Court took her allegations seriously. It framed the issue medically, focusing 
on the wife’s health and pregnancy. The High Court looked at the evidence and noted that the 
husband insisted “upon having sexual intercourse with his wife, about a month after childbirth, so 
that she became pregnant again.”907 The High Court avoided the language of rape or sexual assault 
and instead argued sex was dangerous because pregnancy was not medically recommended so soon 
after childbirth. The trial court found that “even if she had some objection to having any sexual 
intercourse with her husband soon after the birth of a child to her, the insistence of the husband 
upon such intercourse does not amount to cruelty in the eye of law.”908 The High Court noted that 
the first appellate court “has, very lightly, dismissed this matter by observing that all young and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
903 Ibid., paras. 25-6. 
904 Ibid., para. 28. 
905 Ibid. 
906 Durba Mitra and Mrinal Satish, “Testing Chastity, Evidencing Rape: Impact of Medical Jurisprudence on Rape 
Adjudication in India,” Economic and Political Weekly 49, no. 41 (October 11, 2014): 53-4; Flavia Agnes, “To Whom do 
Experts Testify? Ideological Challenges of Feminist Jurisprudence,” Economic and Political Weekly, 40, no. 18 (April 30, 
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907 Kusum Lata v. Kampta Prasad, AIR 1965 All 280, para. 27. 
908 Ibid. 
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newly married husbands are liable to indulge in sexual relations with their wives rather 
excessively.”909 The High Court condemned such views, stating they were “…completely out of tune 
with the times and in conflict with the ideas of underlying the concept of cruelty” in the HMA. The 
judge opined that the correct approach to cruelty as found in the HMA “excludes, in my opinion, 
selfish brutality or disregard for the health, needs, desires, and feelings of the other by either spouse 
even in a matter such as sexual relations between the two.”910 The judge also pointed out that in the 
“The modern view” of cruelty found in HMA the definition of cruelty did not vary by the spouse’s 
gender. At the same time he also noted, “The need to pay particular attention to the mind of the 
petitioner entitles the courts to take into account the greater liability of a woman to psychological 
injury.”911 Though the wife won her judicial separation, she could not do so without exposing the 
messy and painful details of her sexual and reproductive life in the public forum of the court. The 
lower courts were wrong in causing both parties to lose their suits. If the wife successfully barred the 
RCR suit, she also should have been entitled to a judicial separation, which she won in the High 
Court ruling.912  
Another important RCR suit came not under the HMA but under the Civil Procedure Code 
since it involved Muslim litigants. In Itwari v. Smt. Ashgari and Others913 the husband appealed his loss 
in a RCR suit to the Allahabad High Court. The couple married in 1950 but when their marriage fell 
apart the wife returned to live with her parents while he remarried. The wife, in a now familiar 
pattern, filed a maintenance suit under s. 488 Criminal Procedure Code and in response her husband 
filed a RCR suit. She claimed that she had reasonable excuse for not living with her husband: he 
kicked her out of the matrimonial home, beat her, took her jewelry, and did not pay her prompt 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
909 Ibid. Moreover, the High Court also recorded that the first appellate court had written that the wife “wanted to 
dictate to her husband the time when he should have sexual relations with her.” 
910 Kusum Lata v. Kampta Prasad, AIR 1965 All 280, para. 27. 
911 Ibid., para. 30a.  
912 Ibid., para. 31. 
913 Itwari v. Smt. Asghari and Ors, AIR 1960 All 684.   
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dower; all of this “caused her physical and mental pain.”914 The husband won his suit for restitution 
of conjugal rights before the munsif because the wife failed to prove cruelty: the munsif did not 
deem the second marriage cruelty, especially since the husband did not bring the second wife to the 
home he shared with his first wife. After his second marriage the wife did not attempt to dissolve 
her marriage, which the munsif interpreted as the wife’s condonation of the second marriage. The 
wife appealed to the District Judge in Rampur and won her appeal. The District Judge thought the 
husband was using his RCR suit as retaliation for her maintenance suit. He thought she would be 
unhappy if compelled to return to the matrimonial home now that the husband had a second wife.915 
 The husband appealed to the High Court, making three arguments. First, the High Court 
need not confine itself to ruling only on the points of law; it could also re-open an investigation of 
the facts of the case and it should do so in this case. Second, that taking a second wife was not 
cruelty under Muslim law. Third, that “to defeat a husband’s suit for assertion of his conjugal rights 
there must be proof of cruelty of such a character as to render it unsafe for the wife to return to her 
husband’s dominion.”916 He claimed neither a second wife nor his other behaviors met this standard 
of cruelty. 
A Muslim husband tried to argue that his “right” to multiple wives under his religious 
personal law did not constitute cruelty. This was not a product of some kind of religious separatism 
or patriarchy but of husbands’ attempts to get the best possible outcome for their cases. Viewed in 
this light, the husband’s argument here was not an anachronistic or political attempt to carve out a 
unique space in Indian secularism but simply a legal strategy designed to give the husband his best 
shot at dodging his maintenance obligation.  
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The High Court responded with creative judicial reasoning. Justice Dhavan ruled that the 
question was not a matter of the husband’s right to marry a second wife under Muslim personal law. 
The important question, according to Justice Dhavan was “whether this Court, as a court of equity, 
should lend its assistance to the husband by compelling the first wife, on pain of severe penalties, to 
live with him after he has taken a second wife in the circumstances in which he did.”917 Justice 
Dhavan turned to the argument in Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem as well Abdul Kadir v. Salima918 that RCR 
was a decree for specific performance of a contract (the marriage contract) and that this remedy was 
an equitable relief. Since it was an equitable relief, the Courts could “take into consideration the 
conduct of the person who asks for specific performance [the husband in this case].”919 Therefore, a 
simple consideration of justice and the wife’s well-being could guide the Court’s decision.920 Justice 
Dhavan noted that even though under Mulsim law it was “undisputed” that the husband could take 
up to four wives, “it does not follow that Muslim Law in India gives no right to the first wife against 
a husband who takes a second wife, or that this law renders her helpless when faced with the 
prospect of sharing her husband’s consortium with another woman.”921  
To make this point, the judge examined the various circumstances under Anglo-Muslim 
personal law in which a Muslim wife could obtain relief due to her husband’s second marriage. First, 
she could divorce him under her delegated power (talak-i-tafwiz) if he took a second wife.922 Second, 
the wife could write a right to divorce into the marriage contract from the start.923 Justice Dhavan 
argued that if Muslim law had seen the husband’s right to take a second wife as absolute, then it 	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918 Abdul Kadir v. Salima, ILR All 149 149 (FB).  
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920 Ibid., para. 7. 
921 Ibid., para. 10.  
922 Here Justice Dhavan referred to Badu Mia v. Barannessa, 40 Ind Cas 803: AIR 1919 Cal 511, Itwari v. Smt. Asghari and 
Ors, AIR 1960 All 684, para. 10.  
923 Justice Dhavan referred to Sheikh Mohammad v. Bardunnissa Bibee (7 Beng LR App 5) and Badaraunnissa Bibi v. Mafiattala 
(7 Beng LR 442). For the point that the second marriage was a continuing wrong and she need not exercise her right 
straight away, Justice Dhavan referred to Ayatunnessa Beebee v. Karam Ali (ILR 36 Cal 23). Itwari v. Smt. Asghari and Ors, 
AIR 1960 All 684, para. 10.  
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would not have given the wife the right to stipulate her way out of the second marriage in the 
marriage contract. Therefore the law “cannot regard the husband’s right to compel all his wives to 
submit to his consortium as fundamental and inviolate.”924 Moreover, Justice Dhavan referred to 
Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem’s point that Muslim, Hindu, and English cruelty did not much differ from 
each other. He wrote, “It follows that Indian law does not recognize various types of cruelty such as 
‘Muslim’ cruelty, ‘Christian’ cruelty, ‘Hindu’ cruelty, and so on, and that the test of cruelty is based 
on universal and humanitarian standards that is to say, conduct of the husband which would cause 
such bodily or mental pain as to endanger the wife’s safety or health.”925 As in the previous case, 
Kusum Lata v. Kampta Prasad, Justice Dhavan argued for a definition of cruelty that reflected 
contemporary social circumstances and the circumstances and temperaments of the parties.926  
Justice Dhavan also specifically noted that Muslim law was responsive to social change. He 
wrote, “Muslim society has never remained static and to contend otherwise is to ignore the record of 
achievements of Muslim civilization and the rich development of Mohammedan jurisprudence in 
different countries.”927 Justice Dhavan referred to the DMMA, and specifically its provision allowing 
divorce if a husband failed to treat his multiple wives equally, as further evidence that Muslim law 
could change and adapt to the times.928  Justice Dhavan wrote, “Today Muslim woman [sic] move in 
society, and it is impossible for any Indian husband with several wives to cart all of them around. He 
must select one among them to share his social life, thus making impartial treatment in polygamy 
virtually impossible under modern conditions.”929 Justice Dhavan went on to state that the social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
924 Itwari v. Smt. Asghari and Ors, AIR 1960 All 684, para. 10.  
925 Ibid., para. 12. 
926 For this, he referred to Raydyn on Divorce, 5th edition, page 80. Itwari v. Smt. Asghari and Ors, AIR 1960 All 684, para. 
13.   
927 Itwari v. Smt. Asghari and Ors, AIR 1960 All 684, para. 13. For this he referred to Sir Abdur Rahim’s Tagore Law Lectures, 
1908.  
928 Itwari v. Smt. Asghari and Ors, AIR 1960 All 684, para. 14. He took further evidence for the position that that the 
DMMA was designed to improve women’s status from the ruling in Mt. Sofia Begum v. Zaheer Hasan (AIR 1947 All 16, 
discussed in the previous chapter).  
929 Itwari v. Smt. Asghari and Ors, AIR 1960 All 684, para. 15.  
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disapprobation attached to multiple wives would have a negative impact on the first wife’s mental 
health. He claimed, “Under the prevailing social conditions the very act of taking a second wife, in 
the absence of a weighty and convincing explanation, raises a presumption of cruelty to the first.”930 
Unless the husband could provide a good reason for the second marriage (Justice Dhavan gave the 
example of the wife suggesting it), it would be presumed cruelty. Justice Dhavan also specifically 
rejected the husband’s argument that, relying on Mulla’s Principles of Muhammadan Law,931 cruelty had 
to rise to the standard of physical violence to give the wife good reason for not returning to the 
matrimonial home. Instead, he noted, “The Court will grant equitable relief of restitution in 
accordance with the social conscience of the Muslim community, though always regarding the 
fundamental principles of the Mahommedan Law in the matter of marriage and other relations as 
sacrosanct.”932 He was careful to point out that though the second marriage could act as a good bar 
to the husband’s RCR suit, his ruling did not deny the husband his right to take a second wife. If he 
chose to marry and bore children with his second wife, those children would still be legitimate. 
Justice Dhavan noted that even if the first wife could not prove physical or other forms of cruelty, if 
the court felt that she would face an injustice by returning to her husband, it would not compel her 
to do so.933 Therefore, as in the previous case involving Hindu litigants, Justice Dhavan felt 
competent to refuse the husband’s RCR suit and grant the wife maintenance.  
A recent article on the Itwari case highlights how easy it is to conflate both Muslim litigants 
with Muslim law and the religious identity of litigants with religious law in general. The article takes 
the Itwari case as an example of a suit for a Muslim wife’s restitution of conjugal rights under the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
930 Ibid. 
931 14th edition, page 246, Itwari v. Smt. Asghhari, AIR 1960 All 684, para. 16.  
932 Itwari v. Smt. Asghari and Ors, AIR 1960 All 684, para. 16.  
933 Here Justice Dhavan referred to three precedents in which the courts refused to grant the husband a RCR order 
when they thought the husband did not sufficiently care for the wife: Hamid Hussain v. Kubra Begum (ILR 40 AIR 332: 
AIR 1918 All 235); Nawab Bibi v. Allah Ditta (AIR 1924 Lah 188); and Khurshid Begum v. Abdul Rashi (AIR 1926 Nag 234).  
      291 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act.934 Of course, there was no provision for RCR under this act, 
which only addressed divorce. Even after the DMMA took effect, a litigant who sought RCR, rather 
than divorce, would turn to the general civil jurisdiction under the Civil Procedure Code. A wife 
who sought maintenance, as the wife in Itwari did, would turn to the maintenance procedures under 
the Criminal Procedure Code. I argue a substantial portion of Indian matrimonial litigation took 
place in these legal bodies, neither of which was religiously specific. It is true that the ruling in Itwari 
mentioned the DMMA as one persuasive authority for a broad definition of cruelty – though it was 
only one such source. The most important legal authority came from the equity jurisdiction of the 
court. Such jurisprudence was incorporated in Indian law through a case involving Muslim litigants 
(Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem) but, as this dissertation has argued, litigants of all religions regularly used 
restitution of conjugal rights and maintenance. Other sources included an English decision from 
1951,935 an English legal treatise,936 and 1908 lectures on Muslim law.937 The previous case discussed 
(Kusum Lata) also referred to the DMMA to justify the broad category of cruelty. Each decision 
referred to the changing definitions of cruelty, arguing that a broader definition was appropriate for 
the time period.  
The slippage in the recent scholarly literature parallels errors in scholarly understandings of 
the Rukhmabai restitution of conjugal rights suits. Chandra shows how even scholars committed to a 
post-colonial framework interpret the order for Rukhmabai to return to her husband as a feature of 
Hindu patriarchy, when all contemporary observers acknowledged RCR as an English device.938 
These slippages indicate the perils of conflating the religion of litigants with the laws they used, and 
of reducing our understanding of Indian law to any one statute or lawsuit without understanding its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
934 De, “Mumtaz Bibi,” 106.  
935 Simpson v. Simpson, 1951 1 All ER 955).  
936 Raydyn on Divorce, 5th ed., 80.  
937 Tagore Law Lectures, 1908, p. 43, by Abdur Rahim.   
938 See discussion of Rukhmabai in Chapter Two. Sudhir Chandra makes these points about the “inverted” interpretation 
of the first edition of his book by David Gilmour in The Long Recessional: The Imperial Life of Rudyard Kipling and Antoinette 
Burton in The Heart of Empire. Chandra, Enslaved Daughters, 256-8.  
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larger context. Similarly, in the recent article, a matrimonial dispute about RCR and maintenance—
both non-religious, nineteenth century legal devices—are conflated with a religiously specific 
twentieth century statute simply because of the litigant’s religion.  
When we compare Itwari with a case involving Hindu litigants from around the same time, 
this point is made even more clearly. It was not only Muslims who made arguments about their 
special rights under religious personal law. Just as Itwari argued that Muslim husbands should be 
entitled to second marriages under Muslim law, so too did Ram Prasad Seth argue for Hindu 
husbands’ rights to polygamy. Ram Prasad Seth, a civil servant, challenged the HMA’s prohibition 
on polygamy before first a single-Judge bench in 1957939 and then before a two-Justice bench four 
years later. The challenge came under Article 226 of the Constitution, which allowed High Courts to 
issue any directions, orders, or writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights of the Constitution 
or any other reason.940 Ram Prasad Seth’s petition prayed that the orders issued by the UP 
government prohibiting his second marriage be quashed. He also prayed for a writ of mandamus (an 
order from a high court to a lower court or other government office to take or refrain from some 
action) that his petitions be dealt with under the Hindu law of dharmashastra and not under the 
HMA. He claimed the HMA violated the Constitution since it guaranteed his fundamental right to 
his personal law.941 Ram Prasad Seth’s case shows domestic personal relationships were closely 
intertwined with government employment. Government employees provided a prime site for the 
state to exercise its socially reformist initiatives. Though not a restitution of conjugal rights case 
strictly speaking, it is treated here because of its thematic overlap with the issue of polygamy under 
Itwari.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
939 Ram Prasad Seth v. State of UP, AIR 1957 All 411. 
940 Constitution of India, 1950, Article 226.  
941 Ram Prasad Seth v. State of UP, AIR 1957 All 411, para 1. 
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Seth had a degree in civil engineering and worked as a Sub-Divisional Officer for the Public 
Works Department in District Garhwal. He married his wife Shanti Devi in 1934 and together they 
bore four daughters; after the birth of their fourth child, the wife had five miscarriages.942 The 
husband contended that he had a right to bear a son under the Hindu dharmashastras and a son was 
required for his religious salvation. He obtained permission from his wife (so he claimed) to marry 
another woman in the pursuit of a son, but she later changed her mind and asked the State 
Government to stop him from marrying again. The Chief Engineer of the Public Works 
Department sent him a telegram stating he should not marry a second wife without the permission 
of the State Government.943 As a result of this denial he applied for permission from the UP state 
government in April 1955 and his father applied again on his behalf that July. He was not granted 
permission, although the HMA had not yet taken effect. In August 1955, he inquired from the Chief 
Engineer about the status of his application and the reasons for not allowing him to marry again. 
The Chief Engineer responded in November 1955 stating that no reasons could be given.944 Along 
with the HMA, from January 1955 the UP state government had passed an order that prohibited 
government servants’ polygamous marriages. Seth’s proposed second marriage ran afoul of both the 
UP government’s January 1955 order, first, and then the HMA that May.  
Seth contended that the state government order along with the HMA violated his rights 
under Article 25 of the Constitution. Article 25 guaranteed the freedom to “profess, practice, and 
propagate religion” although these were subject to “public order, morality and health.”945 The State 
Government argued that if a person entered state government service with an understanding of its 
rule against polygamous marriages, he could not argue that the rule was unconstitutional, for “[i]n 
effect this argument is that what the State Government is doing is only enforcing a certain term for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
942 Ibid., para 2. 
943 Ibid.  
944 Ibid. 
945 Constitution of India, Article 25.  
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the conditions of service.”946 The High Court found that the state could not simply escape the 
burden of Constitutionality by stating that someone had entered its employ agreeing to certain 
conditions of service (such as any rules made by the State). Therefore the High Court had to 
evaluate the constitutionality of the state government’s rule against polygamy for government 
servants.947  
The High Court framed the question as whether “the right to marry a second wife in the 
presence of the first wife can be regarded as a religious belief and any restriction placed on such a 
right is hit by Article 25 of the Constitution?”948 Seth argued that it was an essential part of 
Hinduism for a husband to marry a wife and produce a son. The freedoms guaranteed under Article 
25 were not just freedoms of belief but of practice.949 In response, the High Court opinion pointed 
out that though freedom of practice was indeed guaranteed under the Constitution, it was subject to 
restrictions of public order, morality and health.950 Next, the husband argued that a Hindu man 
needed a male child for salvation and by extension he had a right to marry a second wife: remarriage 
was part of his freedom of practice to Hinduism. In response, the High Court reasoned that though 
Hindu religious texts testified to the requirement of a son they did not state that the bearing of a son 
must happen via a second marriage; rather, it could also happen through an adoption.951 Polygamy 
came within the exception to freedom of religion under Article 25(2) of the Constitution.952 The 
Justice relied on two authorities for the position that polygamy would harm public order, morality 
and health. First, the legislature passed such a law in an effort to achieve social reform: “…marriage 	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947 Ibid., para. 3.  
948 Ibid., para. 5. 
949 One case the husband turned to for this point was a 1954 Supreme Court case that made a similar point. Ratilal 
Panachand v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388. Justice Mehrotra ruled that a second marriage though permitted by the 
Yagnyawalkya Smriti “cannot be regarded as an integral part of a Hindu religion.” 
950 Ram Prasad Seth v. State of UP, AIR 1957 All 411, para. 6; Constitution of India, Article 25.  
951 Ram Prasad Seth v. State of UP, AIR 1957 All 411, para 6. 
952 Justice Mehrotra’s ruling endorsed the State’s reliance on the Bombay case of State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali 
which ruled that the state could prohibit certain practices in line with public health, morality, and social welfare. State of 
Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom 84.   
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is a social institution and it may be for the welfare of the State to control such an institution and to 
bring about measures of reforms which the legislature’s wisdom thinks proper to in the Interest of 
the State.”953 Second, the Justice turned to a general position that polygamy was disavowed by world 
opinion and was anachronistic in a modern society: “It may not be universally recognised but it still 
has been admitted by a large volume of world opinion that monogamy is a very desirable and 
praiseworthy institution.”954 The High Court determined polygamy fell within the exception to 
Article 25 for public order, morality and health.  
The matter did not end there. Ram Prasad Seth appealed the 1957 decision to a Division 
Bench.955 This bench also denied his appeal. Ram Prasad Seth again made three major arguments. 
First, as before, the rules against polygamy violated his right to freedom of religious practice under 
Article 25. Second, the exception to Article 25 for public order, morality, and health (Article 25(2)) 
was subordinate to Article 25(1). All exceptions under Article 25(2) needed to be read against Article 
25(1): if the two conflicted, then Article 25(1) should predominate. Third, the exceptions carved out 
by Article 25(2) were not aimed at individuals but at Hindu religious institutions. The Division 
Bench quickly dismissed all three arguments. The ruling found the two clauses of Article 25 did not 
conflict with each other: “The extent to which freedom of religion is guaranteed is to be found in 
the whole of the Article and not in any particular part of it.”956 There was certainly no argument to 
be made that Article 25 was only aimed at Hindu religious institutions.957 Finally, the Indian 
legislature was fully competent to make laws aimed at social welfare: “The legislature of the country 
is the best judge of what is necessary for the welfare or reform of a particular community at any 
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955 Chief Justice Mootham and Justice A.P. Srivastava 
956 Ram Prasad Seth v. State of UP, AIR 1961 All 334, para. 8.  
957 Ibid., para. 10.  
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particular stage.”958 Neither of the benches in Ram Prasad Seth’s case engaged in an extensive 
discussion of the merits of polygamy or its place in Indian society. Rather each decision deferred to 
the legislature’s competence to make such a social reform measure.  
 A 1963 decision examined the implications of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 
(HAMA) for the CCrP.959 Ram Singh, like so many husbands before him, attempted to appeal his 
wife’s maintenance order under s. 488 CCrP He claimed that once the HAMA came into effect, the 
wife could not pursue a maintenance suit under the CCrP. The husband went so far as to claim that 
the CCrP was “impliedly repealed” by the HAMA.960 The High Court rejected that claim, stating if a 
wife pursued her maintenance claim under the Code of Criminal Procedure there was no bar to her 
pursuing it in the criminal courts.961 The provisions of the CCrP and the HAMA were not 
inconsistent with each other; in fact, “both the provisions are consistent, inasmuch as both provide 
for the maintenance of a Hindu wife.”962 The order was sent back to the Magistrate’s court to look 
into the amount of maintenance that should be ordered to the wife.963 
Ram Prasad Seth’s arguments were similar to those of Ram Bharosey and Itwari in that they 
sought to carve out an exception for a particular religious familial practice on the ground of freedom 
of religion. Ram Bharosey argued for his right as a Hindu husband to use physical violence and legal 
harassment against his wife, Though he lacked any Constitutional backing for his argument, he could 
turn to the colonial guarantee of the use of religious personal laws. In Itwari, a Muslim husband 
argued that taking a second wife was his right as a Muslim and did not provide his first wife 
reasonable grounds for not living with him under Indian maintenance or RCR law. However, the 	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963 Ibid. An additional issue that came up in this case was the amount of maintenance due to the wife. The husband 
claimed the amount “has been fixed by the Magistrate arbitrarily without due regard to the facts.” The Magistrate found 
that the husband owned 80 bighas [unit of measurement], cattle, and a house. The Magistrate had not looked into the 
husband’s profits on the land or his other income. 
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High Court ruled that though the husband had a right to take a second wife under Muslim personal 
law, it would constitute sufficient enough cruelty to provide a good bar to a RCR suit against the 
first wife. In Ram Prasad Seth’s case, the husband argued that he had a right to take a second wife 
despite the new HA and UP government’s rules against bigamy. One major difference between Ram 
Prasad Seth’s line of argument and Itwari’s was that the latter did not turn to the Constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of religion. Ram Prasad Seth did because he was attempting to impugn the 
laws on constitutional grounds. Ram Singh used a jurisdictional challenge to his wife’s maintenance 
suit order under the CCrP by insisting that she use the relatively new Hindu maintenance statute.  
All of these husbands attempted to use the state’s guarantee of religious personal law to 
justify their treatment of their wives, whether it involved physical cruelty and legal harassment (as in 
Ram Bharosey’s case) or taking a second wife, which in Itwari’s case was brought within the ambit 
of legal cruelty and in Ram Prasad Seth’s case was deemed invalid by the legislature out of the need 
to protect public order and morality. Itwari and Ram Prasad Seth each sought to defend their 
polygamous marriages by resorting to arguments about their rights within their religious law. 
However, the High Court found against both husbands. In all cases, the High Court drew on diverse 
authorities for its broadened definition of cruelty. These included Hindu, Muslim, English, and civil 
law.  
In Smt. Mango v. Prem Chand, the husband’s mental state came up for question. The wife 
married him in 1955 and went to live with him, but her relatives came the next year and brought her 
back to her natal home. The husband then filed a restitution of conjugal rights suit. However, the 
wife contended that she had good reason for living apart from her husband because he was “a man 
of weak intellect, who was sexually impotent, who deserted the appellant and treated her with 
cruelty.”964 Moreover, the husband’s father “had an evil eye on” her and “he was bent upon 	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outraging the modesty of the appellant [wife]”; therefore it was unsafe for the wife to continue to 
live in the matrimonial home.965 The wife lost her suit before the Civil Judge and appealed to the 
High Court. She contended that her husband’s cruelty had been improperly discounted by the Civil 
Judge while the husband’s lawyer argued that the statement was not equivalent to evidence since it 
had not been under oath and therefore her appeal should be dismissed.966 The High Court judge 
(Mithan Lal) noted that the husband “at least was not a person who possessed ordinary 
intellect…However, it cannot at the same time be said that he is an idiot.”967 The question that came 
up before the High Court was whether if the wife’s argument, even if not technically a reasonable 
excuse under the HMA, would still be sufficient to disentitle her husband to RCR. On appeal, she 
chose to focus her arguments simply on the husband’s cruelty, foregoing arguments on his 
impotence or intellect. This presented the problem of proof to the High Court since it had to 
evaluate her evidence against her husband’s. The High Court ruling noted that the husband’s 
statements before the Civil Judge had been a “fully tutored statement” and conflicted with the 
husband’s own statement, made while weeping, in the Civil Judge’s court, that “My father teases me 
and my wife.”968 These were weighted against the wife’s statements that her husband was of weak 
intellect and that both he and her father-in-law had teased her and that her father-in-law had 
attempted to outrage her modesty. Her argument was that it was not the husband who had wanted 
to file the suit but his father.      
 It seemed that the wife had a strong case for living apart from her husband. As she was not 
arguing his impotence or idiocy, however, she faced a legal problem, since most of the mal-
treatment was argued to have come at her father-in-law’s hands. This eventuality did not seem to 
have been provided for in the HMA. However, the Judge found a workaround to this challenge. The 	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RCR provision was divided into two sections, as we have noted. The second section made the rule 
that either spouse had reasonable excuse to live apart for any of the reasons listed in the separation, 
nullity, or divorce provisions.969 If these were the only reasons the wife could live apart, then the 
wife in this case would have been in trouble, since the cruelty was at the hands of her husband’s 
parents. However, her lawyer made an ingenious legal argument, turning to the first section’s 
provision that in order for a spouse to achieve a RCR rights suit, the deserting spouse had to have 
“withdrawn without reasonable excuse.”970 It did not necessarily follow that the only reasonable 
excuses were those outlined in the second section of the provision. The first provision could be 
construed even more broadly than the second provision. The wife’s lawyer had two High Court 
cases from the Punjab High Court to back him up.971 Justice Mithan Lal summed it up this way: “It 
has already been stated earlier that besides the ground given in Sections 10, 12 and 13 of the Act, the 
Court has further to see whether the person, who is living apart, has a reasonable excuse to do 
so…”972 Therefore Justice Mithan Lal could dismiss the husband’s suit and uphold the wife’s appeal. 
 This case indicates how the HMA focused on the dyadic marriage tie when oftentimes the 
wife’s discomfort in her marital home may have extended beyond her relationship with her husband 
to other members of his family, as when many of thix wife’s problems stemmed from her father-in-
law’s behavior. Also, the HMA sought to specifically delineate all the reasonable excuses for resisting 
a RCR suit in s. 9(2)—referring to the grounds in the separation, nullity, and divorce provisions. If 
these were the only reasons available, the wife in this suit would have been subject to a RCR order. 
However, due to her lawyer’s trick of statutory interpretation, borrowed from the Punjab High 
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Court, the High Court retained an expanded discretionary jurisdiction to adjudge the wife’s various 
reasons for not living in the matrimonial home.  
 In Ram Devi v. Raja Ram,973 the wife claimed maintenance from her husband on the ground 
that he treated her cruelly and had taken a second wife. To dodge her maintenance claim, the 
husband argued the two had never been legally married and the marriage was a nullity. He claimed 
that the marriage had not been consummated and the wife “was unfit for sexual intercourse and was 
incapable of begetting children…”974 He also denied cruelty. The wife won both her cruelty claim 
and the court’s recognition for the marriage’s validity; therefore, she won her maintenance. 
However, in so doing, she was subjected to multiple invasive medical examinations and the intimate 
details of her sexuality were exposed in the highly public forum of the court.  
 The trial court agreed that the wife was capable of having children and was deserved of past 
and future maintenance because the husband had treated her with cruelty. The husband appealed the 
decision and the case was remanded so that the wife’s doctor could be examined in trial court. In the 
re-trial the wife called her doctor to the court and the husband applied to have the wife examined by 
another doctor. This plea was rejected and the wife again won her suit. The husband appealed again 
to the Civil Judge. There the husband and wife agreed to having her examined by another doctor 
belonging to neither of them. That doctor found that she was impotent and, given that the marriage 
was a nullity, she was not entitled to maintenance. The Civil Judge dismissed the wife’s maintenance 
suit. She then appealed to the High Court. One of the questions it had to decide was whether a 
marriage could be declared a nullity even if the two had been married according to Hindu 
sacraments. 
 The husband claimed the marriage was a nullity because the wife was sexually abnormal, 
sterile, and impotent. During the course of the proceedings, the wife was examined three separate 	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times by three separate doctors. Two of the doctors found that she was incapable of sexual 
intercourse while one found she was. In all three examinations, it seems the wife was submitted to 
having two fingers inserted in her vagina to determine her capability for intercourse. Other aspects 
of her sexual organs were also described in detail in the High Court report.975 The two-finger test has 
been used in rape trials to determine whether the survivor was sexually active prior to her rape or 
sexual assault. If so, her credibility was called into question on the assumption that a sexually active 
woman is more likely to make a false charge of rape.976 This has justly come in for criticism on both 
medical and feminist ethical grounds: Pratiksha Baxi terms it “state sanctioned assualt.”977 In 2014, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the test “violates the right of rape survivors to privacy, physical and 
mental integrity and dignity.”978 Clearly, there is no relationship between a woman’s consent to 
sexual intercourse and her sexual history or her physiological characteristics. Nevertheless, the test 
has been widely recommended in Indian medical jurisprudence textbooks on rape.979 In rape trials, 
the test is used to prove the woman’s sexual history. Under what was until recently the prevailing 
ideological framework, the unruptured hymen and the capability of being able to fit only one finger, 
rather than two, into the vagina was to the rape survivor’s advantage, since it helped to prove her 
sexual inexperience and the increased likelihood that the sex she experienced was non-consensual.980 
The test could be used in other ways as well. In the present case, the wife’s inability to accomodate 
more than one finger, tested upon three separate occasions, was proof of her sexual incapacity; it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
975 Ibid., paras. 4-7. 
976 Baxi, Public Secrets, Chapter Two; Mitra and Satish, “Testing Chastity, Evidencing Rape,” 51-2; Nisreen Khambati, 
“India’s two finger test after rape violates women and should be eliminated from medical practice,” The BMJ, May 16, 
2014, 348; Flavia Agnes, “To Whom do Experts Testify?,” 1859-60.  
977 Ibid. For the quote, see Baxi, Public Secrets, 86. 
978 Lillu @ Rajesh & Anr. V. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal No. 1226 of 2011, accessed at Indian Kanoon, 
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/78844212/, last accessed March 25, 2015. Crusading Justice Kamini Lau of the Delhi 
Sessions Court also clearly stated that the test “in the absence of consent [by the woman] would be violative of 
Constitutional dictates of right to Life as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India” in St. v. Umesh Singh 
and Anr. FIR No. 1135/06 PS Uttam Nagar, Delhi. Quoted in Baxi, Public Secrets, 102.   
979 Baxi, Public Secrets, Chapter Two; Mitra and Satish, “Testing Chastity, Evidencing Rape,” 51-8; Agnes, “Experts,” 
1859-66.  
980 Mitra and Satish, “Testing Chastity, Evidencing Rape,” 53-4; Agnes, “Experts,” 1862; Khambati, “India’s two finger 
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was proof that marital sexual intercourse would be difficult.981 What in a rape trial would have been a 
physiological advantage, in a matrimonial dispute became a disadvantage. The wife’s responses to 
the physical discomfort and likely psychological trauma that the multiple tests likely inflicted on her 
found no place in the High Court’s ruling. However, I find it hard to imagine that the wife 
experienced no pain or discomfort in the course of these medical examinations or their subsequent 
descriptions in their subsequent court proceedings and the published High Court judgment.982 
Indeed, a 2010 letter from Indian women’s groups to the Government of India stated the test 
“further aggravate[s] women’s experience of assault.”983 Human Rights Watch report noted, 
“Inserting fingers into the vaginal or anal orifice of an adult or child survivor of sexual violence can 
cause additional trauma, as it not only mimics penile penetration but can also be painful.”984 The 
WHO states that medical examinations of rape survivors “should be offered in such a way so as to 
minimize the number of invasive physical examinations and interviews the patient is required to 
undergo” and that such finger exams are “rarely indicated post sexual assault.”985 Also, the Special 
Rapporteur to the UN Commission on Human Rights argued that “‘virginity-testing’ is a form of 
‘gender specific…torture.’”986 Though the wife won her suit in this case, it may have come at a great 
cost.  
The wife won because the court deemed the marriage valid despite her sexual incapacity. 
The judge ruled, “Sexual intercourse for procreation may be the chief reason for the marriage tie but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
981 Ram Devi v. Raja Ram, AIR 1963 All 564, paras. 4-7. 
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983 This letter is cited as “Letter by Indian women’s groups to Mr. G.K. Pillai, Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Government of India, June 2010,” in Human Rights Watch, Dignity on Trial: India’s Need for Sound Standards for Conducting 
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984 Ibid.  
985 World Health Organization, “Guidelines for medico-legal care of victims of sexual violence,” 17, para. 3.1.1. and 
screen no. 124, quoted in Human Rights Watch, Dignity on Trial, 50. 
986 Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights on the question of torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, A/55/290, August 11, 2000, 7, cited in World Health 
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such cases cannot be excluded where the parties may live together without having sexual 
intercourse.”987 The judge found that no matter the state of sexual relations between husband and 
wife, she should be protected by the preservation of the marriage tie. Moreover, the wife’s 
impotence was not complete, since the final examining doctor argued there was some possibility that 
surgery could correct her condition.988 A similar case the Bombay High Court found that if the wife 
was “impotent” at the time of marriage, the marriage was a nullity.989 The Justice in this case 
disagreed with the Bombay High Court ruling, finding Hindu marriage was sacramental and 
indissoluble.990  
The preceding six cases illustrate several trends. Wives continued to win their suits while 
failing to prove physical cruelty. Social offenses such as polygamy and false accusations of adultery 
were more potent ways to prove cruelty. The broad definition of cruelty continued to operate with 
increased attention to the psychological impact of the husband’s behavior. And yet just as the courts 
were concerned with the psychological impact of the husband’s behavior, there was little concern 
for wives’ privacy or dignity when it came to the court examining and reporting on the intimate 
details of their sexual experiences.991 Marital sexual assault was decried on medical terms rather than 
on the grounds of a woman’s right to control her own body and consent.992 Smt. Mango v. Prem 
Chand, though also a victory for the wife, relied on creative, stretched judicial reasoning to provide 
her good cause for living apart despite her father-in-law’s cruel treatment. Though the HMA aimed 
at the dyadic marriage tie, wives had to deal with more complex familial relations in the marital 
home that were not particularly well addressed in the HMA.993 Husbands of all religions tried to 
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988 Ibid., para. 20. 
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assert their rights to bigamy or deny their wives maintenance on the basis of their religious personal 
laws, but the courts denied such claims.994  
 
Cases in which Wives Lost 
 Wives usually but not always won their suits. The Hindu husband’s outcasting or the Muslim 
husband’s failure to pay the wife’s prompt dower did not constitute good grounds for the wife to 
obtain the relief she sought. A husband’s false allegations of unchastity did provide a good ground, 
but overturning an earlier ruling, the High Courts found that if he retracted such charges, the wife 
lacked a good ground to live with him. Finally, even if the husband took out a second marriage, if 
this was not the primary cause for the wife leaving him, she could not resist her husband’s suit for 
judicial separation.  
In a 1964 case, a husband sought a RCR suit against his wife but, unusually, she lost. She 
claimed she had a good ground for not living with him because he had been outcasted. She claimed 
their biradari995 had a custom that allowed a wife to refuse to live with an out-casted husband.996 The 
husband admitted the custom but argued that this custom ran afoul of the HMA. He argued that the 
only reasons a wife could give for resisting a RCR suit were those found under the judicial 
separation, nullity, or divorce provisions of the HMA under s. 9(2). However, there was a catch in 
this case. The husband’s suit had been filed prior to the HMA’s taking effect and the High Court 
judge997 ruled that the act would not apply retrospectively. Therefore the remaining question was 
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whether RCR under pre-HMA law could be successfully resisted on the grounds of a husband’s 
outcasting.998  
The Constitution took effect in 1950, five years prior to the HMA, and under it 
discrimination on the basis of caste was illegal and untouchability was outlawed.999 Yet rather than 
turning to India’s Constitution, the judge turned to a nineteenth century law. The Justice referred to 
the Caste Disabilities Removal Act of 1850 prohibited the inflicting “on any person forfeiture of 
rights or property” just because of outcasting. The Justice ruled that the husband had a right to his 
wife’s company and this was covered under this act.1000 The RCR order stood and the wife lost her 
appeal - one of the few examples of a wife losing such a suit.   
 
Good ground for Living Apart 
 Rabia Khatoon v. Mohammad Mukhtar Ahmed was decided by a Division Bench of the 
Allahabad High Court in 1966.1001 The case was sent to a Division Bench because the single justice 
who first heard the appeal thought that a rule created in an earlier case was obiter dicta and therefore 
not good law. That rule had been that a Muslim wife had no right to refuse herself to her husband 
once the marriage had been consummated, regardless of whether her prompt dower had been paid 
or not.1002 The High Court judgement used the term “prompt dower” to refer to mehr, which is an 
amount of property or money stipulated in the Islamic marriage contract. There are two kinds of 
mehr, prompt and deferred. Prompt dower is given to the wife at the time of marriage.1003 In this 
case, it was set at Rs. 5,000.1004 Deferred dower is an amount guaranteed to the wife if the husband 
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chooses to divorce her and serves as a guarantee for the wife’s well-being in that eventuality.1005 In 
this case, the wife’s failure to prove her husband’s cruelty meant she could rely only on arguments 
about her husband’s failure to pay her prompt dower. 
 The case involved the wife’s suit for dissolution against her husband and the husband’s suit 
for restitution of conjugal rights against the wife. The two married in 1948 and bore a son in 1951. 
But after the birth of the son the wife returned to her father’s home. Her husband came to collect 
her in the spring of 1951 but she refused to return to the marital home. The two turned to the 
courts in 1956. Rabia Khatoon claimed the dissolution of her marriage on grounds of her husband’s 
failure to maintain her (DMMA s. 2(ii))–he had not provided maintenance since 1951-and his cruelty 
(DMMA s. 2(vii)). Each of the lower courts found that she could not win her case on these grounds. 
They dismissed her claims of cruelty and found that though the husband refused to maintain her, he 
had done so because she was living apart without good reason.1006  The High Court mentioned 
several other cases where it was found that the husband did not have an absolute obligation to 
maintain the wife if she lived apart without good reason.1007 In response, the wife’s lawyer had 
argued that the husband’s failure to pay her prompt dower did, indeed, give her good reason for 
living apart.  
Rabia Khatoon claimed that though she performed her marital obligations by having sexual 
relations with her husband and even bearing a child, he failed to live up to his end of the bargain by 
failing to pay her prompt dower of Rs. 5,000. She also alleged that her husband beat her, threw her 
out of his home, and did not maintain her.1008 The husband denied the allegations of cruelty and 
throwing her out, and therefore she lived apart without good cause. He claimed he had only owed 
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her deferred dower of Rs. 500. These same allegations were traded in the RCR suit.1009 The lower 
courts agreed on the following facts: The husband had not beat or thrown the wife out of the 
marital home or otherwise treated her with cruelty. He had owed the wife prompt dower in the 
amount of Rs. 5,000, and he had not paid it, as the wife claimed. The courts also found that the 
husband had not paid the wife any maintenance since she had been living apart. However, the Civil 
Judge in Meerut, who heard the first appeal, thought that since the wife consummated and 
continued sexual relations with the husband, she essentially condoned the non-payment of her 
prompt dower. Therefore she had no good reason for refusing to live with him. The Civil Judge 
declared the husband’s RCR suit in his favor and the wife lost her suit for dissolution, “on the 
ground that she could not deny herself to the husband after consummation of the marriage merely 
because her dower remained unpaid.”1010  
 Herein lay the reason for the hearing of this case by a Division Bench. The key question was 
“whether a Mohammedan wife has a right to refuse to go to her husband if her prompt dower is not 
paid even though the marriage had been consummated with the consent of the wife before the date 
of the refusal.”1011 The Full Bench decision of the High Court in 1886 found that once the wife 
consented to sexual relations with her husband and consummated the marriage, she lost her ability 
to refuse to live with him for non-payment of prompt dower.1012 A similar case up before a Division 
Bench in 1933 and the rule developed in the 1886 case was followed.1013 Notably, each decision was 
penned by an important Muslim High Court justice, the 1886 decision by Justice Mahmud and the 
1933 decision by Justice Sulaimain.1014  
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 The 1886 case ruled that the husband’s failure to pay prompt dower did not provide the wife 
a good excuse not to live with her husband. The 1886 decision highlighted that there were different 
points of view among three major Imams on the topic. While Imam Abu Hanifa thought that the 
husband’s failure to pay prompt dower provided the wife a good reason not to live with her 
husband, his two disciples, Qazi Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad, disagreed, finding that the 
failure to pay prompt dower did not provide the wife a reasonable excuse. In the 1886 decision, 
Justice Mahmood thought that the decision should be made according to a majority rule and agreed 
with the two disciples in his final opinion.1015 When a case came up before Chief Justice Sulaiman in 
1933,1016 he found that the majority rule was not the correct one. He stated, “According to Allawi 
the correct rule was that in cases of difference of opinion regard should be had to the authority and 
reasons in support of each of view and the one which has the strongest support should be 
followed.”1017 Nevertheless, Justice Sulaimain agreed with the earlier decision because it had the 
force of time behind it, because in India dower amounts were very high which made it practically 
difficult for the husband to fulfill his obligation, and in part because a RCR suit was a suit for 
specific performance and the courts could exercise their discretion in analyzing the marital 
situation.1018 The discussion of the position framed within the terms of Muslim law was ultimately 
irrelevant, because the High Court decided that if the 1886 decision “were to be held as bad law it 
would not only create uncertainty about the law but also disturb the domestic peace of 
Mahommedan families throughout India…it would be dangerous to adopt this view [that the 
marriage is invalid even if consummated without payment of prompt dower] at the present time 
having regard to the prevalent practice and the modern conditions of life.”1019 The arguments over 
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authoritative Hanafi legal scholars’ various positions and their proper interpretation and application 
was designed to show that the High Court did not intend to apply the wrong legal position, though 
it was known that this was the incorrect position, but that it was applying the rule for reasons of 
administrative convenience. 
The High Court found, “There is no right in the wife to refuse to live with her husband after 
the marriage has been consummated with her consent. So long as she keeps herself away without the 
fault of the husband she has no right to claim maintenance from him.”1020 The opinion also 
expressed doubt about the wife’s evidence that she actually requested the prompt dower from her 
husband. The High Court upheld the lower courts’ dismissal of the wife’s dissolution suit and its 
orders in the husband’s RCR suit. His victory in the RCR suit was conditional, however, upon his 
payment of the wife’s prompt dower in the amount of Rs. 5,000.1021 The wife’s failure to prove 
cruelty left her dependent on this one excuse, the husband’s failure to pay dower, and she lost.   
The feminist legal strategy organization FeminIjtihad criticizes the decision in this case.1022 It 
points out that in Pakistan a similar case arrived at a different opinion, upsetting the rule in the 1886 
decision in Abdul Kadir.1023 The FeminIjtihad analysis notes, “A disappointing aspect of the judgment 
is the grounds on which the decision rests. The judgment follows the approach of Justice Mahmood 
in Abdul Kadir; it is worth noting that in Abdul Kadir that in Abdul Kadir preference was given to the 
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view of the disciples than that of the master Imam Abu Hanifa.”1024 The website concludes, “we find 
that the Islamic law on this point is actually in favour of the woman and to the extent that Rabia 
Khatoon and earlier judgments have overlooked case laws and the Sharia Law are judgments per 
incuriam.”1025 In other words, the court was wrong and the court made its decision without following 
the relevant Muslim personal law.1026  
 
Husbands’ Retractions of False Imputation of Unchastity  
 Wives often won against their husbands’ false accusations of adultery. The 1949 case Kalloo v. 
Imaman1027 gave the wife a good ground for dissolution under the DMMA though he subsequently 
retracted his false charges of adultery. Yet in two similar cases from the 1960s wives lost their suits 
when they attempted to pursue redress on this ground because their husbands retracted the 
accusations.  
One was the first case (1962) under the DMMA in post-colonial UP from the district of 
Saharanpur.1028 The case was referred to a two-justice bench from a single justice because it involved 
an important legal question.1029 Jamila Khatun married Tufail Ahmed in 1935. The marriage began to 
deteriorate in 1947 and the next year she left and went to live with her brother. Her husband then 
filed a complaint against her under s. 498 IPC impugning her chastity. The complaint was dismissed. 
Around the same time, the husband also filed a RCR suit where he “unequivocally retracted the 
allegation which he had, apparently stupidly, made” about her unchastity.1030 Despite this retraction, 
he lost the RCR suit. The wife then filed a suit in March 1949 for dissolution under DMMA on s. 	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2(ix) that allowed dissolution on any ground allowed under Muslim law.1031 Her ground was the 
husband’s false imputation of unchastity against her, made when he filed a suit against her under s. 
498 IPC. The husband contested the suit by pointing to his retraction of that statement when he 
filed the RCR suit against her.1032 The court had to decide whether the husband had falsely accused 
the wife of adultery and, if so, whether his retraction had been valid. The lower courts found that 
the husband did falsely accuse his wife of adultery but that he indeed retracted the false accusation in 
his RCR suit.1033 However, the lower courts declared the wife’s dissolution suit because a similar 
case, 1949’s Kalloo v. Mt. Imamam,1034 set the rule that the husband’s procedure for retracting under 
laan had been eliminated by the DMMA. Therefore, the lower courts ruled that the wife deserved 
her dissolution under the DMMA. But the single judge who heard the wife’s appeal to the High 
Court was not as certain and referred the case to a two-judge bench.1035 Thus the Kalloo v. Mt. 
Imamam decision was revisited.  
 The DMMA did not specifically address the false accusation of unchastity. Rather, the device 
had continued to be used under DMMA s. 2(ix) that allowed dissolution “on any other ground 
which is recognised as valid for the dissolution of marriages under Muslim law.”1036 The High Court 
noted that the husband’s false accusation under s. 2(ix) was always accepted; the only question was 
whether the wife lost her right to dissolution if the husband retracted it.1037 The High Court 
disagreed with the decision in Kalloo v. Mt. Imamam. Its first line of reasoning was that “the right of 
the wife to claim a dissolution of marriage arose not merely on there being a false imputation of 
unchastity against her but a failure to retract or failure to prove that imputation.”1038 Since the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1031 Ibid. 
1032 Ibid., para. 3.  
1033 Ibid., para. 4. 
1034 Kalloo v. Mt. Imaman, AIR 1949 All 445.  
1035 Justices Mukerji, D. Uniyal. 
1036 DMMA 1939 s. 2(ix).  
1037 Tufail Ahmad v. Jamila Khatun, AIR 1962 All 570, para. 6.  
1038 Ibid., para. 12.  
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husband had retracted, the wife’s suit did not meet this condition. The second line of reasoning 
provided by the High Court was that “the law was jealous of preserving matrimonial relations: the 
law did not lightly put asunder man and wife, even though they had come together by virtue of a 
contract and not as a result of a sacrament.”1039 The High Court thought that the husband should be 
given an opportunity to retract his statement: “The law has always recognised and acted on locus 
poenitentiae and has tried to forgive where forgiveness was possible and tried to whittle down the 
rigors where complete exoneration under the law was not possible, in all cases where the Court was 
of the view that there was honest locus poenitentiae.”1040 The Justice noted that locus poenitentiae had 
been “engrafted by the Muslim law” and, this being so, “there was not only perfect justification for it 
but that it would be unjust and against the conception of marriage tie not to give effect to it.”1041 
Therefore the wife lost her appeal and her suit to dissolve her marriage was dismissed. In so doing, 
the High Court also overturned Kalloo v. Mt. Imamam.  
Smt. Prabhawati Devi vs. Radhey Shyam Tripathi presented a similar set of circumstances though 
it did not mention the cases under the DMMA discussed above.1042 The High Court came to the 
same conclusion in two very similar cases, one involving Hindu and one involving Muslim litigants. 
The wife applied for maintenance on the ground that her husband and his father treated her 
cruelly.1043 The husband denied this and stated his desire to have his wife and children come back to 
him. She lost her maintenance suit before the Magistrate’s court because she had no good reason to 
live apart.1044 The wife appealed to the Sessions Judge who accepted her appeal on the ground of the 
husband’s false accusation of unchastity against the wife.1045 The Sessions Judge sent the case to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1039 Ibid., para. 9.  
1040 Ibid. Locus poenitentiae means “place of repentance” and refers to the “point at which it is not too late…to change 
one’s legal position.” See Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West, 2004).  
1041 Tufail Ahmad v. Jamila Khatun, AIR 1962 All 570, para. 9.  
1042 Smt. Prabhawati Devi vs. Radhey Shyam Tripathi, AIR 1965 All 598.  
1043 Ibid., para. 2.  
1044 Ibid.  
1045 Ibid., para. 4.  
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High Court so that the Magistrate’s order could be set aside. The High Court opinion noted that the 
husband, wife, and children all appeared before the High Court. The husband again claimed he was 
ready to take his wife and children back to his home and the wife again stated she was not willing to 
go back to him. The judge thought, based on the husband’s behavior, he genuinely wanted his wife 
and children to live with him.1046 He stated that there was no good reason for the wife to refuse to 
live with her husband. While he acknowledged that the husband had falsely accused the wife of 
unchastity, he dismissed them as merely “foolish allegations.”1047 The husband claimed he had filed 
criminal charges against the wife’s brother and mother because he thought they were the ones 
obstructing her return to his home. He was attempting to get her relatives to send her back to him 
with these criminal charges. The charges showed “his keen desire to get back his wife and to force 
her people to allow her to live with him.”1048  
The Magistrate did not see any negative intentions in the husband’s actions and the High 
Court judge agreed with him. The wife had no further evidence of the husband’s cruelty besides his 
criminal charges.1049 The High Court framed the question as “…whether if a husband in his weaker 
moments, pressed by unfavorable circumstances, makes a false charge of unchastity against his wife 
but later on in calmer moments sincerely recants it, does it disqualify him forever from enforcing his 
marital relations against his wife?”1050 The Justice did not think so: “if it [the false accusation of 
unchastity] has been made not by any such motive but under pressing circumstances and with the 
aim of getting back the wife from the possession of others…” and if the husband also recanted the 
statement, it did not provide the wife a good ground for residing apart and claiming maintenance.1051 
The Justice also bolstered his ruling that the wife did not deserve separate maintenance by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1046 Ibid.  
1047 Ibid., para. 5.  
1048 Ibid.  
1049 Ibid., para. 6.  
1050 Ibid., para. 7.  
1051 Ibid., para. 8.  
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examining the husband’s financial circumstances. He found that the husband did not have sufficient 
means to support the wife and children living separately.1052 Together these two cases might have 
had the effect of opening the door to wives’ losses when their husbands retracted such accusations. 
If so, wives lost an important ground for claiming redress. 
 
Desertion: A Surprising Finding 
 The circumstances in Smt. Rohini Kumar v. Narendra Singh1053 involved wealthy royal litigants 
and a tricky question of law. The failure to prove cruelty made a substantial difference in the 
outcome of the case. When the husband’s suit for judicial separation came up before a single judge 
bench of the Allahabad High Court, the judge referred it to a two-judge Division Bench.1054 
Narendra Singh of Sarela Estate married Rohini Kumari, the daughter of the Maharaj of Aliraipur 
Estate, in 1945. After about two years, she returned to her father’s estate while her husband was out 
of town, taking her property, including jewelry and other valuables, with her. The husband entreated 
her to return but she refused. She claimed she told him that she did not want to be with him and 
that he could remarry. The husband petitioned for a judicial separation. In response, the wife 
claimed she had been treated cruelly at her husband’s and that she left her husband’s home with 
good excuse, to seek treatment for her heart condition at her father’s home. She also claimed she did 
not outright refuse to return to her husband’s home but instead stated she was willing to go if he 
promised to reform his behavior. She also denied that she had permitted the husband to remarry. 
Finally, she claimed the husband instituted the petition against her “to justify his conduct in having 
married Countess Reita in Europe.”1055 In the trial court, the husband won his suit for judicial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1052 Ibid., paras. 9-10.  
1053 Smt. Rohini Kumari vs. Narendra Singh, AIR 1970 All 102.  
1054 Ibid. The two-judge bench comprised Justices R. Prasad and A. Kirty.  
1055 Smt. Rohini Kumari vs. Narendra Singh, AIR 1970 All 102, para. 4. If the website indianrajputs.com is to be believed, the 
husband was Raja Narendra Singh, b. 1927, educated at Mayo College, Ajmer, Allahabad University, and Magdalene 
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separation. The wife appealed and lost her first appeal. The two lower courts agreed on certain facts 
that could not then be contested before the High Court: the wife was well-taken care of at her 
husband’s home, she left the husband’s home to end her marital ties with her husband, and she had 
no intention of going back to her husband.   
 The wife argued that although she may have originally deserted her husband without good 
cause, her desertion did not last for two years. Rather, once the husband made a second marriage, 
she now had good cause to live apart from him.1056 He retorted that to prove just cause for living 
apart, she had to show that it was his second marriage that caused her to leave him. If she left for 
another reason, she would be living apart without just cause.1057  The husband pointed to 
correspondence between the husband and wife when the husband was posted at the Hague. The 
correspondence lacked any reference from the wife to the cause of her refusal being his “friendship 
with that Dutch girl.”1058 The husband in the correspondence expressed his willingness to take back 
the wife. She requested that the husband provide for her separate residence and maintenance and to 
return her stridhan.1059 This led the High Court to conclude “…the friendship of the respondent with 
Countess Reita which ultimately resulted in marriage, did not really have any impact on the mind of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
College, Cambridge. He was a Foreign Service officer from 1948 until 1985, serving as the Aide-de-Camp to 
Mountbatten around Partition and as the Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, an Officer on Special Duty for 
Kashmir Affairs, a Joint Secretary dealing with Pakistan and the UN in External Affairs, and eventually, in the 1970s, 
ambassador to Spain, Brazil, Libya, and Switzerland. He also served as Chairman of the Board of Nestle from 1994 to 
2000. The second wife in question was Countess Rita von Oberndoff and bore one daughter with her. The two married 
in Dehra Dun in 1955 and divorced four years later. Narendra Singh is also the author of The Shadow of the Great Game: 
The Untold Story of India’s Partition (HarperCollins, 2005). See the entry for Sarila on the website Indianrajputs.com, last 
accessed March 25, 2015.   
1056 Smt. Rohini Kumari vs. Narendra Singh, AIR 1970 All 102, para. 14-19. The wife’s lawyer cited Lachman Utamchand v. 
Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40, as well as four other precedents.  
1057 Smt. Rohini Kumari vs. Narendra Singh, AIR 1970 All 102, para. 20, 22. The husband’s lawyer referred to the same 
Supreme Court case the wife had used, quoting Lachman Utamchand v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40. The husband’s lawyer 
referred to the same Supreme Court case the wife had used. He quoted from the SC judgment the rule that “…where, 
however, on the facts it is clear that the conduct of the deserted spouse has had no such effect on the mind of the 
deserting spouse there is no rule of law that desertion terminates by reason of the conduct of the deserted spouse.” In 
further support of this position, the husband’s lawyer also referred to several English cases and authorities. These were 
Earnshaw v. Earnshaw (1939-2 All ER 698); Herod v. Herod (1938-3 All ER 722); Parrock v. Parrock (1956-1 All ER 555); 
Rayden on Divorce, 8th ed., p. 188, and Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd ed., v. 12, p. 259.  
1058 Smt. Rohini Kumari vs. Narendra Singh, AIR 1970 All 102, para. 21.  
1059 Ibid.  
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the appellant [wife] so as to afford a cause for desertion.”1060 In making this finding, the Allahabad 
High Court disagreed with the position taken by the Andhra Pradesh and Mysore High Courts.1061 
Those Courts, the Allahabad High Court stated, incorrectly imported an interpretation of the 
meaning of desertion from other statutes (such as the 1946 HSRMA) that did not apply in the case 
of the Hindu Marriage Act. Under the HMA, the Allahabad High Court stated, desertion must 
include “a determination to put an end to marital relations and to put an end to cohabitation 
permanently,” - an “animus deserendi.”1062 The simple fact of the husband’s remarriage did not give the 
wife a reasonable cause to live apart from the husband if it was not what caused her to desert him in 
the first place.1063 In this case, since it was not his remarriage that caused the wife to leave him, she 
had had no reasonable cause for desertion; the husband, therefore, rightly earned a judicial 
separation.1064 The wife lost her appeal. The High Court granted the wife maintenance of Rs. 
150/month from the husband on his income of Rs. 2000/month (1600/month salary plus 
400/month allowance). It based this paltry amount on the fact that the cost of living was high, the 
husband had many taxes to pay on his income, and he needed to support his daughter with 
Countess Reita.1065 It is possible that, given that the husband was a highly placed Foreign Service 
Officer with important roles at the UN and the Ministry of External Affairs, the High Court shaped 
its analysis to find in favor of the highly placed husband.  
A 1964 ruling showed that bigamy could cut both ways.1066 A wife sought to prove that her 
second marriage was valid so that she could obtain maintenance at the rate of 15 Rupees/month 
from her second husband. She won in the first trial but her husband appealed and won on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1060 Ibid.  
1061 Thenku Verriah v. Tamisetti Nagiah (AIR 1959 Andh Pra 547); S. Pullaiah v. S. Rushingamma (AIR 1963 Andh Pra 323); 
K. Siddegowda v. Parvathamma (AIR 1965 Mys 299); discussed in Smt. Rohini Kumari vs. Narendra Singh, AIR 1970 All 102, 
paras. 15-17.  
1062 Smt. Rohini Kumari vs. Narendra Singh, AIR 1970 All 102, para. 28.  
1063 Ibid. 
1064 Ibid., para. 30.  
1065 Ibid., para. 31.  
1066 Ishwar Singh v. Smt. Hukam Kaur, AIR 1965 All 464. 
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finding that her first husband was alive, which therefore invalidated the second marriage. She then 
appealed to the High Court. While the wife’s claims might seem far-fetched at first she had some 
reason to think that her second marriage was valid. This is because her first husband, though still 
living, “… had allowed her to marry any person she liked because of his ill health.”1067 In this regard, 
she was not much different the husband in the previous case in arguing that she had permission to 
undertake a second marriage. However, her claim to have her first husband’s permission was based 
on her own testimony rather than the first husband’s direct testimony and the High Court 
disbelieved it. The High Court found that unless the divorce between first husband and wife had 
been conducted under the HMA, it was not a valid divorce. Therefore the second marriage was 
invalid and the wife was not entitled to maintenance. 
More common, however, were cases in which the husband disavowed his marriage to his 
wife, as in a case decided in 1968.1068 Naurang Singh and Sapla Devi married in 1963. The wife 
claimed that after about one year, the marriage deteriorated and the husband took a second wife, 
Kalpa Devi. About four months after the second marriage, Naurang Singh allegedly threw Sapla out 
of the house and she returned to her father’s home.1069 The husband denied the claim that he 
actually had married Sapla Devi. In contrast, he contended that he had married the purported wife’s 
cousin-sister, Kalpa Devi, fifteen years prior. He claimed it was to visit her cousin-sister that Sapla 
Devi came to his home and they started an “illicit connection” that resulted Sapla’s pregnancy.1070 In 
the Magistrate’s court, Sapla Devi won her maintenance claim, the judge finding that the two had 
validly married.1071 The husband appealed. The Sessions Judge’s view was that first Naurang Singh 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1067 Ibid., para. 3. 
1068 Naurang Singh Chuni Singh vs. Smt. Sapla Devi, AIR 1968 All 412.  
1069 Ibid., para. 2.  
1070 Ibid., paras. 3, 4.  
1071 Ibid., para. 4.  
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had married Kapla Devi and then he took on Sapla Devi as his second wife. Therefore, Sapla Devi 
was not entitled to maintenance since the marriage had not been valid in the first place.1072  
She then appealed to the High Court where a single justice1073 decided to refer the case to a 
Division Bench.1074 The Division Bench accepted the lower court’s finding that Sapla was indeed 
Naurang Singh’s second wife. The legal issue was framed as “[w]hether the marriage of a Hindu 
husband, solemnized with a second wife during the continuance of his marriage with his former wife 
is void on account of the provisions of sections 5(1) and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, and is 
such a wife by the subsequent marriage prevented from claiming maintenance from him in 
accordance with section 488, Code of Criminal Procedure?”1075 The first marriage with Kalpa took 
place in 1952 or 1953. The second marriage with Sapla took place a decade later. The High Court 
reiterated the purpose of s. 488: “to prevent vagrancy by compelling the husband or the father to 
support his wife or child unable to support itself. These provisions are not in the nature of penal 
provisions but are only intended for the enforcement of a duty, a default in which may lead to 
vagrancy. The real object is to provide food, clothing and shelter to deserted wife and children.”1076 
The Court reiterated the position that maintenance was due only to a “legally wedded wife.”1077 So 
the question that had to then be determined was whether the validity of the marriage. The High 
Court turned to three precedents to show that a second marriage taken out in the lifetime of the first 
wife was void. 1078 The wife lost her suit for maintenance.  
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1073 Justice Misra 
1074 Justice R. Chandra and Justice K. Puri.  
1075 Naurang Singh Chuni Singh vs. Smt. Sapla Devi, AIR 1968 All 412, para. 6.  
1076 Ibid., para. 7.  
1077 Ibid.  
1078 Ibid., para. 9. The three cases cited were Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1964 SC 1625); Ishwar Sinen 
v. Smt. Hukam Kaur (AIR 1965 All 464); Banshidhar Jha v. Chhabi Chatterjee (AIR 1967 Pat 277).  
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Community and Compromise 
 This section discusses matrimonial disputes in which local customs or community 
intervention played an important role. Community leaders seem to have been a frequent first stop 
for resolving matrimonial disputes. When such efforts failed, husbands and wives could turn to the 
courts. In 1972 a two-justice bench issued a ruling on cruelty under the HMA.1079 The husband and 
wife married at an unnamed date. In 1963, the wife filed a suit for maintenance, claiming that her 
husband had thrown her out of the house three years before, that he had treated her cruelly, and that 
he had committed adultery.1080 In response the husband pleaded that the two had divorced by 
mutual consent in a custom available in their community called “Chhuttam Chutta.” Both husband 
and wife had signed a decree declaring their divorce by mutual consent. At first the wife contended 
that her assent to this decree had been obtained by fraud. She later conceded that she signed the 
agreement but she contended that this customary divorce was invalid.1081 The key issue the courts 
had to decide was “Has the relation of husband and wife between the parties been dissolved?”1082  
 The trial court found that no dissolution had taken place because there was no legally 
binding divorce and it granted the wife’s maintenance claim along with arrears. The husband 
appealed; he did not owe his wife maintenance because they were legally divorced. In his appeal, he 
argued that he should be allowed to lead evidence about the custom’s validity in the appellate court. 
He had not been allowed to do so in the trial court because his application to do so was very late. 
The appellate court did not allow him to enter the evidence. The appellate court agreed with the 
lower court and dismissed the husband’s appeal: his claim that the dissolution was valid was 
rejected.1083 He then appealed to a single-justice bench of the High Court, arguing he should be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1079 Madho Prasad v. Smt. Shakuntala Devi, AIR 1972 All 119, bench of Justices H.D. Gupta and A.K. Kirty. 
1080 Ibid., para. 2. 
1081 Ibid.  
1082 Ibid. 
1083 Ibid., paras. 2-3. 
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allowed to lead evidence to prove the validity of the community’s custom of divorce by mutual 
consent. The single-judge1084 bench agreed with the husband because “it was necessary in the interest 
of justice and for pronouncing a satisfactory judgment to obtain a finding on the question whether 
in the community known as ‘Barai Chaurasiya’ to which the parties belonged…” the custom of 
Chuttam Chuttu divorce actually existed.1085 The High Court sent the case back to the lower court 
with an order to look into the custom that existed in the community.1086  
When the lower court re-opened the case, the husband entered evidence from five witnesses 
and the wife entered evidence from seven. The court found that the custom of divorce by mutual 
consent did exist within the community. This finding was sent to the High Court and the wife then 
objected. The single-justice bench decided that the issue was an important one because it “affect[ed] 
an important section of the Hindu community known as ‘Barai Chaurasiya’” and therefore a two-
justice bench should hear it.1087 The wife put forward two arguments. First, the single-justice bench’s 
decision to send the case back to the lower court to allow the parties to enter evidence had been 
improper. Second, the lower court had been wrong in finding the custom valid. The two-justice 
bench rejected both of these arguments, finding that it was an important question, and the first 
justice had been correct in ruling that the case should be re-opened to allow for the entering of 
evidence about the custom. The High Court also noted that the lower court’s ruling on the existence 
of the custom had been correct. The wife’s case that the custom did not exist was harmed by the 
fact that her witnesses had also testified to its existence. One of the wife’s witnesses, the Secretary of 
the Barai Chauraiaya Sahbha at Allahabad, had testified that custom had been in existence for a long 
time. Therefore the appeal was set aside and the wife lost her maintenance case.1088 Though the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1084 Justice K. Asthana.  
1085 Madho Prasad v. Smt. Shakuntala Devi, AIR 1972 All 119, para. 4.  
1086 Ibid. 
1087 Ibid., para. 5.  
1088 Madho Prasad v. Smt. Shakuntala Devi, AIR 1972 All 119, paras. 7-9. 
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courts ruled against the validity of second marriages by Hindu husbands or wives after the HMA, in 
this case the High Court accepted the validity of the customary divorce. Such customs were 
specifically saved by s. 29(2) of the HMA, though this provision was not mentioned in the judgment. 
 A 1964 decision from the Allahabad High Court examined the question of cruelty under the 
DMMA as well as the legal validity of informal arbitration of marriage disputes.1089 At first the wife 
had filed a suit for dissolution under DMMA on the ground of cruelty. The Munsif then appointed 
Himayat Ullah Kidwai to examine the wife.1090 However, when the day for the examination came, 
the husband, wife, and their lawyers approached the court and stated they agreed to have the divorce 
arbitrated by three leaders in Faizabad, the advocate Himayat Ullah Kidwai, Haji Mohammad Ismail, 
and Hakim Murtaza Hussain.1091 The spouses gave full freedom to the arbitrators to make any 
enquiries and to make any decision they liked and stated the decision of the arbitrators would be 
binding.1092 About three months later, the arbitrators declared the marriage dissolved.1093 Then, the 
husband filed several objections to the arbitration award in the Munsif’s court. His main claim was 
that arbitration in a matrimonial dispute was not covered under the Arbitration Act.1094 The Munsif 
rejected these claims, letting the arbitrators’ order stand. The husband appealed the Munsif’s 
decision to the Civil Judge in Faizabad, where it was also dismissed. The husband then appealed to 
the High Court.  
The High Court had to decide whether the Arbitration Act could be used in such cases, or 
whether the DMMA prevented its use. Justice Manchanda noted that the DMMA did not give any 
specific procedure for dealing with suits nor did the statute purport to replace other forms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1089 Faqir Mohammad vs. Amina, AIR 1964 All 246.  
1090 Ibid.  
1091 Ibid.  
1092 Ibid. 
1093 Ibid., para. 3.  
1094 Ibid., para. 4.  
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Muslim law, only to “consolidate and clarify it.”1095 The Justice noted, “The CPC [Civil Procedure 
Code], the Arbitration Act and other procedural laws would, therefore, clearly be attracted to suits 
under [the DMMA].”1096 The parties could certainly avail themselves of the Arbitration Act for a suit 
under the DMMA, the Justice ruled.1097 This position found further support because Muslim 
marriage was a civil contract and not a sacrament.1098 The husband also alleged that there was 
misconduct by the arbitrators. Since the two lower courts found this not to be the case, the High 
Court could not re-open the issue.1099 
The High Court ruling argued that even if the husband and wife could not enter arbitration 
under the DMMA, they agreed to a form of talak-i-tafwiz (delegated divorce) when they submitted 
their agreement to arbitration to the court. The husband had delegated to the arbitrators the power 
to divorce. The Justice quoted Baillie’s Digest of Mohammaden Law: “As a man may in person 
repudiate his wife, so he may commit the power of repudiating to herself or to a third party.” The 
Justice also pointed to Sayed Ameer Ali’s treatise and the Fatawa-i-Alamgiri to provide further 
support for this position.1100 The declaration to the court, the Justice noted, “leaves no manner of 
doubt that the husband had delegated his powers to the three persons mentioned in the document 
as objectly [sic--abjectly], unequivocally and categorically as it is humanly possible for anyone to 
do.”1101 This was a form of talak-i-tafwiz in which the wife did not exercise her own option of divorce 
but had rather delegated it to someone else. Whether the marriage had been dissolved by arbitration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1095 Ibid., para. 6.  
1096 Ibid.  
1097 Ibid., para. 7. He referred to an earlier RCR suit in which the parties also availed of the Arbitration Act. Rup Narain v. 
Mt. Nandrani, AIR 1934 Oudh 494, Division Bench; he also referred to Ramudamma v. Kasi Naidu, AIR 1945 Mad 269. 
He dismissed a Lahore decision that seemed to bar the use of arbitration in a matrimonial dispute because the justice’s 
comments in that case were deemed obiter dicta, Abdul Ghani v. Mt. Sardar Begum, AIR 1945 Lah 183.  
1098 Faqir Mohammad vs. Amina, AIR 1964 All 246, paras. 9-10. For authority, the justice cited Abdul Kadir v. Salima, ILR 8 
All 149, Full Bench.  
1099 Ibid., para. 11, 12. Another minor procedural objection was rejected as well. 
1100 Neil B.E. Baillie, Digest of Mohammaden Law, 2nd ed. (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1875),,238; the Justice also quoted 
Ali’s Mahommedan Law, 5th ed.,  495; Fatawa-i-Alamgiri, vol. 1, 543. quoted in Faqir Mohammad vs. Amina, AIR 1964 All 
246, para. 13, 15, 16.  
1101 Faqir Mohammad vs. Amina, AIR 1964 All 246, para. 17. 
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or talak-i-tafwiz, the High Court ruled that it was dissolved. Since the wife had undertaken a second 
marriage, the Justice also did not see fit to overturn the lower courts’ decisions and the husband lost 
his appeal.1102 
 This case showed that wives and husbands would often turn to community leaders to 
negotiate their marital disputes in what was a sometimes start-and-stop process. The couple initially 
turned to the courts, yet were somehow convinced to turn to community leaders for arbitration. 
They still sought some official recognition of their dissolution, which explains why they submitted 
their arbitration agreement to the court. The examples given here show how community forms of 
arbitration and marital dispute resolution overlapped with and even received sanction from the 
twentieth-century codes of the HMA and the DMMA. Sometimes formal law and informal law are 
depicted as discrete fields or in conflict with each other or women’s rights. The examples here 
suggest that the various forms of dispute resolution could work together and reinforce each other as 
well.  
 
UP Amendment  
 
This final section turns to unique features of matrimonial law in UP. The 1962 UP 
Amendment to the HMA showed that UP availed of its powers under India’s federalism. Though 
the UP Amendment was not widely used by litigants, yet its enactment shows that states saw fit to 
amend personal laws. The UP example is an important case of Indian federalism with respect to 
personal law in action. Under the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution, “marriage and 
divorce; infants and minors; adoption; wills, intestacy and succession; joint family and partition” are 
concurrent powers, that is, topics on which both the state and federal center can legislate.1103 In 
September 1962, UP availed of these powers to make two changes to the HMA as it operated in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1102 Ibid., para. 18.  
1103 Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, List III, item 5.  
      324 
state. First, the 1962 Amendment allowed divorce on the ground that the respondent “has 
persistently or repeatedly treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable 
apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to 
live with the other party.”1104 In other words, the Amendment added the ground of cruelty to 
divorce under the HMA in UP. The second modification changed the timeframe for divorce. 
Normally, once a petitioner received a decree of judicial separation, he or she had to wait for two 
years before petitioning for a divorce. The Amendment allowed a petitioner to apply for divorce 
immediately once a decree of judicial separation was passed if “the case is one of exceptional 
hardship to the petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the other party.”1105  
The 1962 Amendment highlighted some of the HMA’s limitations. Take the example of a 
wife seeking a divorce because of her husband’s cruel treatment. As we have seen, this situation was 
extremely rare. Wives usually alleged a variety of grounds rather than just cruelty. Nevertheless, in 
the hypothetical case where a wife wanted a divorce and her sole ground was cruelty, she would 
need to first petition for a judicial separation under s. 10. If she proved it, she could get it on the 
ground that her husband had “treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable 
apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to 
live with the other party.”1106 Then, the wife would need to wait two years before she could petition 
for a divorce.1107 In sum, she would need to go through two major legal proceedings separated by at 
least two years, in other words, legal limbo between the judicial separation and divorce. Neither she 
nor her husband could remarry during this period. The amendment to the Hindu Marriage Act 
adopted by UP allowed the wife to skip this lengthy process and move straight to divorce. It allowed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1104 The Hindu Marriage (Uttar Pradesh Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1962, UP Act No. XIII of 1962, s. 2.  
1105 Ibid. 
1106 HMA s. 10(1)(b).  
1107 HMA s. 13(1)(viii). 
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a wife (or husband) to move more quickly by skipping over the two-year interim period to divorce 
on the ground of her husband’s persistent or repeated cruelty.  
Domicile played an important role in the application of the Act. After all, the Amendment 
could allow anyone present in UP to avail of its provisions, or it ran the risk of opening the state up 
to a rush of unhappy spouses coming to use its easier divorce provisions. (In the event, the statute 
was lightly used.) The Act stated that it “applies to Hindus domiciled in the State of Uttar Pradesh 
and shall also apply if either of the parties to the marriage was at the time of the marriage a Hindu 
domiciled in the State of Uttar Pradesh.”1108 Domicile played an important role in determining the 
application of the Act. If either one of the two spouses had a domicile in the State of UP, he or she 
could avail of the Amendment. However, one wonders whether the courts would have followed the 
rule of the wife’s dependent domicile in determining her domicile—so, for example, if she had an 
UP domicile and her husband had a domicile in the Madhya Pradesh, would her domicile also be 
Madhya Pradesh?  I found no evidence that this conflict was never litigated on so it remains an open 
question.  
 
Impact of the Amendment 
The UP Amendment is relatively unknown. My survey of the its High Courts for the decade 
after its passage only found only one example of its use by litigants. There are few references to the 
Amendment in legal publications and treatises, though it is mentioned in one treatise published in 
Allahabad.1109 The Justice Minister who was responsible for sheparding the amendment through the 
UP legislature, Syed Ali Zaheer, does not mention the Amendment in his memoir.1110 However, it 
was not entirely unknown; there was litigation under it that was ultimately decided by the Supreme 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1108 The Hindu Marriage (Uttar Pradesh Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1962, UP Act No. XIII of 1962, s. 1(2).  
1109 Shiva Gopal, The Hindu Code, 2nd ed. (Allahabad: Central Law Agency, 1964), 352-3. 
1110 Zaheer, Memoirs, 40-69.  
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Court in 1967.1111 Moreover, there were several days worth of debate over the proposed 
Amendment in the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Council (Upper House of Parliament, Vidhan Sabha) in 
1962. Finally, the Amendment played an important role in national reforms to the Hindu Marriage 
Act fourteen years later in 1976.   
One clue to how the UP Amendment became a model for the national reforms is offered by 
examining the recommendations and membership of the report, Towards Equality: Report of the 
Committee on the Status of Women in India. The report recommended that the UP model be adopted at 
the national level, which was then adopted in a 1976 Amendment to the Hindu Code which allowed 
divorce on the ground that the “respondent has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, treated the 
petitioner with cruelty.”1112 While the UP Amendment was explicitly discussed as a model in the 
Towards Equality report, it was not discussed in the Law Commission Report that recommended the 
same change.1113 It seems probable that the conduits for this were two UP-based members of the 
Commission: Savitri Shyam, a supporter of the UP Amendment in the Vidhan Parishad, and Sakina 
Hasan, daughter of Syed Ali Zaheer.1114 
One major difference between the UP Amendment and the 1976 national Amendment 
highlights the limits of UP’s progressivism. The UP Amendment granted divorce on the ground of 
the responding spouse having “persistently or repeatedly treated the petitioner with such cruelty as 
to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1111 Avinash Prasad Srivastava vs. Smt. Chandra Mohini, AIR 1964 All 486 and Chandra Mohini Srivastava vs. Avinash Prasad 
Srivastava, 1967 AIR 581: 1967 SCR 864. 
1112 HMA, s. 13(1)(ia), as amended by the Marriage Laws Amendment Act of 1976 (Act 68 of 1976).  
1113 Law Commission of India, Fifty-Ninth Report on Hindu Marriage Act and Special Marriage Act, 1954 (Delhi: Law 
Commission of India, March 1974), http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/report59.pdf, last accessed April 21, 
2015, under the chairmanship of P.B. Gajendragadkar, paras. 2.11-2.17 
1114 For the recommendation regarding adapoting the UP amendment nationally, see 4.95 (p. 119) of Committee on the 
Status of Women in India, Towards Equality: Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in India (New Delhi: Department 
of Social Welfare, Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, Government of India, 1974). The 1976 Amendment 
(Marriage Laws Amendment Act of 1976, Act 68 of 1976) adopted other changes that made it easier for spouses to 
divorce:  it allowed divorce for a single instance of adulterous sexual intercourse after marriage (changed from “living in 
adultery”); desertion for a period of at least one year (instead of the previous two); granted the wife the ability to divorce 
in case she won a maintenance suit under the Code of Criminal Procedure and had not resumed cohabitation for at least 
one year; and granted divorce by mutual consent. 
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for the petitioner to live with the other party.”1115 The 1976 Amendment defined cruelty as 
“treat[ing] the petitioner with cruelty.”1116 The cruelty need not have been persistent or repeated as it 
was under the UP Amendment.  
 
Reasons Behind the Act  
 Given the relative obscurity of the Amendment, it is difficult to state with certainty the 
reasons behind its development.  Based on my survey of High Court decisions, there was no 
smoking gun case that showed a clear need for the reforms to divorce law in UP. Rather, it seems 
there were a variety of factors that contributed to the development of the Act. First, in the Vidhan 
Parishad debates, Law Minister Syed Ali Zaheer stated, “Various letters/petitions [khatuut] have 
come to us that if it [cruelty] is persistent then there should be an amendment in this. We accepted 
this.”1117 This suggests that some form of public pressure influenced the Government, though 
Zaheer gave no further details about who sent such petitions or in what quantity. Nor was I able to 
find any archival records of the genesis of the Amendment in the UP State Archives or the National 
Archives of India that might have explained whether a particular organization lobbied for such 
changes. 
Another influence seems to have been the experience of individual lawyers and judges in 
dealing with matrimonial disputes. Here, Legislative Council member Savitri Shyam, who held an 
LLB, suggested that Zaheer’s own experience with matrimonial cases in the courts might have 
influenced his push for the Amendment. She congratulated the government, “especially Ali Zaheer 
Sahab who had a long association with the bar, from which experience he benefited...How many 
full-of-sadness stories must have come in front of him, how many women must have put their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1115 The Hindu Marriage (Uttar Pradesh Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1962, UP Act No. XIII of 1962, s. 2(a)(i-a).  
1116 HMA, s. 13(1)(ia), as amended by the Marriage Laws Amendment Act of 1976 (Act 68 of 1976). 
1117 Uttar Pradesh Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Council) Debates, speech of Syed Ali Zaheer, 10 September 1962, 325-36.  
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sorrowful cries in front of him, how many of their cases he must have plead in court.”1118 Savitri 
Shyam herself would go on to serve as a member of the Committee on the Status of Women in 
India, whose 1974 report recommended that reforms similar to UP’s be adopted at the national 
level. Syed Ali Zaheer’s mother, Begam Wazir Hasan (Sakinatul Fatima) founded the Lucknow 
Women’s Association.1119  His wife, Begam Ali Zaheer (Aliya Khatoon) was from Bhopal and served 
as the chairman of UP’s State Social Welfare Board from 1955 to 1967.1120 Syed Ali Zaheer’s legal 
practice and the influence of his mother and wife may have also influenced his decision to develop 
and advocate for this Amendment.1121  
A further context for the Amendment might be found in national-level discussions and 
reforms on other aspects of marriage law and women’s rights. In 1959, the Parliament passed the 
Miscellaneous Personal Laws Extension Act, which extended Indian personal laws to former 
princely states.1122 Syed Ali Zaheer was certainly aware of the cruelty ground under the Dissolution 
of Muslim Marriages Act, which allowed a Muslim wife dissolution on the ground of cruelty even if 	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1120 Ibid., biographical sketch of Begam Ali Zaheer (Aliya Khatoon), 219. 
1121 Not much is known about Syed Ali Zaheer beyond what is found is his memoir. See the Appendix for further details 
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to cause resentment.” This quote is from L.N. Sarin, Chandra Bhanu Gupta: A Profile in Courage (Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 
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he was Justice Minister when Govind Ballabh Pant served as Chief Minister in 1953 and 1954. See Paul R. Brass, An 
Indian Political Life: Charan Singh and Congress Politics, 1937 to 1961 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2011), 408-9. William 
Gould presents a discussion of corruption accusations against Zaheer. Gould states that some of the corruption 
allegations in 1964-5 against Zaheer were quite minor and seem to have been a product of his membership in a faction 
that rivaled dominant faction of then-Chief Minister Sucheta Kripalani. Gould, Bureaucracy, Community and Influence in 
India: Society and the State, 1930s-1960s. (London: Routledge, 2011). Syed Ali Zaheer’s brother, Sajjad, was far more 
famous. Sajjad was a member of the Communist Party and a founder and important figure in the Progressive Writer’s 
Association. He was also its chief chronicler, with his history of the movement titled Roshnai, or “the light.” See Sajjad 
Zaheer, The Light: A History of the Movement for Progressive Literature in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, trans. by Amina Azfar, 
with an introduction by Ahmad Ali Khan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
1122 Miscellaneous Personal Laws Extension Act, Act 48 of 1959. The Act excluded the extension of these various Acts 
from Jammu and Kashmir and Manipur.  
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it was not physical. He may have had this in mind with his proposed Amendment. In 1961, the 
Prohibition of Dowry Act was passed at the all-India level.  Moreover, the Indian Law Commission 
published three Reports in 1960 and 1961 about Christian marriage and divorce law.1123 Just one 
month before the Vidhan Parishad debates discussed above, the Law Commission published a 
Report on the Law of Foreign Marriages.1124 Meanwhile, across the border in Pakistan, the Muslim 
Family Law Ordinances were enacted in 1961. The Ordinance expanded wives’ rights, making 
previously irrevocable talaq [divorce] revocable, providing for the formation of Arbitration Councils 
to try to reconcile the couple in case of divorce, and allowing judicial dissolution of marriage on the 
basis of irretrievable breakdown.1125 India also sent representatives to the 1962 Tokyo Conference on 
the Status of Women. None of these events directly explains the direct impetus for the Act, but they 
do show that there was a great deal of attention to regularizing and reforming personal laws in India 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  
 
Debates on the Act in the UP Vidhan Parishad 
The Definition and Defense of Cruelty 
 The UP Legislative Council debated the Amendment in September 1962 and approved on 
September 10, 1962, with no changes or amendments. The Legislative Council debates acted as a 
forum for the airing of opinions or grievances rather than a forum for introducing substantive 
changes. The debates in UP's legislature took on a pro forma quality as Pitambar Das, the leader of the 
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Jan Sangh, and his allies engaged in lengthy discourses against the Amendment on grounds of the 
protection of the sacred nature of Hindu marriage.1126 Their comments recapitulated the themes of 
the 1955 HMA debates, reiterating a culturalist defense of preventing changes to the HMA. 
 As the many cases analyzed in this dissertation have shown, High Court justices often found 
it difficult to define cruelty precisely. This lack of clarity was one major criticism of the Amendment 
in the Vidhan Sabha. Justice Minister Zaheer’s response to this criticism highlighted the interplay of 
India's common-law tradition, state-made statutes, and local circumstances in the state adjudication 
of violence within marriage. The 1955 HMA defined the standard of cruelty needed to obtain a 
judicial separation as needing to “cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that 
it will be harmful or injurious to live with the other party.” The 1962 UP Amendment added that if 
such behavior was repeated and persistent, the petitioner could obtain a divorce, and if the behavior 
exhibited “exceptional depravity,” the petitioner could obtain divorce directly without the two-year 
period of judicial separation. In response, to such criticisms, Zaheer went on to point out “you 
know that these words [defining cruelty] have been taken from English law,” pointing to the 
common law tradition’s influence upon India as well as the common knowledge of that tradition.1127 
Zaheer pointed out that the new definitions still allowed for considerable latitude on the part of the 
adjudicating judge to consider individual contexts: “The special condition of husband-wife, in that 
some things are understood to be a cruelty, while in relation to a different condition of husband-
wife, its definition changes. The court will have to decide this in each case whether it is cruelty or 
not.”1128 Zaheer argued that the definition of cruelty might change depending on the context and the 
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personalities of the husband and wife. It left latitude for the judge to hear and consider individual 
circumstances.  
As one of the Act’s major critics, Pitambar Das pursued this line of criticism. He stated, 
“People have different-different ideas about cruelty. One friend was saying that if a husband would 
swear at his wife then that too would come within cruelty…. One time a woman told me I will have 
this one remorse in life that my husband did not beat me even once. Sometimes to beat is also 
understood as an indication of love.”1129 One way to read Das’s comments is as a defense of north 
Indian patriarchal prerogative. Yet Das’s words are also similar to the title of Reva Siegel’s article on 
domestic violence, “‘The Rule of Love?’ Wife-Beating as Prerogative and Privacy.”1130 Siegel’s 
analysis of debates over what kinds of violence should trigger the 1993 American Violence Against 
Women Act’s federal civil rights remedies shows Das’s link between love and violence was by no 
means unique to his time and place.1131 Siegel analyzed Senator Orrin Hatch’s objections to the civil 
rights provisions of the VAWA. For example, Hatch stated, “‘If a man rapes a woman while telling 
her he loves her, that’s a far cry from saying he hates her. A lust factor does not spring from 
animus.’”1132 In other words, a rape “motivated by love” should not attract the federal civil rights 
provisions of VAWA. Siegel argues that in the late twentieth century, “As in the nineteenth-century 
interspousal immunity cases, assertions about love and intimacy in a relationship rhetorically efface 
the violence of sexualized assault…Where love is, law need not be. Intimacy occurs in a domain 
having no bearing on matters of citizenship.”1133  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1129 Ibid., 325-6.  
1130 Siegel takes this phrase from James Schouler’s 1870 treatise, A Treatise on the Law of Domestic Relations (Boston: Little 
Brown & Company, 1870). She uses it as an index of the rise of the ideal of companionate marriage but the overall 
argument of her article suggests that the rise of affective tie of love between husband and wife as an ideal did not 
supersede the acceptance of violence within marriage. Siegel, “‘The Rule of Love?,’” 2143.  
1131  Siegel, “The Rule of Love?,” 2196.  
1132 Here Siegel takes Senator Hatch’s words from Ruth Shalit, “Caught in the Act,” New Republic, July 12, 1993, 12 and 
14. Siegel, “The Rule of Love?,” 2205.  
1133 Ibid,. 2205-6.  
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Siegel argues that a law intended to eliminate status-based regimes (in this case 
discriminatory laws about sexual assault) were soon co-opted by “traditional discourses of marital 
status in new idiomatic form.”1134 Pitambar Das’s anecdote bears similarities to Siegel’s example of 
Senator Hatch. Zaheer’s Amendment also sought to eliminate the husbandly prerogative of physical 
cruelty by giving wives in UP access to speedy divorce. Pitambar Das sought, like Hatch, to mount a 
culturally conservative defense of a husband’s prerogative in the language of affect, to frame 
“traditional discourses of martial status in new idiomatic form,” 1135to clothe a wolf in sheep’s 
clothing.   
The arguments against the Amendment also reiterated the argument that making divorce 
easier in the case of cruelty would lead to the breakdown of Indian family life. In these debates, 
restraint was counterposed to happiness, and the ideal of restraint included the suffering of martial 
wrongs. For example, Hraday Narayan Singh stated,  
To obtain happiness is a very elusive ideal…. Mankind should pass his life in restraint, 
behind marriage is this thought…. The idea of western civilization, that type [of 
independence] is not our principle. We pass our married lives through self-restraint…Now 
the question is, imagine if a wife and husband don’t live together in harmony, so a talak [in 
this context, general term for divorce] should take place, and another marriage took place, 
but if there also they don’t live harmoniously, and then another divorce took place, in this 
way divorce and marriage would keep on happening. From this family life will become 
broken, shattered (chittra-bhinn).1136  
 
Siegel’s history of American domestic violence law shows that the idea of forbearance as a necessary 
aspect of marriage was not unique to India. As the martial ideal shifted from patriarchal authority to 
companionate marriage during the nineteenth century, Siegel argues “…it was not the husband’s 
authority that defined the nature of marriage so much as the wife’s altruism. Altruism included 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1134 Ibid., 2206.  
1135 Ibid.  
1136 Uttar Pradesh Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Council) Debates, speech of Hraday Narayan Singh, September 10, 1962, 
304-5.  
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forgiveness of the husband’s transgressions, service to others, ‘magnanimity,’ and privacy.”1137 
Hraday Narayn Singh’s arguments also enjoined wives to suffer marital wrongs and unhappiness as a 
sacrifice to protect Indian family life. 
In response to a proposed amendment that would have allowed divorce only if the spouses 
lived apart for three years, Syed Ali Zaheer differentiated Hindu and Muslim law, reiterating that 
Hindu law, even with the Amendment, still made it harder to get a divorce than Muslim law. Zaheer 
stated,  
Your thought is if those people would only live apart for three years, then divorce can be 
given [i.e. divorce due to marital breakdown], this is not a correct thing. In Muslim homes, 
this is there that if husband and wife are agreed upon divorce then the Maulvi was called and 
a divorce is given. But this is not in this provision. In this divorce can be given [only] upon 
some reason. It cannot happen just because they both agree. If this [i.e. the proposed change 
to the Amendment] would be given then it could also happen that husband and wife live 
apart for three years and take another marriage, then live apart for three years apart and 
marry again so from this the condition would not be good. Only upon both agreeing is not 
correct either, but rather in that there should be some reason without which talak could not 
be given. I think that the sections that are there, to make any kind of change/amendment is 
not correct. The things which have been given in the bill are good, to make changes in that is 
not good. I think it is not good to make these things so easy. To agree and get a divorce is 
not correct.1138  
 
In other words, divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown or no-fault divorce was going too 
far. Zaheer was a reformer but he did not wish to make divorce too easy without at least providing 
some basis of legal wrong.  
 
UP’s Unique Position  
 An additional criticism was that Uttar Pradesh had no need to change the HMA since other 
provinces had not done so. Zaheer’s responses highlighted some possible reasons for the UP 
Government's thinking about the Amendment. He asked his fellow legislators to consider that such 
a provision allowing judicial separation on the ground of cruelty was already present in the all-India 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1137 Siegel, “’The Rule of Love?,’” 2145-7, 2155, 2169.  
1138 Uttar Pradesh Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Council) Debates, speech of Syed Ali Zaheer, 10 September 1962, 313-14.  
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HMA, so, “What are we changing...? This change was from the beginning in the law [i.e. the HMA].” 
His point was that a new ground was not being added; the ground of cruelty already existed to 
obtain judicial separation and now divorce was being added as an additional relief for cruelty. The 
Amendment simply extended the ground of cruelty, already allowed for separation, to include 
immediate divorce as well. Zaheer went on to state, “Various letters/petitions [khatuut] have come to 
us that if it [cruelty] is persistent then should be an amendment in this. We accepted this.” 1139 This 
suggests that some form of public pressure influenced the Government in conceptualizing the Bill, 
but Zaheer provided no further details about who sent such petitions or in which quantity, nor was I 
able to find any archival records of such letters.  
 Legislators also raised the question of the records of the UP courts on matrimonial disputes, 
suggesting that judicial trends and decisions might influence the Government's actions on a 
particular legal matter. One opponent (Virendra Shah) complained that Zaheer had not provided the 
number of such cases before the judiciary that this Amendment would help remedy, and therefore 
the case for the Amendment was not compelling.1140  
 
Women, Men, and Representation 
 The debates show how two women legislators, and some male legislators as well, were 
forced into defending their own right to speak in the debates. The two female advocates for the Act 
were Savitri Shyam and Sheoraj Vati Nehru.1141 They took on the responsibility of speaking for 
women in cruel marriages and more broadly for women in society, and directly contested the Hindu 	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1140 Uttar Pradesh Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Council) Debates, speech of Virendra Shah, Septmber 10, 1962, 320. 
1141 Neither Sheoraj Vati Nehru nor Savitri Shyam is discussed in Visalakshi Menon’s Indian Women and Nationalism: The 
UP Story (New Delhi: Shakti Books, 2003) or the other books on UP politics and history that I have surveyed. Savitri 
Shyam (1918-89, born in Muzaffarnagar) held an MA and LLB. She held numerous positions in UP related to 
community development, social welfare, and prohibition. She was a member for the UP Legislative Council from 1955-
67 and served in the Lok Sabha representing Anonla from 1967 to 1977.  With Shyam Sunder, she wrote a book called 
The Political Life of Govind Ballabh Pant (Lucknow: Shailanil, 1960). C.K. Jain, Profiles of Women Parliamentarians (Surjeet 
Publications, 1993), 842-3. 
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revivalist position of members like Pitambar Das. In the process some frank truths about “our 
country’s married life”1142 were put forth into the public sphere. According to Sheoraj Vati Nehru, 
who stood to speak against sending the Amendment to a Select Committee, married life for women 
was not happy, but rather filled with trouble (ranj), sadness, sorrow (aaha), and tears.1143 According to 
Sheoraj Vati Nehru, “For women, it [marriage] is only sacrifice, service, fulfilling the duty and the 
ties of religion, virtue, and chastity's burden.”1144 The proposed amendment provided an opportunity 
for Sheoraj Vati Nehru and Savitri Shyam to expound upon the limits and problems of marriages in 
Indian society. 
 Here, the Chairman apparently intervened to state that another woman legislator, Savitri 
Shyam, also wanted to speak, but Sheoraj Vati Nehru's interpretation of this interruption was to 
state, “You are being troubled [i.e. by the opposition], that is why you are not letting me speak.”1145 
She went on to state, “I do not want to give my right to anyone.”1146 It seems that the Chairman, 
sub-consciously or consciously, allotted to women legislators as a whole only a limited amount of 
time to speak and he felt a responsibility to divide that time between Shyam and Nehru. Nehru, 
however, in the interests of her own passionate beliefs or political interests, did not want to engage 
in this zero-sum game. She continued outlining the troubles of married women and the abuses and 
atrocities they faced, including increased dowry demands and lack of interest from husbands who 
have returned to them from abroad.  
 Supporting my suggestion that female legislators were viewed as a unified bloc, Savitri 
Shyam was the next speaker after Nehru. Her speech began with a request that “this respected body 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1142 Uttar Pradesh Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Council) Debates, speech of Sheoraj Vati Nehru, September 7, 1962. 
1143 Ibid. Sheorajvati Nehru (1897-1981) was born in Lucknow and educated in Aligarh. She married Dr. Kishan Lal 
Nehru in 1915 and was imprisoned for nationalist activities from 1939 to 1942. She was a member of the first Lok Sabha 
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1144 Uttar Pradesh Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Council) Debates, speech of Sheoraj Vati Nehru, September 7, 1962. 
1145 Ibid. 
1146 Ibid. 
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not...make fun of this bill, it is beneficial for both women and men and in relation to this, if a story 
full of pain about a woman is told, then laughter is not necessary in this. It does not raise your honor 
and it does not raise the honor of women.”1147 Savitri Shyam's and Shivarajwati Nehru's speeches 
were seen by their less sympathetic colleagues as undifferentiated and shrill women’s talk, there were 
important differences. Savitri Shyam made the point that women had played important roles in the 
earlier independence struggle and in electing the Congress. In one of the rare instances in the entire 
debate when the Constitution was explicitly invoked, Shyam noted, “our Constitution gave women 
equal rights, but I believe that right is only up to giving votes...Women have equal rights, but where 
do women work as equals of men in offices and public offices [kacheri]? They do have the right but 
in practice there is no right. They say that women are princesses and queens, but they are not 
allowed actually to do anything.”1148 In other ways, Savitri Shyam echoed some of Sheoraj Vati 
Nehru’s comments, for example, in pointing out the problems that wives of husbands who have 
returned from foreign countries faced, the general sadness of married life for women, the hypocrisy 
of “male society,” and increasing and increasingly vehement dowry demands.1149  
 While Savitri Shyam and Sheoraj Vati Nehru advocated for women’s rights, there were some 
tensions in their speeches. Nehru began to discuss increasing dowry demands and the redress that 
the Amendment would provide to women subject to them when the Chairman interrupted her and 
suggested she consider that husbands might take a wife's dowry, begin beating her in order to 
expedite a divorce, and then remarry and begin the process all over again with a second wife. In 
response, she noted that such wives would at least have the right of maintenance, but went on to 
state, “Whoever gives her right to property to a man, I really believe that woman is a fool 
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1148 Ibid. 
1149 Ibid. 
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(bevkuf).”1150 Her comments evinced her belief that women of all classes and circumstances were able 
to maintain control over the disposition of their property. 
In a similar vein, Savitri Shyam noted that “education is in shortage among women,” and 
then went on to point out some class differences in the treatment of women from her point of 
view.1151 She stated,  
I myself have seen that a money-earning man who drives a rickshaw that brought the liquor 
bottle with him, when he reached home he threw 2-4 annas in front of his wife, and then 
became absorbed in intoxication, and he did not bring anything home to fill the stomach and 
he began to beat the wife. Leave aside genteel (sabhya) matters of genteel people, those who 
are educated respect women, and those who are of lower class because of economic means 
and because they have not been educated, today their women are not good...It has become 
the duty of us women that we should give women this kind of education that it is also our 
fundamental right to spend our lives with freedom and respect.1152  
 
In these excerpts, both women claimed to speak on behalf of all Hindu women—even all Hindu and 
Muslim women on occasion—but they also felt that class and educational differences resulted in 
irrational and uncivilized behavior toward and by women among the lower classes.  
Although their speeches were interrupted by male legislators, they also engaged in 
unparliamentary behavior. In other words, they tried to give as good as they got. The transcripts of 
the debates record one such interesting incident. Shri Jaganatth Acharya stood to speak, and almost 
before he could begin, “a woman” (as recorded in the transcript) sarcastically interjected, “Now goes 
the contractor (thekadar) of religion.”1153 The use of the term “a woman” reflects both the difficulties 
and vagaries of accurately transcribing Parliamentary debates, but also the sense that women 
legislators were an undifferentiated bloc within the Council. There were male legislators who spoke 
in support of the Amendment for similar reasons as Sheoraj Vati Nehru and Savitri Shyam. A 
Socialist legislator’s speech was interrupted by a woman who pointed out that his party did not have 
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any female representatives.1154 The debates on the Amendment showed a culturalist defense of 
indissoluble marriage, and its ideals including forbearance, restraint, and the toleration of violence. 
On the other hand, the female legislators described marriage as difficult and sad for women and 
advocated for the Amendment so that wives could get divorces more easily.  
  
The UP Amendment in the Courts 
 My extensive research did not, however, much evidence of the Amendment’s use in the 
appellate courts. One series of cases that showed the Amendment was known and used by at least 
one set of lawyers and litigants. The case involved a husband who sought divorce or, failing that, 
judicial separation from his wife under the HMA. The husband won a divorce before the Allahabad 
High Court but his wife won when she appealed to the Supreme Court. The UP Amendment was 
used in a way probably not intended by the Amendment’s drafters since the husband, rather than the 
wife, employed it in an attempt to expedite his divorce.  
The couple married in May 1955 in Gorakhpur and had a son two years later. The husband 
claimed that the wife refused co-habitation with him without reasonable excuse and that she lived in 
adultery with another man. The wife denied these allegations and claimed that the husband and his 
parents treated her with cruelty. The husband claimed separation on three separate grounds: 
adultery, cruelty, and desertion. Before the High Court, he proved the wife’s adultery and desertion 
but not her cruelty. 
The husband had several forms of evidence for the wife’s adultery, including letters between 
her and her alleged adulterer in 1955 and his father’s and his own testimony that he caught the two 
in flagrante delicto in his home in 1958.  However, the Civil Judge in whose court the case was first 
tried, rejected the husband’s and his father’s testimony about catching the two because “8 P.M in the 	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month of May and June was not at all the opportune time for carrying on such a nefarious activity in 
a house inhabited by the parents and other relatives” of the husband. 1155 The Civil Judge also 
pointed out other problems with the testimony: it was unlikely that the two would have pursued 
their adulterous affair at a time when they knew the husband was expected home from the office or 
that the two would have taken up to ten minutes to open the bedroom door.1156 The High Court 
agreed with the Civil Judge’s assessment on the demerits of the husband’s testimony. However, it 
disagreed with the Civil Judge about the value of the letters between the wife and her alleged 
adulterer, the wife’s cousin. The High Court found in the letters convincing proof of the affair: “The 
flowery language of these letters, the emotional out-bursts and the half revealed and half concealed 
sentiments expressed therein clearly indicate that it was not a sort of platonic love, which existed 
between the respondent and the co-respondent, but it was the usual intimacy of sex.”1157  
Even without the direct evidence of catching the two lovers in the act, the High Court 
thought that the letters showed “they had reasonable opportunities of having sexual 
intercourse…when both of them lived at Gorakhpur.”1158 The High Court opinion noted, ‘The 
learned Civil Judge, who had the advantage of seeing, hearing, and watching the demeanour of the 
witnesses also came to the definite conclusion that there was some illicit intimacy between the 
respondent and the co-respondent…”1159 It pointed out that to get a divorce the plaintiff had to 
prove that the respondent was living in adultery while to get a judicial separation the plaintiff merely 
had to prove that adulterous sexual intercourse took place even once. Thus, the husband could claim 
judicial separation. The High Court also rejected the lower court’s ruling that the husband had 
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somehow condoned the affair by not reporting it immediately when it was alleged to have happened 
in 1955. He did not find the letters until 1959 and instituted the suit the next year.1160  
The husband did not prove any physical cruelty by the wife against him, though her 
“voluntarily depriving the appellant [husband] of her society and co-habitation for a long period” 
was “mental and moral cruelty” to him.1161 Both he and his father each testified that the wife had 
deserted him. Moreover, a Railways employee had also testified that “he had himself seen the 
respondent fleeing away from her husband’s house, and two other Railways employees had testified 
that “he had himself seen the respondent fleeing away from her husband’s house, that it was with 
great difficulty that he took her home, but she refused to live with her husband.”1162 A second 
witness who was also employed by the Railways testified that in 1958 the wife “had gone to the 
office of the appellant [husband] and threatened to commit suicide by laying herself on the railway 
track.”1163  This evidence was further confirmed by a letter written by the husband’s father to the 
wife’s father in 1959 that stated that she had left him. There were also letters from the husband to 
the wife that showed that she was living apart from him. Her living apart from the husband was 
deemed to have been without reasonable cause.1164 Yet the evidence provided by the various 
witnesses suggests a far more tortured conflict between the couple, one in which the wife was even 
willing to threaten suicide in public. The High Court seems to have given short shrift to any reasons 
the wife had for deserting for her husband. 
The Justice used the 1962 UP Amendment to grant the divorce. He noted that, while he 
normally would have preferred to grant a judicial separation to maintain the possibility of 
reconciliation, the degraded state of relations seemed to have foreclosed that possibility. The 
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husband, he noted, “is already about 31 years of age, while the respondent has attained the age of 27; 
they have thus already passed the ages of matrimony, judged from normal Indian standards.”1165 The 
Justice thought he had good legal ground to skip directly to divorce because the 1962 Amendment 
allowed divorce in “the case…of exceptional hardship…” to the petitioning spouse and “exceptional 
depravity” by the responding spouse.1166  
The wife appealed to the Supreme Court and, three years later, her appeal was upheld.1167 
The bench consisted of two justices, G.K. Mitter and K.N. Wanchoo, the author of the opinion. 
The Court reviewed the husband’s claim for divorce: he had experienced exceptional hardship 
within the meaning of the UP Amendment to s. 13. If he could not get divorce, he claimed cruelty 
sufficient to allow a judicial separation under s. 10.1168 The Court reviewed the history of the case: 
the trial court found no evidence of any kind of adultery or cruelty on the part of the wife.  
The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court’s finding that the wife committed 
adultery. It pointed out that the trial court found that the alleged intimacy at the husband’s home 
between the wife and her cousin had not taken place. The key evidence for adultery was the cousin’s 
(alleged adulterer’s) letter to the wife. The Supreme Court noted that “the mere fact that some male 
relation writes such letters to a married woman, does not necessarily prove the there was any illicit 
relationship between the writer of the letters” and the wife.1169 It also pointed out that there was 
evidence within the letters that the wife did not reciprocate her purported adulterer’s feelings; for 
example, in one of the letters, he wrote, “‘You love me as you others and this is why my share is 
very small.’”1170 The Supreme Court summarized its position: “When we have the clear denial of the 
appellant to the effect that she never had any sexual intercourse with Chandra Prakash, we have no 	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hesitation in accepting that denial, for there is nothing in these letters which would even suggest that 
the denial was false.”1171 
The Court also noted that even if the letters proved adultery of some kind, the High Court 
wrongly applied the UP Amendment. It noted there were two separate requirements needed to 
trigger the Amendment. First, an order of judicial separation needed to be passed and, then, either a 
period of two years needed to elapse or the petitioner needed to prove “exceptional hardship” to 
him or herself or to prove “exceptional depravity” by the other spouse to obtain an expedited 
divorce.1172 The High Court had wrongly skipped the judicial separation stage and moved straight to 
divorce. As the Supreme Court put it, “We cannot accept the contention that it is open to a court 
under the amended provision to grant a decree of divorce on the ground of exceptional hardship to 
the petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the other party, even without a decree of 
judicial separation having been first made.”1173 If that was the case, was the Supreme Court willing to 
pass an order of judicial separation? It did not think the husband had proved the wife’s adultery 
sufficiently. The letters did not prove adultery. Even if they did, the Supreme Court found the 
husband condoned the adultery because although it was alleged to have taken place in 1955 or 1956, 
he continued to live with her and even fathered a child with her in 1957. He tried to escape from 
this implication by stating he held suspicions, but no proof, about the affair in 1955 and 1956. It was 
only when he discovered the letters latter that these were confirmed. Since they continued have 
sexual relations until 1958, the Supreme Court interpreted this as condonation because he continued 
to have a sexual relationship with her in spite of his discovery of her letters.1174 Therefore the wife’s 
appeal was allowed, the High Court’s decree was set aside, and the trial court’s initial decree 
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dismissing the husband’s petition was upheld. The wife was exonerated and the marriage remained 
intact. 
Avinash Prasad Srivastava’s pursuits show that lawyers and litigants knew about the UP 
Amendment. However, the only reported appellate court case using the Amendment was pursued by 
the husband in an attempt to expedite his divorce. It was not used by wives to escape from a 
difficult and cruel marriage. The Amendment was an experiment designed to help UP wives obtain 
divorce, and more quickly, on the ground of cruelty. It shows that individual states, especially UP, 
sought to use their concurrent powers under the Constitution to modify national laws as they saw 
fit. Apparently lightly used by litigants, modifications to the cruelty provision found their most 
helpful expression in national changes to the HMA in 1976, if the reported appellate court cases are 
any indication.  
The UP Amendment to the HMA was not the only specific expression of a UP position on 
personal law. The UP state government banned second marriages for Hindu husbands in state 
employ even before the HMA was enacted, as shown by Ram Prasad Seth’s 1957 constitutional 
challenge to the rule.1175  
A third UP-specific approach involved the state’s approach to maintenance law, as illustrated 
by a case decided in 1960 by the Allahabad High Court.1176 In this case a Brahmin man married a 
Thakur widow around twenty years earlier. In 1954, he kicked her out of his home and refused to 
support her. She duly applied for maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The village 
panchayat (council), however, gathered in April 1954 and mediated the dispute, making a written 
agreement with the husband that he would pay his wife Rs. 30/month as maintenance. Like many 
husbands before him, he refused to pay, causing the wife to turn to the formal court system and file 
a maintenance claim in the Small Causes Court (SCC) in Rampur. The husband then claimed that he 	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originally “engaged [her]…as a maid servant but subsequently turned her out when he discovered 
that she was stealing his things.”1177 He explained away his earlier signing of the maintenance 
agreement before the village panchayat by claiming that the Sub-Inspector of the village police station 
in Tanda coerced him. The Small Causes Court judge did not believe the husband’s coercion claim. 
Nevertheless, he dismissed the wife’s maintenance suit because he found the marriage was never 
properly validated. It had been an inter-caste marriage made when no custom existed to sanction 
such a marriage, and it had not been solemnized with proof of the rite of saptapadi. The wife then 
appealed to the High Court. The husband contended the wife’s suit in the SCC had never been 
maintainable. However, the High Court found that within UP the Provincial Small Causes Court Act 
had been amended in 1954 to allow a wife to sue for arrears of maintenance in a Small Causes Court, 
even if she could not institute a suit for maintenance in the SCC. This is an additional example of 
UP’s use of its concurrent powers to amend national legislation to improve wife’s rights within the 
state. The Amendment to the Small Causes Court (SCC) Act was likely aimed at making it easier for 
wives to get cheap and easy justice in the case of their husbands’ refusal to pay maintenance. The 
problem for the wife was she never obtained an official maintenance order, just a written agreement 
mediated by the panchayat. Her husband challenged the validity of her suit for arrears in the SCC on 
this ground. He also argued that his agreement with her had been an invalid contract because it 
lacked consideration or, in other words, any “benefit conferred” as an “inducement to a contract,” 
typically one of the requirements for a valid contract.1178 However, the High Court found that the 
wife had given him a consideration for the agreement negotiated by the panchayat: she agreed to 
stop her proceedings for maintenance against him in the District Magistrate’s court.  
Next, the wife needed to disprove the Small Causes Court judge’s decision that her marriage 
was invalid due to its intercaste nature. She correctly argued that the judge’s decision had ignored the 	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HMA along with an earlier similar act, the 1949 Hindu Marriages Validity Act. The decision noted 
that each of these statutes had retrospective effect, a point that the SCC judge had ignored. 
Moreover, even before this recent legislation. an intercaste (anuloma) marriage of a lower caste 
woman to a higher caste man had the sanction of the smritis. The Judge disagreed with the view of a 
Madras High Court opinion1179 that though the smritis might have endorsed such an anuloma 
marriage, later commentators did not. Justice Dhavan noted, “the opinion of a commentator, 
though of great value in elucidation of the Code, cannot be permitted to override the law [i.e. the 
smriti allowance of intercaste marriage] itself.”1180 It is interesting that Justice Dhavan engaged in this 
somewhat extensive discussion of the position of Hindu law when none of it really mattered given 
the statutes’ retrospective endorsement of inter-caste marriages. It shows that though the tradition 
of analyzing Hindu religious texts in the common law courts was no longer strictly necessary, it still 
held some symbolic weight. Perhaps Justice Dhavan engaged in this reasoning in order to provide 
greater weight and influence to the newer statutes, hoping to change minds through religious 
reasoning as well as through the force of law. He also noted that proof of saptapadi was not a 
requirement to prove a valid marriage; the only evidence required was a witness to the marriage. In 
this case, the wife herself had testified that the marriage had taken place as had the priest who 
performed it. So too had other witnesses.1181 Justice Dhavan ruled in favor of the wife and decreed 
her suit for maintenance. He noted, “…the defendant has behaved throughout in a manner which 
would justify this Court in calling him a cad.”1182 Justice Dhavan reiterated the courts’ specific 
disapproval of the ways in which a woman’s character could be harmed by her husband: “He [the 
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husband] put up a defence, which if successful, would have had the effect of branding the plaintiff 
as a woman of loose character.”1183  
This example shows an alternative route wives could use to pursue maintenance, by 
obtaining a local agreement by the panchayat and then, if the husband refused to follow the 
agreement, by pursuing maintenance arrears in the Small Causes Court. Perhaps UP amended its 
Small Causes Court Act in 1954 to allow wives who were not being maintained to pursue cheap and 
ready justice against their husbands in the Small Causes Courts. The case also showed that along 
with some of the strategies we have already outlined, husbands could attempt to dodge their 
maintenance burdens by calling into question their marriages’ very validity. In this case, the husband 
did so on caste grounds. Along with rejecting such an argument on the basis of new statutes that 
retroactively allowed intercaste marriages, Justice Dhavan also engaged in analysis of Hindu religious 
texts in order to rule that such intercaste marriages were valid.   	  
Conclusion 
 Post-colonial matrimonial litigation continued on much the same lines as before the HMA. 
Wives most often won their suits; social offenses continued to be the easiest for wives to prove and 
win; and accusations of marital physical and sexual cruelty were plagued by the problem of proof. 
Yet, the courts also took an increasingly medical and psychological view of cruelty. The broader 
definition of cruelty allowed the courts to go beyond considerations of physical harm and consider 
the psychological impact of the husband’s behavior against his wife. The courts also carefully 
examined intimate details of husbands and wives’ sexual lives, with an emphasis on the wife’s 
medical capacities for sexual intercourse and childbearing. While in each case the wife won her relief, 
the process of doing so resulted in the exposure of intimate details of the wife’s body and sexuality 	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in the public forum of the court. Courts’ definitions of cruelty as psychological, on the one hand, 
provided a broader scope for considering the grounds on which a wife could attain redress. On the 
other hand, it again shaded the courts attention away from husbands’ physical violence against 
wives.  
Husbands from a variety of religious communities attempted to use the state’s guarantee of 
religious personal law to make an argument for their treatment of their wives, even when this 
involved physical cruelty and legal harassment. The definition of cruelty, as the courts interpreted 
and applied it, drew on the twentieth century statutes as an additional layer on top of the legal-
historical definitions of cruelty developed over long decades of litigation in the UP High Courts. 
These definitions drew on diverse sources, such as previous Indian courts’ decisions on cruelty, 
English appellate court rulings, and English statutes, the latter often derived from common law 
precedent. Cases involving Hindu litigants also defined cruelty with reference to the Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriages Act [DMMA] and an important case on this Act drew upon precedents involving 
Hindu litigants. 
The Hindu Code and family law in general in UP sit at the conjunction of several important 
features of the new Constitutional regime in India. The UP Amendment of 1962, for example, raised 
the issue of the concurrent powers of states and the federal center to legislate on personal law. More 
important, perhaps, were the factors that judges took into consideration – whether a particular bar 
for cruelty, however defined, was met; whether and how marriages were considered to be valid; and 
ultimately how much scope wives (and husbands) should have for dissolving the bonds of what was 
then – and now – considered to be one of the fundamental institutions of Indian life. As this chapter 
has tried to show, litigants chose to utilize whatever aspects of the new legislation they could to 
advance their suits and to bolster their individual narratives.  
 






 This dissertation has examined how marital status influenced women’s rights in twentieth-
century India. In several different arenas, Indian law attempted to preserve the marital bond and tie 
wives to their husbands. This was the case both before and after Independence. I examined two 
separate arenas of Indian law to show how coverture affected many different aspects of womens’ 
marital status, both those directly under the rubric of family law as well as under so-called secular 
arenas of law.  
Chapter One examined the evolution of Indian citizenship law. It showed the signal role 
played by the legal idea of domicile: that each person had a particular location. Domicile was written 
into the Indian Constitution to help determine citizenship in the fluid circumstances of India’s 
independence. Determining citizenship was complex due to the Partition, which was accompanied 
by mass migration and the substantial numbers of Indians who resided outside of India. Domicile 
was a well-known feature of private international law which made it a compelling legal device to help 
structure India’s new citizenship law. With this well-known concept came its attendant body of 
structuring principles, namely the wife’s dependence on her husband. Even as India’s new 
Constitution enacted individual fundamental rights for Indians of all social locations, no matter 
gender, caste, or creed, the law of citizenship written into it incorporated the coverture-based notion 
of dependent domicile.  
 Dependent domicile structured many aspects of citizenship law until 1955, when two 
important developments provided a fillip to married women’s independent citizenship. The 1955 
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Supreme Court decision in Kumar Amar Singh created a small hole in the coverture-based 
interpretation of domicile, allowing wives independent volition but only when it came to migration 
from India to Pakistan. Thus, the edifice of coverture began to crumble in the narrow category of 
cases of wives with ties to Pakistan. The 1955 Indian Citizenship Act allowed married women’s 
independent citizenship but it continued to limit citizenship-by-descent to the paternal line for 
diasporic Indians. At the discursive level, wives’ ties to their husbands continued to influence 
bureaucratic understandings of citizenship. Throughout, the state and national executives played a 
very important role in citizenship policy. It was these bureaucracies that decided, on a day-to-day 
basis, who met the burdens of citizenship, such as loyalty and assimilation. Though all routes to 
citizenship had the same endpoint—national belonging—the variances impinged on the ease and 
difficulty of depriving someone of citizenship.   
 Chapter Two’s study of restitution of conjugal rights (RCR) shows that physical control of 
the wife was at the heart of the marriage tie. It examined three important RCR cases, Ardaseer 
Cursetjee (1856), Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem (1867), and Rukhmabai (1884-8). This concept of marriage in 
the particular form of RCR was brought into Hindu and Muslim personal law from English 
ecclesiastical law over the course of the nineteenth century. It shows how Indian common law 
deemed wives dependent on their husbands for their legal identities. In the first part of the century, 
wives most often used conjugal rights suits to attempt to compel their husbands to maintain them 
and treat them as properly married wives. With the 1856 decision in Ardaseer Cursetjee, the Privy 
Council deemed that such suits could not be brought within the Ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the 
Indian courts. However, it did not ban the use of such suits by Indian litigants entirely. Therefore, 
they began to be brought under the civil jurisdiction of the courts.  
The structure of the conjugal rights suits remained the same whether they were brought by 
Hindu or Muslim litigants; however, in the second half of the nineteenth century they were brought 
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within the ambit of religious personal law. The suits showed the braided influences of the Indian 
legal context: an Ecclesiastical remedy, removed by the Privy Council from ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
in India, adopted by Muslim and Hindu litigants within the ambits of their civil religious personal 
law. One shared feature of this remedy was the extent to which it simultaneously granted wives relief 
by allowing them to compel certain behaviors on the parts of their husbands and granted husbands 
scope for the use of physical violence against their wives.  
 Through its study of the incorporation of RCR into Indian law, Chapter Two makes several 
important points. First, the remedy of RCR had its origins in English Ecclesiastical law and was 
acknowledged as such even as it was imported into Hindu and Muslim law. Second, its structure was 
similar to the family structure found in domiciles: a husband-headed family, located together in a 
single home, with the wife legally dependent on the husband, and the husband having some 
extensive, though not unlimited, rights over the wife. Third, litigants of all religious communities 
used conjugal rights suits and it appears to have been one of the foremost methods to attempt to 
attain marital redress in the British Indian courts.  
Chapter Two shows that restitution of conjugal rights opened the door to two modes of 
analysis that simultaneously sought to assert the difference of Hindu and Muslim law from English 
law and draw aspects of English law into Indian family laws. Judges drew bright lines among the 
various religions but found similarities in how each religious law treated women, thereby showing 
the scope for RCR in Hindu and Muslim personal law as well as in Christian law. Similarly, courts 
also drew analogies among the bodies of law that allowed the operation of RCR in all bodies of law. 
An open secret was the way in which RCR would allow a wife to be exposed to her husband’s 
physical and sexual violence. The cases showed that courts acknowledged that in ordering a wife to 
return to her husband they were exposing her to this risk as well as some physical violence and the 
husband’s control over her property.  
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 Chapter Three shows how the nineteenth century remedy of RCR structured twentieth 
century matrimonial litigation in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. Its end point is the 1939 
case of Ram Bharosey, an important case that showed that the law of RCR was the same for husbands 
of all religious communities. Ram Bharosey built upon Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem, the 1891 Mackenzie 
case, the 1906 Husaini Begam decision, and the 1927 Mt. Maqboolan decision. The chapter shows how 
RCR suits, no matter the location or religion of the litigants, often followed very similar patterns 
dictated in part by the legal form itself. So, too, did judgments share certain similarities. Judges drew 
composite pictures of husbands’ behavior and viewed them with distrust. This allowed them to rule 
in favor of wives on the ground of husbands’ legal cruelty. However, the definition of legal cruelty 
was broad and often focused on damage to the wife’s reputation as much as to her physical or 
psychological well-being.    
 Husbands relied on arguments about both religious and geographic jurisdiction. They were 
keenly aware of jurisdictional differences, whether it was between Scottish and English law in 
Mackenzie or Princely and British India in Husaini Begam. In Husaini Begam, the fear that wives would 
be mal-treated in a princely state caused the court to break the usually strict rule associating the 
location of the matrimonial home with the husband. But this was not a possibility in the later cases 
of Maqboolan or Ram Bharosey. In Ram Bharosey, the husband argued that the line of law developed 
from Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem to Maqboolan should not apply to him as a Hindu husband. But he lost 
this argument. By the late 1930s, everyone was well aware that RCR was a British importation, yet it 
had firmly established itself in Indian law. It never took on the guise of a Hindu or Muslim remedy 
but rather fit well into Indian law. As the remedy became ever more entrenched in Indian law with 
each new case, the courts took on larger scope for discretion about the husband’s behavior.  
Chapter Four turns from restitution of conjugal rights to examine the history of maintenance 
law in Uttar Pradesh (UP). Like RCR, maintenance was aimed at preserving the marital tie since it, 
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under compelling circumstances, allowed wives living separately to be maintained by their husbands. 
Maintenance was an imperial legal form. Multiple arenas of law conditioned by India’s status as a 
British colony shaped Indian maintenance. These included criminal, civil, matrimonial, and 
Ecclesiastical law. Colonial governance sought to limit vagrancy and it drew upon the longer history 
and shape of English poor law that had similar aims.  Maintenance was shaped around a pattern that 
preserved the marriage tie and was administered through local institutions, tying the wife to her 
husband legally and physically. Though it was easy to portray maintenance as a humanitarian 
endeavor designed to protect destitute women, viewing it through this lens shows that a wife’s 
liberty was often pitted against her sustenance. I site maintenance at the intersection of these 
overlapping ideas of social control: the colonial desire to settle mobile populations and ensure 
stability and security, and the domestic English idea of tying paupers to a particular parish to ensure 
that the local community bore the burden of poor relief. As my discussion of twentieth century 
maintenance law shows, this idea was reproduced across the Empire, oftentimes at considerable 
effort, because the perceived deterrent and morally salutary effect of tying wives to their husbands 
was a priority for the imperial government in London.  
My study of the operation of maintenance law in Uttar Pradesh between 1939 and 1955 
shows that to obtain maintenance from their husbands, wives had to show a good reason for living 
apart from them, such as unreasonable cruelty or adultery. All wives could use criminal procedure to 
obtain maintenance readily in relatively small amounts. If larger sums were desired due to the 
husband’s wealth, they had to turn to the general civil law. Wives almost always won their 
maintenance suits. While one could interpret this as a victory for the humanitarian mission of the 
courts, I argue that their success was driven by the need of British Indian law, influenced 
significantly by English poor and Ecclesiastical laws, to reduce welfare expenses and to prevent 
prostitution by preserving the marriage tie. 
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 Chapter Five examined the application of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act in Uttar 
Pradesh. This groundbreaking 1939 statute provided a complete and lasting code of divorce for 
Muslim marriages in reaction to the fear that wives, facing difficulty in obtaining unilateral divorces, 
would leave the Muslim fold to gain the advantage of a divorce by apostasy. The DMMA delineated 
nine grounds for divorce, one of which was cruelty. Cruelty was further sub-divided into six specific 
categories of behavior. The Act provided a model of the statutory codification of grounds for 
martial redress. Within Uttar Pradesh, my survey found eight appeals to the High Courts under the 
new DMMA. Wives won in six of these, showing that the DMMA could be a powerful tool to attain 
marital redress on the ground of cruelty. In three of the six, wives won due to the physical violence 
and marital cruelty they experienced. In three, wives won due to the charge of laan, or false 
accusations of adultery by the husband.  
This chapter also suggests that laan, the practice of a husband retracting a false accusation of 
adultery against his wife, took off as a remedy in the twentieth century with the 1919 Zafar Hussain 
case. It continued to remain in use after the DMMA with three cases decided by the UP High 
Courts. The three wives in each case won their suits even though the husband retracted his false 
accusation of adultery. Even under the DMMA, judges continued to take a dim view of husband’s 
use of the courts to cast aspersions on their wives’ faithfulness and chastity. Chapter Five concludes 
with a study of the number of applications for marriage dissolution across the state in 1948-9. 
Almost all applications for dissolution originated with wives rather than with husbands and most 
were filed on the basis of the husband’s “cruelty, misbehavior, or neglect.” Wives seemed to have 
most often won their suits on such charges and as the High Court cases show, even if they lost at 
the lower court level, they were likely to win on appeal to the High Court. Though there were limits 
on the husband’s behavior and wives almost always won, the courts acknowledged that husbands 
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did have rights of violence over their wives. Earlier findings under RCR could also influence the 
outcome of suits under the DMMA.  
 Chapter Six examines the fate of UP matrimonial litigation in the period after 1955, when 
the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA) and other statutes reforming Hindu law were adopted at the 
national level. Wives used the Hindu Code less frequently than might have been expected, often 
continuing to rely on the maintenance provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and RCR suits. 
There continued to be a great deal of traffic between the various arenas of law as, for example, when 
the High Courts addressed the legality of taking a second wife using sources from both Hindu and 
Muslim law. The courts continued to take a dim view of social offenses - especially bigamy - as well 
as false accusations of adultery or other immorality in the courts. In the 1960s, when the courts 
allowed the husband’s retractions of false accusations of adultery, this signaled a shifting trend 
toward husbands. While wives still often won their suits, they seemed to lose with greater frequency 
at the High Court level than in the 1939-55 era.  
 An additional important change to the jurisprudence of cruelty was the increasingly medical 
view that the courts took of the matter. This had two prongs: first, the courts delved into medical 
details of couples’ sexual lives. Marital rape and sexual assault were viewed through a medical lens as, 
for example, when the courts granted the wife separation due to her husband’s forcing sexual 
intercourse on her while pregnant. Also, courts used the so-called two-finger test not just in the 
more well-known example of testing rape survivor’s chastity but also to determine the chastity of a 
married woman. The second prong of this medicalization involved the courts’ practice of delving 
into the details of the couples’ sexual life. Chapter Six also shows how local community institutions 
and informal arbitration played an important role in regulating matrimonial disputes. Such 
institutions were not opposed to formal law; rather the formal, court-based law and the local 
institutions worked as overlapping entities.   
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My translations and analyses of the 1962 debates on the UP Amendment to the Hindu Code 
show the distance between Delhi and Lucknow and between legislative debates and legal practice. 
Perhaps compared to the monumental DMMA or the parent statute itself, the Hindu Marriage Act, 
the UP Amendment was not so significant in legal practice at the High Court level. Yet it 
represented an example of an Indian state amending a national marriage law on terms that did not 
map onto any particular UP-specific custom or practice. Rather, the UP Amendment made 
separation and divorce somewhat easier than it had been under national law. This state-based unit of 
analysis is an important one. It highlights that while regional and religious-communal considerations 
did play an important role in Indian family law, they were not the only motivating factors.  
In summary, I argue that this dissertation makes several important contributions. First, it 
shows how marriage occupied an important position in many arenas of Indian law, not just marriage 
laws that applied to a particular religious community.  
Second, priorities beyond religion structured both the colonial and post-colonial Indian 
state’s approaches to marriage in Indian law. These included social control and colonial governance, 
the weight of tradition and institutions, legal infrastructures such as the availability of treatises, and 
the law itself - both statute and precedent. The point here is not to quantify somehow the English 
and Indian impact on Indian law, patriarchy, or society, which would reinforce the competitive view 
of women’s rights.  
Third, even within the formal court systems, and even within that sub-set of the High Courts 
in UP, litigation on marriage was very complex. Despite the absence of one over-arching Uniform 
Civil Code of family law for all Indians, the interlaced system of criminal, civil, and communally 
marked laws approached something like a complete system for governing marriage. In some ways, it 
was lawyers, litigants, and judges who created this system through the development of precedents 
and definitions that supported particular interpretations of the law. Together, for better or worse, 
      356 
the various domains of law examined here laid out where a husband and wife should live, how they 
should treat each other, and their economic relations. Religiously marked personal law was an 
important but not the sole part of this system. 
Fourth, it is important to consider law from the point of view of both statute and precedent. 
For that matter, associated institutions such as publishers, educational institutions, and bar 
associations are significant as well. This dissertation has sought to balance accounts of the 
development of important marriage statutes with its own account of the development of case law. In 
translating and analyzing the UP legislative debates in the final chapter, I suggest that when scholars 
do consider statutes, it is worthwhile to consider how different states debated amendments to those 
statutes for their particular states.  
Fifth, this dissertation contributes to the literature on the Constitution, rights, and 
discrimination and equality in India. It shows that the pace of legal change is slow and that, even 
within one very narrow slice of the law, a variety of compulsions structure how the law is applied to 
the husbands and wives who turn to it. These central features, such as definitions of key terms, 
precedents, long-standing statutory frameworks, persuasive authorities like treatises, and many other 
factors influenced how the courts applied new statutes. I have resisted the temptation to comment 
on contemporary Indian legal and political matters related to marriage and family, such as the Shah 
Bano affair, honour killings and other forms of illegal, extra-legal, and legal coercive violence directed 
at controlling gender and sexuality. These events are well-known and without extensive and sensitive 
discussions of their context, it is easy to interpret them in ways that reinforce rather than challenge 
colonial assumptions about the community control of women and Indian illiberality.  
Sixth, and finally, I have used a case law-focused method for selecting my sources. This 
method involved analyzing High Court decisions. Rather than being guided by the treatise literature 
on family law, I chose to focus on all matrimonial disputes in a particular period (1939-72) and 
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jurisdiction (Uttar Pradesh). This choice allowed me to see all the different kinds of family disputes 
in the UP courts, rather than the much more narrow set of cases that would have been selected if I 
had followed the cases highlighted by the treatise literature. Also, generally treatises cover the law of 
all of India and focus on the most important cases. Completing a survey like this one, of course, 
cannot come close to replicating the mindsets of litigants and lawyers as they approached the High 
Courts. However, it has sought to represent some important aspects of the world of the practicing 
lawyer in a legal capital in the twentieth century. By adopting something closer to the perspectives of 
lawyers and litigants themselves, even at the relatively far remove from everyday life of the High 
Courts, I have shown that a variety of categories beyond religion are required for analyzing the legal 
history of the family in India. I have specifically sought to disprove the value of the competitive 
framework for analyzing women’s rights.   
These general insights build toward the overall argument of the dissertation about the law of 
the family. An English model of marriage structured many aspects of Indian marriage law, especially 
those that set the conditions of entering and leaving and residence. This model allowed the husband 
some modicum of physical control over the wife. Indian marriage law emphasized the preservation 
of the marriage tie. It sought to tie husbands and wives to a limited number of locales, reflecting 
both colonial governance and the long shadow of English poor law. I argue that this represents a 
coverture-based model of marriage and that the law of status, especially that of marriage, structured 
many arenas of Indian law. I have sought to show that to the extent that restraint and control are a 
central part of marriage and marriage law, at least in modern India, these features have genealogies 
directly traceable to its English common law system.   
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